Sir, once again, thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today, and we look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of General Alexander follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY LTG KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and members of the committee, on behalf of the men and women of United States Army Intelligence, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. First, let me assure you that I find the alleged abuses of detainees in Abu Ghraib Prison, Iraq, totally reprehensible. Army Intelligence neither condones nor tolerates these actions. Furthermore, I would like to emphasize that Army Intelligence Soldiers are trained to abide by the highest standards for the humane treatment of all personnel in the custody of our soldiers worldwide. We conduct extensive legal training for all of our Army Intelligence professionals, especially interrogators, in the Law of War and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Our training manuals specifically prohibit the abuse of detainees, and we ensure all of our soldiers trained as interrogators receive this training. Geneva Conventions protocols are reinforced during each practical exercise. An interrogator will flunk an exercise should he or she inadvertently violate a Geneva accord. The contemptible behavior of a few soldiers does not represent the professionalism, dedication, and compassion demonstrated by the majority of soldiers in Iraq. Commanders and soldiers at every level have the duty to respect and follow the established international laws of armed conflict and to treat everyone, to include those within our military detention facilities with dignity and decency in the same ways that we expect to be treated as Americans. Those soldiers who mistreated or humiliated detainees will be brought to justice swiftly. Again, the Army does not condone or tolerate such behavior. The allegations of misconduct at Abu Ghraib have hit at the very core values of our Nation, the Department of Defense and the Army Intelligence Community, causing us grave concern and prompting a very focused and thorough review of these incidents. Senior Leaders at all levels take every report seriously and expect an extensive investigation of every allegation. CJTF-7 has an ongoing investigation of allegations that Intelligence Soldiers were involved in the abuse of detainees in Abu Ghraib. This investigation, a “Procedure 15," currently ongoing and being conducted by Major General George Fay, will identify and report questionable intelligence activities that may have violated law, Executive Order, or presidential directive. Army Intelligence will not tolerate soldiers who violate the dignity and rights of others, to include those we have detained. We remain steadfastly committed to dealing expeditiously with any complaint or allegation of mistreatment, and to ensuring our commanders take appropriate action. Once again, thank you for this opportunity to speak before you today. I look forward to answering your questions. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. General Burgess. General BURGESS. Sir, I will stay with the statement as read by Lieutenant General Alexander, and I look forward to your questions. Chairman WARNER. Fine. General Romig. General ROMIG. Sir, I have no comments, either. I look forward to your questions. Chairman WARNER. Let us proceed with a 6-minute round, in hopes that we can get in two rounds this afternoon. General Alexander, with due respect to you, you laid out very concisely and professionally, exactly what the manuals say, what everybody was supposed to do, but it didn't happen, and this committee and you pointed out, General Fay is looking into that-is trying to put together a record for the Senate, for the American public, that lends some explanation to what happened. Now, you're the chief of all Army Intelligence. Number one, the MI people that did the interrogations participated, presumably to some degree, with the guards. They were your people down the chain, correct? General ALEXANDER. Yes, sir. Chairman WARNER. General Karpinski was in your chain, so to speak. Is that correct? General ALEXANDER. She's in the Army, yes, sir. Chairman WARNER. I realize that, but she was working with your people. General ALEXANDER. Yes, sir. Chairman WARNER. Now, what can you tell the committee, of your own knowledge, to help us and the American public and, indeed, much of the public in the world, to understand what went wrong? We know the wrongs occurred. We've gotten the initial reports General Taguba. We, through the press, have seen pictures. It's a possibility the Senate may see additional pictures. The Pentagon is very forthcoming in trying to help this committee and the leadership of the committee and the leadership of the Senate develop that evidence. What can you personally tell, as chief, as to what went wrong? General ALEXANDER. Sir, on the specifics, my assessment, it was a failure of leadership. What we need to-in terms of the MP leadership, as General Taguba said the question, the real question is, did intelligence personnel tell those individuals to do that? Were those personnel low-level people who said this would be a good idea, or was that high-ranking personnel that said, "This is the method of operations?" My understanding and, to date, my belief, is that this was interaction between low-level people, who were not in the action of their duties, who were not doing interrogations at the time, or who made statements to these folks that, "Yes, what you're doing"-as it was in General Taguba's report-"is softening them up. They're speaking like crazy." What General Fay has to find out in his investigation is, where was there complicity? Who and at what level did that go? To this point, my belief is that that was informal, and that these were a group of undisciplined MP soldiers who felt that they had some, according to their statements, preference from MI to go and do what they were doing. But we don't have any facts to an individual that did that, other than a couple of civilian contractors who were involved. That's what we're looking for, sir. We will investigate that to find out exactly who said it and where does it go. Chairman WARNER. So even though you're the chief of Army Intelligence, even though this series of problems has been going on since the fall of 2003, you cannot provide the committee any facts that help us understand exactly what was done and not done by all levels, not just low levels of those in the Intelligence Command. Is that correct? General ALEXANDER. No, sir. I—————— Chairman WARNER. All right. General ALEXANDER. Let me go up higher. Clearly, at the higher levels, the rules of Chairman WARNER. A lot of people are following this. I think the committee understands "high" and "low." Chairman WARNER. What's your definition of "high," what's the definition of "low"? General ALEXANDER. Let's start at the brigade level, where Colonel Pappas was involved. The two incidents that Chairman WARNER. He was an MI man, is that correct? General ALEXANDER. He was an MI colonel, subordinate to the CJTF-7, working for General Sanchez. His responsibilities and his policies that he put out were as an example, these interrogation ROE and the procedures. I know of two incidents Chairman WARNER. You know for a fact he did that? General ALEXANDER. Yes, sir. We have-in fact, we also have his rules that he had folks coming in to brief them on. We had General Sanchez's statements of, "Here are the interrogator rules of engagement." Both of those are the same, and they stem from that same manual. In every case, it says, "Treat prisoners humanely." Also, sir, I think it's important to note that when we talk about this humane treatment, when Colonel Pappas found a soldier having a prisoner walk naked, he found out about that and disciplined that soldier right away. So when actions were brought Chairman WARNER. What's the date/time group of that action? General ALEXANDER. I don't have the date/time group, but I'll get you that, sir, for the record. [The information referred to follows:] On 16 November 2003, a military intelligence soldier decided to strip a detainee in response to what the solder believed was uncooperative and physically recalcitrant behavior. Later the soldier walked the semi-naked detainee across the camp. Colonel Pappas left the issue to Lieutenant Colonel Jordan to handle. Lieutenant Colonel Jordan temporarily removed the soldier from interrogation duties. The soldier was counseled by her immediate supervisor but did not received an Article 15, UCMJ. General ALEXANDER. But he took action. So my thoughts are, when he knew something was going on, he took action. There were other cases of discipline that he took on soldiers who did an interrogation at the wrong time, and I will get you the exact date/time group of that, too. It's in General Taguba's report, but I think we need to get that, and I'll put that for the record. [The information referred to follows:] On 7 October 2003, three MI personnel conducted an interrogation without authorization. The three soldiers each received nonjudicial punishment, Field Grade Article 15s, from Colonel Pappas for failing to get authorization to interrogate the detainee. Additionally, Colonel Pappas removed them from interrogation operations. General ALEXANDER. So it's clear, from where I sit, that both Colonel Pappas and the theater knew the ROE. Chairman WARNER. But somehow that information either didn't flow down the chain or there was absolute total breakdown in discipline and disregard. General ALEXANDER. That's what I believe. Chairman WARNER. Go below Pappas. What's the next level? General ALEXANDER. Sir, the next level was Chairman WARNER. Battalion commander, isn't it? General ALEXANDER. There's the battalion commander, and there is the JIDC. Chairman WARNER. All right. Can you tell us about their level General ALEXANDER. Right. Yes, sir. Lieutenant Colonel Jordan was the officer in charge of the JIDC. He is also mentioned in the Taguba Report for not doing his job. What we have to find out is, in executing his, and in executing Colonel Pappas's, what did they or did they not do. That's one of the things that General Fay has to find out, and that's part of that Procedure 15, sir. That's part of an ongoing investigation. Chairman WARNER. I feel that, as hard as this committee tries to discharge its oversight, we're at the point where we're not likely to learn much about what took place and where that level struck a breakdown of discipline until this Fay Report is out. Is that your thinking? General ALEXANDER. Yes sir, to get the accurate answer. I can give you an assessment, but that assessment will change as we find these facts out and as General Fay completes his investigation. Chairman WARNER. Give us your assessment to date. General ALEXANDER. Sir, my assessment is there was a complete breakdown in the discipline on the MP side, and there were some MI soldiers, contractors who may have been involved, or at least in some of those pictures. The question is, what did they say to the MPs to get them to do this? To this point, as General Taguba said, there is nothing that we know that a MI person told them to do this. Chairman WARNER. All right. General ALEXANDER. That's what we're trying to find out. General ALEXANDER. Sir, the contract actually stems under a CENTCOM contract, and that CENTCOM contract then went to CJTF-7. But the MI people there at Abu Ghraib were responsible for oversight of those contractors. It's important to note that what Major General Fast required of those contractors-and she's the C2 in Iraq, the senior MÎ person in Iraq Chairman WARNER. I met her on my visit over there during the same time frame you were there. General ALEXANDER. Right. Sir, they were to read and state they understood the interrogation ROE. Chairman WARNER. Did she check their level of experience and training? General ALEXANDER. Sir, that was part of the contract, that they were supposed to have the 97 Echo, which is our interrogation military occupational specialty (MOS), or equivalent, to be hired. Chairman WARNER. All right. Do you have any knowledge of other government-U.S. Government agencies, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or otherwise, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) or any other group, that were working with your MI people? General ALEXANDER. Sir, I know that there were other government agencies that visited the facility and talked to prisoners, but I know of no wrongdoing on their behalf. Chairman WARNER. I'm not suggesting that. Who are they? What are they? General ALEXANDER. The CIA. Chairman WARNER. CIA. General ALEXANDER. The CIA also conducted some interroga Chairman WARNER. What about DIA? General ALEXANDER. Sir, I do not know that DIA conducted that. I would have to check that. Chairman WARNER. All right. My time is expired. Senator Levin. Senator LEVIN. You say you have no evidence that MI people were actively involved in and directing, and suggesting that harsh activities occur? General ALEXANDER. Sir, we have not found any. Senator LEVIN. But General ALEXANDER. That's what we're looking for. Senator LEVIN.-the Taguba Report itself quotes for instance, on page 18, Sergeant Davis, the MP company Sergeant or Specialist Connell. He said, "I saw them nude, but MI"-military intelligence "would tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes." Isn't that evidence that MI General ALEXANDER. Sir, that Senator LEVIN.-told them to take away their clothes? Then you have Sergeant Davis stating that he heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. Isn't that evidence? When he asked what MI said, he stated, "Loosen this guy up for us. Make sure he has a bad night. Make sure he gets the treatment." Isn't that evidence that the intelligence folks were involved in this? General ALEXANDER. Sir, those are the statements that spawned the Procedure 15 to look into exactly who said it. Because the statements, as you read those, it says, "MI personnel or people in civilian or people of authority." But when you ask, you get, "Well, who specifically told you to do this?" That's the question that we have to get to. Senator LEVIN. But you've General ALEXANDER. They can't be Senator LEVIN.-some evidence, at least. General ALEXANDER. Oh, absolutely. Sir, and that's why the investigation is going on. Senator LEVIN. But I thought a minute ago you said you haven't seen any evidence that MI was involved. General ALEXANDER. Sir, we have no proof that a person in authority told them to do this activity. Senator LEVIN. Let's go back to the MI personnel. There is evidence, I take it, in the Taguba Report that MI personnel gave suggestions to the MPs that they "loosen this guy up," that they take his clothes away, that they make sure he has a "bad night," and that he gets "the treatment." That is evidence, isn't it, of MI personnel involvement? General ALEXANDER. Yes, sir, that's a statement by those soldiers. Senator LEVIN. Right. All I'm saying is, is that evidence? I'm not saying it's conclusive. I'm not saying anything other than it is evidence, is it not? General ALEXANDER. Yes, sir. That's the evidence that led to the beginning of the Procedure 15. Senator LEVIN. All right. So you've seen that evidence. Now, these interrogation ROE that I think you handed out |