sure, however, was arrayed a large majority of the House of Representatives.* The opposition members of Congress opposed the recommendation of the President, and there were only forty-eight of his own party in the House who sustained his views. It is difficult to see any propriety in the opposition which was made to levying a war tax upon tea and coffee. That the people of the United States would submit to any tax which might be necessary to sustain the national honor, there can be no doubt. Indeed, this was unanimously voted by the House, with great gravity. If this question was divested of the sophistry with which politicians have invested it, it would be extremely difficult to see why a duty should not be raised from tea and coffee in time of peace. It is asserted that these articles have now become necessaries of life, still it cannot be maintained that they are indispensable. There are other importations upon which a tariff of twenty and thirty per cent. are levied, which are absolutely necessaries of life. It is almost as impossible for the people of this country to dispense with

would cheerfully, and without complaint, submit to the payment of this additional duty, or any other that may be necessary to maintain the honor of the country, provide for the unavoidable expenses of the Government, and to uphold the public credit. It is recommended that any duties which may be imposed on these articles, be limited in their duration to the period of the war."-Message of Mr. Polk to Congress, February 13, 1847. *"Resolved, That it is inexpedient to levy any duty on tea and

coffee."

This resolution passed by a vote of 115 to 48."—Congressional Globe, 2d session 29th Congress, p. 102.

"Resolved, That the people of the United States are too patriotic to refuse any necessary tax in time of war."

This resolution was unanimously adopted.—Ibid. p. 103.

the use of iron and salt, as to exist without water. Why then should these necessaries be taxed, and tea and coffee be placed upon the free list? It is easily conceived that the protectionists are in favor of this policy, because the exemption of articles which are not raised or manufactured in this country from taxation, will create the necessity for higher duties upon merchandise which comes in competition with their own manufactures. But that those persons who advocate the doctrine of free trade, should desire to place tea and coffee upon the free list, and produce thereby the necessity for more exorbitant taxes upon articles of still greater importance to the people, is equally surprising and preposterous.

CHAPTER XI.

Internal Improvements.-Contest between Congress and the Executive upon that question.-Discussions upon the power granted Congress to authorize the States to lay duties upon tonnage in the Constitutional Convention.Public lands. Pre-emption rights.-Lands granted to several States.Land granted to soldiers.-Post-Office Department.-Rates of postage.— Foreign mails.-Lines established to Chagres and California.-The Navy.

THE administration of Mr. Polk was signalized by the struggle between the friends of internal improvements, and the Executive. A large majority in both Houses of Congress, numbering members of both political parties, were favorable to a lavish expenditure of the public treasury for such purposes. The struggle was commenced during the first session of the 29th Congress, and was continued with unabated energy throughout. On the 31st of December, 1845, a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives by Mr. Tibbatts, for the improvement of harbors and rivers, and passed that body on the 20th of March, by a vote of 109 to 90. It passed the Senate precisely as it was reported to that body on the 24th of July, 1846, by a vote of 34 to 16.* The bill encountered an Executive veto. The message which the President transmitted to the House of Representatives, assigning the reasons why he could not approve the

* Congressional Globe, 1st session 29th Congress, p. 1136.

bill, is charactized by remarkable vigor and power.* The authority of the General Government to make internal improvements within the States, was tho

* "The Constitution has not, in my judgment, conferred upon the Federal Government the power to construct works of internal improvement within the States, or to appropriate money from the treasury for that purpose. That this bill assumes for the Federal Government the right to exercise this power, cannot, I think, be doubted. The approved course of the Government, and the deliberately expressed judgment of the people, have denied the existence of such a power under the Constitution. Several of my predecessors have denied its existence in the most solemn forms."

"The general proposition that the Federal Government does not possess this power is so well settled, and has for a considerable period been so generally acquiesced in, that it is not deemed necessary to reiterate the arguments by which it is sustained. Nor do I deem it necessary, after the full and elaborate discussions which have taken place before the country on this subject, to do more than state the general considerations which have satisfied me of the unconstitutionality and inexpediency of the exercise of such a power."

"That the power in question is not properly an incident to any of the granted powers, I am fully satisfied; but if there were doubts on this subject, experience has demonstrated the wisdom of the rule that all the functionaries of the Federal Government should abstain from the exercise of all questionable or doubtful powers. If an enlargement of the powers of the Federal Government should be deemed proper, it is safer and wiser to appeal to the States and the people in the mode prescribed by the Constitution for the grant desired, than to assume its exercise without an amendment of the Constitution. If Congress does not possess the general power to construct works of internal improvement within the States, or to appropriate money from the treasury for that purpose, what is there to exempt some, at least, of the objects of appropriation included in this bill from the operation of the general rule? This bill assumes the existence of the power, and in some of its provisions asserts the principle that Congress may exercise it as fully as though the appropriations which it proposes were applicable to the construction of roads and canals. If there be a distinction in principle, it is not perceived, and should be clearly defined. Some of the objects of appropriation contained in this bill are local in their character, and lie within the limits of a single State; and though, in the language of the bill, they are called harbors, they are not connected with foreign commerce, nor are they places of refuge or shelter for our navy or commercial marine on the ocean or lake shores. To call

roughly examined, and the corruptions of the system, which expended money in particular sections,

the mouth of a creek, or a shallow inlet on our coasts a harbor, cannot confer the authority to expend the public money in its improvement. Con gress have exercised the power coeval with the Constitution, of establishing light-houses, beacons, buoys, and piers, on our ocean and lake shores, for the purpose of rendering navigation safe and easy, and of affording protection and shelter for our navy and other shipping. These are safeguards placed in existing channels of navigation. After the long acquiescence of the Government through all preceding administrations, I am not disposed to question or disturb the authority to make appropriations for such purposes."

"When we advance a step beyond this point, and in addition to the establishment and support, by appropriations from the treasury, of lighthouses, beacons, buoys, piers, and other improvements within the bays, inlets and harbors on our ocean and lake coasts, immediately connected with our foreign commerce, and attempt to make improvements in the interior at points unconnected with foreign commerce, and where they are not needed for the protection and security of our navy and commercial marine, the difficulty arises in drawing a line beyond which appropriations may not be made by the Federal Government."

"It not only leads to a consolidation of power in the Federal Government, at the expense of the rightful authority of the States, but its inevitable tendency is, to embrace objects for the expenditure of the public money, which are local in their character, benefiting but few at the expense of the common treasury of the whole. It will engender sectional feelings and prejudices, calculated to disturb the harmony of the Union. It will destroy the harmony which should prevail in our legislative councils. It will produce combinations of local and sectional interest, strong enough when united, to carry propositions for appropriations of public money which could not of themselves, and standing alone, succeed, and cannot fail to lead to wasteful and extravagant expenditures."

"It must produce a disreputable scramble for the public money, by the conflict which is inseparable from such a system, between local and individual interests, and the general interest of the whole. It is unjust to those States which have with their own means constructed their own internal improvements, to make from the common treasury appropriations for similar improvements in other States."

"In its operation it will be oppressive and unjust towards those States whose representatives and people either deny or doubt the existence of the power, or think its exercise inexpedient, and who, while they equally con