"Her Majesty's Government have had under consideration, in communication with the government of India, the letter addressed by Mr. Welsh to my predecessor on the 29th of July, on the subject of the trial at Calcutta, in January, 1879, of one John Anderson, a British subject, on the articles of the American bark C. O. Whitmore, who was charged with having killed the first officer of that vessel while on the high seas. In that letter, Mr. Welsh stated that, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, the exercise of jurisdiction in that case by the high court at Calcutta was a breach of comity. He urged that as regards common crimes committed on board merchant vessels on the high seas, the competent tribunals of the vessel's nation have exclusive jurisdiction of the question of trial and punishment of any person thus accused of the commission of a crime against its municipal law.' "As regards the general proposition above laid down, Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to admit that a statute conferring jurisdiction on the court of the country of the offender in the case of offenses committed by its own subjects on the high seas, on board a foreign vessel, or in places within foreign jurisdiction, would violate any principle of international law or comity. "On the contrary, they are of opinion that there are many cases in which the conferring of such jurisdiction would subserve the purposes of justice and be quite consistent with those principles. “Such an assumption of jurisdiction does not involve a denial of jurisdiction on the part of the state in whose territory the offense was committed; it involves no more than an assertion of a right of concurrent jurisdiction, and the most eminent authorities on international law in this country, and also in the United States, lay down that the legislative and judicial powers of a state extend to the punishment of all offenses against its municipal laws by its subjects wheresoever committed. "But as regards the particular case of John Anderson, it appears from a report furnished by the government of India that, in the opinion of their law officers, the high court at Calcutta had jurisdiction to try the accused by virtue of the imperial act 23 and 24 Victoria, cap. 88, which extends to Her Majesty's territories in India the provisions of the act 12 and 13 Victoria, cap. 96, to provide for the prosecution and trial in Her Majesty's colonies of offenses committed within the jurisdiction of the admiralty.' "The question of jurisdiction was not raised at the trial, and no decision was therefore pronounced upon it, but Her Majesty's Government are advised by the law officers of the Crown in this country. that the jurisdiction of the admiralty does not extend to offenses committed on the high seas in other than British ships. "It follows therefore from their view of the law that the high court at Calcutta had not jurisdiction to try the case and that the trial was a nullity. "It further appears from the report of the government of India that, after the trial, the consul-general of the United States applied for the extradition of the prisoner, and was informed that the government of India were unable to order the surrender of a person on a charge in respect of which he had been already tried and convicted by a competent British court. "I have the honor to request that you will express to your Government the regret of Her Majesty's Government that the action of the authorities at Calcutta, in the case of John Anderson, should have been governed by a view of the law which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, can not be supported, and I trust that you will convey to them the assurance that Mr. Evarts has justly attributed this incident to a misconception and not to any design to question the jurisdiction of the United States in this or any similar case." Earl Granville, Sec. for For. Aff., to Mr. Lowell, min. to England, June 8. 1880, For. Rel. 1880, 481. The Government of Chili has no jurisdiction over a merchant vessel of the United States on the high seas so as to enable it to proceed against that vessel or its officers, when in a Chilian port, for cruelty on the high seas to a Chilian subject on board that vessel. Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Logan, Oct. 15, 1883, MS. Inst. The courts of the United States have no jurisdiction to redress any supposed torts committed on the high seas upon the property of its citizens by a cruiser regularly commissioned by a foreign and friendly power, except where such cruiser has been fitted out in violation of its neutrality. The courts of the captors are open for redress, and an injured neutral may there obtain indemnity for a wanton or illicit capture. Nor is the jurisdiction of the neutral court enlarged by the fact that the corpus no longer continues under the control of the capturing power. The Estrella, 4 Wheat., 298. 2. Halleck's Int. Law, 3rd ed., by Baker, II. 173–174. "Since our last meeting the aspect of our foreign relations has considerably changed. Our coasts have been infested Piracy. and our harbors watched by private armed vessels, some of them without commissions, some with illegal commissions, others with those of legal form, but committing piratical acts beyond the authority of their commissions. They have captured in the very entrance of our harbors, as well as on the high seas, not only the vessels of our friends coming to trade with us, but our own also. They have carried them off under pretense of legal adjudication, but not daring to approach a court of justice, they have plundered and sunk them by the way, or in obscure places where no evidence could arise against them; maltreated the crews, and abandoned them in boats in open sea or on desert shores, without food or covering. These enormities appearing to be unreached by any control of their sovereigns, I found it necessary to equip a force to cruise within our own seas, to arrest all vessels of these descriptions found hovering on our coast within the limits of the Gulf Stream, and to bring the offenders in for trial as pirates.” President Jefferson, annual message, 1805. Murder or robbery committed on the high seas may be cognizable by the courts of the United States, though committed on board of a vessel not belonging to citizens of the United States, if she had no national character, but was held and possessed by pirates or persons not lawfully sailing under the flag of any foreign nation. United States v. Holmes, 5 Wheaton, 412. This rule is peculiar to the offence of piracy by law of nations, which is justiciable in the courts of any country. waters. 66 It is natural to consider the vessels of a nation as parts of its territory, though at sea, as the state retains its jurisdicActs in foreign tion over them; and, according to the commonly received custom, this jurisdiction is preserved over the vessels even in parts of the sea subject to a foreign dominion. This is the doctrine of the law of nations, clearly laid down by writers of received authority, and entirely conformable, as it is supposed, with the practice of modern nations. If a murder be committed on board of an American vessel by one of the crew upon another or upon a passenger, or by a passenger on one of the crew or another passenger, while such vessel is lying in a port within the jurisdiction of a foreign state or sovereignty, the offence is cognizable and punishable by the proper court of the United States in the same manner as if such offence had been committed on board the vessel on the high seas. The law of England is supposed to be the same. It is true that the jurisdiction of a nation over a vessel belonging to it, while lying in the port of another, is not necessarily wholly exclusive. We do not so consider or so assert it. For any unlawful acts done by her while thus lying in port, and for all contracts entered into while there, by her masters or owners, she and they must, doubtless, be answerable to the laws of the place. Nor, if her master or crew, while on board in such port, break the peace of the community by the commission of crimes, can exemption be claimed for them. But, nevertheless, the law of nations, as I have stated it, and the statutes of governments founded on that law, as I have referred to them, show that enlightened nations, in modern times, do clearly hold that the jurisdiction and laws of a nation accompany her ships not only over the high seas, but into ports and harbors, or wheresoever else they may be water-borne, for the general purpose of governing and regulating the rights, duties, and obligations of those on board thereof, and that, to the extent of the exercise of this jurisdiction, they are considered as parts of the territory of the nation herself.” Mr. Webster, Sec. of State, to Lord Ashburton, British min., Aug. 1, 1842, Webster's Works, VI. 306–307, cited in United States v. Rodgers (1893), 150 U. S. 249, 264. In 1868 James Anderson, a citizen of the United States, was indicted for murder committed on board a British vessel. The vessel, when the offense was committed, was 45 miles up the river Garonne, in France, in the body of the country, though within the ebb and flow of the tide. The prisoner was convicted in the central criminal court of London of manslaughter. The vessel, though flying the British flag, belonged to Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, and it was contended that as the offence was committed in France and the vessel was a colonial vessel and the prisoner an American citizen the court had no jurisdiction to try him. It was held that he was properly convicted. Reg. r. Anderson (1868), 11 Cox C. C. 198. It was admitted by the judges that the French courts had a concurrent jurisdiction which they might have exercised had they claimed it. By section 5346, Revised Statutes of the United States, it is provided that "every person who, upon the high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, on board any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or any citizen thereof, with a dangerous weapon, or with intent to perpetrate any felony, commits an assault on another shall be punished by a fine of not more than three thousand dollars and by imprisonment at hard labor not more than three years.” Under this section the courts of the United States have jurisdiction to try a person for an assault, with a dangerous weapon, committed on a vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States, when such vessel is in the Detroit River, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the territorial limits of the Dominion of Canada. United States r. Rodgers (1893), 150 U. S. 249, 252, 266. An indictment for murder which charges that the offence was committed on an American vessel on the high seas, within the jurisdiction of the court and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, sufficiently avers the locality of the offence. (St. Clair v. In United States r. Rodgers, supra, the court disapproved People v. A defendant was indicted in the circuit court of the United States at Philadelphia for murder. It appeared that he was mate of the American brig Rorer; that while the brig lay at Cape François he dealt the master a blow with a piece of wood, and that the master, being taken on shore, died there the next day. It was contended that in order to give the court jurisdiction under the eighth section of the crimes act both the death and the blow must occur on the high seas. Peters, J., said that both the stroke and the consequent death must happen on the high seas. Mr. Justice Washington took the same view. United States v. McGill (1806), 4 Dallas, 426. Where a gun was fired from an American ship lying in a harbor of one of the Society Islands, killing a person on board a schooner belonging to the natives in the harbor, it was held by Judge Story that the act was, in contemplation of law, committed on board the foreign schooner where the shot took effect, and that jurisdiction of the offense belonged to the foreign government and not to the courts of the United States. Where a prisoner under such circumstances was sent home for trial, it was held that the court had no jurisdiction. United States r. Davis, 2 Summer, 482.' Civil liabilities on An action for damages was brought for the negligent killing of a person on a vessel hailing from and registered in a port of the State of New York and owned by citizens thereof. The action was brought in a court of the State of New York, and in order to maintain it it was necessary to show that the statute of the State, by which such a right of action was given, was operative on board the vessel on the high seas. It was admitted that, if the question had arisen under the laws of the United States, the principle that a ship on the high seas is constructively a part of the territory of the nation to which she belongs would be applicable; but it was denied that the State of New York could be regarded as a sovereignty whose laws followed her till she came within the jurisdiction of another government. The court said that, in respect of crimes committed on the high seas, the power to provide for their punishment had been delegated to the Federal Government, so that State laws could not be applicable to them; but, |