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British Government, which had brought about such a state of things, tend to soften this hostility. Every man in South Africa would feel that England was not the sort of comrade to choose for a bear hunt. The union of interests might take place, but it would be a union antagonistic to the sovereign country. As to the character of the Government which would be formed by an electorate composed of Uitlanders and Boers, it is not possible to speak with certainty. If it was given a broad popular basis, without a pretty high qualification in property and education, it is open to doubt whether it would be conspicuous for honesty and enlightenment, or would be in any appreciable degree superior to that which it had replaced.
would be devised. Grievances would spring up against the controlling power when they discovered that they could not do exactly as they wished in matters of taxation, of the maintenance of armed forces, and of the treatment of native races. The necessity as a matter of justice to the British nation and the loyal colonists of imposing on the Republics some portion of the cost of the war would afford an immediate ground of common complaint. The mining interest would have to bear the chief burden of the indemnity, for the simple reason that none other could support more than a very small proportion of the charge. Although the new taxation might be much lighter, and at the same time more remunerative, to the State than the taxes imposed by Kruger, in process of time the appropriation for the payment of English debt of a large sum from the Transvaal revenue would become intolerable, and a union against England would be the result. The payment of this money, and also in all probability of a considerable sum towards the maintenance of a large military force in South Africa, would have to be made a condition, failing which the independence of the State would not be guaranteed by Great Britain. It would soon become a burning question, and agitation in which both parties would unite would follow. a few years the reformed Republics would be as hostile to British supremacy as Kruger and Steyn's oligarchies. Nor would the weakness of the
It will be suggested, perhaps, that many of these objections may be removed by separating the mining districts from the Transvaal, and throwing them into Natal. There would perhaps be no insuperable difficulty in carrying this out, although the configuration of the country does not favour it. The Republic would then be almost purely Dutch, and if left to itself it would still remain as a home for Afrikander intrigue and disloyalty-less powerful for evil, indeed, because less wealthy. But the poverty imposed upon it would bring troubles of its own. The Republic could not pay for an efficient administration, and it would soon be in as great financial straits as was the Transvaal prior to the annexation of 1881. There
would, moreover, difficulty in providing for the present Transvaal debt, which could only be overcome by England making herself responsible for it.
be serious dence. What is demanded by the British nation and their brethren and fellow-subjects in South Africa and all over the world is a permanent settlement of the contest between Boer and Briton for supremacy. It is necessary to assert that this is no new question. It was not born of the grievances of the Uitlanders, or created by the Jameson Raid, which has been made responsible for so many things, from the hatred of everything English by the Dutch and the the armament of the Republics to the ineptitude of our own Ministers.
Lastly, there is this very great objection to the plan that is being discussed, that it would be altogether repugnant to the feelings of our loyal fellow-subjects in Natal and the Cape. To see their enemies reinstated and placed in a position, however modified, which would enable them again to become a trouble to the commonwealth of South Africa; to know that their blood and money had been squandered to enable Great Britain to make this weak compromise, would be a cruel blow to our friends and allies. We shall be told that their feelings have nothing to do with it; that they have no right to nourish hatred and envy and all the rest; that it is a mere sentimental objection, and the like. That is altogether to mistake the position. They have fought for British supremacy and for a final settlement of the rivalry between Dutch and British, without which life in South Africa to the British subject is a burden. If they have helped us to gain the victory, surely they have a right to make their voice heard in the settlement of the terms of peace.
So far we have been occupied in clearing the way by showing the impracticable and insufficient character of any plan which would leave the Republics either as they have been, or in any modified form of indepen
Mr James Anthony Froude visited the Cape at the time of Sir Charles Warren's expedition to turn the Boers out of Bechuanaland. He did not approve of the expedition. He condemned it as not only unnecessary, but as likely to lead to a bitter war. It was true that the Boers had entered Bechuanaland in contravention of their engagements. It was true that we had made provision in the Convention for the protection of the native chiefs who had been our allies, and were now threatened by the Boers.
"We could not," wrote Mr Froude, "or thought we could not, leave them without taking security for them and their territories. I think it would have been better, though it might have seemed unhandsome, to have fallen back on the principle which had worked so well while it lasted of the Orange River Treaty, and had resolved to meddle no more and these tribes." in the disputes between the Boers
Mr Froude went about Cape Town proclaiming these opin
ions, and was pleased to find many of the Cape politicians in agreement with his views. But not all.
"I called on one man," he great eminence, unconnected politically with party, yet intensely colonial, and related personally both to Dutch and English, whom I found to my surprise not only approving of Sir Charles Warren's expedition, but professing to believe that if we meant to retain our position in South Africa we had no alternative. This gentleman said, that after our surrender to the Transvaal, it had been taken for granted that we were weary of South Africa, and had intended to retire altogether. The future had been a blank, on which no one had dared to calculate. They were to be a Republic. They were to be under the protection of Germany; anything was possible. The English in the colony had lost heart; some were preparing to leave the country; others, who could not leave, were making terms with the winning party. He for one, whose home was at the Cape, had been depressed and disheartened. South Africa, he was convinced, could not stand alone, and could never be so free under any other sovereignty as it had been under the English Crown. Till the last few months, and until the resolution of the Eng lish Government was known, he had looked at the prospect with dismay. All was now changed. The Cape English knew they were not to be
deserted. The Dutch-the sensible part of them-would acquiesce when they saw that we were in earnest."
This quotation from Mr Froude is given because it expresses, as we think, the views held by the English colonists in South Africa then and at the present time. It was written long before the Uitlanders' grievances or the capitalists were heard of, when the Transvaal was a purely pastoral State. It was recorded, by a man who strongly favoured the Boers, as
the opinion of an eminent colonist allied to both races. "If we meant to retain our position in South Africa we had no alternative." "South Africa cannot stand alone, and can never be so free under any other sovereignty as the English." “All was now changed. The Cape English know that they are not to be deserted. The Dutch -the sensible part of them— will acquiesce when they see that we are in earnest." There is the whole question in a few lines as it was nearly twenty years ago, and as it is now. We have no alternative: we must dispose once for all of this question of Dutch supremacy. If we cannot settle it, we must go.
We maintain, therefore, that the only course open to the Government of Great Britain is the third course. The Dutch republics in any form or shape must cease to exist, and the whole of South Africa must be welded together into one empire, subdivided into separate provinces, under the supreme government of the Queen. An impartial examination of all our mistakes and misfortunes in South Africa will show that they are due to the absence of such a government. There has been government of a sort in the Cape Colony, of another kind in Natal, and of still other and more abnormal varieties in the protectorates and in the territories of the Chartered Company. But there has been no local embodiment of her Majesty's rule, with power to control the different parts, to regulate their relations,
to maintain peace within the than any other in modern borders, and to afford protection against enemies from without.
should not have been ignorant not only of the armament and numbers of the enemy, but even of the configuration of those parts of our own territory which, it was well known, would be, in the first period at least, the field of war. We should not have collected large quantities of warlike stores in a place like Ladysmith. We should not have permitted the Boers to be furnished with arms and ammunition through British ports and by British railways. We should not have permitted the Minister of a British colony to sympathise openly with our enemies, and to obstruct, or at any rate to omit, all precautions for the protection of British territory. We should not have allowed him to make a piteous appeal to the Queen's enemies to refrain from invading her territory.
Hitherto this nation, which boasts of having more experience and success in administering colonies and dependencies
times, has been content to allow everything in South Africa to be left to chance. The consequence is confusion and entanglement past understanding. The Cape is a selfgoverning colony and so is Natal, both having Governors appointed by the Crown, Legislative Councils, in the Cape elected, in Natal nominated by the Governor in Council, and Legislative Houses or Assemblies, in both cases elected. There is what is called "responsible Government" in both colonies-that is to say, the Ministers are responsible to the Colonial Legislature. The Governor of the Cape Colony is also "High Commissioner for South Africa and protector of native tribes." What are his nominal powers as High Commissioner, it is not easy to find out. They do not appear to be clearly defined. But, whatever they may be, he has no authority or force at his command to make them effectual. He may be able to advise the Colonial Governments, and to make reports to the Secretary for the Colonies and seek his orders. He can as commander-in-chief dispose of any of her Majesty's troops that may be within his jurisdiction as Governor of the Cape. He does not seem to have any power of the kind in Natal, where the Governor of that colony is also commander-inchief. Basutoland and Bechuanaland are practically reserves for the native tribes, and are under the direct control of the High Commissioner, who can
legislate for them by proclamation, and is represented by local officials who govern under his authority. Lastly comes the enormous territory of Rhodesia, the administration of which was left to the British South African Company, who were empowered to administer it and to legislate for it. It is true that after the Jameson Raid the control of the police and the administration of justice were taken over by the Crown; but other parts of the administration were left in the hands of the company. From a jumble of this kind, what but trouble and confusion can be expected? You cannot toss together a number of differently constituted States inhabited by various races with discordant interests, and hope that, like the bits of glass in a kaleidoscope, they will group themselves into a harmonious and well-proportioned whole. The extraordinary nature of the situation becomes more apparent when the geographical position of the Cape Colony and the existence of two practically foreign and hostile States in the midst of British territory are added to the picture. The whole country, British colonies and Dutch States, are SO closely connected by position, that what affects the one must affect the others. It is not possible to treat them as distinct countries with nothing but diplomatic relations with each other. Yet we have hitherto endeavoured so to treat them. There is no power on the spot to hold them together or make them
act in unison. The High Commissioner, who may know what ought to be done, is hampered at every turn by the selfgoverning power of the Cape Colony, from which and through which he must act. The Cape Colony is a self-governing colony, and has a responsible Government. If he wishes to move the colonial forces, he must persuade the Ministers and get their consent. If he requires the use of the State railways for Imperial purposes, he may be baulked by the official who has control of them, and is not under his orders. He may foresee hostile invasion of the colony, which is supposed to be part of her Majesty's dominions, and he may be unable to provide against it because the Ministers, forsooth, think it inexpedient to use colonial forces for such a purpose. If his policy, dictated by Imperial reasons, is adverse to the sentiments of the majority of the colonial Legislative Assembly, he may be thwarted at every point. He may know that the enemy is being supplied with arms through the colonial ports, and he cannot issue an order to stop the importation without the Ministers' consent. While a Dutch Republic is threatening England with war, the first Minister of the selfgoverning colony may be loudly proclaiming the intention of the Colonial Government to maintain an attitude of neutrality, and whining to the enemy for consideration.
Similar difficulties and obstructions must confront the High Commissioner when in