mum year in return for the payment. Upon these two facts we can rest. I do not care to go through the testimony that you have had before you. I did make one or two tabular statements, but I do not think it worth while to trouble you with them. The general results you can get at as well as I did. You know the general run of the testimony. You know whether I am saying what is fairly and reasonably accurate. Our contention is that we have proved these points conclusively, and taking them as the basis, there is no margin whatever left for an award on account of profits accruing to the United States from the privilege of inshore fishing.

But there is another fact not stated in any of the evidence, but which is clearly proven by the whole of it; and it is this: The mackerel market is a speculative market; its profit represents simply a commercial venture, and not the profit to the fisherman. In other words, a barrel of mackerel salted, packed, and sold, produces a result in which the profit of the fisherman makes but a small part. Take the statement of Mr. Hall, that he purchases regularly from the fishermen of Prince Edward Island their mackerel at $3.75 per barrel. Now, whatever Mr. Hall sells that barrel of mackerel for above and beyond $3.75 represents capital, labor, skill, with which the fishery, as a fishery, has no concern. Between the fish in the water and the fish in the market there is as much difference as there is between a pound of cotton in the field and a pound of cotton manufactured; and you would have as much right to estimate the value of a cotton plantation by the value of the cloth and yarn into which its production has been manufactured, as you have to value the fisheries by the value of the manufactured fish which are sold.

Suppose that Mr. Hall, or a combination of Mr. Hall's, should purchase the whole mackerel catch at $3.75, and then hold for such a rise in price as they might force. This speculation might make Mr. Hall a millionaire or a bankrupt, but would any man in his senses consider the result, be it profit or loss, as representing the value of the mackerel fishery?

So little, indeed, does the value of fish enter into the market value of the mackerel, that you have this statement from Mr. Pew, the largest and longest established fish-merchant on this continent: "No. 1 bay mackerel in the fall were bought by us at $22.50, and piled away over winter, and I think the next May and June they sold down as low as $4, $5, and $6 a barrel-the same fish; and I think that shore mackerel, which had sold as high as $24, were then sold for about the same price." Would the mackerel market of that year have afforded you any fair criterion by which to appraise the mackerel fishery of that year? What interest had the mackerel fishermen in this speculative variation of the market price? And you have the further and uncontradicted testimony of more than one competent witness that when the mackerel catch of 1870 was, with one exception, the largest ever known, prices were maintained at a higher point than in years of very small catch.

Upon this state of facts, proven by such competent witnesses as Proctor, Sylvanus Smith, Myrick, Hall, and Pew, I submit that in estimating the value of the fishery you can only take the value of the raw material—that is, the fish as taken by the fisherman and by him sold to the merchant; and even then the price he receives represents, besides the value of the raw material, his time, his labor, his living, and his skill. For throughout this argument you must not forget that the British Government gives us nothing. For the freedom from duty, and the right to fish in United States waters, it gives us the privilege only of using our own capital, enterprise, and industry within certain limits. It cannot secure us, and does not offer to secure us, a single fish. It

cannot control the waters or the inhabitants thereof. It cannot guarantee that in the twelve years of the treaty the catch in the gulf will be even tolerable, and, indeed, for the five years that have already run it has been pure loss. And yet the British Case demands that we should pay not only for the little we do catch, but for all that, under other circumstances, we might catch; and not only that, but that we should pay for all the fish that the British fishermen do not catch!

We contend, then, that we have proved that the mackerel fishery of the gulf is so variable that it offers no certainty of profit; that the use of the gulf fishery has diminished steadily; that in the gulf there is no evidence of any habitual fishing within the three-mile limit; that an equal number of experienced and competent fishermen prove that they do not fish at all inside the limits, and that the development of the United States coast fishery has offered, and is offering, a more profitable field for the industry and capital of United States fishermen, while the supply of fish from the lakes and the transport of fresh fish far into the interior is superseding the use of salted mackerel as an article of food; and therefore there is no ground in any advantage offered by the Treaty of 1871 upon which to rest a money award.

We now go further and maintain that if in this condition of the mackerel fishery you can find any basis for such award, then the advantages offered to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty by the United States in the same treaty are a complete offset.

These advantages consist, first, in the right to share the shore fisheries of the United States. It will not do to assert, as the British Case does, that "their modes of fishing for menhaden and other bait are furthermore such as to exclude strangers from participating in them without exceeding the terms of the treaty; and even without this difficulty it must be apparent that such extensive native enterprises would bar competition and suffice to insure the virtual exclusion of foreigners." (Page 29.)

These, as they stand, are mere assertions, unsupported by any proof. The treaty provision is the highest law of the land, and no local legislation can prevent the exercise of the privileges it confers. The competition of native enterprise is just what the United States fishermen meet in British waters; and that the native enterprise is more extensive on the United States shores, only proves that there is an industry which better rewards the enterprise. It is like all treaty privileges-one, the use of which depends upon those who take it, and if, when given and taken in exchange, the parties taken do not choose to use it, this refusal cannot deprive it of its value.

2. The second advantage given to Her Britannic Majesty's subjects is the right to export into the United States fish and fish-oil free of duty. The estimate which we have submitted as to the value of this privilege is that it is worth about $350,000 annually.

This has not been denied, but I am concerned with the principle, not the amount. To this offset the British counsel object, upon the ground that the duty taken off the British producer reduces the price to the American consumer, and is therefore a benefit to the latter to the same extent, for, if imposed, the consumer would have to pay. Into the politico-economical argument I shall not enter. You have heard enough of it in the cross-examinations, where counsel and witnesses gave you their opinions; and our view of the case has been placed before you with great clearness and force by the learned counsel who preceded me. Upon that question, I have but two remarks to make, and I do not think

either can be controverted:

1. If it be assumed, as a general principle, that the consumer pays the duty, it is equally true that he does not pay the whole of it. For to assume any such position would be to strike out all possibility of profit. Take an illustration: A merchant imports 1,000 yards of broadcloth, which, adding all costs and duties, he can sell at a profit at $6 a yard. Now add a duty of $2 a yard. He cannot sell his customer at $8 a yard; he must divide the rise in price, and, while he adds the duty, he must diminis the profit. Except in case of articles of luxury, such as rare books, jewels, costly wines, scientific instruments, works of art, the increase of duty cannot, and never has been, imposed entirely upon the

consumer.

2. If this be true, then you must ascertain what is the proportion of increase in price of mackerel consequent upon the duty which is paid by the consumer, before you can say what he, the consumer, gains by the removal. There has been no attempt to do this on the part of counsel. Our most experienced witnesses testify that the additional duty of $2 would raise the price of mackerel about fifty cents a barrel, which would leave $1.50 to be paid by the producer. I do not undertake to say whether this is right or wrong, for I am discussing the principle, not the amount. The question is an insoluble one. You have been told by competent witnesses, and after a fortnight's preparation for rebuttal they have not been contradicted, that the mackerel market is a specu lative one; that in one year the speculative price has varied from $22 to $4, while for ten years the price to the daily consumer has scarcely varied at all; that the price depends much upon the catch; and yet that in the year of the largest catch the price has not gone down; and that being food for poor people, there is a price which when reached, with duty or without duty, the consumption is immediately reduced; and, added to all this, that the competition of fresh fish is fast driving it out of use. With all these conditions to be ascertained first, who can ever say what proportion of duty is paid by the producer and what by the consumer, or if any is paid by the latter?

I do not believe it is possible to do it, but if it were possible to do it you cannot make it an offset. If you undertake to make an offset of it let us know what it is. We state our account. We take this statement

and we say, "In the year 1874 the duty remitted was $355,972." Now, what are you going to set off against that?-an opinion, a theory, a belief, a speculation to weigh it down with? If you are going to set off dollars against that, tell us how many dollars in 1874 you are going to set off against that. How are you going to find out? How can you ever tell us? But if the gentlemen's theory is right, they have not converted it into a practical theory that you can apply. If they will undertake to tell us, "In 1874 and 1875 we will show you a reduction of price in mackerel to a certain number of consumers to the amount of $200,000 or $250,000," strike the balance. But you cannot strike the balance with an opinion. Before they can make this claim they must submit that statement to us. But I do not intend to dwell upon that, for this reason. The principle that I hold ought to be applied to the solution of this question is this: that it is one with which, under the treaty, you have nothing on earth to do. If our friends on the other side could show, dollar for dollar, that every dollar of the $355,000 remitted by the renewal of the duty was $355,000 to the benefit of the American consumers, you could not reckon it.

Now, let us look at the treaty:

ARTICLE XXII. Inasmuch as it is asserted by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty that the privileges accorded to the citizens of the United States, under Article XVIII of

this treaty, are of greater value than those accorded by Articles XIX and XXI of this treaty to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, and this assertion is not admitted by the Government of the United States, it is further agreed that Commissioners shall be appointed to determine, having regard to the privileges accorded by the United States to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, as stated in Articles XIX and XXI of this treaty, the amount of any compensation which, in their opinion, ought to be paid by the Government of the United States to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, in return for the privileges accorded to the citizens of the United States under Article XVIII.

Now, under this treaty there stands before you to-day a balance, on one arm of which hangs the 18th Article of the Treaty of 1871, and on the other the 19th and 21st Articles. You cannot add to either scale one scruple, one pennyweight, which the treaty has not put there. You cannot transfer weights from one to the other. You can only look at the index and see whether the register shows that one is heavier than the other, and how much heavier. What are the advantages conferred by the 18th Article of the Treaty of 1871 on the citizens of the United States?

It is agreed by the High Contracting Party, that in addition to the liberty secured to the United States fishermen by the Convention between Great Britain and the United States, signed at London on the 20th day of October, 1818, of taking, curing, and drying fish on certain coasts of the British North American Colonies therein defined, the inhabitants of the United States shall have, in common with the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, the liberty, for the term of years mentioned in Article XXXIII of this treaty, to take fish of every kind, except shell-fish, on the sea-coasts and shores, and in the bays, harbors, and creeks of the Provinces of Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and the Colony of Prince Edward Island and of the several islands thereunto adjacent, without being restricted to any distance from the shore, with permission to land upon the said coasts and shores and islands, and also upon the Magdalen Islands, for the purpose of drying their nets and curing their fish.

That is the only advantage which is given to us by the 18th Article of the treaty, and it is the only advantage so given to us, the value of which you have any right to estimate. I am perfectly willing to admit a set-off of this kind, which is provided for apparently. It is agreed in Article XXI that for the term of years mentioned in Article XXXIII of this treaty, fish-oil and fish of all kinds (except fish of the inland lakes and of the rivers falling into them, and except fish preserved in oil), being the produce of the fisheries of the United States or of the Dominion of Canada or of Prince Edward Island, shall be admitted into each country, respectively, free of duty.

Now, if against the $350,000 of duty remitted upon fish and fish oil imported from the Dominion into the United States, you can set off any duty on fish and fish-oil imported from the United States into Canada, you will have the right to do it; but that is the extreme limit to which, under the words of that treaty, you have a right to go. It is nothing whatever to you whether the advantage to us is great or small of the remission of that duty. It is a positive advantage to the citizens of the Dominion; it is given to them as an advantage, and in return for it they have given us a right to do one thing and nothing else, and under that treaty you have no right to value any other advantage against us.

I have now stated, as concisely as I have been able, the scope of our argument-the principles which we think ought to be applied to the solution of this question. As to the facts, you will judge them by the impression the witnesses have made upon yourselves, and not by any representations of the impressions they have made upon us. And we fully and gratefully recognize that you have followed the testimony with patient and intelligent attention.

It seems to me (and this I would say rather to our friends on the other side than to you) that at the end of this long investigation, the true character of the case is not difficult to see. For a century the re

lations of the two countries on this question have been steadily improving. We have passed from the jealous and restrictive policy of the Convention of 1818 to the free and liberal system of the Treaty of 1854, and, with good sense and good temper, it is impossible that we should ever go backward. The old feuds and bitternesses that sprang from the Revolution have long since died out between the two great nations, and in fact, for Great Britain, the original party in these negotiations, has been substituted a nation of neighbors and kinsmen, a nation working with us in the wise and prosperous government of this vast continent, which is our joint possession; a nation, I may add, without presump tion or offense, whose existence and whose growth is one of the direct consequences of our own creation, and whose future prosperity is bound up with our own. In the Treaty of 1871 we have reached a settlement which it depends upon your decision to make the foundation of a firm and lasting union. Putting aside for the moment the technical pleadings and testimony, what is the complaint and claim of the Dominion? It is that where they have made of the fishery a common property, opened what they consider a valuable industry to the free use of both countries, they are not met in the same spirit, and other industries, to them of equal or greater value, are not opened by us with the same friendly liberality. I can find no answer to this complaint, no reply to this demand, but that furnished by the British Case, your own claim to receive a money compensation in the place of what you think we ought to have given. If a money compensation is recompense-if these unequal advantages, as you call them, can be equalized by a money payment, carefully, closely, but adequately estimated-then we have bought the right to the inshore fisheries, and we can do what we will with our own. Then we owe no obligation to liberality of sentiment or community of interest; then we are bound to no moderation in the use of our privilege, and if purse-seining and trawling and gurry-poison and eager competition destroy your fishing, as you say they will, we have paid the damages beforehand; and when at the end of twelve years we count the cost, and find that we have paid exorbitantly for that which was profitless, do you think we will be ready to renew the trade, and where and how will we recover the loss?

No. I believe that this treaty as it stands executed to-day, interpreted in the broad and liberal spirit in which it was conceived, is, whether you regard the interests of the maritime provinces or the wider interests of the whole Dominion, a greater advantage in the present and a larger promise in the future than any money-award which may belittle the large liberality of its provisions. As it stands it means certain progress. The thorough investigation which these interests have now for the first time received, a few years, a few months of kindly feeling and common interest will supply all its deficiencies and correct all its imperfections. And, therefore, do I most sincerely hope that your decision will leave it so, free to do its own good work, and then we who have striven together, not, I am glad to say, either unkindly or ungenerously, to reach some just conclusion, will find in the future which that treaty contains the wisest solution, and we shall live to see all possible differences which may have disturbed the natural relations of the two countries, not remotely but in the to-morrow of living history, not metaphorically but literally, "in the deep bosom of the ocean buried."