persons or property under the Constitution and laws of the United States or conclude the courts of the United States in a determination of these rights (Little . Barreme, 2 Cranch, 170, 177; United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 418); and it was argued that Congress, in passing the act of March 2, 1889, in relation to the seals in Bering Sea, deliberately declined to determine the question of the extent of the dominion of the United States in that sea. In response to these arguments the court said that it did not appear by the act in question that Congress had "invited" the judicial branch of the Government to determine that question; but that there was, on the contrary, much force in the position that the passage of the act, with full knowledge of the previous executive action and of the diplomatic situation, justified the President in the conclusion that it was his duty "to adhere to the construction already insisted upon as to the extent of the dominion of the United States, and to continue to act accordingly. If this be so," continued the court, "the application calls upon the court, while negotiations are pending, to decide whether the Government is right or wrong, and to review the action of the political departments upon the question contrary to the settled law in that regard. Foster. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 3 Sumner, 270; S. C. on certificate of division, 13 Pet. 415; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50; Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202; Nabob of Carnatic . East India Company, 1 Ves. Jr. 371; S. C., 2 Ves. Jr. 56; Barclay v. Russell, 3 Ves. Jr. 424; Penn. v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sr. 444

"We are not to be understood, however, as underrating the weight of the argument that in a case involving private rights, the court may be obliged, if those rights are dependent upon the construction of acts of Congress or of a treaty, and the case turns upon a question, public in its nature, which has not been determined by the political departments in the form of a law specifically settling it, or authorizing the Executive to do so, to render judgment, since we have no more right to decline the jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given.'

"But we need not go further in this direction, as our decision rests upon narrower grounds."

In re Cooper (1892), 143 U. S. 472, 502-505. The court then decided that as, upon the face of the libel, the facts found, and the final decree, none of which disclosed the exact place of the seizure, the district court clearly had jurisdiction, the writ of prohibition should not issue. The observations of the court, therefore, on the political question, though suggestive, were not material to the decision actually made.

"Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial but a political question, the determination of which by the

legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens, and subjects of that government. This principle has always been upheld by this court, and has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances. Gelston . Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 324; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; The Divina Pastora, 4 Wheat. 52; Foster . Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307, 309; Keane . McDonough, 8 Pet. 308; Garcia . Lee, 12 Pet. 511, 520; Williams e. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415; United States v. Yorba, 1 Wall. 412, 423; United States . Lynde, 11 Wall. 632, 638. It is equally well settled in England. The Pelican, Edw. Adm. appx. D; Taylor e. Barclay, 2 Sim. 213; Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 DeG., F. & J. 217, 221, 233; Republic of Peru ». Peruvian Guano Co., 36 Ch. D. 489, 497; Republic of Peru. Dreyfus, 38 Ch. D. 348, 356, 359,"

Jones v. United States (1890), 137 U. S. 202, 212–213, Gray, J., delivering the opinion of the court.

"In United States . Arredondo the court, referring to Foster v. Neilson, said: This court did not deem the settlement of boundaries a judicial but a political question-that it was not its duty to lead, but to follow the action of the other departments of the Government.' The same principles were recognized in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Garcia. Lee. These authorities . . . relate to questions of boundary between independent nations.”

United States v. Texas (1892), 143 U. S. 621, 639, discussing Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307, 309; Cherokee Nation r. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 21; United States r. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 711; and Garcia r. Lee, 12 Pet. 511, 517.

"All courts of justice are bound to take judicial notice of the territorial extent of the jurisdiction exercised by the government whose laws they administer, or of its recognition or denial of the sovereignty of a foreign power, as appearing from the public acts of the legislature and executive, although those acts are not formally put in evidence, nor in accord with the pleadings. United States v. Reynes, 9 How. 127; Kennett. Chambers, 14 How. 38; Hoyt v. Russell, 117 U. S. 401, 404; Coffee . Grover, 123 U. S. 1; State v. Dunwell, 3 R. I. 127; State v. Wagner, 61 Maine, 178; Taylor . Barclay, and Emperor of Austria . Day, above cited; 1 Greenl. Ev. section 6."

Jones r. United States (1890), 137 U. S. 202, 214.

(2) RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.

§ 155.

By the compact settling the boundary between Virginia and Tennessee it was declared that all titles and claims to land derived from

either government in the disputed territory should remain as secure as if derived from the government within whose limits they fell under the settlement. Two contesting titles, derived from grants from Virginia, were set up to lands which fell in Tennessee. One of the parties brought an action of ejectment, in which he offered certain evidence. Objection was made to the evidence on the ground that it tended to establish only an equitable title, acquired previously to the grant, and that this was inadmissible because such a claim could not be asserted in an action of ejectment in Virginia. Held, that remedies in respect to real estate were governed by the lex loci rei sita; that there was nothing to show that the two States in question intended to vary this rule in cases within the compact; and that the acts of their legislatures, passed to give the compact effect, should be construed as relating only to the validity of titles, leaving the remedies to be regulated by the lex fori.

Robinson r. Campbell (1818), 3 Wheaton, 212.

It belongs to sovereignties to fix boundaries between their respective jurisdictions; and when fixed by compact, they become conclusive upon their citizens and bind their rights.

Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Peters, 185.

Grants made by the Spanish authorities in territory which, upon the subsequent settlement of a disputed boundary line, was determined to belong to one of the United States, are void.

66

Robinson v. Minor, 10 Howard, 627.

Suffice it to say, that the Government of the United States, ever since the acquisition of Louisiana, in its legislative, executive, and judicial departments, has always held in theory, and by repeated acts of Congress and judicial decisions asserted in practice, that the territory between the Perdido and the Iberville rightfully constituted a portion of the province of Louisiana, as ceded by France to the United States on the 30th of April, 1803; and that the treaty between His Catholic Majesty and the United States, of the 22d February, 1819, has, in no respect whatever, strengthened the claims of Spanish grantees to lands embraced within these limits. This being the fact, it therefore follows, as a necessary consequence, that the grant by the Spanish intendant, Morales, of land within this territory, on the 24th March, 1804, having been made after the date of the Louisiana treaty, was without authority and is void."

Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State, to Mr. Calderon de la Barca, July 27, 1847,
MS. Notes to Spain, VI. 155.

By Art. IV. of the Webster-Ashburton treaty of Aug. 9, 1842, grants of
land made by either party in the territory divided by the treaty were

confirmed, as well as all equitable possessory claims, arising from a possession and improvement of any lot or parcel of land by the person actually in possession, or by those under whom such person claims, for more than six years before the date of this treaty."

(3) ACCRETION.

§ 156.

When a river is the line of arcifinious boundary between two nations, by a treaty, its natural channel so continues, notwithstanding any changes of its course by accretion or decretion of either bank; but if the course be changed abruptly into a new bed by irruption or avulsion, then the river bed becomes the boundary.

Cushing, At.-Gen. (1856), 8 Op. 175. See, also, St. Louis v. Rutz (1891), 138 U. S. 226. See, further, as to accretion, supra, § 82, pp. 270–273, and particularly Nebraska r. Iowa (1892), supra, § 82, pp. 272–273. As to dependent islands formed by accretion, and the measurement of territorial waters therefrom, see the case of the Anna (1805), 5 C. Rob. 373, supra, § 82.

By the convention between the United States and Mexico, of November 12, 1884, it is provided that the dividing line between the two countries, in the Rio Grande and Rio Colorado, shall, in conformity with prior treaties, forever" follow the center of the normal channel of the rivers named, notwithstanding any alterations in the banks or in the course of those rivers, provided that such alterations be effected by natural causes through the slow and gradual erosion and deposit of alluvium and not by the abandonment of an existing river bed and the opening of a new one." (Art. I.)

Any other change, wrought by the force of the current, whether by the cutting of a new bed, or when there is more than one channel by the deepening of another channel than that which marked the boundary at the time of the surveys made under the aforesaid treaty [of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848], shall produce no change in the dividing line as fixed by the surveys of the International Boundary Commissions in 1852, but the line then fixed shall continue to follow the middle of the original channel bed, even though this should become wholly dry or be obstructed by deposits." (Art. II.)

(4) PRESCRIPTION.
$ 157.

The legislature of Virginia, in 1800, and the legislature of Tennessee, in 1801, passed acts to authorize the appointment of commissioners to determine the boundary line between the two States. In January, 1803, the commissioners made a report, which was adopted by the respective legislatures of the two States. In 1856, fifty-four

years after the line was settled, Virginia passed an act reciting that the line as marked by the commissioners in 1802 had from lapse of time and other causes become indistinct, and authorizing the appointment of commissioners to cooperate with commissioners of Tennessee in running and marking the line again. Commissioners were appointed by both States, and their re-marking of the line was approved by the legislature of Tennessee. Virginia withheld her approval and asked for the appointment of new commissioners to re-run and re-mark the line, but no complaint was made as to the correctness of the line run and established in 1802, nor was any complaint made by her in that regard until within a recent period. At length Virginia filed a petition in the Supreme Court asking that the compact between the two States, under their legislation of 1803, be declared null and void, as having been entered into without the consent of Congress, and praying that the court proceed to establish the true boundary line. The court held that, by acts of Congress passed subsequently to 1803, the compact of that year had been impliedly consented to and approved; but the court also said:

"Independently of any effect due to the compact as such, a boundary line between states or provinces, as between private persons, which has been run out, located and marked upon the earth, and afterwards recognized and acquiesced in by the parties for a long course of years, is conclusive, even if it be ascertained that it varies somewhat from the courses given in the original grant; and the line so established takes effect, not as an alienation of territory, but as a definition of the true and ancient boundary. Lord Hardwicke, in Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Vesey Sen. 444, 448; Boyd v. Graves, 4 Wheat. 513; Rhode Island . Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 734; United States . Stone, 2 Wall. 525, 537; Kellogg . Smith, 7 Cush. 375, 382; Chenery. Waltham, 8 Cush. 327; Hunt on Boundaries, (3d. ed.) 306.

"As said by this court in the recent case of the State of Indiana v. Kentucky, (136 U. S. 479, 510,) it is a principle of public law, universally recognized, that long acquiescence in the possession of territory, and in the exercise of dominion and sovereignty over it, is conclusive of the nation's title and rightful authority.' In the case of Rhode Island r. Massachusetts, 4 How. 591, 639, this court, speak: ing of the long possession of Massachusetts, and the delays in alleg ing any mistake in the action of the commissioners of the colonies said: Surely this, connected with the lapse of time, must remove all doubts as to the right of the respondent under the agreements of 1711 and 1718. No human transactions are unaffected by time. Its influence is seen on all things subject to change. And this is peculiarly the case in regard to matters which rest in memory, and which consequently fade with the lapse of time and fall with the lives of