tion of the naphtha until the final explosion which occurred at the lower end of the sewer. Had the first explosion resulted in the injury to the plaintiff, we hardly think it would be seriously contended that there was no liability for the negligent act in firing the naphtha. The same cause produced the last explosion that produced the first, and the only difference between them is "time and distance." The wrongful act and its injurious effects were connected by an unbroken and continuous succession of events, which made the consequence the immediate and natural result of the act, unaffected by any efficient intermediate cause. whether any efficient or self-operating cause intervened to produce or contribute to the final explosion which resulted in the plaintiff's injury. The appellant affirmed, and the appellee denied, the proposition. In If the facts of a case are in dispute, the question of remote or proximate cause must go to a jury. If, however, the facts are undisputed, and the inferences to be drawn from them are plain, and not open to doubt by reasonable men, it is the duty of the court to determine the question as a matter of law. Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Hope, supra; Haverly v. Railroad Company, supra; Potter v. Natural Gas Company, 183 Pa. 575. 39 Atl. 7; West Mahonoy Township v. Watson, 116 Pa. 344, 9 Atl. 430, 2 Am. St. Rep. 604. In this last case, Gordon, J., speaking for the court, says: "It is also urged that the question of remote or proximate cause was for the jury, and was properly submitted. This would be so, were there any dispute about the facts; but where, as in this case, they are not disputed, the court should determine the question as a matter of law." the same case, when previously in this court (112 Pa. 574, 3 Atl. 866, 56 Am. Rep. 336), it was said: "It is undoubtedly true, as a general proposition, that the question of proximate cause is for the jury, yet it has been repeatedly held that where there are no disputed facts the court must determine it." In Webster v. Monongahela River Consolidated Coal & Coke Company, 201 Pa. 278, 50 Atl. 964, cited by counsel, the case was, against the objection of the defendant company, submitted to the jury, who, under the evidence, found for the plaintiff. We held that there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury on the question of proximate cause. What was there said as to the negligent act being the proximate cause of the ¦ plaintiff's injuries was in support of the position that the facts disclosed by the evidence were sufficient to warrant the jury in finding in his favor, and not a determination of the fact itself by this court. We are at a loss to understand how the appellant can successfully support its position that the court, and not the jury, should have determined, under the evidence in this case, the question whether the negligent act of the defendant company was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, or see wherein the appellant would obtain any advantage if its contention should be sustained. It is most strenuously insisted here that the gas at the mouth of the sewer was ignited by fire in the vicinity of the explosion, and was not ignited by fire carried from the freightyard through the sewer. The court instructed the jury, if they found such to be the fact, that the verdict should be for the defendant. The learned counsel for the appellant advanced many reasons in support of their proposition, while the counsel for the appellee were equally insistent that the explosion was caused by fire carried from the yard to the mouth of the sewer. Who should determine the fact-the court or the jury? We think, under our judicial system, the reply is obvious, and that the question can admit of but one answer. Its solution requires the determination of a controverted fact from the evidence in the case, and that is unquestionably the function of a jury. Had the jury found for the appellant on this question, the verdict must have been against the plaintiff, under the charge of the court. Again: Did the naphtha, when released from the car, flow to the catch-basin, and through the sewer to its mouth? Did sufficient time elapse from the ignition of the naphtha until the final explosion occurred to permit the fire being carried through, and to the mouth of, the sewer? Did the jury believe the witnesses, who the court says so testified, and find as a fact that there was a series of explosions in the sewer immediately prior to the explosion that injured the plaintiff? It would be necessary to determine these and other questions in ascertaining whether the fire started in the freightyard caused the explosion at the mouth of the sewer. It was also one of the controlling questions in the case, conceding the gas at the mouth of the sewer to have been ignited by the fire carried from the yard, We are clear that there was ample evidence in this case to warrant the jury in finding that the explosion resulting in the plaintiff's injuries was caused by the gas coming in contact with the fire carried through the sewer from the freightyard, and that the negligent act of the defendant's servants in causing the naphtha to be ignited was the proximate cause of the injurious consequences to the plaintiff. Whether, therefore, that question was submitted to the court or to the jury, the finding of either tribunal. must be against the defendant company. After carefully considering the questions raised on this record, we have discovered no reversible error in the trial of the cause, and the judgment is therefore affirmed. (208 Pa. 30) KENNY et al. v. PITTSBURG, V. & C. RY. CO. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 4, 1904.) EMINENT DOMAIN-PROPERTY SUBJECT. 1. Where land was conveyed by a landowner, for full value, to a railroad company for a right of way, the landowner reserving a ferry landing and a private right of way, the_company could, under Act March 17, 1869 (P. L. 12), giving the railroad company power to enlarge and otherwise improve the whole or any portion of its road, condemn both the ferry landing and the reserved right of way. Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County. Bill by Anthony H. Kenny and Adam Lock against the Pittsburg, Virginia & Charleston Railway Company. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. The following is the opinion of the court below (Frazer, P. J.): "The bill in this case sets forth: That Thomas J. Kenny, the father of Anthony H. Kenny, was, in his lifetime, the owner of 375 acres of land, situate in Mifflin township, this county, having a front of nearly one mile along low-water line of the Monongahela river. That during his lifetime Thomas J. Kenny sold a portion of that property to the defendant company for the sum of $40,000, the deed of conveyance containing the following reservation, viz.: 'Reserving, however, unto the said Thomas J. Kenny, his heirs, assigns and licensees forever, the right of way for a wagon road twenty feet in width across the strips or pieces of land hereinbefore described to extend from Kenny's landing on the Monongahela river across all the tracks and property of the said railroad company to the land of the said Thomas J. Kenny lying on the southwest of the said railroad tracks at a point in a private road near Kenny's station as shown on the plot hereto attached and made part of this indenture. The said railroad company, their successors and assigns to have the right at any time to change said road or any part thereof so as to cross the said tracks of the railroad of the said company either above or below grade of the said railroad, and in such case to use and occupy as much of the other land of the said Thomas J. Kenny, his heirs and assigns, to the southwest of the strip or piece of land first above described as may be necessary to construct approaches to said crossing. Provided, however, that such road shall not have a grade in any part thereof of more than twelve feet to the hundred feet, and that said road shall be constructed by the said railway company.' That subsequently Thomas J. Kenny died, and by his last will and testament devised to his son, Anthony H. Kenny, the plaintiff, the property upon which the road referred to in the clause above quoted was located, and also devised to him a ferry and ferry landing at the point where the road above referred to reached the Monongahela river, which ferry and the right to operate the same have been leased by Kenny to his coplaintiff, Lock, who is now in possession of and operating the same. That the railroad company did not take possession of the land under the deed above referred to, or make any use of the same, until on or about September 7, 1899, at which time it made certain embankments upon and across the original private way, which was then still in use by plaintiffs, so as to make it impossible for vehicles to cross the railroad at that point. That the railroad company has not constructed a road across its tracks in accordance with the reservation contained in the deed of December 14, 1893, and has entirely cut off all of plaintiff's means of approach to that landing, and that it refuses to build or construct a road across its tracks so as to afford access to the landing. That the defendant company has recently notified the plaintiff Anthony H. Kenny that it has appropriated the road and ferry landing belonging to him and described in the reservation above referred to for the purpose of making additions and improvements to its roadway facilities, and has filed in the court of common pleas No. 3 a bond to secure the damages resulting from the appropriation. The bill prays for an injunction restraining and enjoining the railroad company from appropriating the road and ferry of plaintiffs. "To this bill the defendant demurs, alleging (1) that the bill shows upon its face that plaintiffs have a full, complete, and adequate remedy at law for the injury complained of; (2) under the act of the General Assembly of the state of Pennsylvania approved March 17, 1869 (P. L. 12), the power to widen, deepen, enlarge, and otherwise improve the whole or any portion of defendant's railroad can be legally exercised whenever, in the opinion of the board of directors, the same may be necessary for the better securing the safety of persons and property and increasing the facilities and capacity for the transportation of traffic thereon; (3) the exercise of the powers given by the act of 1869 are not limited to or exhausted by one action. "The contention of plaintiffs is that this case is similar in all respects to Semple v. Cleveland, etc., Railroad Company, 172 Pa. 369, 33 Atl. 564, and is ruled by that case. In this contention we cannot agree. According to our view, the cases are entirely different. In the Semple Case the railroad company entered into a contract with the landowner, by which, in consideration of a right of way, the company agreed to employ the landowner as station agent, if he would erect a station house upon adjoining land owned by him. Afterwards the company endeavored to revoke the contract in part by instituting proceedings to condemn the land upon which the station house was built, and thus revoke the landowner's agency, but at the same time retain the right of way, which was the main consideration for the contract. In that case the court held the contract to be entire, and required it to be performed or rescinded as a whole. In this case there is no such contract between the parties. Here the landowner conveyed certain real estate to the railroad company for full value, reserving in his conveyance to the company a ferry landing and a private right of way over and across the land conveyed, the work of constructing the road to be done by the railway company. It seems to us the reservation in this case is not different from any other reservation. It was admitted upon the argument that the company might have taken the ferry landing, and also have deprived the landowner of a road to the river, had it proceeded with its original condemnation proceedings. That being the case, we fail to see why it may not do so now. Certainly, there is nothing in the deed which amounts to a contract sufficient to either estop the company from taking the property reserved or to require at this time a condemnation of the land described in the deed, together with that now appropriated. It seems clear to us that the purchase made by the railroad company from plaintiff's father in 1893 was a complete contract in itself, so far as the land transferred at that time was concerned, and that property not included in the conveyance or reserved out of it is in no way affected by its terms. If the railway company had the right in 1893 to take the land now sought to be appropriated, we see no reason why it cannot take it now. "As to the plaintiff Adam Lock, a bond should be given him to secure any damages he may sustain by reason of the taking of the property described in the bill. "And now, September 21, 1903, demurrer sustained." Argued before MITCHELL, C. J., and DEAN, FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, and POTTER, JJ. Henry A. Davis and William M. Galbraith, for appellants. James R. Sterrett, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed on the opinion of the court below. (207 Pa. 623) PRESS PUB. CO. v. CITY OF PITTSBURG, MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS-VALIDITY-INDORSE- 1. Though a contract for advertising has been let by a city under Act March 7, 1901, art. 15 (P. L. 36), as amended by Act June 20, 1901 (P. L. 592), and the award has been accepted, and the contract reduced to writing and accepted by the successful bidder, and delivered by him to the city, no contract exists where such contract is unsigned by the recorder, though such failure to sign is caused by the sudden death of the recorder immediately after the delivery of the contract to him, and before he can affix his signature. Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County. Bills by the Press Publishing Company, by Samuel H. Charlton, by the Pittsburg Commercial Gazette, and by the German Catholic Press Company, against the city of Pittsburg. From a decree dismissing the bills, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. The following is the opinion of the court below (Shafer, J.) in the Charlton case: "With this case were tried the cases of the Pittsburg Commercial Gazette against the same defendants (No. 91, July term, 1903), the Press Publishing Company against the same defendants (No. 116, July term, 1903), and the German Catholic Press Company against the same defendants (No. 122, July term, 1903). These four bills were heard together, and may be considered together. Each is for an injunction restraining the defendants from letting contracts for official advertising for the city of Pittsburg before March 13, 1906, and to declare the validity of an alleged contract made with the city by each of the three plaintiffs, who are newspaper publishers; the bill of Samuel H. Charlton being a taxpayers' bill for the same purpose. "(1) Samuel H. Charlton, plaintiff in one of the bills, is a citizen and taxpayer of the city of Pittsburg. The other three plaintiffs are each publishers of newspapers in the city of Pittsburg. "(2) On March 2, 1903, J. O. Brown, who was then the city recorder of said city, advertised for proposals for the publication of all official advertising of the city of Pittsburg, the cost of which is payable out of the municipal treasury, to include all ordinances of council, proclamations of the city recorder, official reports of the city officers, notices in regard to streets, sewers, viewers' reports, and proposals for public works and supplies. March 13, 1903, at 10 o'clock a. m., sealed proposals were received from certain newspapers published in the city of Pittsburg, accompanied by proper bonds, as required by the advertisement. The bids were thereupon publicly opened by the city recorder in the common council chamber and read, and the recorder thereupon declared that he awarded the contracts for the publication of official advertising for three years from April 2, 1903, to the Pittsburg Press, the Pittsburg Commercial Gazette, the Post Printing & Publishing Company, the Pittsburg Leader, and the Pittsburg Beobachter. The recorder thereupon directed his clerk to draw up written contracts, to be signed by the respective newspapers, except the Beobachter, and by himself, which was accordingly done by his clerk; and on the 14th day of March the contracts were signed by all of the newspapers named, except the Beobachter. They were then taken by the recorder's clerk to his resi dence to be signed by him, but he was too ill to do so, and said he would sign them later, but died the next day without signing them. "(4) After the bids were open, and the recorder had publicly awarded them as above stated, it was discovered by the recorder that the bid on behalf of the Pittsburg Beobachter was irregular, in that the bond and the bid were not in the same name, and the bid did not designate distinctly the standard by which the amount of advertising was to be measured. The recorder thereupon directed his clerk not to make out any writing to be signed by the Beobachter, and declared that he would not accept the bid of that newspaper. "(5) On April 11, 1903, William B. Hays, city recorder, who succeeded J. O. Brown in that office, advertised for proposals for the publication of official advertising for the city of Pittsburg, to be opened on April 21, 1903, to be let to three newspapers. "(6) It would not be possible, in an action at law, to compute or estimate the damages which would arise to a newspaper from the breach of a contract for the insertion of official advertising not actually published by the newspaper, by reason of the numerous elements which enter into the cost of publishing advertisements of uncertain length at uncertain intervals. "If the recorder, J. O. Brown, had a general power to contract for the city as an agent of a private corporation might contract for it, there can be no doubt that a valid contract was created by the advertisement, proposal, and acceptance above stated. The act of March 7, 1901, art. 15 (P. L. 36), as amended by the act of June 20, 1901 (P. L. 592), is the law governing the making of contracts for cities of the second class. This article provides that 'all contracts relating to city affairs shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder, after reasonable notice,' and, further, that 'all contracts shall be in writing signed and executed in the name of the city by the city recorder and the head of the proper department,' and the amended act provides that 'no contract shall be let until councils have passed an ordinance providing for the letting of the same by the city recorder and heads of proper departments.' After making these and other like provisions in regard to the making of contracts with the city, it is further provided that 'at the expiration of the present contract and every three years thereafter, the city recorder of each of the cities of the second class shall contract for a term of three years with not less than three nor more than five daily newspapers for the publication of all official advertising.' "The sole question in this case, therefore, appears to be whether the power thus conferred upon the recorder to contract with these papers for advertising is one which may be exercised by him without any ref * erence to the provisions above stated, and amounts to an authority to him to contract for advertising in any manner and upon any terms he may think fit, without advertising, without writing, without countersigning by the controller, or any of the other provisions which in their nature are applicable to the contract for advertising, or whether, on the other hand, the act does not mean that the recorder is authorized to contract under the preceding provisions of the section in regard to city contracts, so far as the same can be applied to the case. "It is quite evident that the intention of the Legislature was to authorize the recorder to make such contracts without the intervention of the head of any department, as the contracts are expressly. made by the act itself to apply to all departments of the city government; and the provision that contracts are to be signed by the head of the proper department can, therefore, have no application to a contract for advertising. In like manner, as the Legislature has positively directed the recorder to make contracts for advertising, it is not to be supposed that the provision requiring an ordinance of councils to be passed, providing for the letting of the contract, applies to the case of contracts for advertising. Counsel for plaintiffs have argued with great force that, as these provisions of the first part of the section are inapplicable to the contract in question, it must be inferred that no part of the provisions above stated are applicable to the contracts for advertising, and that the intention of the act is to give the recorder complete control of the matter, without any restriction. We are not convinced, however, that the Legislature intended in this respect to depart from the rules which have been in force under the various charters of large municipalities for a long time, and to allow the recorder, without any advertising, to make any bargain he pleased for official advertising, but that the general provision of the act with regard to public contracts must be applied to the contracts in question so far as in their nature they are applicable. The only parts of the general provision as to the making of contracts which are not applicable to the present case are that there is no head of the proper department to sign a contract with the recorder, for the reason above stated, and that the provision as to the passage of an ordinance cannot be supposed to apply to the present case, for the reason that the act expressly directs the making of the contract. All the other provisions as to advertisement, letting to the lowest bidder, public award, writing, and signature by the city recorder, and countersigning by the controller, are as applicable to this as to any other municipal contract, and we are of opinion that they are to be applied to this contract. If we are correct in this, it follows that no contract was made by Recorder Brown with the plaintiff newspapers, as the contract was not put in writing, and signed by him, or countersigned by the controller. McManus v. Philadelphia, 201 Pa. 619, 51 Atl. 320, and the cases therein cited. "It is also argued that the provision in question does not contemplate a previous advertisement, because at the time of the letting of the contracts there are no official papers in which to do the advertising, and, the amount being over $250, advertising would be required, and that thus it would be impossible to begin. The answer to this suggestion is that the act itself contemplates the existence of a contract for advertising extending up to the very date of the letting of the new contract, and provides that 'at the expiration of the present contract' the city recorder shall contract for advertising. There is no difficulty, therefore, in his advertising for proposals as other city contracts are advertised for, up to the very date of the expiration of the existing contract, which is the time when the new contract is to be awarded. "We are of opinion, therefore, that the plaintiffs in these several cases are not entitled to any relief, and the bills are dismissed at the costs of plaintiff." Argued before MITCHELL, C. J., and FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, and POTTER, JJ. Clarence Burleigh, Henry O. Evans, and James C. Gray,. for appellants. W. B. Rodgers and T. D. Carnahan, for appellee. PER CURIAM. These decrees are affirmed on the findings and conclusions of the court below. (208 Pa. 37) PITTSBURG STOVE & RANGE CO. v. PENNSYLVANIA STOVE CO. et al. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 4, 1904.) CONTRACT-CONSIDERATION-BREACH-INJUNCTION-EQUITY-FINDINGS. 1. Where the consideration of a contract is the stock of a corporation, which is valuable at the time, the fact that the stock subsequently depreciated in value is immaterial. 2. On a sale of his business, the vendor agreed not to engage in a similar business in three named states for five years, but thereafter became the president of a corporation engaged in a similar business. Held, that he would be enjoined from acting as such, at the instance of the vendee. 3. Where the chancellor is required to answer specifically certain requests for findings of law and fact, he should number separately the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County. Bill by the Pittsburg Stove & Range Company against the Pennsylvania Stove Company and others. From the decree, Lyman W. De Haven appeals. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court. ¶ 2. See Injunction, vol. 27, Cent. Dig. §§ 121, 123. The court entered the following decree: "(1) That the plaintiff's bill be dismissed as to Addison C. De Haven. (2) That the plaintiff's bill be dismissed as to the Pennsylvania Stove Company, at the cost of the plaintiff. (3) That Lyman W. De Haven be, and he is hereby, restrained and enjoined from engaging or continuing to engage in the business of manufacturing or selling stoves, ranges, furnaces, heating appliances, and kindred manufactures, as an employé of the Pennsylvania Stove Company or otherwise, at Ellwood City, Lawrence county, Pennsylvania, or elsewhere in the state of Pennsylvania, for a period of five years from September 1, 1899, and that the said Lyman W. De Haven pay one-half of the costs.". Argued before MITCHELL, C. J., and DEAN, FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, and POTTER, JJ. Walter Lyon, Charles H. McKee, and H. Walton Mitchell, for appellant. W. M. Lindsay and A. M. Neeper, for appellee. MESTREZAT, J. On and prior to September 8, 1899, the appellant and certain other parties, under the partnership name of De Haven & Co., Limited, were engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling stoves, ranges, furnaces, heating appliances, and kindred manufactures. On that date De Haven & Co., Limited, by a written bill of sale, sold to the appellee, for the consideration therein mentioned, its personal property, including the good will of the business, also cash, book accounts, etc., and therein agreed as follows: "And in consideration of the purchase of said property by the party of the second part [the appellee], the party of the first part covenants and agrees that for and during the period of five years from the date hereof, L. W. De Haven, A. C. De Haven, John A. Rowe, Philip Mowry and Charles W. Goodnough shall not engage, directly or indirectly, in the business of manufacturing or selling stoves, ranges, furnaces and heating appliances at any place within the states of Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia." Contemporaneously with the bill of sale, the appellant, with the other parties referred to, as parties of the first part, entered into a written agreement with the appellee in which it was agreed, inter alia, as follows: "That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the benefits accruing to them from the sale of their interest in De Haven & Company, Limited, to the Pittsburg Stove & Range Company and the payment by the Pittsburg Stove & Range Company for the consideration of said transfer, do hereby agree to bind themselves, and each of them, not to engage in a business similar to the business now or hereafter carried on by the Pittsburg Stove & Range Company relating to the manufacture and selling of stoves, ranges, furnaces and kindred manufactures for a period of five years from September 1, 1899, in the states of Pennsylvania, Ohio and |