General ABIZAID. Policies do flow from the top of the DOD and I do not want to give any impression that they do not.

Chairman WARNER. We recognize the tradition of civilian leadership.

General ABIZAID. But SOPs are our business and we work them. Senator BYRD. These are not SOPS we are talking about, I hope. Chairman WARNER. Fine.

Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out that I think the real travesty of justice is on the other side, where we see women and children used as shields, where we see a fight being carried on in mosques and other religious structures by our adversaries, where I see that conflict being carried in schools, and where our adversaries do not care about innocent lives. They will cheat and lie and do anything. I think that we have to understand the challenges that our men and women are facing in Iraq, and I think that it is a very difficult situation.

Now, that does not justify, I think, what we have seen by a few individuals here in this prison, and I want to fully understand how it is that that kind of incident would happen in the prison. I think we all have to understand it. I think, General Abizaid, that you have recognized that there is a problem and that we are in the process of correcting that problem.

Major General Miller, of the list of reports that came out, yours was the first report. You looked at Guantanamo and then you went on ahead and briefed, I think, the command in Iraq as to what you learned in Guantanamo, is that correct?

General MILLER. Senator, when I briefed the command of CJTF7, it was on the findings and recommendations that the team I brought found of our assessment of the operations within CJTF–7 in Iraq.

Senator ALLARD. Did you share with them some of the lessons learned and what not in Guantanamo, and explain to them what to watch out for?

General MILLER. Yes, sir. We used our SOPS that we had developed for humane detention, interrogation, and intelligence fusion, to be able to use that as a starting point where they could go about improving their capability.

Senator ALLARD. So when you did your briefing, how far down did that information go? Did it go to those interrogators or were you relying on individuals further down in the command to pass on your words?

General MILLER. Sir, the recommendations that I made from the assessments were given to the senior leadership of the JTF for them to make decisions, upon their applicability, and then to, if they chose, make additional modifications to their procedures to go about doing that. In no case did the team have the opportunity to or ask to brief down at the lowest level. It was at the senior leadership level, at the commander and the senior staff-officer level.

Senator ALLARD. Now, with those lessons learned, can anybody on this panel explain to me what happened to the information that was shared by Major General Miller to the higher command? How

General SANCHEZ. Yes, Senator. After I received the recommendations of General Miller, I then forwarded those to my staff and the commander of the detention center for modification, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, since we knew that there was a difference in climates between the two different operations.

Senator ALLARD. By that difference in climate, you are saying that, in Guantanamo, it was not as pertinent to actually what was happening in the field of battle, but what was happening in Iraq was very pertinent to what was happening on a day-to-day basis in the field of battle, and that information was crucial to the survival of Americans. Is that correct?

General SANCHEZ. Yes, sir, that is exactly right. We were, at that point in time, working very hard to get intelligence fusion at a higher level that could allow us to target, precisely, the enemy forces. We had to very rapidly take those recommendations and modify them to the theater, modify them to ensure that they were in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, get the lessons that had been learned before in interrogation and detention operations, and be able to adjust our own procedures and fix the procedures that we had in country.

Senator ALLARD. Now, General Abizaid and General Sanchez, I would like for you to describe the checks and balances, or the command-wide reporting and supervision, that was in place during 2003, when the subject prisoner abuses occurred. General Taguba's report clearly shows abuses reported as early as May 2003 in Iraq, as well as major accountability and leadership and basic discipline breakdowns through the 800th MP Brigade. I guess the bottom line is, did Brigadier General Karpinski, the 800th MP Brigade Commander, keep you informed as to the deteriorating conditions in her command?

General ABIZAID. I did not talk to the 800th MP Brigade Commander.

Senator ALLARD. General Sanchez.

General SANCHEZ. Sir, as far as the deteriorating conditions of her command, part of our basic understanding in the July/August time frame was that we had a detainee situation that had not been faced by our Army in over 50 years. That was the reason why I had requested the Ryder team to come in to assist us in establishing those operations so that they would be efficient, effective, and treating people with dignity and respect. That is why I supported the Miller team coming into the country. We were providing the resources that were necessary in order for us to stand up the capabilities of the 800th to be able to function effectively.

Senator ALLARD. So the Ryder Report, that was a first report in trying to deal with any hint of impropriety that was happening at the prison, is that correct?

General SANCHEZ. Senator, there were investigations that had been conducted as a result of allegations of abuse that were out in the command, not at the detention centers, at that point. As we have stated before, there were allegations at the point of contact, where the soldiers are fighting every single day, from the ICRC, that prisoners were being treated roughly. Those were the allegations that were being investigated at that point in time. As far as

detention center abuses at that point, I did not have knowledge of that.

General ABIZAID. But I would like to make sure that the committee understands we did have detention center problems. They were overcrowded, we didn't have the MPs in the right place, we were moving into facilities that had been destroyed or damaged by the war, and we had an intelligence problem, in that the tactical units were not getting feedback from the detainees who moved into the detention centers. From Ambassador Bremer's point of view, he had a problem, in that we were not releasing detainees back into the population quickly enough, and he wanted us to come up with a system that would make that more efficient.

So let us be clear that we understood there were problems in the detainee system, linked to the intelligence system, linked to the political system, that had to be addressed and we were working on them. But I would also like to remind you that these images are not the kind of thing that we thought was happening out there, that anyone in the chain of command would have condoned or allowed to be practiced.

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired.

General MILLER. Sir, if I may just add one clarifying point, because I think it is important. During the assistance visit that my team made in the August/September time frame, we were also charged with the responsibility of looking for humane detention at the CJTF-7 level detention facilities. In doing that assessment in one of the facilities, the team found that it was being operated in an unsatisfactory manner. I stopped the assessment, went to General Sanchez and made this report. He directed that there be corrective action made within 48 hours in this facility. That action was immediately started and was continuing on as the assessment team that I led departed theater. So there were reports. I will tell you there was very aggressive action taken by the chain of command to go about correcting those shortfalls.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.
Senator ALLARD. My time is expired.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel Warren, is it accurate to say that all the prisoners at Abu Ghraib were entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions, that they were either enemy prisoners of war (POWs) or protected persons? Is that correct?

Colonel WARREN. Sir, that is right. They were protected persons, either under the Third or Fourth Geneva Conventions.

Senator REED. Under the Geneva Convention Article 31, no physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against any protected persons, in particular to obtain information about them or from third parties. Is that correct?

Colonel WARREN. Sir, you are quoting from Article 31 of the Fourth Convention. That is an accurate recitation of what the Article says. I would cite for you Pictet's Commentary on the Article for elaboration that coercion should not be taken out of context.

Senator REED. Colonel, thank you. But that is the operative rule.

Colonel WARREN. That is the literal rule.

Senator REED. Let us go back to the ROE here. Sleep management, 72 hours, sensory deprivation, 72 hours. Would you consider that to be physical or moral coercion?

Colonel WARREN. Sir, not prohibited coercion, under Article 31, for security internees and unlawful combatants.

Senator REED. I am talking about "in particular to obtain information about them or from third parties."

Colonel WARREN. No, sir, I would not.

Senator REED. So these are not methods to use for interrogation. Colonel WARREN. Sir, the list on the right-hand side of the Senator REED. Can you answer the question, Colonel?

Colonel WARREN. Sir, that does not require a yes or no answer. I have to elaborate upon it.

Senator REED. Well, Colonel, my time is 6 minutes, so let me just

move on.

Colonel WARREN. Yes, sir.

Senator REED. You have just said that these are coercive means. Colonel WARREN. No, sir, I did not. What I said is

Senator REED. For a protected person to obtain information. Colonel WARREN. No, sir. What I said was those that are on the right are a list on a slide, which was produced at a low level, which was not representative of our counter-resistance and interrogation policy.

Senator REED. Excuse me, Colonel. I am not asking how it was evolved, but if 72 hours with a bag over your head is contrary to Article 31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Colonel WARREN. That would be. Yes, sir.

Senator REED. Thank you.

General Sanchez, in today's USA Today, it has been reported that you ordered or approved the use of sleep deprivation, intimidation by guard dogs, excessive noise, and inducing fear as an interrogation method for a prisoner in Abu Ghraib prison. Is that correct?

General SANCHEZ. Sir, that may be correct that it is in a news article, but I never approved any of those measures to be used within the CJTF-7 at any time in the last year.

Senator REED. Excuse me. Now I want to get back to this. It may be correct that you ordered those methods used against a prisoner, is that your answer?

General SANCHEZ. No, sir, that is not what I said. I said it may be correct that it is printed in an article, but I have never approved the use of any of those methods within CJTF-7 in the 122 months that I have been in Iraq.

Senator REED. What level of command produced this slide?

General SANCHEZ. Sir, my understanding is that that was produced at the company commander level.

[The information referred to follows:]

In response to questions by Senator Reed concerning whether I had ordered or approved specific interrogation approaches, I stated, "I have never approved the use of any of those methods within CJTF-7 in the 12.5 months that I've been in Iraq." I provided a similar response to follow-up questions by Senators Collins and Dayton. In the context of Senator Reed's questions, "those methods" referred to a list of interrogation approaches on the right column of a chart entitled, "Interrogation Rules of Engagement" (IROE), which would require a written exception to policy for

use, and to "Sleep Deprivation, Intimidation by Guard Dogs, Excessive Noise and Inducing Fear," which were reported in a USA Today article as having been approved by me for a specific prisoner at Abu Ghraib prison.

CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy in the fall of 2003 was stated in two memoranda, the first dated September 14, 2003, and the second dated October 12, 2003. Both CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy memoranda were furnished to the committee on May 19. The September 14 Policy authorized the methods listed in the right column of the IROE chart, except for “sensory deprivation" and "sleep deprivation." Use of the authorized methods was subject to the general and specific safeguards listed in Enclosure 2 of the Policy, as well as the implementation guidance of the commander, 205th MI Brigade. The September Policy remained in effect for less than 1 month, until superceded by the October 12 Policy.

The October 12 Policy, which remained in effect for 7 months, authorizes the methods listed at its Enclosure 1. These methods do not include sleep deprivation, presence of military working dogs, or excessive noise. Use of any methods not listed at Enclosure 1 of the October 12 memorandum would require an exception to policy granted by me, as well as legal review and review by the command's senior intelligence officer. The methods listed in the right column of the IROE chart are similarly not authorized under the October 12 Policy without an exception to policy granted by me.

Except for segregation in excess of 30 days, I have neither received nor approved any requests for the use of any methods requiring an exception to policy. Except for segregation in excess of 30 days, I have not approved the use of any of those methods for a particular prisoner.

Senator REED. How could the company commander evolve such a specific list? How could the company commander then turn around and say some of these things would require your permission, without any interaction between your commands? It seems to me just difficult to understand.

General SANCHEZ. Sir, it is difficult for me to understand. You would have to ask the commander.

Senator REED. This is the company commander that you relieved and gave a letter of admonition?

General SANCHEZ. No, sir.

Senator REED. No? Okay.

General Miller, at Guantanamo it has been reported that you developed a 72-point matrix for stress and duress that lays out types of coercion and escalating levels. They include harsh heat or cold, withholding food, hooding for days at a time, and naked isolation in cold, dark cells. Is that correct?

General MILLER. Sir, that is categorically incorrect.
Senator REED. That never happened.

General MILLER. Sir, that is categorically incorrect.

Senator REED. All right. When you were dispatched by Secretary Cambone and General Boykin to go to Iraq, did they give you any specific instructions about increasing the aggressiveness of interrogations?

General MILLER. Sir, I was tasked to conduct an assistance visit by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They tasked U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), who then tasked CJTF-Guantanamo to put the team together.

Senator REED. Did you have conversations with General Boykin and Secretary Cambone, prior to your departure, about your trip? General MILLER. Sir, I did not.

Senator REED. You did not. Did you have any discussions after