§ 481. Corporations Protected.

Corporations equally with natural persons are entitled to the protection of the clause. "The inhibition of the amendment was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation. Under the designation of person there is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose, and permitted to do business under a particular name, and have a succession of members without dissolution." 12

But is is to be observed that as to foreign corporations, a State having the constitutional right to say whether a corporation not chartered by itself shall do business within its limits (interstate commerce excepted) the State may impose upon such corporations as conditions precedent to the enjoyment of the privilege, such special conditions as it may see fit.13

Perhaps the best general statement of the scope and intent of the provision for the equal protection of the laws is that given by Justice Field in his opinion in Barbier v. Connolly," in which, speaking for the court, he says:

"The Fourteenth Amendment in declaring that no State' shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' undoubtedly intended, not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty or arbitrary spoliation of property but that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and acquire and enjoy property; that they should have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property, the pre

12 Pembina Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 737; 31 L. ed. 650.

13 But see the discussion as to the right of the State to prevent foreign corporations from exercising the federal right of removing suits brought against them into the federal courts (Section 571). See also, generally, the chapters dealing with the control of the States over Interstate Commerce. 14 113 U. S. 27; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; 28 L. ed. 923.

vention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition, and that in the administration of criminal justice no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like offenses. But neither the Amendment, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment was designed to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its 'police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often be had in certain districts, such as for draining marshes and irrigating arid plains. Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits, for supplying water, preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many other objects. Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon anyone, but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good. Though, in many respects, necessarily special in their character, they do not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons and property under the same circumstances and conditions. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the Amendment. In the execution of admitted powers unnecessary proceedings are often required, which are cumbersome, dilatory and expensive, yet, if no discrimination against anyone be made and no substantial right be impaired by them, they are not obnoxious to any constitutional objection. The incon

veniences arising in the administration of the laws from this cause are matters entirely for the consideration of the State; they can be remedied only by the State. In the case before us, the provisions requiring certificates from the health officer and the board of fire wardens may, in some instances, be unnecessary, and the changes to be made to meet the conditions prescribed may be burdensome, but as we have said, this is a matter for the determination of the municipality in the execution of its police powers, and not a violation of any substantial right of the individual."

§ 482. Illustrative Cases Arising under the Equal Protection Cause.

The enumeration of some of the specific applications which the requirement of equal protection of the laws has received will sufficiently illustrate its scope and intent.

The provision of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to individuals and to corporations that they shall not by state law be excluded from the enjoyment of privileges which other persons and corporations similarly circumstanced enjoy, or that they may not have imposed upon them burdens which others similarly circumstanced are free from. But no one is guaranteed that in fact, through the fortuitous operation of a law, which in itself is not discriminative, a special burden may not be imposed, or the enjoyment of a privilege taken away. Thus, for example, in Strander v. West Virginia a state law was held invalid which denied to members of the colored race the right to act upon juries, the court saying, "the law in the State shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the State." But in Virginia v. Rives16 and other cases17 it is held that the fact that it happens that no negroes are in fact drawn upon the jury, or vice versa,

15 100 U. S. 303; 25 L. ed. 664.

16 100 U. S. 313; 25 L. ed. 667.

that

17 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; 26 L. ed. 567; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110; 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625; 27 L.. ed. 354; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. B. 213; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583; 42 L. ed. 1012.

no whites are so drawn is not constitutionally objectionable, unless it affirmatively appear that the state officials intrusted with the administration of the law arbitrarily and with intent have given an unequal and discriminative effect to the law.18

§ 483. Yick Wo v. Hopkins.

The case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins19 involved the validity of an ordinance of the City of San Francisco which required all persons desiring to establish laundries in frame houses to obtain the consent of certain municipal officials. Here the law or ordinance was not upon its face discriminatory, but it was held void for the reason that it gave to the designated officials "not a discretion to be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of each case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent not only as to places but as to persons," and because the evidence showed in fact " an administration directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons [the Chinese] as to warrant and require the conclusion that whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances so adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their administration and thus representing the State itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of that equal protection of the law which is secured to the petitioners as to all other persons by the broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." The court then go on to declare the general doctrine: "Though the law be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution." 20

18 See Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 904; 40 L. ed. 1075.

19 118 U. S. 356; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; 30 L. ed. 220.

20 This principle of interpretation is declared to have been sanctioned in Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. 259; 23 L. ed. 543; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275; 23 L. ed. 550; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; 25 L. ed. 676;

§ 483. Equal Protection of the Law does not Control the Grant of Political Rights.

The requirement as to equal protection of the law does not operate to prevent the States from restricting the enjoyment of political privileges to such classes of their citizens as they may see fit.21

§ 484. Classifications.

When there are reasonable economic or political or social reasons for doing so, certain ocupations or industries, or even classes of persons may be selected out for special regulation or for the enjoyment of special privileges.

Thus, for example, the practice of certain professions may be limited to persons of the male sex, or to those of a certain age, or to those possessing other qualifications that may reasonably be held to indicate a fitness for the profession.22

Thus also, as proper police measures, the States are permitted to impose special restrictions and liabilities upon railway corporations. Special modifications of the common-law doctrine of employer's liability with reference to them have been upheld, as have laws placing the presumption of negligence upon them when cattle have been killed by their trains, and laws making them responsible for fires kindled by sparks from their locomotives, though they may have taken every possible precaution to avoid such fires.23

However, in Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ellis24 a state law was held void which imposed an attorney's fee in addition to costs upon Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; 26 L. ed. 567; and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; 28 L. ed. 1145. See also Grunding v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633; 44 L. ed. 725. But see

as to doctrine declared in Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U. S. 32; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 317; 43 L. ed. 603.

21 Chapter XXXVIII.

22 Re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1082; 38 L. ed. 929; Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130; 21 L. ed. 442.

23 See especially St. Louis, etc., Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243; 41 L. ed. 611; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161; 32 L. ed. 107.

24 165 U. S. 150; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; 41 L. ed. 666.