[§ 2978 pulsory general appearance on the making of a motion to quash citation or service does not carry with it the waiver of venue.9 One who suffers a default waives the venue if service was good,10 but moving to open default and tendering answer as required does not waive it, no service having been had.11 The venue of an action wholly or partly local cannot, ordinarily, be waived unless there is a statute permitting it.12

Officers and stockholders as such can neither make 13 nor revoke a waiver.14 It is an act for the corporation. A stipulation in advance. for a certain venue against the corporation has been held valid,15 and not obnoxious to a statute condemning agreements to accept service, enter appearance, or confess judgment,16 but it cannot be required of a foreign corporation as a condition of admission to the state.17

The venue will be presumed right, so far as necessary to support the judgment and the jurisdiction, 18 but a consent to remove the

Spratley v. Louisiana & A. R. Co., 77
Ark. 412, 95 S. W. 776.

It is not waived by answering to
the proper venue after demand for
change and filing answer with the
original clerk, and by resisting a mo-
tion to strike such answer, and accept-
ing a notice of ruling on the motion
to strike and then moving to strike
the case from the calendar and trans-
fer it as demanded. State v. District
Court of Clay County, 120 Minn. 99,
139 N. W. 135. But it is not waived
when seasonable objection is made.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.
S. 202, 36 L. Ed. 943; Shaw v. Quincy
Min. Co., 145 U. S. 444, 36 L. Ed. 768.
9 The appearance entered conform-
ably to statute is only such as a cor-
rect citation and service would have
been equivalent to. It does not waive
a plea of privilege of venue.
v. A. B. Crouch Grain Co.,
Civ. App., 174 S. W. 630.

Kelly
Tex.

to suit in a county where the court has no jurisdiction because the action is localized elsewhere. Hammel v. Fidelity Mut. Aid Ass'n, 42 Wash. 448, 85 Pac. 35.

13 Under a constitution requiring all civil cases to be tried in the county of defendant's residence, a director's consent to suit in the wrong county is of no force. Central Bank v. Gibson, 11 Ga. 453.

14 A waiver cannot be revoked by intervening stockholders. Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 129, 38 L. Ed. 98.

15 A stipulation that a particular venue be chosen, if suit against the corporation be brought, is valid. Texas Moline Plow Co. v. Biggerstaff, Tex. Civ. App. 185 S. W. 341.

16 Ft. Worth Board of Trade v. Cooke, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 324, 25 S. W. 330.

17 An agreement to waive such a privilege as a condition of admission to do business in the state is void and a statute requiring it unconstitutional. Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 36 L. Ed. 943.

18 Zindorf v. Western American Co.,

case to a county where neither party resides, and where it cannot be sent with their consent, will not be presumed.19 Jurisdiction is not lost by dismissal of the party on whose residence the venue was based.20

-

§ 2979. Residence, chief office or principal place of business. While it has been said that "at common law" a corporation could be sued only at its chief place of business or domicile, this is inaccurate. What is meant is that it could not be served elsewhere, and hence in consequence it could not be sued elsewhere for want of means to acquire jurisdiction.21 This also may be true under the modern statutes, if they require a mode of service that can be accomplished only in a given county or counties; but if the mode so prescribed is not an exclusive one and service can be accomplished elsewhere, the venue is not restricted by such statutes.22 Thus, a provision for service on a lessor through the agency of the lessee's officers or agents has been held not to make the lessor suable only in the county where the injury occurred and where the lessee's agents may be served.23

The statutes applicable to suits against natural persons are usually applied to suits against corporations, if there is no statute expressly applicable to the latter, and by such statutes it is generally enacted that civil actions shall be brought in the county where the defendant, or one of the defendants, resides, or is found,24 or where the plaintiff

26 Wash. 695, 67 Pac. 355; State v.
Superior Court of Pierce County, 14
Wash. 203, 44 Pac. 131; Snyder v.
Philadelphia Co., 54 W. Va. 149, 63
L. R. A. 896, 102 Am. St. Rep. 941, 1
Ann. Cas. 225, 46 S. E. 366.

19 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Cas-
selberry, Tex. Civ. App. -, 139
S. W. 1161; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co.
v. Kiser, Tex. Civ. App.
S. W. 852.

20 See § 2977, supra.

136

21 At common law a corporation could only be sued in the territorial jurisdiction where it had its legal domicile, and that was where it had its chief place of business."' Park Bros. & Co. v. Oil City Boiler Works, 204 Pa. 453, 54 Atl. 334, citing Bailey v. Williamsport & N. B. R. Co., 174 Pa. St. 114, 34 Atl. 556, wherefrom it appears that inability to serve

process on it elsewhere was the reason for the rule.

22 See § 2978, supra.

Under the statute, service may be had on an agent in any county, if the president be absent therefrom or a nonresident. It is not necessary to sue at the corporation's principal place of business. Peoria Ins. Co. v. Warner, 28 Ill. 429.

23 Southwestern R. Co. v. Vellines, 14 Ga. App. 674, 82 S. E. 166, where the lessor was held suable at its own residence, though it might have been sued by service on the lessee's agent in the county where the injury occurred.

24 The statute fixing venue for natural persons applies, and a corporation is suable where it has its principal place of business, but no part of its railroad, for an injury

[§ 2979 resides.26 Such statutes will be held applicable to corporations on the theory that they are to be sued like natural persons 27 and that though they have no "residence" in the technical sense, yet the place of business given to them or chosen by them is for this purpose equivalent to residence, 28 but the terms of the statutes may preclude such an application.29 If the corporation is suable only where a natural person would be, a garnishment proceeding against it must be brought where he could be garnisheed, in absence of a statute specially prescribing another place:30 Before the doctrine of corporate residence was developed by the United States Supreme Court, some authorities were inclined to find that the residence of the corporation was not necessarily at the charter place of business, but was where its stockholders resided.31 In North Carolina it was but recently denied

done in another county where its railroad runs. Bristol v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 15 Ill. 436.

Action against joint tort-feasors may be brought where one lives and process may be sent, as in case of natural persons, to be served in the county where the corporation has its office. Cobbey v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb. 619, 110 N. W. 643.

Insurance corporation of Charleston is a "resident" thereof within jurisdiction of the city court. Cromwell's Ex'rs v. Charleston Insurance & Trust Co., 2 Rich. (S. C.) 512.

A railroad corporation is a person within the statute fixing venue for trespass. Bartee v. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co., 36 Tex. 648.

See as to former and present federal statutes, § 2978, supra.

26 Glaize v. South Carolina R. Co., 1 Strob. (S. C.) 70.

Assumpsit on a bank note lies where holder lives (St. 1784, c. 28, § 13). Briggs v. Nantucket Bank, 5 Mass. 94. 27 Assimilation to natural persons, see

2926, supra.

As to the so-called "common-law doctrine" that they were like persons residing" at the principal place of business and accordingly suable there, see § 2978, supra.

28 See cases in the notes preceding, also in note following in this section. 29 The provision that no "person' shall be sued out of the county in which "he" resides does not apply to corporations. Baltimore & Y. Turnpike Co. v. Crowther, 63 Md. 558, 1 Atl. 279.

30 A trustee process, where the only trustees were corporations in a single county, must be brought there (Rev. St. c. 90, 16). Lewis v. Denney, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 588.

31 A corporation was held to reside and be suable where some of its stockholders resided. Wood v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 13 Conn. 202, 33 Am. Dec. 395.

It was held that a corporation was not to be regarded as dwelling in a place merely because its charter required it to keep and it did keep an office there. (This was decided partly on authority of the earlier cases of Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 3 L. Ed. 38, as to which see Chap. 13, § 390, supra.) Wood v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 13 Conn. 202, 33 Am. Dec. 395.

A corporation has no commonancy and therefore is not within a statute fixing venue according to the residence of the person. Taunton & S.

that a corporation could have the quality or attribute of residence, and hence the plaintiff's residence was the place for suit,32 but statutes have been enacted there giving the corporation a locus for this purpose at its principal place of business,33 so that the doctrine is immaterial except for the argument afforded by it. A foreign corporation, being incapable of a residence within any state but its domicile,34 may be sued at the county of plaintiff's residence,35 or elsewhere at his option,36 in any county which the law permits to be chosen.37

The "residence" of the corporation for such purpose is its principal place of business 38 though some authorities hold it to be a resident wherever it carries on business or has its operative properties.39

[§ 2979 The principal place established by law, not the one actually and wrongfully maintained elsewhere, is to be chosen,40 and when this place is attached to the franchise it binds a holder thereof by succession.41 A corporation may be "found" in any place where it is carrying on business, 42 although this has been denied in Oregon which asserted the doctrine that it was incapable of being found anywhere.43 Within a constitutional provision that certain actions shall be tried in the county where a defendant party resides, a corporation has