to the permanent interests of the South African Dutch, who have everything to lose and nothing to gain from the ascendancy of the Transvaal Boers. A century ago our grandfathers were bearing the brunt of a deadly struggle with Napoleon and his colossal power. Three centuries ago we had just closed a mortal conflict with the whole power of Spain, at the zenith of its greatness, under Philip II. To-day we have only President Kruger and a limited force of peasant farmers to deal with; and that we are so engaged in a way which jeopardises our empire is entirely our own fault. The struggle will not rank as one of the great enterprises which have made our empire. It is the Nemesis of Mid-Lothian oratory and of a popular statesman's portentous blunders. But such as it is, we owe it to the generations which have gone before us and to those which will succeed us to carry it to a successful end, and worthily maintain the empire which centuries of our ancestors have built up, and which it is our task not merely to enjoy but to defend and uphold. Printed by William Blackwood and Sons. WHAT is to be done with South Africa? How is that great territory to be governed when peace has been established by the sword? That is the question of the day, and not Home Rule, or Old Age Pensions, or another. It will be said that it is too soon to enter upon such a discussion at the present time, when our armies are held in check and victory seems so far off. It will be condemned as arrogant and presumptuous, and not in accord with that spirit of self-humiliation which is inculcated as necessary to national salvation. To us, however, it seems none too soon to begin the consideration of a problem which needs long and careful thought, nor is it in any spirit of undue confidence or assumption of success that it is put for VOL. CLXVII.-NO. MXIII. ward. There is a condition subject to which all human designs and plans are conceived and laid. No wise man defers on that account to prepare himself for circumstances that may arise, and which he is striving to bring about. No one but the conventionally pious deems it necessary to be for ever proclaiming the limitation. Moreover, apart from the difficulty of the problem, there are many strong reasons against delay in this matter. It is one thing to conquer a country and destroy its Government. It is another thing to devise and establish a new system of administration to replace it. And unless the scheme has been thought out and prepared beforehand, there must necessarily occur an interregnum of confusion and uncertainty, even if Y positive anarchy does not follow. With the final defeat of the Boer armies will fall not merely the power of Mr Kruger and Mr Steyn and their councillors, but also the whole fabric of the present constitution, with the police and courts of the Republics. There must be some recognised authority to take the reins. At first, no doubt, that will be the chief military officer in command of her Majesty's troops and his subordinates in the various parts of the conquered territories. This, however, is only a temporary makeshift, and must be replaced as soon as may be by a well-organised system of civil administration. The sooner that system is in working order the better for the peace and prosperity of the country. The interests of vast industrial undertakings, in which the capital not only of our own but of other nations is embarked, depend upon the finding of the right solution. Then again it is of great importance that no room for doubt as to our intentions, and as to the nature of the government which is to follow the assertion of British supremacy, should be left in the minds of the Boers, of the white inhabitants of our own colonies, or of the various native tribes and races. The first question that has been put to the commander of an invading force more than once in our history is, "Are you going to remain? Many of us would welcome the Queen's Government and the Pax Britannica. But have you come to stay?" More than once in Asia and in Africa the answer has been, "Yes. So long as the sun rises in the heavens, the British flag shall fly in the Transvaal. So long as the earth endures, the British Government will never leave Kandahar." Such promises, sincerely made no doubt, have in the past induced many to come to our side and help our cause. How have they been fulfilled? How have those fared who, trusting to them, have become our friends and given us help? What was the lot of those British subjects who, believing that England would keep the Transvaal, or, when that failed, that she would control it, made their homes there? What was the fate of such Afghan notables as showed themselves friendly to the the English in 1878? There are undoubtedly some at least of our own kindred who have been compelled to take up arms against us, and who would gladly lay them down if they were sure of our intentions. There are probably many in the Orange Free State, even of Boer blood, who have no personal quarrel with England, and no rooted dislike to live under her rule, who might lay down their arms if they knew that the power of England would protect them. our armies advance into the enemies' country and the hopelessness of their cause becomes apparent, this class will become more numerous. If they have reason to think that the republican government will be maintained in any form, they will fight on, preferring the chance As of a British bullet to the certainty of the persecution that will await them at the hands of their own people when peace has been made. as will in either case leave things much as they were, it is idle to expect the colonial Dutch to give active help to England, or even to refrain from aiding the cause of the enemy. They must be made to understand that the result of this war—a result irrevocable and inexorable as fate will be to wipe off these pestilent oligarchies from the face of Africa and to establish a British Government, under which the Queen's warrant shall run in every nook and corner of the land. Then, as to our own colonists. The considerations set forth above are applicable even with greater force to the Dutch in Natal and the Cape Colony. If they believe that the result of the war will be the maintenance of the Republics under conditions much the same before, they will feel that they can always rely on finding a safe refuge, even if the British Government or the Cape Ministry, with whom it will technically rest, thinks fit to prosecute them for rebellion. With an Afrikander Ministry in power and the constitution of the Cape Colony as it is now, their chances of escaping prosecution or finding refuge from its effects would amount to certainty. Their obvious and safe game is to continue to fight in the ranks of the enemy. If the Boers win, they are sure of their reward in being allowed to appropriate the farms and the stock of the British or loyal Dutch settlers. If the British win and traitors are threatened with punishment, they will have a city of refuge in the Transvaal or the Orange Free State. They know well, moreover, that a British Government which would use the victory won by the blood of its people to reinstate the Republics, would hardly have the face to move for the punishment of its own disloyal subjects. If they are allowed to hope that the war Mr Chamberlain, gives his If a consideration of the influences bearing on the conduct of the disloyal renders a speedy settlement of the matter advisable, from the view of the loyal colonists even stronger arguments can be adduced. The British in the Cape Colony and Natal have thrown themselves with all their heart into the conflict on the side of the mother country. They have exhibited a loyalty and patriotic devotion beyond praise. Their lives and their property have been given to England without reserve. They ask what is to be the state of things after they have helped us to conquer the Boers, and they have a right to a straight and unequivocal answer from the British Government and nation. It is well worth while to quote the following passage from Mr F. S. Tatham's letter to the Governor of Natal, written on the 11th September last. Mr Tatham is a member of the Legislative Assembly; and Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, in sending the letter to to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State is explained by Sir opinion that the views expressed by Mr Tatham shared by a large body of his Walter Hely-Hutchinson in his fellow-colonists in Natal. are "Spurred on," he writes, "by the strong declarations publicly made by Mr Chamberlain and other members of her Majesty's Government, and by their strong sentiment of loyalty to the Crown, the people of Natal have unhesitatingly ranged themselves on the side of the Imperial Government; and by resolutions at public meetings and in Parliament, passed in the firm belief that her Majesty's Government intended to carry through a final settlement of the question, Natal is so deeply committed that she will be at the mercy of the Transvaal oligarchy if that Government be allowed to continue. The loyalty of the people of Natal, intense as it is, might be tried beyond breaking-point if we should be abandoned to the tender mercies of the Transvaal; and though the events of 1881 rudely shocked the British sentiment of the people of this colony, they would be as nothing weighed against such an abandonment now of England's supremacy. The franchise matter is dead. The issue now is British supremacy or Boer supremacy; and upon a definite settlement of that issue hang the lives and fortunes of those who have stood by Great Britain in this controversy. Natalians live in daily dread of news that a settlement is contemplated which will fall short of a complete safeguard of Natal's interests and the interests of those who have taken so strong a stand by the side of the mother country in this matter. Such a dread may be quite unjustifiable; but that it exists cannot be truthfully denied." If these were the sentiments of the Natal English before the war, what has taken place since the strife began has strengthened and accentuated them. They have now burnt their ships, and depend on English firmness for the future of their colony. The position of Natal with regard letter to Mr Chamberlain of the 15th September on the state of public feeling and the situation in his province. "I need scarcely remind you," he writes, "that in her relations with the Transvaal Natal is in a very vulnerable position.' He goes on to explain that of the Natal loan of £9,000,000 seven-ninths have been invested in a railway which derives the bulk of its revenue from the overberg trade. She has also spent more than £1,000,000 on harbour works to accommodate the railway traffic. way competes with the CapeFree - State system and the Delagoa Bay system. All three lines centre in the Netherlands Railway, over parts of which all the overberg traffic must pass. The Natal Rail The Transvaal Government and the Netherlands Railway, different names for the same thing, can fatally injure the commerce of Natal, and by starving the Natal Railway make it difficult for the colony to pay the interest on her debt. For the interest is derived from the railway revenue. can doubt what the Transvaal oligarchy will do if it is left in power. Of Boer malice and ill-will to every South African colonial who has fought for England there is abundant evidence. No one There is another, and in respect of numbers а very important, portion of the population in South Africa, on whom uncertainty regarding the future policy of Great |