and having a control over the correspondence and intercourse of the whole community, should be permitted to remain so long, without efficient checks or responsibility, under the almost unlimited control of the Executive. Such a power, wielded by a single will, is sufficient of itself, when made an instrument of ambition, to contaminate the community, and to control, to a great extent, public opinion. To guard against this danger, and to impose effectual restrictions on Executive patronage, acting through this important department, your committee are of the opinion that an entire reorganization of the department is required; but their labor, in reference to this subject, has been superseded by the Committee on the Post-office, which has bestowed so much attention on it, and which is so much more minutely acquainted with the diseased state of the department than your committee can be, that it would be presumption on their part to attempt to add to their recommendation.

But, as extensive and dangerous as is the patronage of the Executive through the Post-office Department, it is not much less so in reference to the public funds, over which, as has been stated, it now has unlimited control, and, through them, over the entire banking system of the country. With a banking system spread from Maine to Louisiana,—from the Atlantic to the utmost West,-consisting of not less than five or six hundred banks, struggling among themselves for existence and gain, with an immense public fund under the control of the Executive, to be deposited in whatever banks he may favor, or to be withdrawn at his pleasure,—it is impossible for ingenuity to devise any scheme better calculated to convert the surplus revenue into a most potent engine of power and influence; and, it may be added, of peculation, speculation, corruption, and fraud. The first and most decisive step against the danger is that already proposed,—of distributing the surplus revenue among the States,—which will prevent its growing accumulation in the banks, and,

with it, the corresponding increase of Executive power and influence over the banking system. In addition, your committee have reported a bill to charge the deposit banks at the rate of per cent. per annum for the use of the public funds, to be calculated on the average monthly deposits; to prohibit transfers, except for the purpose of disbursements; and to prevent a removal of the public funds from the banks in which they are now, or may hereafter be deposited, without the consent of Congress, except as is provided in the bill. The object of the bill is to secure to the Government an equivalent for the use of the public funds,-to prevent the abuses and influence incident to transfer-warrants, and to place the deposit banks, as far as it may be practicable, beyond the control of the Executive.

In addition to these measures, there are, donbtless, many others connected with the customs-Indian affairs, public lands, army, navy, and other branches of the administration --into which, it is feared, there have crept many abuses, which have unnecessarily increased the expenditures and the number of persons employed, and, with them, the Executive patronage; but to reform which would require a more minute investigation into the general state of the administration than your committee can at present bestow. Should the measures which they have recommended receive the sanction of Congress, they feel a strong conviction that they will greatly facilitate the work of carrying accountability, retrenchment, and economy through every branch of the administration, and thereby reduce the patronage of the Executive to those safe and economical limits which are necessary to a complete restoration of the equilibrium of the system, now so dangerously disturbed. Your committee are deeply impressed with the necessity of commencing early, and of carrying through to its full and final completion, this great work of reform.

The disease is daily becoming more aggravated and danger

ous, and, if it be permitted to advance for a few years longer with the rapidity with which it has of late, it will soon pass beyond the reach of remedy. This is no party question. Every lover of this country and of its institutions, be his party what it may, must see and deplore the rapid growth of patronage, with all its attendant evils, and the certain catastrophe which awaits its further progress, if not timely arrested. The question now is not how, or where, or with whom the danger originated, but how it is to be arrested; not the cause, but the remedy; not how our institutions and liberty have been endangered, but how they are to be rescued.

REPORT

On that portion of the President's Message which related to the adoption of efficient measures to prevent the circulation of incendiary Abolition Petitions through the Mail, February 4th, 1836. The Select Committee to whom was referred that portion of the President's Message which relates to the attempts to circulate, through the mail, inflammatory appeals, to excite the slaves to insurrection, submit the following report :-

The committee fully concur with the President as to the character and tendency of the papers which have been attempted to be circulated in the South through the mail, and participate with him in the indignant regret which he expresses at conduct so destructive of the peace and harmony of the country, and so repugnant to the Constitution and the dictates of humanity and religion. They also concur in the hope that, if the strong tone of disapprobation which

these unconstitutional and wicked attempts have called forth, does not arrest them, the non-slaveholding States will be prompt to exercise their power to suppress them, as far as their authority extends. But, while they agree with the President as to the evil and its highly dangerous tendency, and the necessity of arresting it, they have not been able to assent to the measure of redress which he recommends-that Congress should pass a law prohibiting, under severe penalty, the transmission of incendiary publications through the mail, intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection.

After the most careful and deliberate investigation, they have been constrained to adopt the conclusion that Congress has not the power to pass such a law; that it would be a violation of one of the most sacred provisions of the Constitution, and subversive of reserved powers essential to the preservation of the domestic institutions of the slaveholding States, and, with them, their peace and security. Concurring, as they do, with the President in the magnitude of the evil, and the necessity of its suppression, it would have been the cause of deep regret to the committee, if they thought the difference of opinion, as to the right of Congress, would deprive the slaveholding States of any portion of the protection which the measure recommended by the President was intended to afford them. On the contrary, they believe all the protection intended may be afforded, according to the views they take of the power of Congress, without infringing on any provision of the Constitution on one side, or the reserved rights of the States on the other.

The committee, with these preliminary remarks, will now proceed to establish the positions which they have assumed, beginning with the first-that the passage of a law would be a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

In the discussion of this point, the committee do not deem it necessary to inquire whether the right to pass such a law can be derived from the power to establish post-offices

and post-roads, or from the trust of "preserving the relation created by the Constitution between the States," as supposed by the President. However ingenious or plausible the arguments may be, by which it may be attempted to derive the right from these or any other sources, they must fall short of their object. The jealous spirit of liberty which characterized our ancestors at the period when the Constitution was adopted, for ever closed the door by which the right might be implied from any of the granted powers, or any other source, if there be any other. The committee refer to the amended article of the Constitution, which, among other things, provides that Congress shall pass no law which shall abridge the liberty of the press-a provision which interposes, as will be hereafter shown, an insuperable objection to the measure recommended by the President. That the true meaning of this provision may be fully comprehended, as bearing on the point under consideration, it will be necessary to recur briefly to the history of the adoption of the Constitution.

It is well known that great opposition was made to the adoption of the Constitution. It was acknowledged on all sides, at the time, that the old confederation, from its weakness, had failed, and that something must be done to save the country from anarchy and convulsion; yet, so high was the spirit of liberty-so jealous were our ancestors of that day of power, that the utmost efforts were necessary, under all the then existing pressure, to obtain the assent of the States to the ratification of the Constitution. Among the many objections to its adoption, none were more successfully urged than the absence, in the instrument, of those general provisions which experience had shown to be necessary to guard the outworks of liberty: such as the freedom of the press and of speech,—the rights of conscience,—of trial by jury, and others of like character. It was the belief of those jealous and watchful guardians of liberty, who viewed