Blameworthy Belief: A Study in Epistemic Deontologism

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Springer Science & Business Media, 18 հլս, 2007 թ. - 282 էջ

Believing the wrong thing may sometimes have drastic consequences. The question as to when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief is an important one: It touches upon the roots of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility.

The answer to this question may influence the extent to which we are willing to submit each other to punishments ranging from mild resentment to harsh prison terms.

This book presents an extensive effort to shed light on the conditions under which we may appropriately deem someone blameworthy for holding a particular belief. It regiments and unifies several debates within contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship. Finally, the book brings a new philosophical look on issues like our power to control beliefs and the extent and nature of foresight.

 

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INTRODUCTION
1
12 THE JUSTIFICATION OF REACTIVE ATTITUDES
3
14 EPISTEMIC BLAMEWORTHINESS AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY
10
15 EPISTEMIC BLAMEWORTHINESS AND THE NOTION OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
16
16 ALTERNATIVE NOTIONS OF EPISTEMIC BLAMEWORTHINESS
17
17 THE STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY
19
BELIEF AND ACCEPTANCE
23
22 THE DEONTIC EVALUATION OF BELIEFS AND ACCEPTANCES
28
8322 The general analogy argument
136
DIRECT PROPERTYDIRECTED DOXASTIC CONTROL OR PROPERTY VOLUNTARISM
143
92 JOHN HEIL AS A PIONEERING PROPERTY VOLUNTARIST
144
93 JAMES MONTMARQUETS PROPERTY VOLUNTARISM
146
94 THE LIMITATIONS OF PROPERTY VOLUNTARISM
147
INDIRECT CONTENTDIRECTED DOXASTIC CONTROL OR DOXASTIC PASCALIANISM
153
102 DOXASTIC PASCALIANISM
157
103 A FIRST GLIMPSE OF THE FORESIGHT PROBLEM
159

APPROACHING A CONCEPTION OF EPISTEMIC BLAMEWORTHINESS
33
32 THE NOTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
36
33 SOME OVERRIDING DISTINCTIONS
37
332 Substantialism Versus Nonsubstantialism
41
333 Sentimentalism Versus Nonsentimentalism
42
BLAMEWORTHY BELIEF AS INEXCUSABLY UNDESIRABLE BELIEF
47
42 THE PROBLEM OF EPISTEMIC ACCUSES
48
EPISTEMIC UNDESIRABILITY
53
52 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRUTHGOAL
55
53 GROUNDS REASONS AND EVIDENCE
57
54 TRUTHCONDUCIVENESS OR RELIABLE FORMATION
63
55 THE NOTION OF EPISTEMIC UNDESIRABILITY
69
BRUCE RUSSELLS BASIC ANALYSIS OF THE NOTION OF EPISTEMIC BLAMEWORTHINESS
73
DOXASTIC CONTROL
79
72 SOME BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR DEONTOLOGICAL ADEQUACY
83
73 A TAXONOMY OF MODES OF DOXASTIC CONTROL
86
74 PREVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT AHEAD
95
DIRECT CONTENTDIRECTED DOXASTIC CONTROL OR DOXASTIC VOLUNTARISM
99
82 THE CASE AGAINST DOXASTIC VOLUNTARISM
105
8213 Bernard Williams selfdefeat arguments
107
8214 Williams retrospectivist incompatibility claim
110
8215 Doxastic voluntarism and selfdeception
111
8216 Dion ScottKakures prospective argument
115
8217 Heinrich Wansing against the conceptional impossibility claim
116
822 The Psychological Impossibility Claim
118
8222 The psychological impossibility of doxastic action
120
83 THE CASE FOR DOXASTIC VOLUNTARISM
123
8312 Hobartian voluntarism
128
832 The Defiant Strategy
131
104 A FRANKFURTSTYLE OBJECTION
161
105 THE LIMITATIONS OF DOXASTIC PASCALIANISM
163
106 THIRDPERSON INDIRECT DOXASTIC CONTENT CONTROL
165
INDIRECT PROPERTYDIRECTED DOXASTIC CONTROL OR PROPERTY PASCALIANISM
169
112 JOHN HEIL AND HILARY KORNBLITH AS PIONEERING PROPERTY PASCALIANISTS
170
113 HOW TO EXERCISE INDIRECT PROPERTYDIRECTED DOXASTIC CONTROL
172
INTELLECTUAL OBLIGATIONS
177
122 INSTITUTIONAL AND NONINSTITUTIONAL INTELLECTUAL OBLIGATIONS
178
123 THE SOURCE OF INTELLECTUAL OBLIGATIONS
179
FORESIGHT AND BLAMEWORTHY INADVERTENCE TO RISK
189
132 BLAMEWORTHY INADVERTENCE TO RISK
193
133 RELEVANT FORESIGHT AND RELEVANT INADVERTENCE TO RISK
195
134 LARRY ALEXANDERS OBJECTIONS
197
135 FORESIGHT INADVERTENCE AND HARMDOING
200
EPISTEMIC BLAMEWORTHINESS ANALYSED
203
142 WHAT COUNTS AS AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR VIOLATING AN INTELLECTUAL OBLIGATION?
207
143 PARTICULAR TYPES OF EXCUSES FROM EPISTEMIC BLAMEWORTHINESS
208
1432 Cognitive Deficiency
214
144 DOES THE PROPOSED ANALYSIS OF THE NOTION OF EPISTEMIC BLAMEWORTHINESS HAVE A VICIOUS REGRESS PROBLEM?
217
EPISTEMIC AUTONOMY
223
152 APPROACHING A NOTION OF EPISTEMIC AUTONOMY
225
153 EPISTEMIC AGENTAUTONOMY AND EPISTEMIC ROLEAUTONOMY
227
154 EPISTEMIC AGENTAUTONOMY EXAMINED
228
NOTES
233
REFERENCES
259
NAME INDEX
263
SUBJECT INDEX
265
BRIEF SUMMARY
267
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Էջ iii - Honorary Editor: JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Boston University, USA Editors: DIRK VAN DALEN, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands...
Էջ 1 - Inquiry into the evidence of a doctrine is not to be made once for all, and then taken as finally settled. It is never lawful to stifle a doubt; for either it can be honestly answered by means of the inquiry already made, or else it proves that the inquiry was not complete. "But," says one, "I am a busy man; I have no time for the long course of study which would be necessary to make me in any degree a competent judge of certain questions, or even able to understand the nature of the arguments.

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