XLV. 1840. CHAP. Arabs in this part of Africa are extremely simple in their habits, without artificial wants, and content with the rudest fare; but they are nevertheless passionately desirous of gold, which, when gained, they bury in the earth, or invest in arms or costly ornaments for their persons. This habit may in some degree account for the heavy expenses of the colony, which has proved a serious drain on the French treasury ever since their arms first obtained a footing in the country. Between the years 1830 and 1846 the colony had swallowed up no less than 1,000,000,000 francs of French treasure, over and above the scanty revenue extracted from it. The annual ex89 (Coloni penses of the colony, including the immense military forces required to keep it in subjection, are not less than 100,000,000 francs.1* 1 Stat. de l'Algérie, 1845-46, 87, sation). 7. of the colony industry. Unlike the Transatlantic and Australian colonies of Difficulties Great Britain, Algeria has never proved a successful in respect of field for emigrants. This is no doubt in part owing to the vicinity of the Arab tribes, whose natural condition is now, as it has been from the earliest times, a state of ceaseless warfare with the peaceful and comparatively rich indwellers in the plains. But it is in part also owing to the extreme poverty and inefficient habits of the emigrants themselves who have attempted to settle in the country, and to the neglect or inability of the Government to give a title to the lands assigned to them. So powerful has been the operation of these causes, that in the years 1845 and 1846 the total number of emigrants, French and foreigners, who settled in the colony, was only 1172 and 1882 respectively, although every possible encouragement had been given to them by the grant of free passages across the sea, and otherwise. The consequence is, that XLV. 1840. labour is extremely high in the colony, and though the CHAP. waste lands are assigned by the Government for a mere trifle, yet, as two or three years' toil are in general necessary before any return is obtained, it is long before the colonist can reap any fruit from his soil. The condition of the settler is in general miserable in the extreme. Perched upon arid spots, distant from water, the poor tenants lie panting under the rays of the sun or the blast of the sirocco, and seeking in vain the promised land, which tempted them to leave their distant and oftregretted homes. Cultivation, in consequence, proceeds 1.Atarie, very slowly, even in the richest spots; and the agricultural 1845-46, produce of the Metidja is greatly less than when the stan- 226, 227. dards of Charles X. first approached its sunny plains.1 de l'Algérie, 180; Borrer, imports. It may readily be conceived that when such, at first at 8. least, is the condition of most of the new settlers in the Exports and colony, its exports and imports cannot present a very flattering return. Such as they are, they are chiefly owing to the expenditure of the Government on the supplies required for the large body of troops permanently stationed on the African shore. The imports in 1845 were 99,360,000 francs, and the exports only 10,491,000— a state of things which sufficiently demonstrates that it was the consumption of the army which alone kept alive The troops in Algeria, since 1840, had risen from 50,000 to 100,000 men, and the European inhabitants from 25,000 to 99,000, and it is their expenditure, drawn from the salaries they receive from the Government, rather than their own industry, which occasions the immense disproportion between the imports and ex- 2 Stat. de ports of the colony. The entire imports from 1831 to 'Algérie, 1845 were 634,000,000 francs, and the exports during 394, 395. the same period only 65,854,000 francs.2 commerce. But although not as yet abounding in the wealth which in the British colonies has attended the effects of laborious and persevering industry, there never was a colonial establishment so well calculated to draw forth what both the 1845-46, XLV. 1840. 9. Great im portance of Algiers as a school for war. CHAP. Government and the nation still more desired, the military prowess of the army. In this respect Algiers has been of inestimable importance to France; and in the severe training which its ceaseless wars have given to the generals and soldiers engaged, is to be found the main causes of the recent resurrection and present formidable state of its military power. The interior of the country was by no means conquered with the reduction of Algiers. For about twenty years after, the Arab tribes and indigenous Africans in the mountains, the plains, and the deserts, maintained a desperate and persevering war with the invaders, as their ancestors had done with the Roman legions. Abd-el-Kader proved as formidable an enemy to the French as Jugurtha had done to the ancient masters of the world. Like them, the modern invaders were compelled to cut roads through mountains and forests, to penetrate deserts, to throw bridges over torrents; and so identical is the art of war in all ages, and such perfect masters were the ancients in all its parts, that the French engineers, in general, had only to follow the still remaining highways with which the Romans had penetrated, eighteen hundred years before, the wilds of nature. The bivouac of the soldiers of Louis Philippe was often spread out within the precincts of a camp of the legions; their fortified posts were almost always passim; constructed on the site of a Roman fort, and often with the very stones which had been cut and laid down by the hands of the legionary soldiers.1 1Castellane, Borrer, 226, 227. 10. Qualities called out cers and soldiers. In this prolonged and desperate warfare the talents and energy of all ranks of the army were constantly taxed to in the offi- the very uttermost. Summer and winter they were in presence of the enemy: alike in heat and cold they were required to make expeditions, to be prepared to repel assaults. In the heat of spring, or under the ardent rays of the dogdays, they were called on to force their way up steep ascents, through rocks and thickets, swarming with expert marksmen, or over waterless deserts, where the XLV. 1840. 1 Castellane, enemy, constantly in sight, was nevertheless rarely acces- CHAP. sible, except when numbers or advantage of ground gave them a decided superiority. In winter, the garrisons left in the forts to keep up the communications were isolated for months together amidst ice and snow, and often compelled to depend for their subsistence upon a razzia or predatory sweep among the herds of an enemy, ever as vigilant in repelling an attack as skilful in effecting a surprise or deluding their opponents into an ambuscade. The very providing the troops in such a warfare with supplies was often a matter of extreme difficulty; the conveyance of them with the columns required great previous preparation, and no small amount of experience and energy on the part of the commissariat. To provide for themselves, and trust to no one else; to construct their huts, cook their victuals, carry their food, mend their garments, and look after their effects, was a matter of necessity to the common soldiers, and soon became a habit. To handle large bodies of men in a mountainous 46. country, and concentrate attacks at the same moment, by many different columns which had to cross ridges, traverse torrents, and penetrate forests in their advance, was the task frequently imposed upon the officers. No military man need be told what a school such a warfare is for training an army; and if any doubt could exist on the subject, it would be removed by the perfection in which the best qualities both of officers and soldiers have been exhibited by the troops brought from Algiers to the Crimean war. In the campaigns to be narrated in this chapter will appear many names which have since become as household words over all the world; and they appear at first with a faint radiance, an uncertain light, gradually expanding in brightness, as the stars which on the approach of night become visible, one by one, in the azure firmament, till with the increasing surrounding gloom they shine forth with a clear and imperishable lustre. CHANGARNIER, by the common consent alike of his XLV. 1840. CHAP. friends and his enemies, is to be placed at the head of this bright band. Though political causes have kept him in retirement since the accession of Louis Napoleon, and he Character of took no part in the war in the Crimea, he has already Changarnier. done enough in those of Algeria, and in the streets of 11. Paris, to earn for himself an imperishable renown. Grave and taciturn, like Napoleon in early life, in his ordinary demeanour, his thoughts were constantly on his military duties, and his ambition fixed on military distinction. No one revolved more anxiously in his mind the chances of an enterprise before it was attempted, no one, when he deemed it practicable, carried it into execution with more vigour or celerity. Such was the confidence which his constant success inspired in the soldiers, that it was a common saying among the men, when he was put in command of a razzia, "We already smell the sheep"--a saying repeated by them in subsequent years in the streets of Paris, to the great astonishment of the Parisians, when employed to charge a body of insurgents. When a dangerous expedition was in contemplation, the general commanding in chief sent for Changarnier, who, after maturely considering the chances for and against success, delivered his opinion without reserve to his commander. If it was in favour of the attempt, he received the command, and 1 Castellane, 46, 49, 57. seldom failed to return adorned with the laurels of victory.1 12. Like Hannibal, Cæsar, and all great commanders, he Continued. was extremely attentive to the provisioning of his troops, and also to giving them, whenever it was practicable, an adequate amount of repose. He was careful also to avoid imposing on them unnecessary fatigue. His practice was, the moment a company arrived on its ground, to pile the arms, lay off the knapsacks, and then every one ran to get water, cut wood, or cook victuals, as circumstances might require. His maxim was, "To eat well and sleep well, are the two most important things in war. Sancho Panza was right when he said, 'The man does not make |