his capacity of protector of the natives he finds it necessary to take measures not in accordance with the views of his Ministers, or of the majority of the colonial electors and their representatives. The position is impossible. A selfgoverning colony is all very well when the colony can stand alone, and does not depend for its very existence on the mother country. A colony which under ordinary circumstances can protect itself, is not distracted by internal dissensions, does not adjoin foreign and unfriendly territories, and has not relations with tribes of savages which greatly outnumber its own people, may without mischief be allowed to govern itself, and amused with parody of the British constitution. In the cases of the Cape and of Natal all these adverse conditions are present. If the genuine British constitution hampers Lord Salisbury, what must be the effect of hanging a paste imitation of it round the neck of our High Commissioner in South Africa?

a

In 1853, when the present constitution of the Cape Colony was set going, no one foresaw how the country would develop, and consequently the difficulties that now meet us could not have been fully estimated or thought out. The ruling idea was to free the Home Government from direct responsibility, and to leave the colonists to manage their own affairs, or, as Bismarck would say, to stew in their own juice. The Cape is a possession so vital to the British empire and her naval

power, that it is not possible to allow the majority of the colonists to do as they please. What the Dutch majority would like to do would be to get quit of British supremacy.

The first step in forming a suitable Government for South Africa is to substitute for the High Commissioner a GovernorGeneral with powers adequate to the responsibilities and needs of the position. His authority must be derived directly from the Crown and the Parliament of Great Britain, and must enable him to control, and if necessary override, the authority of the governments of the various provinces into which the country may be divided. He must be vested, like the Governor-General in Council in India, " with

the superintendence, direction, and control of the whole civil and military government" of all the territories in his jurisdiction. The GovernorGeneral of India has supreme control of the revenues as well. In the case of South Africa it would not be advisable to deal with the finances of all the provinces as a whole. In India the tendency is to decentralise finance, and it would be an error to attempt the reverse process in South Africa, even if it were possible.

The Governor-General should ordinarily be an English statesman of high rank, of a stamp similar to that of the men who are sent as Viceroys to India. Such a man would rarely possess local knowledge or personal experience of the country. He would need, therefore, the assist

ance of responsible experts. It would be necessary to give him the aid of a Council of three or four members, appointed by the Crown, to advise to advise him. These councillors should be selected from amongst the the prominent men of South Africa, whether official or non-official, and should be so chosen as to include experience from all provinces. The relations of the Governor-General with reference to the Council would have to be determined. It would be unwise to bind him by the opinion of the majority of the Council, which should be an advisory not an executive body. It would be his duty to consult them, and if he differed from them to put his reasons on record. They, on the other hand, would have the right of recording their opinions if the Governor-General differed from them, and of asking that they should be submitted to the Home Government. But they should have no power to obstruct or override the Governor-General, or stay his hand if he decided to set aside their opinions.

In matters which require secrecy, or where prompt action in an emergency is imperative, the Governor-General should have power to act on his own responsibility, and without consulting his Council. The commander of her Majesty's forces in South Africa would be his constitutional adviser on military matters, and should have a seat on the Council.

The most important part of the Governor-General's duties after the cessation of the war will be the organisation and dis

position of such forces of military police as may be found necessary for the maintenance of order. Such questions must be considered in Council, and military as well as local knowledge will be required to deal with them. The legislative functions and financial powers of the Governor-General will have to be carefully considered. It would seem unnecessary to constitute a Legislative Assembly for all South Africa. Municipal and domestic legislation must be suited to the very diverse conditions of each province, and may best be left to the provincial Legislatures which already exist in the Cape and in Natal, and may be established elsewhere under such restrictions as may seem necessary. It may be found sufficient to give the Governor-General power to veto any Act of a local Legislature, and to make ordinances which shall hold good for a limited period, and have the force of law over such areas as he may direct, when the safety of the empire or the maintenance of internal order renders such a step necessary.

In financial matters the control of the Governor-General should be exercised only when it is necessary to prevent evident mismanagement or the results of incapacity on the part of a local government. It has been said above that to centralise the financial business of South Africa does not appear to be advisable, if it were practicable. It is possible, however, that there may be charges, military or other, which ought to be defrayed proportionately

by all or several of the provinces. To meet cases of this kind it may be found expedient to give the Governor-General power, in consultation with the provincial governments, to apportion the burden, and to recover the money, if necessary, from the customs revenue.

It has been assumed that the whole territories of South Africa will be divided anew into suitable provinces. And it is in this part of the work that the greatest difficulty will be met with. It can only be overcome by persons familiar with the local conditions, and it would be pure impertinence and waste of time to attempt, without such knowledge, to deal with the matter. The Cape Colony may perhaps with advantage give up some portion of its present territories. Speaking broadly, merely for the sake of illustration, it might be as well to break up the Orange Free State, giving the north eastern portion to Natal, which is connected with it by railway and commercially; the southern part, lying between the Orange and the Riet rivers, to the Cape; the remainder to go to a new province of Kimberley, to which might be allotted Griqualand West and Bechuanaland, and perhaps the corner of the Transvaal which lies between the Vaal river and the Bechuanaland boundary. Natal might take Swaziland also, in addition to the portion of the Orange Free State which has been suggested above. Similarly the Transvaal territory might be broken up, the southern bank of the Limpopo up to the foot

province, having its capital at Johannesburg. Rhodesia might in the main stand as it is. These proposals may appear impossible or impracticable in the light of special local knowledge. The main point to keep in view is to break up the territories of the Republics, so as to destroy their cohesion and create a divergence of interests between the different parts, and at the same time so to arrange the division as to give each portion railway communication with the coast, either through British or Portuguese territory.

In constituting the provincial governments the differing conditions of each province will have to be taken into account. It will be obligatory to modify the constitutions of the Cape Colony and of Natal, so far as may be needful to give the Governor-General sufficient control for Imperial purposes. In other respects they may be left as they are. Considering that these provinces cannot stand alone, that they must depend on the Government of Great Britain for protection against all armed attack, and even for the assurance of internal peace, they cannot with reason object to give up so much of their present independence as may be necessary for this purpose. England has been put to enormous expense by the wars in South Africa, past and present. She will always have the burden of extricating these colonies from any trouble into which they

may fall owing to disturbances between the Dutch and British colonists, which it is possible may arise, to insurrections on the part of native tribes, or to invasion by foreign enemies. For the protection of the coastline, which is the life of the country, they are entirely dependent on her fleet. The Government of Great Britain has therefore the right to insist on such surrender of privileges by them as may be needed for the due maintenance of British supremacy. The surrender will, in any case, be of small importance, and will in no way interfere with their local freedom.

In the newly formed States, which will contain the larger portion of the territories of the Republic, it is desirable So to arrange matters that the majority of electors shall not be our enemies. Whether this may be possible it is difficult to say without very intimate local knowledge. Some such arrangement as that sketched should be devised, with a view to lessen the influence of the Dutch population. The obvious and most reasonable course would be to treat the new provinces as Crown colonies, with Governors appointed by the Crown, and nominated Councils for the purpose of local legislation. For the next twenty years this would certainly be the wisest settlement. The diffiThe difficulty in the way of adopting it arises from the fuss the British Government has been making over the franchise question. It may be doubted

if it was the true issue, and the raising of it has placed us in a dilemma. We must either refuse to the new provinces any sort of elective Assembly or representative government, or we must incur the danger of having a considerable proportion of the elected representatives hostile to British supremacy. In the former case, it will be said that after going to war with Kruger because he refused a franchise to the Uitlanders, we have denied them, as well as the Dutch, representation in any form. It is impossible, under any circumstances, to follow Kruger's policy and refuse to the Dutch what we give to others. The risk, therefore, whatever it may be,-of finding the majority or an important minority of the members hostile mustbe faced, and the new provinces must be permitted to elect their Legislatures. Some restrictions must be placed on the powers given to the Houses or Assemblies; and if it is obligatory to have a travesty on party government, the executive powers of the Ministers must be restricted. It is imperative that the appointments of all superior officials, especially in the police and magistracy, the recruitment and disposition of armed forces, and all matters connected with the possession and importation of arms and ammunition, should be retained in the hands of the Governors, subject to the Governor-General's control.

The appointment and removal of the superior judges must lie with the Crown. The Gover

nor-General should have power to call to account any one in the public service who is guilty of misconduct a power which he will naturally exercise through and with regard to the feelings and prestige of the local governments.

Perhaps as much as can be usefully said at the present time has been written with regard to the constitution of the provinces.

There remains the very big question of the method and the agency by which the GovernorGeneral is to be connected with the Home Government and controlled by it. Is he to be under the Colonial Office, and look to the Colonial Secretary as his chief? The Colonial Office will answer, Yes. And it would be the easiest solution. There are reasons for thinking that much of the benefit to be derived from a reorganisation of the local governments would be lost if the reins are to remain in the hands of the Colonial Office. the first place, no one can read the history of South Africa under the Colonial Office without coming to the conclusion that it is a tale of indifference, confusion, misunderstanding, and inconsistency, which has found its foredoomed conclusion

In

in the present war. There cannot be in the minds either of our friends or enemies in South Africa any strong feeling of respect or affection towards that office. Meddling where interference was unnecessary, annexing one day and cancelling the annexation on the next, threatening and surrendering, promising protection and be

VOL. CLXVII.—NO. MXIII.

traying those that trusted to the promise, deaf to the warnings and advice of friends, eager to believe and be cajoled by enemies, what has the Colonial Office done for the British colonists or for the Uitlanders in the Dutch Republics? What is the present condition of those who have appealed to it for redress? The part to be taken by the Home Government in the administration of South Africa had need to be very different from that it has played in the past. Therefore it is desirable to break away from the traditions of the Colonial Office. But it is one of the hardest tasks in the world to get any of the great Government offices to break away from its traditions. They cannot do it. It is as hopeless to expect them to free themselves from their bonds as it is to ask a confirmed drunkard to abstain from alcohol. The men who work the machine have begun as boys. They have never been away from their desks. From the permanent Under Secretary downwards there is not one of them who has been confronted with the actualities of things or has taken a personal part in the administration of the countries with whose affairs he deals. What can they do but stand by their traditions, and when an emergency arises hunt out precedents and put up references? True, there are very able men among them, but they have not had the training in real life and in living contact with the colonial world which alone could enable them to recognise the bearing