first parcel is bounded northerly by land formerly of Thomas W. Williams, 2d, easterly by land formerly of Elijah Dyer, southerly by Sachem street, and westerly by land formerly of Mary W. Goddard, and is the same premises described in a deed from the Thames Bank to said trustees of the Central Methodist Episcopal Church, dated March 23d, 1854, and recorded in the land records of said Norwich, Book 59, page 643. The second parcel begins at a point on the southerly side of Williams street, on the dividing line between the land herein described and land of George H. Martin; thence running easterly, by said Williams street, fifty feet; thence running southerly, at right angles to said street, one hundred eighteen and 85/100 feet; thence running westerly, at right angles to the last-described line, and parallel with said street, forty-seven and 15/100 feet; thence running northerly one hundred and eighteen and 9/10 feet, to the place of beginning, bounding westerly on said Martin land; and is the same premises conveyed to said trustees of the Central Methodist Episcopal Society by Charles P. Coggswell by deed dated April 4, 1884, and recorded in land records of said Norwich, Book 91, page 250. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal at Cincinnati, in the state of Ohio, this third day of August, 1897. John M. Walden, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church. [L. S.]'" "(39) If the effect of Bishop Walden's act of April 8th, aforesaid, was to end the existence of the three churches mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, and unite the members thereof in a new church by the name of "Trin. ity,' the plaintiffs Calvin L. Harwood, Costello Lippitt, and Allen S. Barbour are, and when this action was begun were, members of said Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church, and there are also about five hundred and seventy other members thereof. Said Harwood and Lippitt were until said April 8, 1895, members of the East Main Street Church, and said Barbour was a member of the Central Church. None of said persons have united with said Trinity Church by letter or otherwise than by such union and by acquiescence therein, and by proceedings as stated in paragraph 19 hereof." "(42) The land in question in this action was conveyed to the trustees of the Central Methodist Episcopal Church and their successors by Isaac C. Swan by a deed dated September 17, 1891." "(46) Upon these facts the plaintiffs claimed and asked the court to rule: (a) That the action taken by Bishop Walden at the New England Southern Annual Conference on the 8th day of April, 1895, had the effect of uniting the Central Methodist Episcopal Church, the East Main Street Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Sachem Street Methodist Episcopal Church into one local church or society. (b) That by said act said three churches became extinct and ceased to exist as local Methodist Episcopal Churches or Societies. (c) That by said act said three churches, with all their members, were merged in and became Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church. (d) That by said act Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church became a local Methodist Episcopal Church, a society, and a constituent member of the Methodist Episcopal Church. (e) That by said act, and the course pursued and the acts done by said churches and their officers and members since said act was performed, and by the Methodist Episcopal Church and its annual conferences and bishops and other authorities, as appears by the finding, said three churches have ceased to exist as local Methodist Episcopal Churches or Societies, and have been merged in and become Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church. (f) That the property described in the complaint has, by the union of said three churches, become vested in the trustees of Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church, to be held in trust according to the usage, rules, and discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church. (g) That the title to said property became vested in the trustees of Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church by said act of Bishop Walden, the course pursued, and the acts done by said churches, and by the Methodist Episcopal Church and its annual conferences and bishops and other authorities, as appears by the finding and the provision of chapter 138 of the Public Acts of 1897, and the certificate of Bishop Walden, referred to in the complaint. (h) The plaintiffs also claimed that the plaintiffs, upon the facts, were entitled to judgment that the defendant should execute and deliver to the trustees of Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church a quitclaim deed as demanded in the first claim for relief, or that the court should by its judgment set aside said mortgage and declare it void. (i) That, if anything is due on said mortgage, the trustees of Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church should be allowed to redeem as demanded in the third claim for relief. "(47) The court did not rule as thus requested, but overruled said claims, and rendered judgment for the defendant." The plaintiffs appealed. Henry Stoddard and Frank T. Brown, for appellants. Charles F. Thayer and Donald G. Perkins, for appellee. ANDREWS, C. J. (after stating the facts). The piece of land which is the subject of litigation in this case was deeded on the 17th day of September, 1891, by Isaac C. Swan to certain persons named and described in the deed as "the trustees of the Central Methodist Episcopal Church of Norwich, Connecticut, and their successors in office." The plaintiffs claim that the title to that piece of land should be vested in them, because they are in the law the successors in office of the grantees named in the deed. They say that the Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church in Norwich is the lawful successor of the Central Methodist Episcopal Church in Norwich mentioned in the deed, and that they, being the trustees of the said Trinity Church, are the successors to the said grantees so named. The question, then, in the case, is whether or not the plaintiffs are such successors; and that depends on the power and authority of Bishop Walden to do the things he undertook to do as set forth in the finding. If they are such successors, then the language of the deed itself conveys an equitable title to the land sufficient to support their claim for relief sought. The action of Bishop Walden at the annual conference in Providence in 1896, as is stated in his certificate recited in the finding, was intended to terminate the existence of the three Methodist Episcopal Churches in Norwich, i. e. the East Main Street Methodist Episcopal Church, the Sachem Street Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Central Methodist Episcopal Church, and to consolidate them into one church, to be named the Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church of Norwich, Conn., with the effect, among other things, that the trustees of the consolidated church would be in the law of the church the successors of the trustees of the churches whose existence was terminated. His authority and power to do these acts, and to bring about this effect, is found in one of the sections of the Book of Discipline of the Methodist Church of America. That book is made a part of the finding. Bishop Walden construed that section of the Discipline Book as giving him that power and authority as the presiding bishop at an annual conference of the New England Southern Annual Conference, within the territorial limits of which conference the said churches were located. The finding states that other bishops of that church have put the same construction on that part of the Book of Discipline, and that churches have been in the past on many occasions so united, and, so far as appears, the power and authority of a bishop presiding at an annual conference to make such consolidation has never been called in question. We understand that this construction of the Book of Discipline is in accordance with the uniform and universal practice of the Methodist Episcopal Church. It agrees with the common understanding of the practice of that church. The action of Bishop Walden was binding on the defendant, and upon every member of each of said three churches. According to his ruling, it would seem very plain that the plaintiffs' contention is correct. The plaintiffs are, according to the rules, usages, and discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church, the successors to the grantees named in the deed of Mr. Swan. The consolidation of the three churches into one was a matter of ecclesiastical law and practice, and the decision of the ecclesiastical tribunal on that matter is binding on the superior court and on this court. In all ecclesiastical matters the courts are bound by the decision of the ecclesiastical tribunal. It is so laid down by this court in Whitney v. Society, 5 Conn. 406, and in Gibbs v. Society, 38 Conn. 153. "In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad * * view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority, is that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law, have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final and as binding on them in their application to the case before them." Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 727, 20 L. Ed. 666; Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131, 21 L. Ed. 69. The case of Gaff v. Greer, 88 Ind. 122, is in principle precisely identical with the one at bar. That was an action demanding the title to, and the possession of, lands, and the case depended upon the application of ecclesiastical law. Land had been conveyed to certain persons named in the deed, and described as trustees for the Presbyterian Church in Aurora, Ill., and to their successors in office. The church edifice was erected on this land. A disagreement had arisen between the members of the church in respect to the employment of a pastor. The matter was taken before the presbytery. The presbytery decided that the further employment of this pastor was unwise, and directed the church to secure the services of some other minister. With this decision the majority were dissatisfied, and, the presbytery refusing upon application to recede from its position, they presented to the presbytery a paper reciting their grievances, and asking for certain relief, which concluded by saying: "Failing in this, we have no other alternative but to withdraw from your ecclesiastical jurisdiction." The presbytery considered the paper, and determined that when any portion of the members of a church withdrew the remaining members constitute the church. This decision had been approved by the synod, and by the general assembly of the Presbyterian Church. The majority had possession of the church building, and continuously had regular preaching and services in conformity with the rites and ceremonies of the Presbyterian Church. minority, under the direction of the presbytery, thereafter selected elders, elected trustees, employed another minister, demanded the possession of the church property, and, that being refused, brought the suit for its recovery. The court held and decided that the determination of the presbytery "that where any portion of the members of a church withdrew the remaining members constitute the church" was binding upon it (the court), and that the minority was entitled to recover. The decision may be expressed in this way: "Where a presbytery has decided that certain members of a Presbyterian Church have seceded, the decision The binds the civil courts, and the seceders, although a majority, lose their rights to the church property." There are many other cases to the same effect, among which we have examined the following ones: State v. Farris, 45 Mo. 183; Robertson v. Bullions, 9 Barb. 64, 134; McKinney v. Griggs, 5 Bush, 401; Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. St. 335; Krecker v. Shirey, 163 Pa. St. 534, 30 Atl. 440, 29 L. R. A. 476; College v. Wyatt, 27 Or. 390, 31 Pac. 206, 37 Pac. 1022, 26 L. R. A. 68; Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253; Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 14 L. Ed. 942; Hennessey v. Walsh, 55 N. H. 515, 530; Baxter v. McDonnell, 155 N. Y. 83, 49 N. E. 667, 40 L. R. A. 670. In Wheelock v. Presbyterian Church, 119 Cal. 477, 51 Pac. 841, the court said: "But the ecclesiastical court known as the 'presbytery' had the power to deal with the First Presbyterian Church in all matters ecclesiastical. The church, as an ecclesiastical body, was under the absolute control and dominion of the presbytery, and the decisions and decrees of that body were binding upon it, as the decisions of this court are binding upon inferior judicial tribunals. These decisions are not only binding upon the church as an ecclesiastical body, but they are binding and conclusive upon courts wherever and whenever material to pending litigation." We think these authorities are sufficient to establish the proposition made a little above, that in all matters ecclesiastical the decision of the ecclesiastical tribunals is binding on the courts, and that the action and decision of Bishop Walden, to the effect that the plaintiffs are, according to the rules, usages, laws, and discipline of the Methodist Church, the successors of the grantees named in the deed of Mr. Swan, ought to have been held by the superior court as binding upon it, that the general claims of the plaintiffs are correct, and that their prayers for relief, as the pleadings now stand, should have been granted. It is unnecessary, in view of these conclusions, to consider the act of the general assembly of 1897. The finding shows that the land was mortgaged to the Norwich Savings Society, on which mortgage the defendant has paid $514.50. It seems equitable that he should receive this back, with interest at the same rate which would have been paid to the bank. We think the third prayer of the plaintiffs ought to be granted; that is, that the plaintiffs, on paying to the defendant the amount due on said mortgage as is above specified, should be allowed to redeem said mortgage, and that upon such payment the defendant should execute to the plaintiffs a proper release deed of the premises. There is error. The judgment is set aside, and the case is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings, as is herein directed. The other judges concurred. (73 Conn. 249) MURPHY v. DERBY ST. RY. CO. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Oct. 4, 1900.) STREET RAILWAYS-KILLING OF CHILD-NEGLIGENCE OF PARENTS-MATERIALITY-FINDING OF TRIAL COURT- CONCLUSIVENESS DUTY TO SOUND BELL-NEGLECT OF CHILD TO LOOK-INCONSISTENT FINDINGS-PROXIMATE CAUSE. 1. In an action by the administrator of a child for damages for its death from being run over by a car of the defendant company, the negligence of the child's parents in allowing it to play in the street is an immaterial question, where it does not appear that the parents are in a position to be benefited by a participation in the distribution of the amount recovered. 2. In an action for the killing of a child by a street car, which approached an ice wagon standing by the track, behind which the child was playing, without sounding the bell, a ruling by the trial court that, whenever a car is rapidly approaching a point where it is apparent that the danger of injury to the public will be materially lessened by sounding the bell, it is the duty of the motorman to do so, was proper. 3. A finding of the trial court that the circumstances of the case presented a special emergency which required the motorman, in the exercise of ordinary care, to sound his bell, cannot be reviewed on appeal, since it would be impossible to tell whether the error, if any, was in the inference of fact from the whole testimony or in the inference of law from the facts as viewed by the trial court. 4. Where a child of 6 years, who was playing behind an ice wagon, which obstructed his view of an approaching car, stepped on the track without looking in both directions, a finding that the failure to look was not conclusive evidence of contributory negligence will not be disturbed. 5. Where the trial court found, as a matter of fact, that a car of the defendant company approached an ice wagon standing by the track without sounding the bell, and that plaintiff's intestate, a child of 6 years, who was play ing behind the wagon, stepped on the track 25 feet in front of the car, and was killed, and also found, as conclusions of law, that the de fendant was negligent in not sounding the bell, and that the intestate was free from contributory negligence, the contention that the findings of fact and conclusions of law were inconsistent was without merit. 6. Where plaintiff's intestate, who was playing behind an ice wagon, which was standing by the defendant's track, was killed by stepping in front of a car, which approached without sounding the bell, a finding of the trial court that the failure to sound the bell was the proximate cause of the injury was proper. Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; George W. Wheeler, Judge. Action by Timothy Murphy, administrator, against the Derby Street-Railway Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff's intestate (William Murphy) died from injuries caused by his being struck and run over by a trolley car operated by the defendant, and that the injuries were wholly due to the negligence of the defendant. Two grounds for the claim of negligence are stated,-one, that the defendant, at the time and place alleged. so carelessly and improperly operated and managed said street car, at so great a rate of speed, without proper watchfulness and without proper control, that by reason of its negligence in that respect said car struck and ran over the said William Murphy, causing the injuries mentioned; the other, that the defendant neglected to equip said car at said time and place with any fender or appliance adapted to reasonably protect from injury persons having occasion to cross said street and said railroad and tracks thereon. The defendant suffered a default, and, in pursuance of statute, gave notice that upon the hearing in damages it would offer evidence to disprove the allegation of negligence through careless operation of the car, and the allegation that said William Murphy was in the exercise of due care, and to prove that the railroad commissioners have never made any order upon the defendant in reference to the use of fenders, under the provisions of the statute in such case provided. The trial court found that the defendant was guilty of negligence upon both grounds alleged, that contributory negligence of the plaintiff's intestate had not been proved, and rendered judgment that the plaintiff recover substantial damages. The finding of facts by the court (G. W. Wheeler, J.) shows, among other things, that at the time of the accident the street was occupied by three large carts, one (a covered cart loaded with ice) so situated that any one behind it could not see the approaching car, and the motorman could not see any one behind the cart; that the car approached the ice cart at about the rate of eight miles an hour, without any sounding of the bell; that the deceased ran out from behind the ice cart to cross the street, and just as he reached the track the conductor rang the bell, the car then being about 25 feet off; that deceased stopped, seemed paralyzed with fear, and in a moment was struck, notwithstanding every effort the motorman could make to stop the car. The finding states as fully as possible all the surrounding circumstances, including the statement that the deceased was a boy 6 years old, of ordinary intelligence; that he had left his home, a short distance from the place of the accident, without permission, and went to the house of a lady where he was accustomed to go, and half an hour after leaving there was, with some other children, unattended, playing behind the ice cart. The court states its conclusion as follows: "The operation of the car with ordinary care at this place, and under the circumstances of this case, required the motorman should ring his bell, when approaching this crosswalk and driveway and this covered ice cart, at a reasonable distance therefrom, and to continue to ring it at intervals when approaching the ice cart until the cart was passed, so as to give notice of the approaching car to any one in the street behind the cart whom the cart concealed from the view of the motorman, and who was unable to see the car because of the cart"; and also required the defendant to instruct its motorman to ring as aforesaid in situations like the one appearing in evidence. "I find that the defendant has not proved either its own freedom from negligence or the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's intestate." The finding also states the facts from which the court drew the further conclusion that the defendant was also liable for negligence in not equipping its car with a fender. Upon the trial the defendant made the following claims of law: (1) The defendant was not guilty of negligence; (2) it was not guilty of negligence in not having upon said car a fender; (3) it was negligence in the parents of the plaintiff's intestate to permit him to play at large unattended upon the street, as stated in the finding, and said negligence of the parents contributed to the accident, and is a good defense to this action, beyond the consequences of the default; (4) that upon the facts in said case the defendant is not liable for more than nominal damages. The court overruled all said claims. The appeal assigns error as follows: (1) The facts set forth in the finding do not support the conclusion of fact that the defendant was negligent in omitting to equip its car with a fender; (2) said facts do not support the conclusion of fact that the motorman was negligent, as found by the court; (3) said facts do not support the conclusion of the court that the plaintiff's intestate was not guilty of contributory negligence; (4) in overruling the claims of law made upon the trial. Edwin B. Gager and George C. Bryant, for appellant. Charles S. Hamilton and Denis T. Walsh, for appellee. HAMERSLEY, J. (after stating the facts). There is no error in the rulings of the court made upon the trial. The first is disposed of in treating the fourth. The second, in the view we take of the case, is not material. The third is correct. Whether parents are negligent or not in permitting a child to be in the street unattended is an immaterial question in a suit by the child for injury to it. Daley v. Railroad Co., 26 Conn. 591, 598. This action is based on the injury to the child, and is brought by his administrator under the statute. If it be so that the negligence of the parents might be material in such an action by reason of their expectant participation in the distribution of the amount that might be recovered, nevertheless it must appear that the parents were in a position to be so benefited, and that fact does not appear in this case. Railroad Co. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 393, 20 S. E. 550. The fourth is the one under which the material errors claimed are assigned. The court ruled that upon the facts the defendant was liable in substantial damages. Such a ruling in this case is equivalent to a conclusion that the facts as settled by the court establish negligence in the defendant, and do not establish contributory negligence in the plaintiff. The conclusion is final unless it appears from the record that the trial court applied to the conduct of the parties an erroneous standard of duty, or that its finding of facts was necessarily influenced by the adoption of some other erroneous rule of law, or that one or more of the subordinate facts found are clearly and necessarily inconsistent with the soundness of the court's ultimate conclusion as to negligent conduct. And so the appeal assigns as error that the subordinate facts found do not support the ultimate conclusions as to negligence, and the defendant claims in argument that these conclusions are erroneous for all the reasons above indicated. The only error claimed in the application of a standard of duty or other rule of law, as affecting the finding of negligence in the operation of the car, relates to the duty of the motorman in sounding his bell. The duty of a corporation like the defendant to use every reasonable precaution to minimize the danger to the public growing out of its exercise of the special privileges granted it in the use of highways is clear. The reasonableness of a particular precaution against danger, arising from conditions well defined and constantly recurring, may be a question of law. Bunnell v. Bridge Co., 66 Conn. 24, 34, 33 Atl. 533. It appears from the record that the trial court ruled that whenever a car of the defendant is rapidly approaching a point where, from the existing condition and occupancy of the highway, it is apparent that the danger of injury to the public at that time and place will be materially lessened by sounding the bell, it is the duty of the defendant and of its motorman to sound the bell. This ruling is correct. But the court went further, and found as a fact that at the time and place in question there was an apparent danger arising from the circumstances of the case, and presenting a special emergency which required the motorman, in the exercise of ordinary care, to sound his bell. It is this finding of fact which is the defendant's real grievance, but this finding of the fact of negligent conduct, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, we cannot review. It is one of those cases where it is impossible for the appellate court (no matter how detailed a statement the trial court may make) to say with certainty whether the error, if any, was in the inference of fact from the whole testimony, or in the inference of law from the facts as they really lay in the mind of the trial court. It cannot know the precise legal inference drawn. Nolan v. Railroad Co., 70 Conn. 159, 191, 39 Atl. 115; Lawler v. Railway Co., 72 Conn. 74, 81, 43 Atl. 545. The only error urged that could affect the conclusion as to contributory negligence rests on the claim that a boy of 6 years of age, of ordinary intelligence, is necessarily guilty of contributory negligence in running across a street where there is a street-railway track, without looking in both directions to see if a car is then approaching. It is, at least, doubtful whether this question is fairly raised upon the record. But, assuming that it is, we think the defendant's claim is incorrect. Such conduct may be evidence of contributory negligence in a child as described, but not necessarily conclusive. The court found that, under the circumstances of this case, it was not conclusive, and that finding is final. Wood v. City of Danbury, 72 Conn. 69, 73, 43 Atl. 554. Especially is this true when the burden rests, as it does upon a hearing in damages, on the defendant to prove contributory negligence. The claim that the subordinate facts found, or any of them, are logically and necessarily inconsistent with the ultimate conclusions as to negligent conduct, is without merit. There is no error in the conclusion of the trial court that the negligence of the defendant in the operation of its car was a proximate cause of the injury complained of, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover substantial damages on that ground. This conclusion is sufficient to support the judgment, and there is no occasion to consider the alleged error of the court in holding that the defendant was also liable by reason of its negligence in omitting to equip its car with a fender. There is no error in the judgment of the superior court. The other judges concurred. (73 Conn. 247) CAMP v. CARROLL (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Oct. 4, 1900.) BASTARDS-BOROUGH COURT-JURISDICTION- 1. Under direct provisions of Sp. Laws 1886, pp. 225, 232, the borough court of Wallingford has jurisdiction over bastardy proceedings, and may proceed therein in the same manner as justices of the peace may do. 2. Under Pub. Acts 1899, c. 187, providing that unless one of the parties to a suit should make a written request for a jury to the clerk of court within 30 days after the return, or within 10 days after an issue of fact was actually joined, the issue shall be tried by the court, where defendant did not move for a jury trial until after the issue had been joined and the time for entering the case in the jury docket had expired, and the parties and witnesses were present for trial, his motion was properly denied. 3. Pub. Acts 1899, c. 187, which provides that unless one of the parties to a suit shall request a jury within 30 days after the return day or within 10 days after an issue of fact is actually joined, it shall be tried by the court, applies to bastardy proceedings. Appeal from court of common pleas, New Haven county; Leverett M. Hubbard, Judge. Action by Anna Camp against John Car`roll. From a judgment in favor of complainant, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Cornelius J. Danaher, for appellant. Oswin H. D. Fowler, for appellee. HAMERSLEY, J. There is no sufficient reason for this appeal. Bastardy proceedings are regulated by chapter 83, Gen. St. By a special act (Sp. Laws 1886, pp. 225, 232), the jurisdiction and powers given under the |