convenient and accommodating has it proved to be in practice, that its name has been applied to cases that really do not lie within the domain of semi-sovereignty. The French protectorates in Indo-China and elsewhere are placed under the colonial minister, and are properly classed as colonies, and we have examples in Africa of protectorates where there was no recognized state to be protected.

Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, I. 79-93. Protectorates, Colonies, and
Non-sovereign States (Protected Malay States, British India, British East
Africa, Uganda, Zanzibar, Egypt, Tonking, Bulgaria, Dutch East Indies),
S. Doc. 62, 55 Con. 3 Sess., Part 2, p. 627 et seq.
Colonial Systems of the World: The Colonies, Protectorates, Dependencies, and
Spheres of Influence of all Nations exercising Authority outside their
immediate Territory; showing Form of Government, Area, Population,
Revenue, etc.; from Summary of Commerce and Finance for December,
1898, Bureau of Statistics, Treasury Department.

dorra, San Marino, Monaco.

"The most important modern instance of a protected state is afforded by the United Republic of the Ionian Islands, estabIonian Islands, An- lished in 1815 under the protectorate of Great Britain. In this case the head of the government was appointed by England, the whole of the executive authority was practically in the hands of the protecting power, and the state was represented by it in its external relations. In making treaties, however, Great Britain did not affect the Ionian Islands, unless it expressly stipulated in its capacity of protecting power; the vessels of the republic carried a separate trading flag; the state received consuls, though it could not accredit them; and during the Crimean war it maintained a neutrality the validity of which was acknowledged in the English courts. The only protected states now existing in Europe are the republics of Andorra and San Marino, and possibly the principality of Monaco."

Hall, Int. Law, 4th ed. 30.

By a treaty between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, signed at London Nov. 14, 1863, the Ionian Islands were united to Greece and were neutralized.

"The commonest case by far is now that of a protectorate exercised Countries not pos- by a state of European civilization over one of other sessing European civilization, as that which France exercises over Tunis civilization. and that which England exercises over Zanzibar. "Where there is no state, that is to say, in an uncivilized region, there can be no protected state, and therefore no such protectorate as has been described in the last paragraph. But in recent times a practice has arisen by which in such regions civilized powers assume and exercise certain rights in more or less well-defined districts, to which rights and districts, for the term is used to express both the one and the other, the name of a protectorate is given by analogy. The dis

tinctive characters of those rights are, first, that they are contrasted with territorial sovereignty, for, as far as such sovereignty extends, there is the state itself which has acquired it and not a protectorate exercised by that state; secondly, that the protectorate first established excludes all other states from exercising any authority within the district, either by way of territorial sovereignty or of a protectoratethat is to say, while it lasts, for the question remains whether a protectorate, like an inchoate title to territorial sovereignty, is not subject to conditions and liable to forfeiture on their non-fulfillment; thirdly, that the state enjoying the protectorate represents and protects the district and its population, native and civilized, in everything which relates to other powers. The analogy to the protectorate exercised over states is plainly seen in the last two characters, exclusiveness and representation with protection. It is less visible in the first character, for, where there is a protected state, the territorial sovereignty is divided between it and the protecting state, according to the arrangements existing in the particular case, while in an uncivilized protectorate it is in suspense.

Westlake, Int. Law, 178. See Hall, Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of the
British Crown, 214.

By Art. 34 of the General Act of Berlin of Feb. 26, 1885, it was agreed that
any of the contracting parties that might thereafter take possession of any
territory or assume a protectorate on the continent of Africa should notify
the other parties; and by Art. 35 the signatory powers "recognize the
obligation to insure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied
by them on the coasts of the African continent sufficient to protect exist-
ing rights, and, the case arising, freedom of trade and of transit on the
conditions that may have been agreed upon." "I am at one with Mr.
Hall in the opinion
that a protectorate on the coast of Africa
carries an obligation of establishing authority equal to that laid down in
Art. 35, although that opinion for me is not based on the article but on
the nature of the case. And while he considers that the obligation which
he finds to be stipulated for the coast implies even for an inland protec-
torate a consent to civil and criminal jurisdiction over foreigners, as being
necessary for the establishment of the authority, it seems to me that that
consent also is carried by a protectorate over any uncivilized region, and
again from the nature of the case." (Westlake, Int. Law, 181.)

5. AMERICAN INDIANS.

(1) THEIR DEPENDENT RELATION.

$ 15.

“The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two peoples in existence. Domestic dependent In the general, nations not owing a common allegiance

nations.

are foreign to each other.

* * *

But the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else. to compose a part of the United States.

The Indian Territory is admitted

*

*

* Though the Indians

are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore unquestioned right to the lands they occupy until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our Government, yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States that any attempt to acquire their lands or to form a political connection with them would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory and an act of hostility."

* * *

Marshall, C. J., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1821), 5 Pet. 1; holding "that an
Indian tribe or nation within the United States is not a foreign State"
in the sense of the Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 2, which provides that the
judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases "between a
State
and foreign States, citizens or subjects."
See, also, Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211; Jones v. Meehan (1899), 165 U. S. 1, 10.

The Cherokee Nation being "a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described," and the "whole intercourse between the United States and this nation" being, by "the Constitution and laws, vested in the Government of the United States," the laws of the State of Georgia can have no force within such territory.

Worcester v. State of Georgia (1832), 6 Pet. 515, 561.

"When the existing system [of agencies] was adopted the Indian race was outside of the limits of organized States and Territories, and beyond the immediate reach and operation of civilization; and all efforts were mainly directed to the maintenance of friendly relations and the preservation of peace and quiet on the frontier. All this is now changed. There is no such thing as the Indian frontier. * * * None of the tribes are outside of the bounds of organized government and society, except that the Territorial system has not been extended over that portion of the country known as the Indian Territory. As a race the Indians are no longer hostile but may be considered as submissive to the control of the Government; few of them only are troublesome. Except the fragments of several bands all are now gathered upon reservations. They are a portion of our people, are under the authority of our Government, and have a peculiar claim upon and are entitled to the fostering care and protection of the nation."

* * *

President Cleveland, Annual Message, Dec. 6, 1886.

Congress may provide for the punishment of crimes committed on an Indian reservation not within the limits of one of the States, whether the offender be a white man or an Indian.

United States v. Rogers (1846), 4 How. 567.

It has been held by the Attorneys-General of the United States that while the general laws of the United States do not apply to the Indians," the sovereignty of the United States over the territory ceded or granted to them is only partly relinquished;' that the Cherokee Nation had no power to impose taxes on persons trading among them under the authority of the United States, and that a white man who had by intermarriage and the exercise of tribal rights become a Chicasaw or Choctaw by adoption, although he did not become subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the nation, yet became subject to their civil jurisdiction in respect of property which represented the proceeds of a grant made to him as a member of the tribe. The Choctaws had no power to pronounce and execute sentence of death on the slave of a white man residing among them, their treaties with the United States limiting their jurisdiction in such cases to the Choctaw Nation of red men and their descendants."

An Indian country may be considered a Territory of the United States within the act of Congress empowering any person to whom letters testamentary or of administration have been granted in any State or Territory of the United States to sue in the District of Columbia. Mackey v. Coxe (1855), 18 How. 104.

By the act of March 3, 1885, sec. 9, 23 Stat. 385, Congress provided that "all Indians committing against the person or property of another Indian or other person" any of certain crimes, among which was murder, should, if the crime was committed in a Territory of the United States, whether "within or without the Indian reservation," be subject to punishment under the laws of such Territory, precisely as other persons, but should, if the crime was committed in a State and within the limits of an Indian reservation, be subject to trial and punishment under the laws and in the courts of the United States. Held, that this act was valid, and consequently that the United States circuit court for the District of California had jurisdiction of a murder committed by two Indians upon another Indian on a reservation in that State.

United States v. Kagama (1886), 118 U. S. 375. See Ex parte Mayfield (1890), 141 U. S. 107; case of Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556.

a 12 Op. 208, Stanbery, 1867.

b2 Op. 693, Butler. 1834.

c1 Op. 645, Wirt, 1824.

d7 Op. 174, Cushing, 1855.

e 2 Op. 693, Butler, 1834.

Eminent domain.

The lands in an Indian territory, though owned by the tribe in fee under patents from the United States, are held, like the lands of private owners everywhere within the geographical limits of the United States, subject to the exercise by the General Government of the right of eminent domain, just compensation being made in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution. Congress therefore has the power to authorize a corporation to construct a railway through such territory, and for that purpose to condemn lands, provision being made for compensation.

not citizens.

Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co. (1890), 135 U. S. 641. Members of an Indian tribe born within the United States, though they afterwards voluntarily separate themselves from Domestic subjects, this tribe and take up their residence among white citizens, are not within the purview of the declaration of the fourteenth amendment that "all persons born * * * in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens. of the United States and of the States wherein they reside." They are not citizens of the United States, but are domestic subjects.' Though capable of naturalization by law or by treaty, they are not within the general statutes relating to naturalization.

ment.

Congress, by an act of May 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 81, provided (sec. 30) that "the judicial tribunals of the Indian nations shall Local self-govern- retain exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising in the country in which members of the nation by nativity or by adoption shall be the only parties." The act also provided (sec. 31) that the Constitution and all general laws of the United States "which prohibit crimes and misdemeanors in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except in the District of Columbia, and all laws relating to national banking associations, shall have the same force in the Indian Territory as elsewhere in the United States; but nothing in this act shall be so construed as to deprive any of the courts of the civilized nations of exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising wherein members of said nations, whether by treaty, blood, or adoption, are the sole parties, nor so as to interfere with the rights and powers of said civilized nations to punish said members for violation of the statutes and laws enacted by their national councils where such laws are not contrary to the treaties and laws of the United States."

Held that while the rights of local self-government possessed by the

@Elk r. Wilkins (1884), 112 U. S. 94.

b7 Op. 746, Cushing, 1855.

Elk v. Wilkins (1884), 112 U. S. 94, approving McKay v. Campbell, 2 Sawyer, 118, and United States v. Osborne, 6 Sawyer, 406. See, also, Wharton, Confl. of Laws, §§ 9, 252; Am. Law Review, XV. 21; XX. 183,

H. Doc. 551-3