[§ 2980 brought in an adjacent county to that where the cause of action arose.28 A statute applying to railroads and covering injuries due to running of engines and cars does not apply to injuries on railroads from other causes.29 A provision for actions "for damages" because of tort will not be construed as applying to actions because of tort but not for damages 30 and when the action is essentially ex contractu it must be laid in a venue proper for contract actions, though it sounds in damages and is based on a breach partaking of the nature of tort.31 Actions for "personal injury" include any tort to the person.32 Not the domicile but the place where an act was to be done is the place for suing for a penalty for failure to do it.33 28 A railroad corporation may “in all other cases" than for setting out fires (Rev. § 419) be sued in a county adjoining that where the cause of action arose (Rev. § 424). Forney v. Black Mountain R. Co., 159 N. C. 157, 74 S. E. 884. And it applies to all railroads. Propst v. Southern R. Co., 139 N. C. 397, 51 S. E. 920. The expression "all other actions" used in a more general sense was construed in a similar inclusive sense in Western Travelers' Acc. Ass'n V. Taylor, 62 Neb. 783, 87 N. W. 950. 29 Under special statute of 1863 as to the Western and Atlantic Railroad, an action for loss of goods shipped should have been brought where the office was located, not at destination of shipment. The general act governs because the special act applied only to damages from running locomotives, etc. Wallace v. Thomas, 34 Ga. 543. By amendment of Laws of [pamph.] 1859, p. 48, by Code, § 3313, a cause of action suable in the county must have been caused by running of cars or engines" or else out of a contract "performable" in the county; hence a trespass to land could only be sued where the principal office was. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Kirpatrick, 35 Ga. 144. Running a hand car is running "cars or engines" (Code, § 3320). IV Priv. Corp.-65 Thomas v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 38 Ga. 222. Trespass on land by constructing a roadbed is suable where it was done. By amendment of Code, § 3369, it was no longer restricted to injuries "in or by the running of cars or engines." Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Carswell, 54 Ga. 251. 30 Etowah Milling Co. v. Crenshaw, 116 Ga. 406, 42 S. E. 709. 31 A supersedeas bond in an injunction suit may be enforced where it is payable (office of the obligor) or where made (county where injunction was had) but not where the damage accrued by delay. The action is contract wise and not tortwise. Waycross Air-Line R. Co. v. Offerman & W. R. Co., 114 Ga. 727, 40 S. E. 738. 32 It is not necessary that there be physical bodily hurt to constitute a "personal injury" within Code, § 6112, and therefore ejection from a train makes a cause of action suable where it occurred. Hatcher v. Southern R. Co., 191 Ala. 634, 68 So. 55. See also Summers v. Southern R. Co., 118 Ga. 174, 45 S. E. 27, on similar facts. 33 Failure to enter satisfaction of mortgage is a wrong done in the county of record; hence a statutory penalty for such failure, recoverable § 2981. Any county in state, or where agency or business is conducted, or railroad or other property is situated. A distinct type of statutes regulating the venue of actions against corporations is that which permits or requires it to be laid at one of the counties indicated by the description of place described in the title of this section. Usually such a venue is alternative and optional with that at the principal place of business or that at the place, situs or origin of the cause of action.34 Under statutes making a corporation suable in any county where it has an agency or conducts its business or has property,35 "an agency or place of business" is any place where its ordinary business operations are conducted through its representatives dealing with third persons 36 and the place of "doing business by personally by the person requesting it, is to be brought in that county rather than the one of corporate domicile (Code, §§ 6110, 6112). Drennen Motor Car Co. v. Evans, 192 Ala. 150, 68 So. 303. 34 Civil Code 1852, § 796, providing that plaintiff may institute action in any county where the corporation "has an office or an agent upon whom process may be served," was repealed by Civ. Code 1881, and by Burns' R. S. 1894, § 1315. Globe Acc. Ins. Co. v. Reid, 19 Ind. App. 203, 47 N. E. 947, on rehearing 49 N. E. 291, overruling Evansville & I. R. Co. v. Spellbring, 1 Ind. App. 167, 27 N. E. 239. In actions against railroads the "venire" or place of trial "shall be laid in some county wherein the track of said company is situated" (Acts 1868-69, c. 257). Graham v. Charlotte & S. C. R. Co., 64 N. C. 631. Under Laws 1903, p. 39, providing for appointment of a resident agent for service on foreign corporations, action may be brought where such agent resides. The former state of the law is pro tanto changed. (The court leaves open the question whether it may still be sued where it has its principal place of business as was the former law.) Cunningham v. Klamath Lake R. Co., 54 Ore. 13, 101 Pac. 213, rehearing denied 101 Pac. 1099. In West Virginia the Act of 1887 requiring appointment of an attorney to accept service related solely to domestic corporations both resident and nonresident; hence it was not repealed by the Act of 1905 relating to foreign and nonresident domestic corporations. Lemon V. Imperial Window Glass Co., 199 Fed. 927. Accordingly a nonresident domestic corporation is suable in the county where the agent resides and his power is recorded if it has complied with the Act of 1887. If it has not complied it may under the Act of 1905 be sued by serving the state auditor but is suable in any county in the state. Id. See statutes construed in §§ 29782980, supra. 35 Railroad corporation is suable wherever it has property and a place of business and where its road runs. Alabama & T. Rivers R. Co. v. Burns, McKibbin & Co., 43 Ala. 169. 36 Where an insurance agent does business is "an agency or place of doing business" within Civ. Code, § 2145. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Brigham, 120 Ga. 925, 48 S. E. 348. Electric power plant where there are laborers and a superintendent is a place of business. Central Georgia [§ 2981 agent" has a very similar meaning.37 The term agent includes officers 38 but not agents for other corporations,39 casual and occasional agencies or transactions and traveling agents being excluded.40 The Power Co. v. Parnell, 11 Ga. App. 779, 76 S. E. 157. So as to a clay mine where there were laborers and a superintendent. General Reduction Co. v. Tharpe, 11 Ga. App. 334, 75 S. E. 339. An office where books and records are kept and a large part of business is done, is "an established place of business" within a statute prescribing where it may sue, although the clerk's residence is elsewhere. Androscoggin & K. R. Co. v. Stevens, 28 Me. 434. "An" established place of business does not mean "the" established usual principal place of business. Rhodes v. Salem Turnpike & C. Bridge Corporation, 98 Mass. 95. Toll house where agent collects tolls and sells tickets is "an established or usual place of business" within the county, though the principal place of business was in another county. Rhodes v. Salem Turnpike & C. Bridge Corporation, 98 Mass. 95. The corporation's place of business with the secretary in charge is an office kept within the county. Taussig v. St. Louis & K. R. Co., 186 Mo. 269, 85 S. W. 378. Touching at a wharf and taking and discharging passengers and freight there is "doing business' there (Bal. Code, § 4854). Sievers v. Dalles, P. & A. Nav. Co., 24 Wash. 302, 64 Pac. 539. 37 Receiving freight and passengers at a station, where a station agent was no longer kept, is doing business by agent" there (Code 1907, § 6112). Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Dawson, 14 Ala. App. 272, 68 So. 674. understanding between him and other officers on the subject. Sharp v. Damon Mound Oil Co., 31 Tex. Civ. App. 562, 72 S. W. 1043. The county where the vice president lives and in which he carries on much corporate business for the company with stationery indicating an office there is regarded as having an agency of the corporation. Gulf, B. & K. C. Ry. Co. v. Texas & N. O. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 64 S. W. 692. The treasurer, custodian of money and books, is an "agent" within Rev. St. art. 1198, subd. 21; and the fact that he was a plaintiff would not affect the right to sue the company there, service being had on an officer not adversely interested. Red River, S. & W. Ry. Co. v. Blount, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 282, 22 S. W. 930. 39 An agent of another road merely selling tickets good over defendant's lines is not defendant's agent, and, if it has no line in the county, it cannot be sued there for personal injuries (Laws 1901, p. 31, § 27). Doster v. Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co., 49 Tex. Civ. App. 47, 107 S. W. 579. 40 Casual sales through brokers in a place are not a doing business there by agent, and the corporation is not suable there in assumpsit (Code, § 4207). International Cotton Seed Oil Co. v. Wheelock, 124 Ala. 367, 27 So. 517. An action on an accident policy for an accident occurring in another state may be brought only where it has its principal place of business or where it has an agency carrying on business (Code Civ. Proc. § 55), and not in a county where an officer is casually found endeavoring to adjust the claim of insured. Western Travel 38 The president whose office is in the county is an agent or representative there, regardless of any private "residence" of an officer was held to mean his official residence.41 If acts done in a county can be considered those of an agent they may constitute the doing of business there, but not where they are in lawthose of an independent contractor.42 A statute of this kind must be limited by the provisions of other statutes in force or subsequently enacted which restrict the place of trial to the locality of the cause. of action.43 By their express terms some of these statutes are limited to plaintiffs residing in the county of such agency or branch er's Acc. Ass'n v. Taylor, 62 Neb. 783, 87 N. W. 950. -- A traveling solicitor is not an agent in a county, when casually there, to support a venue in such county. Mangum v. Lane City Rice Milling Co., Tex. Civ. App. -, 95 S. W. 605. 41 A statute providing for attachment where the secretary "resided" in another town than that where business was carried on, was construed to mean where his official duties were performed rather than where literally he resided." Adams v. Willimantic Linen Co., 46 Conn. 320. 42 Buying and shipping lumber through an agent is transacting business. Strandall v. Alaska Lumber Co., 73 Wash. 67, 131 Pac. 211. A financial corporation of S county does not "transact business" in K county by agent (Rem. & Bal. Code, 206), by making a contract with a construction corporation of the latter to finance the state certificates received for the work under which contract the construction company was bound to make collections and remit to the other. State v. Superior Court King Co., 86 Wash. 657, 150 Pac. 1149. 43 The act for leasing the Western & Atlantic Railroad, in providing that suits might be brought in any county through which the road runs, did not enable plaintiff to choose a different venue from that fixed by Civ. Code, § 2334, it being a later act. Le Croix v. Western & A. R. Co., 118 Ga. 98, 44 S. E. 840. or to 44 In Kentucky action against the carrier for injuries cannot be brought in a county where the line passes but in which plaintiff did not reside and was not injured, nor in a county where he resides but in which it has no agent for service, unless it passes there. Fisher v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 169 Fed. 956. A nonresident cannot sue a domestic corporation at a branch place of business. Speare v. Troy Laundry Machinery Co., 44 N. Y. App. Div. 390, 60 N. Y. Supp. 1080. Evidence held to show residence of plaintiff in the county. Allen v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 143 Ky. 723, 137 S. W. 230. Laws 1901, p. 31, c. 27 enacts that railroads may be sued for personal injuries where the injury occurred or plaintiff at the time resided; provided, that if its line does not run in plaintiff's county or the county of injury, then the nearest county to plaintiff's shall be taken in which the line runs or there is an agent; provided also that a nonresident may sue in any county where it has an agent and operates. It further enacts than an injury within one-half mile of a county boundary may be sued in either county. See Doster v. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co., 49 Tex. Civ. App. 47, 107 S. W. 579. The subsequent Act of 1905 (Laws 1905, pp. 29, 20) relates only to cases of connecting carriers. Id. Under some statutes the right to sue for a personal injury at the county [§ 2981 nonresident plaintiffs 45 and to causes of action arising from the transactions of such agency 46 and by the requirement that service be there had on the agent or some one competent for that purpose.47 where it occurred is limited to such plaintiffs as reside there. Others limit the right to sue at the county of an agency other than the principal office to such plaintiffs as have their residence there. See § 2980, supra. 45 McEachin's Dig. art. 1830, § 26, fixing venue of actions against railroad companies for injuries to person, under a proviso that if plaintiff "is a nonresident of the state" the railroad may be sued in any county where its road runs or operates, is to be strictly construed as to nonresidence. Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 106 Tex. 456, 167 S. W. 801, rev'g Tex. Civ. App. S. W. 1148. 140 A transient not having a residence elsewhere and sojourning in Texas cannot come under it. Id. And the fact that no definite county in Texas could be fixed as the principal place of sojourning is not material if he was not a nonresident of the state. Id. A transient must sue under the general provisions of the statute at the county where the injury occurred, he not having a residence in which alternatively he might sue. Id. In an earlier case a contrary conclusion was reached. It was held that to be a resident some permanency of habitation as a home was required; hence a transient last domiciled in New York was a nonresident and not a resident in the county where he sojourned. Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Monell, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 287, 110 S. W. 504. This must be regarded as overruled by the preceding decision. A brakeman of roving occupation who had no fixed home but had an intention to return at some future time and resume his domiciliary resi dence in another state, is a resident of the county to which he returns at the end of his runs, where he sleeps and eats, though he has no fixed room or habitation. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.), 82 S. W. 822, rev'd on other grounds 99 Tex. 337, 90 S. W. 164. One who had a residence at one time in M county but who for several weeks had lived where his work took him in P county was not a resident in P county. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Cloyd (Tex. Civ. App.), 78 S. W. 43. Texas Rev. St. 1895, arts. 1230, 1235, relating to service of process on "nonresidents' do not affect this statute or control the venue. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Rogers, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 99, 82 S. W. 822. This statute confers an absolute privilege on defendant railroad if claimed. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Rogers, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 99, 82 S. W. 822. 46 Action on a policy may be brought in the county where it was issued by a local agent, though signed elsewhere at the principal office (Civ. Code, § 71). Kentucky Mut. Security Fund Co. v. Logan's Adm'r, 90 Ky. 364, 14 S. W. 337. Any action after 1859-60 may be brought in a county where defendant has an agency and not only those which arose out of the business of that agency (statutes and amendments construed). Toppins v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 73 Tenn. (5 Lea) 600. Such a provision is somewhat similar in effect to those which permit the venue to be chosen where the cause of action arose or the injury occurred. See § 2980, supra. 47 In another county than its prin |