the circumstances referred to, would be tantamount to an interdiction of trade between the United States and those Mexican ports which are not in possession of the republican government of that country. The consuls of the United States in Mexico, who have their exequaturs from that government only, themselves discharge duties as commercial agents in the ports which are not under the control of that government in all respects like those which the person Arroyo, in the same way and to the same extent, claims to do at New York in respect to said ports."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Romero, Mexican minister, Aug. 9, 1865,
Dip. Cor. 1865, III. 486-488.

"I have received your Nos. 44 and 47, of the 14th and 17th ultimo, respectively. They relate to the political disturbances Nicaragua. in Nicaragua in consequence of the imprisonment of President Machado and the minister for foreign affairs at Leon, and report the circumstances under which General Zavala was proclaimed Dictator.

"In reply I desire to state that the shifting course of present events in Nicaragua precludes any positive instructions looking to the recognition of any one party as the dominant Government of the Republic. The long established rule of the United States is to maintain relations with the power having control of the public machinery of government with the assent of the people, and administering the functions of the State.

"Your present dispatches and the later telegraphic reports published in the press do not indicate such a stable retention of public power as to warrant formal action by the United States in recognition of a government in Nicaragua as being titular and effective. In such case the minister should remain in intercourse with the authorities in control of the seat of government, looking to them for the protection of the interests of American citizens.

"To avert embarrassments in dealing with evenly-balanced factions, alternating in power or succeeding thereto in the changes of civil contest, the minister's tact should be exercised to confine his relations with the ascendant authority to questions affecting the public interests of the United States and the security of American life and property in Nicaragua, thus giving to his intercourse a provisional and de facto character, without sympathetic leaning to either side, and without prejudice to the fullest liberty on the part of the United States to declare formal recognition of the government which shall eventually establish itself on a firm basis and effectively administer the affairs of the state and insure orderly respect for its acts by the people of the nation."

Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, to Mr. Baker, minister to Nicaragua, August 15, 1893, For. Rel., 1893, 212.

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo reporting that you have received an inquiry Santo Domingo from the commanding officer of the U. S. S. Nashville, asking whether this Government recognizes the existing government in the Dominican Republic and whether he should fire the customary salute at San Domingo City.

"In reply, I have the honor to say that no political recognition of the revolutionary Government of Santo Domingo has yet been effected. Until the United States chargé d'affaires shall under suitable instructions notify the existing government of that country that he enters into diplomatic relations with it, its existence is merely a matter of common notoriety, while its unopposed exercise of power warrants the transaction of necessary affairs by local agents of the United States with the de facto authorities. A salute does not appear to be necessary unless by way of courteous response to one first given by the local authorities."

Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to the Secretary of the Navy, October 2, 1899, 240
MS. Dom. Let. 353.

The question of salutes, pending an insurrection, became the subject of official
action by the United States during the naval revolt in Brazil in 1893. On
the 20th of October in that year, Commodore O. F. Stanton, U. S. N.,
then in command of the United States naval forces on the South Atlantic
Station, arrived in his flagship at Rio de Janeiro. On entering the port
he saluted the flag of Brazil with 21 guns, his salute being returned by a
Government fort. Inside the harbor lay the vessels in revolt, under the
command of Rear-Admiral Mello, of the Brazilian navy, who flew from
his flagship, the Aquidaban, the Brazilian flag. After coming to anchor,
Commodore Stanton received a visit from Admiral Mello's aide, and
caused it to be returned. Subsequently he saluted Admiral Mello with 13
guns, the salute being returned, and next day he called upon the admiral,
who returned his visit. No call had then been received by Commodore
Stanton from any Brazilian official on shore. The Brazilian Government
complained of his action, and he was detached from his command and
ordered home. In explanation of his course, he stated that his object
was merely to complete the salute usually fired in honor of a nation on
arriving in one of its ports; that, although he was aware that the titular
government had by a decree of October 10 withdrawn from the vessels
in revolt the protection of the national flag, he regarded the Aquidaban
as a Brazilian man-of-war, the flagship of an admiral, and the property
of the Brazilian nation, whichever party might win in the pending con-
flict; that Mello was in fact referred to in the decree as "rear-admiral,”
and on the exchange of visits wore the uniform of a Brazilian naval officer
of that rank; that the salute was intended not as a recognition of the
revolt, but merely as an honor to the Brazilian flag, Mello being the only
Brazilian admiral afloat. The Navy Department, however, held that
Commodore Stanton's action violated article 115 of the U. S. Navy Regu-
lations, 1893, which provides that "no salute shall be fired in honor of any
nation * * * not formally recognized by the Government of the
United States;" that his first salute of the Brazilian flag and its return by

the Government fort satisfied all the requirements of courtesy to Brazil as a nation; that, as it was known that the United States had not recognized Admiral Mello and his forces as entitled to belligerent rights, it was not material that he was referred to as a rear-admiral or was dressed in the uniform of that rank; that a course of reasoning which held that a government or a flag gave status to an officer in spite of what he or his government might do, was manifestly not sound; and that neither the use of the Brazilian uniform nor the flying of the Brazilian flag could give Admiral Mello an official status, as he was using both in opposition to the recognized government. The Navy Department therefore decided that Commodore Stanton had committed a "grave error of judgment," but as he had done no intentional wrong, and as the complaint of Brazil had been satisfied, placed him in charge of the North Atlantic Station, with a promise subsequently to restore him to the command from which he was detached. (Sec. of Navy to Commodore Stanton, tel., Oct. 23, 1893; Commodore Stanton to Sec. of Navy, tel., Oct. 25, 1893; Sec. of Navy to Commodore Stanton, tel., Oct. 25, 1893; Commodore Stanton to Sec. of Navy, Dec. 6, 1893; Sec. of Navy to Commodore Stanton, Dec. 7, 1893; Commodore Stanton to Sec. of Navy, Dec. 7, 1893; Sec. of Navy to Commodore Stanton, Dec. 21, 1893; MSS. Navy Department.)

In the course of his explanation, Commodore Stanton stated that he had been informed by Commodore McCann, who commanded the United States naval forces on the Pacific Station during a part of the insurrection in Chile in 1891, that his flag was saluted by a Chilean commodore and that he returned the salute, and that one of the English men-of-war saluted the Chileans in revolt with 21 guns before the final triumph of the Congressionalists. With reference to this statement the Navy Department said: "I have examined into this matter and it does not appear that this action on the part of Commodore McCann, or of other officers who may have given like salutes to Chilean vessels in revolt at that time was ever approved by the Department, or that it was ever brought to its attention, unless such inference may be drawn from the fact that the new Regulations of the United States Navy, promulgated February 25, 1893, contained for the first time the regulation providing that 'No salute shall be fired in honor of any nation not formally recognized by the Government of the United States.' It is not to be supposed that the Department when inserting this article in the Regulations believed that a naval officer of the United States would fire a salute to a naval officer in revolt against his government, and then claim that the salute was really in honor of the government against which the officer and his forces were at war." (Mr. Herbert, Sec. of Navy, to Commodore Stanton, Dec. 21, 1893, MSS. Navy Dept.)

The only case which the editor has been able to find in the British official publications of a salute to an insurgent officer during the insurrection in Chile is as follows: On January 26, 1891, Rear-Admiral Hotham arrived in H. B. M. S. Warspite at Iquique. He found there the Chilean cruiser Almirante Cochrane, which was engaged in a nominal blockade of the port. The Almirante Cochrane was one of the vessels then in revolt against the government of President Balmaceda. She saluted Admiral Hotham's flag with 13 guns, "and," said Admiral Hotham, "as it was a personal salute I returned it with the same number." (Blue Book, Chile, No. 1, 1892, p. 45.)

H. Doc. 551--16

"Insurgency" or "revolt."

3. OF BELLIGERENCY

$74.

a

Since every civil war, as was observed by the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases, begins in insurrection, and since insurrections generally affect to a greater or less extent the interests of aliens, and in this way, if in no other, compel the consideration and action of foreign governments, some progress appears to have been made toward the definition of the actual condition of things intermediate between peace and recognized civil war, as a state of "insurgency" or "revolt." It doubtless will have been observed that, although the mere admission of insurgent ships into the ports of the United States in 1815 seems then to have been considered as a recognition of the belligerency of the South American governments, yet Mr. Bancroft Davis, speaking for the Department of State in 1869, with reference to the Cuban insurrection then prevailing, said that Mexico, while she had authorized the Cuban flag to be received in her ports, had "not recognized a state of belligerency." This modification or development of view may be ascribed to the elaboration in the meantime of rules for the precise definition of belligerent rights and disabilities and for the discharge of neutral duties, such as that limiting the stay and the privileges of men-of-war of belligerents in neutral ports.

Perhaps the clearest recognition of the state of insurgency or revolt as a distinctive condition may be found in the case of the Cuban insurrection of 1895-1898. June 12, 1895, the President of the United States issued a proclamation reciting that Cuba was the seat of civil disturbances, accompanied by armed resistance to the authority of the established Government of Spain," and admonishing all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States to abstain from taking part in the disturbances adversely to that Government, by doing any of the acts prohibited by the neutrality laws. In his annual message of December 2, 1895, he stated that Cuba was "greatly disturbed," and described the condition of things as an "insurrection," a "flagrant condition of hostilities," and a "sanguinary and fiercely conducted war." July 27, 1896, he issued another proclamation, referring again to the civil disturbances in the island and the provisions of the neutrality laws. In his annual message of December 7, 1896, he stated that "the insurrection in Cuba still continues with all its perplexities," and reviewed the situation at length. With reference to these facts the Supreme Court said: "The distinction between recognition of belligerency and recognition of a condition of political revolt, between recognition of the

See Albany Law Journal, Feb. 13, 1886, 125.
Supra, 194.

€ 29 Stat. 871.

d 29 Stat. 881.

* * *

existence of war in the material sense and of war in a legal sense, is sharply illustrated by the case before us. For here the political department has not recognized the existence of a de facto belligerent power engaged in hostility with Spain, but has recognized the existence of insurrectionary warfare prevailing before, at the time and since this forfeiture is alleged to have been incurred. We are thus judicially informed of the existence of an actual conflict of arms in resistance of the authority of a Government with which the United States are on terms of peace and amity, although acknowledgment of the insurgents as belligerents by the political department has not taken place; and it can not be doubted that, this being so, the act in question [the neutrality statute] is applicable."

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Nos. 90, of January 26; 91, of February 1; 92, of February 3, and 93, of February 10 last, reporting the serious condition of affairs at La Paz and in the surrounding country.

"You will understand that you can have no diplomatic relations with the insurgents implying their recognition by the United States as the legitimate Government of Bolivia, but that, short of such recognition, you are entitled to deal with them as the responsible parties in local possession, to the extent of demanding for yourself, and for all Americans within reach of insurgent authority within the territory controlled by them, fullest protection for life and property.

"If the situation at La Paz becomes unendurable or more perilous, you should collect all Americans within reach and quit that city, taking them with you demanding adequate escort to the nearest place of safety.'

Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Bridgman, min. to Bolivia, March 14, 1899, For. Rel., 1899, 105.

VI. RECOGNITION, BY WHOM DETERMINABLE.

$ 75.

In the preceding review of the recognition, respectively, of new states, new governments, and belligerency, there has Summary of prec- been made in each case a precise statement of facts, edents. showing how and by whom the recognition was accorded. In every case, as it appears, of a new government and of

The Three Friends (1897), 166 U. S. 63–64, 65–66. In obtaining the release of Spanish prisoners from the insurgents in the Philippines, pursuant to Article VI. of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, a difficulty was raised by the insurgents insisting that Spanish vessels sent to receive the surrender of the prisoners should fly the Spanish flag as a sign of recognition. To meet the difficulty, the United States suggested that the vessels should fly the Geneva Red Cross flag. (For. Rel. 1899, 689-691.)