Other statutes of this type apply to particular kinds of causes of action, such as actions against common carriers or railroad corporations,48 or insurance contracts,49 or injuries to person or property.50 A railroad does not extend or operate in the county if its lines do not run there, and its operations are not carried into that county; 51 neither can a connecting carrier be sued in a county where the lines of a third corporation not sued extend, under a statute contemplating only that any one of parties can be sued where any of another party's lines extend.52 The operation of a line of road, or the existence of cipal place of business only if it has a branch or other place of business and is served on an agent there in charge. Beal-Doyle Dry Goods Co. v. Odd Fellows Bldg. Co., 109 Ark. 77, 158 S. W. 955. Action on fire policy may be brought under general statute wherever agent resides and is served. Indiana Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Routledge, 7 Ind. 25. By statute (Code, art. 75, § 22a) an insurance company may be sued for loss in a county where it has an accredited agent who is served. (The title of the act is to be read with the text to ascertain the intent that suit shall be in the county where the agent is.) Henderson v. Maryland Home Fire Ins. Co., 90 Md. 47, 44 Atl. 1020. Statutes limiting place for service, see §§ 2996, 3007, infra. 48 See Spratley v. Louisiana & A. R. Co., 77 Ark. 412, 95 S. W. 776, in which it was held that action against a railroad company for wages was not an action against a "carrier" within the statute. Assumpsit lies. Alabama & T. Rivers R. Co. v. Burns, McKibbin & Co., 43 Ala. 169. Railroad corporation may be sued in county where it carries on business though its principal place is elsewhere (Code Civ. Proc. § 984). Poland v. United Traction Co., 88 N. Y. App. Div. 281, 85 N. Y. Supp. 7, aff'd 177 N. Y. 557, 69 N. E. 1129. 49 The statute applicable to freeholders privileging them to be sued in the county of their residence does not apply. Home Protection v. Richards & Sons, 74 Ala. 466. So as to policy of life insurance. Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Pruett, 74 Ala. 487. 50 Action for personal injury may be in any county where defendant railroad's line runs. South Florida R. Co. v. Weese, 32 Fla. 212, 13 So. 436. For injury to property in any county where defendant has an agency and transacts business. Dennis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 86 S. C. 258, 69 S. E. 465. See also, supra, notes 44, 45, as to residence affecting such actions. 51 Where a railroad's engines and cars pass over a bridge and a railroad appurtenant thereto and into a county, but under a contract between the bridge company and the railroad company whereby they are virtually hired by the bridge company, the railroad line does not pass into that county under the meaning of the Kentucky statutes. Fisher v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 169 Fed. 956. Checking baggage to a station on another line is not "operating" there. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Jackson 4 Willson Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 47, S. W. 128. 15 52 Laws 1899, p. 214, c. 125, providing as to connecting railroads that suit for loss or damages may be brought "against any one or all of a residence, or other determinative fact at the time of bringing the action is the test under some statutes.53 It is a matter of wording and construction which time is required. The road need not be operated if the statute merely requires that it "pass" or extend into the county 54 and the defendant need not be an operating owner.55 § 2982. Local actions. The distinction between local and transitory actions is not well defined under the various statutes that regulate actions against corporations. The effect of requiring or permitting an action to be brought in a particular county or in any of certain counties where there is an office, agency or place of business, or where the cause of action arose or the injury occurred, or where the corporate property or railroads extend, is to localize to that extent actions which at common law were transitory.56 Statutes of the kinds such railroad corporations * Hawn v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 154 Pa. St. 456, 26 Atl. 544. in any county in which either of such railroads extends or is operated," does not permit suit where neither extends but where a third line extends, whose owner is not sued. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Forbis, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 255, 79 S. W. 1074. 53 The operation of a line of road by one joint tort feasor in the county at the time action is brought will support venue as to both, though it had not acquired such line when the cause accrued. Knott v. Dubuque & S. C. Ry. Co., 84 Iowa 462, 51 N. W. 57. A railroad company may be sued where plaintiff resides at the time of the action, he suing as administrator, and where the line of the road passes, though intestate was killed in another county where he and plaintiff then resided and where defendant's main office is. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hoskin's Adm'r, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1263, 108 S. W. 305. 54 A road running into a county will sustain venue there even though trains have never been operated on it. The statute (Civ. Code Prac. § 73) only requires that the line of the "carrier passes' into the county. Louisville, H. & St. L. R. Co. v. Sanders' Adm'r, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 212, 92 S. W. 937. 55 A lessee of a railroad may be sued where the leased line runs. Cleveland, C., C. & I. Ry. Co. v. McLean, 1 Ohio Cir. Ct. 112, 1 Ohio Cir. Dec. 67. 56 Local and transitory enumerated, see McLeod v. Connecticut & P. R. R. Co., 58 Vt. 727, 6 Atl. 648. Action for personal injury under a foreign statute held transitory. McLeod v. Connecticut & P. R. R. Co., 58 Vt. 727, 6 Atl. 648. An action for wrongful death against a carrier is "in one sense made local at the option of the plaintiff," that is where injury occurred; or it is transitory and suable at any of the places allowed by the Code. Chesapeake, O. & 'S. W. R. Co. Heath's Adm'r, 87 Ky. 651.9 832. Action to enforce described in the sections just preceding are not ordinarily construed as applying to local actions so as to make them wholly or partially transitory. Those generally regarded as local are also local under statutes applying to corporate actions, unless a different intent appears.57 It may be assumed therefore as a general rule, subject to exceptions that, as in actions between natural persons, any action af fecting the title to or status of land or seeking redress for injury to it is local.58 If prayed as incidental relief it may be transitory.59 This rule had its genesis in the common-law requirement that a venue be laid where the cause of action had its situs, and of course a cause of action relating to land could have no other situs than the land itself.60 The statutes which now enact the same rule are based on different considerations, and are designed to obviate the incon local so far that it may be begun in the court whence execution issued, or where defendant resides, and it is transitory to the extent that it may be where defendant is summoned (Civ. Code, § 474). McDormant v. Louisville, C. & L. R. Co., 11 Bush (Ky.) 386. 57 Action by corporation for damages to its track and culvert must be brought where they are situated. Rev. St. c. 90, § 16, applies only to transitory actions. Vermont & M. R. Co. v. Orcutt, 16 Gray (Mass.) 116. The addition of section 16 to Rev. St. C. 90, was not to make actions against corporations local but to give corporations a locality or residence for the purpose of being sued. Raymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 524, 53 Am. Dec. 57. An action against a railroad company for damage to land by fire is local to the place where the land is (Rev. § 419), and is not one of the actions which can be brought where plaintiff resides (Rev. § 424). v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 153 N. C. 117, 68 S. E. 1060. Perry The statute allowing suit against railroads in any county where the road extends or is operated (R. S. art. 1198, § 21) is subordinate to the provision that "suits for the re covery of lands or damages thereto" must be brought where the land lies (R. S. art. 1198, § 13). Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Jenkins (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 1113. 58 A suit to compel transfer of mining shares is not a real action. Eddy v. Houghton, 6 Cal. App. 85, 91 Pac. 397. Railroad corporation is a "person" within Pasch. Dig. art. 1423, fixing venue at the county where a trespass was committed. Bartee v. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co., 36 Tex. 648. 59 A complaint to cancel the record of a mortgage though prima facie local is transitory where that is incidental to the main relief of an accounting against the corporation. State v. District Court Clay County, 120 Minn. 99, 139 N. W. 135. on 60 As explained in Stephen Pleading (Tyler's Ed.), the law required the venue to be laid truly at the place of the principal facts, and even after juries ceased to be the witnesses as well as the triers of the facts this remained true as to actions affecting land because the situs of it was material to the issues and had to be proved as laid. See Stephen on Pleading, p. 271 et seq. See also Professor Hepburn's article on Venue, 40 Cyc. 1 et seq. [§ 2982 venience of trial and judgment in a place remote from the fixed subject-matter of the action. The historical view is of little practical importance, at least in such a limited consideration as a work on Corporations admits of.61 The federal statutes provide that "any suit of a local nature, at law or in equity, where the land or other subject matter of a fixed character lies partly in one district and partly in another, within the same state, may be brought in either district," 62 and if the action be to enforce a legal or equitable lien on personalty,63 or realty,64 or any claim to such property,65 or to remove any incumbrance lien or cloud therefrom 66 it may be brought in the district designated and actual or constructive process against defendants residing outside of such district may be had.67 A venue 61 An action to declare a deed a mortgage and to redeem must be brought where the land lies under Code Civ. Proc. § 392, the land being the subject of the action. Baker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 73 Cal. 182, 14 Pac. 686. Eminent domain proceedings by express provision (Code Civ. Proc. § 1243) are to be brought where the land is. California Southern R. Co. v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 65 Cal. 409, 4 Pac. 388, 65 Cal. 394, 4 Pac. 344. 62 United States Judicial Code, § 55. And if defendant resides in a different district within the same state, plaintiff may have original and final process against him. Section 54. tral Fuel Oil Co., 194 Fed. 1. 65 The right to abate a nuisance to plaintiff's land in Georgia arising from the use of defendant's property in Tennessee is not a claim to real property in Tennessee. Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co., 218 U. S. 357 (see discussion at p. 368), 54 L. Ed. 1069. 66 Incumbrances on corporate stock within the state may be removed, though some of the stockholders are nonresidents of the district in which suit is brought to which they are joined as defendants. Schultz v. Diehl, 217 U. S. 594, 54 L. Ed. 896; Jellenik v. Huron Copper Min. Co., 177 U. S. 1, 44 L. Ed. 647. 67 The present law is found in U. S. Judicial Code, § 57, and in terms applies to "any legal or equitable lien upon or claim to, or to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to real or personal property within the district where such suit is brought," etc. By construction with section 51, which specifically provides that all suits shall be brought where defendant is an inhabitant, or, in diverse citizenship cases, where either he or plaintiff resides, and which also specifically excepts suits mentioned in certain sections including section 57 it is implied that actions descri by the words above in quot 64 While a suit for specific performance would be transitory and suable anywhere, a suit also asking enforcement of a lien on oil wells, etc., is to be laid where the property is situated regardless of residence of the parties, jurisdiction being supported by the requisite diversity. Texas Co. v. Cen of insurance actions fixed at the location of the property affected cannot apply where the insurance was not one on property. 68 Though it has been said that the venue, so far as local, cannot be waived,69 as may be done when the corporation is defendant in a transitory action 70 the better reasoning is that it may be waived in actions for trespass, which an early case was inclined to regard as transitory when a corporation was defendant under a statute permitting suit at the principal place of business.72 § 2983. Change or venue or place of trial; transfer of cause—In general. As in actions between natural persons, there may either be a change of venue to that county or place where the defendant has an absolute privilege to be sued, or on grounds or prejudice or other cause preventing a fair trial or for convenience of trial.73 The venue is not always a matter of absolute privilege, but it may be left to discretion of the court.74 Wherever the venue is of right fixed at any particular county, as in the county of the principal place of business, and there is no other counter privilege or cause, as the residence of plaintiff, a change if seasonably demanded must be granted 75 shall be brought in the district where the land lies. See also sections 54, 55. 68 So held as to an accident policy. Mullen v. Northern Acc. Ins. Co., 26 S. D. 402, 128 N. W. 483. 69 In so far as an action may be transitory (on a contract) the objection that it was not brought in the right county may be waived; but jurisdiction will not thereby be conferred on a local portion of the action af fecting real estate. Emmons v. Lexington & C. C. Min. Co., 112 Ky. 91, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1445, 65 S. W. 593. 70 See § 2978, supra. 71 Action for trespass to real and personal property is local to the county where the land lies, but after joining in trial elsewhere the corporation could not object. Blackford v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 53 N. J. L. 56, 20 Atl. 735. 72 Edwards v. Union Bank, 1 Fla. (Branch) 136. 73 Corporate parties though not named in the statute have the same right as natural persons to a change. Commercial Ins. Co. v. Mehlman, 48 Ill. 313, 95 Am. Dec. 543. Compare Plummer-Lewis Co. v. Francher, 111 Miss. 656, 71 So. 907, holding that a corporation cannot have change to its residence as natural person could. 74 Change from the county of suit to that of place of business is not a matter of right but of cause as in other cases. Fresno Nat. Bank V. Superior Court, 83 Cal. 491, 24 Pac. 157. Change will not be allowed as a privilege unless the statute properly construed gives it. Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Cahill, 8 Colo. App. 158, 45 Pac. 285, refusing change of tort action to county where it occurred. As to when the venue is matter of right and when not, see §§ 2978-2981, supra. 75 The court has no discretion. Speare v. Troy Laundry Machinery Co., 44 N. Y. App. Div. 390, 60 N. Y. Supp. 1080. Change to the corporation's princi |