it was essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for the successful exploitation of the internees. General Taguba strongly disapproved of the recommendation, and he has stated that setting of the conditions for the detainees' successful exploitation through interrogation is fundamentally inconsistent with Army regulations and undermines the goals of running a safe and secure detention facility. That is what he testified to here, before this committee.

The New York Times reported yesterday that Colonel Thomas Pappas, who is the MI Brigade Commander at Abu Ghraib, told General Taguba that there were no safeguards to ensure the MPS at Abu Ghraib behaved properly in setting conditions for the detainees. "There would be no way for us to actually monitor whether that happened," Colonel Pappas said. "We have no formal system in place to do that." General Taguba also found the MPs had not been trained on the Geneva Conventions.

Was this not a catastrophic failure of leadership? How would you expect an average soldier in the Army to understand the term "successful exploitation" is not simply an euphemism for "anything goes"? Do you take responsibility for that failure?

General MILLER. Thank you, Senator.

The Taguba Report was very thorough, but I would like to clarify on this one point. The recommendation that my team made in the September time frame was that the MPs help set the conditions for successful interrogation as we had learned of their success in Guantanamo. The recommendation was that they conduct passive intelligence-gathering during this process. That meant to observe the detainees, to see how their behavior was, to see who they would speak with, and then to report that to the interrogators so the interrogators could better understand the human dynamic of the detainee as he would come into the interrogation booth.

We also recommended that the MPs, for security reasons, would accompany the detainee from the cell block, or the area where they were held, up to the interrogation booth, because they are security risks. Then the MP would wait somewhere else, and then accompany the detainee back. Our recommendation was that the MPs did not actively participate in any form of the interrogation itself. That was explained, in detail, to the chain of command. The SOP that laid that out was provided to them. It is about 200 pages long, and it goes into great detail about how this system works, because it says, in the SOP, that the MPs are not trained intelligence officers and should not initiate questioning or anything like that; they were just to be observers of that process. So that was the active support for the interrogation process that was recommended.

So, Senator, I will tell you, I believe that the recommendations we made, had they been implemented, would have not only increased the intelligence value of what was being done, but helped ensure that humane detention was accomplished throughout every facility.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Before responding, General Sanchez, you made full reference to the brigade commander. Now, that would be General Karpinski? General SANCHEZ. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Chairman WARNER. All right. I want the record to reflect that.

General ABIZAID. Mr. Chairman, just for the record, I would like to caution the committee. We still do not know what we do not know.

Chairman WARNER. That is very clear, and we recognize that. It has been a struggle to get a full understanding throughout this whole thing and that is why we have to entrust credibility to what the DOD, and the Army particularly, are doing now with a series of investigations. We fully appreciate that.

General ABIZAID. I think that Major General Fay's report will go a long way to make us understand this dynamic between MPs and MI, in particular, relative to Senator McCain's questions.

Chairman WARNER. I share that. Thank you, General.

Senator Roberts.

Senator ROBERTS. General Abizaid, you realize that your statement is contrary to the United States Senate, where we always know what we do not know. [Laughter.]

Let me say that I want to thank Senator McCain for his comments, because I think he spoke for the whole committee in reference to the contribution that you are making to our country and your service to our country, and I would like to associate myself with his remarks.

I am going to try to get my fast questions in to General Miller and basically-well, first let me ask of General Sanchez, no soldier would be justified in interpreting an order in such a way as to violate the UCMJ, is that correct?

General SANCHEZ. Sir, I would agree with that, absolutely.

Senator ROBERTS. So even if a soldier did misinterpret General Miller's recommendation, even though I doubt if they had it, to carry out these acts, it would not be an excuse, would it?

General SANCHEZ. Sir, that is correct. That is a basic instinct we have built into the soldier.

Senator ROBERTS. General Miller, would the abuse evidenced by the photos be permitted or condoned under any practices or policies that were recommended in your report?

General MILLER. Senator, they absolutely would not be.

Senator ROBERTS. Would the abuse evidenced in the photos be permitted or condoned at any of the practices or policies at Guantanamo Bay?

General MILLER. Senator, they would not.

Senator ROBERTS. Do you have any problem with General Ryder, who allegedly said there should be a firewall between the MPs and MI, given your rationale as to why they should work together, if we have the leadership and the training and the discipline that you have indicated that we now have?

General MILLER. Sir, our doctrinal publication said that there should be cooperation between the MPs and the intelligence function in a detention facility, but it does say there should not be any active participation by the MP force in any interrogations.

Senator ROBERTS. I have a staffer who works on the Intelligence Committee for me. I have the privilege of being chairman. He has been down at Guantanamo, in a Reserve capacity. He indicates that you made a remarkable turnaround down there. Many Senators have gone down. It only takes day. I encourage every Sen

ator here to do that. I credit you for improving a very difficult kind of situation.

In Iraq, it is my understanding that there are three prisons, five battalions. Four of the five are Reserves. Is that correct?

General MILLER. Senator, in the organization that I now lead, as the Deputy Commanding General for Detainee Operations, that is a correct statement.

Senator ROBERTS. After the incident at Abu Ghraib, how would you determine the leadership today in regards to discipline, training, and leadership of those personnel who you command as of right now?

General MILLER. Sir, in the first 30 days of my opportunity to work in this capacity, I was able to visit every facility and talk to virtually every leader and soldier who is involved in this. I will tell you that there is strong, positive, dynamic leadership throughout this chain of command.

Senator ROBERTS. So we have seen a hell of a change.

General MILLER. Sir, we have seen soldiers and leaders who know what standards are and execute them 7 days a week, 24 hours a day.

Senator ROBERTS. At Guantanamo Bay, you had one MP per two prisoners. In Iraq, you have one MP per eight and a half prisoners. Is that correct?

General MILLER. Sir, those are approximately the correct numbers.

Senator ROBERTS. Okay. But you have indicated that 50 percent of the prisoners in Abu Ghraib will be released. You have 3,800 prisoners now; that will bring it down to 1,500. What is happening to the 1,500? I understand there are 74 being tried by the Central Court of Iraq. Will all 1,500 be tried?

General MILLER. Sir, those approximately 1,500 security internees have been interned. That means that we have strong evidence that they have committed attacks on the coalition, and they will most likely be referred to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq for trial by the Iraqi system for those. There are a number of those, approximately 600 to 700, who are so dangerous that, should they be released back into Iraqi society, they would put that society at risk of a high probability of attack on their fellow citizens. Senator ROBERTS. So they are the worst of the worst. General MILLER. Sir, those are the worst of the worst.

Senator ROBERTS. If the ICRC investigated today, what would they find?

General MILLER. Sir, the ICRC is, as a matter of fact, investigating today. They are at Camp Bucca, which is one of our theater facilities down by Umm Qasr, on the southern border. They have found that we are making an enormous effort to improve conditions every day, that we take their findings seriously, and that we have addressed them. General Sanchez made a change when I arrived in the theater and put the ICRC responsibility directly on me. So all reports come to me, and I move them to General Sanchez and the command leadership as rapidly as possible.

Senator ROBERTS. So until we get the report by General Fay to assess responsibility and accountability, you think there has been a big change in regards to leadership, training, and discipline,

which are all directed at interrogation, to provide better intelligence to save Iraqi lives and American lives, is that correct? General MILLER. Yes, sir, that is absolutely correct.

Senator ROBERTS. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Abizaid and General Sanchez, this travesty of justice occurred on your watch. The Iraqi prisoner abuse scandal has dealt a body blow to the heroic efforts of scores of American military troops and civilian workers in Iraq to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. I do not know if that damage can ever be fully repaired. Certainly, a lot depends on what else might emerge about this scandal and on what you and the civilian leadership at the Pentagon do to set things right.

General Sanchez, you told Senator Levin that you never saw the ROE presented to this committee last week. If you did not see or set the so-called ROE for the interrogation of prisoners in Iraq, who does? Who does set them?

General SANCHEZ. Senator, what I stated was that I had not seen the specific slide that was referred to. I was the one who approved the interrogation ROE on September 12 and again in the October time frame, sir.

Senator BYRD. Does anyone in the civilian leadership of the Pentagon need to approve the rules of interrogation operations?

to

General SANCHEZ. Senator, those rules were forwarded CENTCOM in the September time frame, and, based on the inputs from CENTCOM, resulted in the October memorandum.

Senator BYRD. I will ask the question again. Does anyone in the civilian leadership of the Pentagon need to approve the rules of interrogation operations?

General SANCHEZ. Sir, I do not know. As far as I know, there is no requirement for the civilian leadership to approve those rules of engagement.

General ABIZAID. Senator, I would say we are all responsible for making sure what happens in our organizations happens right. Things do not have to go all the way to the top to be approved. We know what is right and we know what is wrong.

Senator BYRD. The committee needs to know if you can answer this question. Does anyone in the civilian leadership of the Pentagon need to approve the rules of interrogation operations? If so, who?

General ABIZAID. My answer is no. It is our responsibility.

Senator BYRD. Then you are saying that nobody in the Pentagon approves these rules.

General ABIZAID. No, I am not saying that, sir.

Senator BYRD. Then what are you saying?

General ABIZAID. I am saying that the ROE for interrogators are a product of Army doctrine, of Army training, of practices in the field, and of commanders doing their job out there.

Senator BYRD. General Abizaid, if someone at the Pentagon is required to approve these ROE, surely you know.

General ABIZAID. If I knew, Senator, I would tell you. I would not forward any ROE to anybody. Nobody has asked me for any, and

Senator BYRD. So you are, indeed, saying that nobody in the Pentagon approved these rules.

General ABIZAID. I do not know that I am saying whether they reviewed them or not. I am saying that I have not personally forwarded anything to the Pentagon for their approval.

Senator BYRD. Did the SECDEF have to approve these rules to your knowledge?

General ABIZAID. Sir, I am just telling you what I said. In CENTCOM, I have not forwarded anything to the Pentagon for approval with regard to ROE.

Senator BYRD. I am not asking you what you forwarded to the Pentagon. To your knowledge, did the SECDEF have to approve these, or did he approve these ROE, to your knowledge?

Colonel WARREN. Senator, if I might, I was the legal advisor for the command and participated in the drafting of the counter-resistance and interrogation policy. There is no requirement that the DOD review or approve the methods that we used. As Generals Abizaid and Sanchez have said, they were operating in a combat environment. The commanders have the authority to approve those policies.

Senator BYRD. All right, if there is no requirement, to your knowledge, did the SECDEF approve these ROE?

Colonel WARREN. Sir, to my knowledge, no.

Senator BYRD. General Sanchez, as Senator Kennedy stated, The New York Times reported this morning-and here it is, right here the headline says, "Officer Says Army Tried to Curb ICRC Visits to Prison in Iraq." Is that allegation accurate?

General SANCHEZ. Sir, I never approved any policy or procedure or requirement to do that.

Senator BYRD. Let us see what this says. "Two announced inspections in Iraq," and, "The ICRC observed abuses in one cell block on two unannounced inspections in October, and complained in writing on November 6. The military responded that inspectors should make appointments before visiting the cell block." Well, we know what that means.

General Abizaid, the ICRC has alleged a pattern of abuse at detention centers in Iraq. With all due respect, how can you explain the culture of abuse that was allowed to develop in a prison system under your ultimate command?

General ABIZAID. I do not believe that a culture of abuse existed in my command. I do not believe that based on what my IG told me and what the Department of the Army IG told me. I believe that we have isolated incidents that have taken place. I am aware that the ICRC has its view on things. A lot of its view is based upon what happens at the point of detention where soldiers fighting for their lives detain people, which is a very brutal and bloody event.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my time is up.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Byrd.

Senator Allard.

General ABIZAID. Mr. Chairman, if I may?

Chairman WARNER. Feel free, General, when you wish to add