(99 Md. 13)

COMMISSIONERS OF QUEEN ANNE'S
COUNTY v. COMMISSIONERS
OF TALBOT COUNTY.

(Court of Appeals of Maryland. Feb. 25, 1904.)
BRIDGES-LIABILITY OF COUNTIES FOR CON-
STRUCTION AND REPAIRS-CONTRACTUAL
RIGHT-TITLE OF ACT.

1. Acts 1876, p. 542, c. 314, directed the counties of Q. and T. to levy a tax for erection of a bridge over a stream in Q. county, and also a tax, not exceeding $300 a year for each county, for repair of the approaches thereto. Pursuant thereto, a bridge was erected and maintained by the two counties, till it became so dilapidated as to require rebuilding; and a new bridge was built over the stream, but on a new site. After it was built, T. county refused to contribute to the cost of its erection or maintenance. Held, in a suit by Q. county against T. county after the second bridge had become so dilapidated as to require a practically new bridge to be built, that there was no authority for requiring T. county to reimburse Q. county for any expenditures on the second bridge, or, even if the act of 1876 was not repealed, to aid in the restoration of the old bridge.

2. Acts 1902, p. 420, c. 300, being an act to "limit and control" expenditure of money "upon public highways" by T. county, does not, by "prohibiting" such county from expending money on the construction or repairs of any highway or bridge outside the county, contravene Const. art. 3, § 29, providing that every law shall embrace but one subject, which shall be described in its title.

3. Acts 1876, p. 542, c. 314, directing the counties of Q. and T. to levy a tax for construction of a bridge in Q. county, and also a tax, not exceeding $300 a year for each county, for repair of the approaches thereto, does not give Q. county a contractual right to require T. county to contribute to such maintenance, so as to render inoperative Acts 1902, p. 420, c. 300, repealing the former statute.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Talbot County; Jas. A. Pearce, Edwin H. Brown, and Wm. R. Martin, Judges.

Mandamus proceedings by the county commissioners of Queen Anne's county against the county commissioners of Talbot county. Demurrer to the petition was sustained, and petitioners appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before McSHERRY, C. J., and FOWLER, BRISCOE, BOYD, SCHMUCKER. PAGE, and JONES, JJ.

1. B. W. Mitchell and Phil. B. Hopper, for appellants. J. H. Covington, for appellees. 57 A.-1

PAGE, J. This is an appeal from a ruling of the court upon a demurrer to a petition filed by the appellants for a writ of mandamus to require the appellees to levy upon the assessable property of Talbot county a certain sum of money, to be used and expended in repairs to a certain bridge over Kent Narrows, within the limits of Queen Anne's county. By Acts 1874, p. 415, c. 276, the county commissioners of Queen Anne's county and of Talbot county where directed to levy a tax upon the taxable property of their respective counties for the purpose of erecting a drawbridge over Kent Narrows. This act was repealed and re-enacted by Acts 1876, p. 542, c. 314, which, in addition to directing the commissioners of the two counties to levy for the erection of the bridge, as contained in the act of 1874, also provided for levy of money on the taxable property of each county, to be used in the repairs of the approaches thereto within the distance of 100 yards, not to exceed the yearly sum of $300 for each county. This act came before this court, for its consideration, in the case of Co. Com'rs of Talbot Co. v. Co. Com'rs of Queen Anne's Co., 50 Md. 256. From the opinion of the court in that case, it appears, that Kent Narrows connect the waters of Eastern Bay with those of Chester river, and divide Kent Island from the mainland. The Narrows, as well as the land bordering thereon, are exclusively within the limits of Queen Anne's county. The island was reached at one time from the mainland, over a causeway; but subsequently, with the view of making the narrows navigable, it was contemplated to cut the causeway, and erect a drawbridge, so that vessels and steamers would have a short cut from the waters in the north and northwestern portions of Talbot county into Eastern Bay; and therefore it was recited in Acts 1876, p. 542, c. 314, that the erection of the drawbridge was at the special instance of Talbot county, and that the benefits thereof would inure chiefly to the citizens of that county. It was also held in that case, that though the Legislature has no power "to require a tax to be raised in one county to pay for a purely local object

in and for another county," and "while it would not have been competent to the county to levy taxes to be expended beyond its territorial limits, without express authority of law," yet it was within the legislative power, "when the purpose of the taxation required is not only public, but the object to be accomplished is at the same time local in its character, and of special and peculiar interest to the people sought to be taxed," to direct a tax to be levied, "though the object of the expenditure may have its situs beyond the limits of the county taxed." The act was therefore pronounced to be liable to no constitutional objection, and therefore valid. By virtue of the authority conferred by this act, a drawbridge was erected over Kent Narrows in the year 1876, at the joint expense of the two counties, and was maintained as a free bridge at their joint expense for six or ten years. It is alleged in the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the petition that about 1887 this bridge, "by decay, the action of weather, and of a swift current of a large body of water, became dilapidated, unstable, and unsafe, and dangerous to public travel, despite the care and attention thereto, and the money expended thereon to keep the same in repair, to such an extent as to require rebuilding of the same," and a new drawbridge was built over the narrows, not on the old site, but a short distance north of the site of the old bridge; that the appellees, "after the new bridge was built refused to contribute and pay any money towards the cost of its erection," or contribute in any wise towards its maintenance, or repair and make safe and convenient for travel, the old, so that the whole burden of erecting the new bridge, and maintaining a safe means of travel between the island and the mainland, has since fallen upon, and been borne by, the appellants. In the ninth paragraph it is alleged that the new bridge has now become so dilapidated and unsafe that a practically new bridge must be built, at an estimated cost of not less than $5,000. It is also alleged that the public convenience requires that "a bridge" shall be repaired, and made safe for travel, and that the appellants desire to do so, and have requested the appellees to contribute for that purpose, but they refuse to levy and expend any money for such repairs. The petitioners set out in their petition the amounts they have expended in maintaining the new bridge, amounting in the aggregate to over $5,000, and pray for a mandamus requiring the appellees to levy one-half thereof on the assessable property of Talbot, as its share of such expenses, to the order of the appellants, to be used in repairs "to the bridge aforesaid." The respondents answered the petition, admitting the facts as stated, but denying, among other things, their legal obligation to contribute to the cost of the maintenance of the new bridge, because of the fact that the new bridge was constructed by the appellants without the consent of

the appellees, and was not authorized by the terms of Acts 1876, p. 542, c. 314, and, furthermore, that the said act has been repealed by Acts 1902, p. 420, c. 300. To this answer the petitioner filed several pleas. These were demurred to, so that the sufficiency of the petition comes in question, and must now be determined.

In 1902, by chapter 300, p. 420, the Legislature repealed the act of 1876, and, by the first section of the repealing act, prohibited the county commissioners of Talbot county from expending money upon the construction or repairs of any highway or bridge not in whole or in part on land within the limits of Talbot county. If this act is valid and operative, there can be no question that the mandamus was properly refused, for the reason that, without the authority conferred by Acts 1876, p. 542, c. 314, the county commissioners of Talbot county have no power to levy a tax to be expended upon a drawbridge wholly within the limits of Queen Anne's county. County Com'rs of Talbot Co. v. Co. Com'rs Queen Anne's Co., 50 Md. 259.

It is insisted by the appellants that the act of 1902 offends the provisions of the twentyninth section of the third article of the Constitution of Maryland, and is therefore void. The terms of this constitutional provision are as follows: "Every law enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title." It has been applied in many cases that have come before this court, and its object and scope have more than once been stated. The leading case, to which many of the subsequent cases have made reference, is that of Davis v. State, 7 Md. 160, 61 Am. Dec. 331. The objects of the provision are there stated to be to prevent (1) the ingrafting upon subjects of great public benefit and importance, for local and selfish purposes, foreign and pernicious matters; and (2) the stealthy incorporation into a law, of foreign matter, whereby, it has not infrequently happened that the statute books have shown the existence of enactments that few of the members of the Legislature knew anything of before. In M. & C. C. of Baltimore v. Reitz, 50 Md. 574, the court said that, "while the title must indicate the subject of the act, it need not give an abstract of its contents, nor need it mention the means and method by which its general purpose is to be accomplished." In Stiefel v. Md. Institute, 61 Md. 147, the one and the only thing in the title of the act was the repeal of another act, and yet by its second section affirmative legislation was attempted. It was held that such an attempt was in violation of this provision, because the title did not disclose that a new law, in lieu of the old, was to be enacted. The real objection to the act was thus stated by the court: That "affirmative legislation was attempted under a title which disclosed absolutely nothing except the repeal of a former act." The sum and substance