In the imports of the year there is a decrease from Rio of 109,752 bags, while from Cuba, &c., there is an increase of 695 bags, and coastwise of 10,000 bags; making an actual decrease in receipts of 99,057 bags. The present stock of all kinds, out of grocers' hands, is estimated at 8,500 bags, and this amount being deducted from the supply (351,167 bags, as above) would leave 342,667 bags as the quantity taken for the consumption of the West and South, against 335,229 bags last year, and 390,141 bags the year previous. The annexed table presents a comparison of the direct imports into this port for the past eleven years:

EXCHANGE. Several causes, which are familiar to all, have combined to disturb the even tenor of the Exchange market, and the fluctuations during the past season have been more frequent and abrupt than we have had occasion to notice for some two or three years past. The following table is arranged to show the highest and lowest quoted rates in each month for sterling bills, and for bills at sixty days' sight on New York, and a reference to it will afford a fair idea of the general course of the market, though there probably have been, at most periods, some transactions at rates both above and below the figures which we give :

FREIGHTS. The rates of freight have ruled unusually high during the past season, attributable in a great measure, as we suppose, to a large European demand for breadstuffs, the transportation of which has given employment to a large number of vessels that would otherwise have been more exclusively at command for the conveyance to market of our leading Sonthern staples. Besides this, the demand for vessels in nearly all parts of the world has been so active, and the rates so remunerative, that there has been a material falling off in the supply of foreign tonnage, as compared with last year. The following table, which presents the highest and lowest points in each month, for cotton to Liverpool, will indicate the course of the market. It will be seen that the lowest point was d., in September, and the highest 1d., in May. Very little was shipped, however, at the latter figure, and the average rate of the season has been about 4d.

The total number of arrivals at this port since 1st September, according to our records, is 1,948—viz.: 713 ships, 204 steamships, 336 barks, 217 brigs, and 478 schooners, showing a decrease, as compared with last year, of 69 ships, 111 barks, 78 brigs and 118 schooners; and the entries at the custom house for the year ended 30th June 1854 were as follows--Whole number of vessels 2.094; tonnage 906,503; showing a decrease, as compared with last year, of 291 vessels and 85,796 tons. Included in the arrivals are 343 foreign vessels, with a total measurement of 158,644 tons; decrease 89 vessels and 39,287 tons.*

JOURNAL OF MERCANTILE LAW.

DISPUTE AS TO QUALITY OF GOODS DElivered.

At the Manchester (England) County Court, an action was brought (June, 1854) by Mr. James Woodiwis, drysalter, of Manchester, against Mr. John Bainbridge, in the same trade in Liverpool, for the difference of the value of 200 bags of sago flour, sold to the defendant in January last, and which defendant refused to accept. Mr. Ovens was counsel for the plaintiff-attorney, Mr. Roberts: and Mr. Wheeler for the defendant-attorney, Mr. Bullock. Mr. Woodiwis stated that on the 26th of January, he saw the defendant at his office, and showed him a sample of sago flour, of which the defendant agreed to buy 200 bags; and a memorandum was then drawn up, "That I have sold to John Bainbridge & Co. 200 bags of sago flour, now lying at the Albert Dock, Liverpool, as per sample, to be delivered in Manchester, per Kenworthy & Co., at 24s. 3d. per cwt." This was signed by the plaintiff, and the defendant took it, and gave it to his brother, and said, "Take care of that, to prevent any mistake." Plaintiff asked him for a written order, and he said, "We shall not demur; it is quite right." Plaintiff then sent to Messrs. Kenworthy, the carriers, a note directed to Messrs. Slea, his brokers at Liverpool, who thereupon issued the following order:-"To the trustees of Albert Docks. Please deliver to bearer the sound portion of the J. R. 200 bags of sago flour, ex Prince of Wales, from Singapore." This was the usual form of the order, because in every cargo there would probably be some small portions more or less damaged. The 200 bags were part of a larger lot of 387 bags, a small portion of which was damaged. The dock trustees were responsible for the delivery of the goods according to sample, having classified them in different qualities. Mr. Slea would not undertake to select the sound flour, not having any authority to do so; and Messrs. Kenworthy's agent, not professing to be a competent judge of the article, did not even see it, but wrote to the defendant for some further instructions. On the 31st of January, plaintiff received a note from Mr. Bainbridge, saying, “The carrier informs me that some of the sago flour is damaged; therefore I shall decline taking it." Plaintiff wrote to Messrs. Kenworthy, and next day went to Liverpool about it; and found that the defendant had desired them not to take the sago on his account. Plaintiff, nevertheless, ordered it to be taken to Manchester, and wrote to Mr. Bainbridge to say what he had done, and to assure him that the lot was perfectly sound, and he should require defendant to take it; his letter was sent back to him with these words written below-"Sir, whatever you may order, it will be at your own risk. J. Bainbridge." The flour was afterwards sold by Messrs. Slea; but the price had fallen in the mean time so that there was a loss of £35. It was stated that the defendant afterwards purchased 200 bags of the same cargo from Messrs. Slea, but at a lower price than had been agreed upon on the 26th. The defence, of course, was that the plaintiff had not delivered the goods according

* For full statistics of the Commerce and navigation of New Orleans, with prices of leading products, &c., see "COMMERCIAL STATISTICS" in subsequent pages of the present number of the Merchants' Magazine.

to contract; but apart from this, the defendant's counsel argued that there was no memorandum or evidence in the defendant's writing, as required by the statute of frauds, of any contract at all; and that if there was a contract, it required the plaintiff to deliver the goods in Manchester; and it was no part of the duty of defendant, nor of the carriers, to go to the Albert Docks and select what was sound from a damaged lot. Mr. Ovens discussed the legal question as to evidence of the existence of a contract, in the several notes of the defendant; and the judge, Mr. Brandt, said, after much deliberation, that the contract in this case, as reduced to writing, was undoubtedly binding on the plaintiff; but that if the defendant had absolutely denied the contract, there would have been nothing in his letters binding himself to it. The terms of the contract did not rest however, on mere parole evidence—as in the case cited by Mr. Wheeler--but might be shown from the memorandum given by the plaintiff, if it were proved that defendant, in anything he wrote, had referred to that contract. It appeared upon the whole, that the correspondence showed there had been a bargain between the parties, which the defendant in his letters did not deny; and the plaintiff was therefore entitled to the verdict with costs.

THE LAW OF LOST BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

The British Court of Exchequer Chamber has recently had this subject before it, and has pronounced a decision, reversing a prior decision of the Exchequer of Pleas, and establishing that a party cannot sue at law for a debt, in respect of which a negotiable bill of exchange has been given and then lost, although the bill may have been lost before it was due, and may not have been indorsed. The following is the material part of the judgment, as reported in the Law Times, vol. 22, page 39:

The present case is not one of an action upon a lost bill, but on a demand for the amount of which the bill was given. A bill given for and on account of money, due on simple contract, operates as an additional payment, which may be repudiated at the option of the creditor, if the bill were unpaid at maturity in his hands, in which case he may rescind the transaction of payment, and sue on the original contract. If the bill be lost, the condition on which the payment may be repudiated does not arise, and the defendant, if compelled to pay the original debt, would be subject to inconvenience of a like kind, as if compelled to pay the bill. . . To entitle the plaintiff to sue, he ought to be the holder of the bill, and the bill ought to be due; and there seems no reason why a defendant may not rely on a defect of the plaintiff's title in either of these respects, leaving the other unnoticed. It may well be that a person who has given a bill on account of a debt, may be able and willing to pay the debt if he can withdraw the bill from circulation, and may object to pay only on the ground that the bill is not forthcoming, without objecting to its not being due. Crowe vs. Clay.

The proper remedy for the loser of the bill is to tender an indemnity, and then to sue in equity.

LIABILITIES OF RAILWAYS.

Some goods were delivered in Staffordshire, directed to the ship Melbourne, East India Docks. Subsequently a countermand was given to a clerk at the London station, and they were sent to Bell Wharf, Rateliff Highway. By mistake they were delivered to the original address. The railway company were held liable for the loss.-Scothorne vs. the South Staffordshire Railway Company, 20 English Law Times, Rep. 225.

The Company's Clauses Consolidation Act prohibits any contract being made by a director of a company, incorporated by act of Parliament, with the company. It was held in Barker vs. the Oxford, &c., Railway Company, 20 English Law Times, Rep. 224, that this does not invalidate the contract, but only vacates the office of such director.

LEGAL DECISION IN REGARD TO FALSELY PACKED COTTON.

We have often occasion, says the New Orleans Price Current, to refer to the very reprehensible practice of falsely packing cotton, which we are sorry to find is continued to some extent, as we have heard of many complaints and reclamations from time to time during the past season. The suit reported below grew out of a case of this kind, and it will be seen that the factors, though innocent parties, and acting in good faith, are held liable for damages :

P. Cusacks vs. Oakey & Hawkins. Third District Court of New Orleans. This suit was brought before Richardson, Justice, to recover the amount due for reclamation on two bales of cotton sold by the defendants.

It appeared in evidence that the cotton in question was sold, with many other bales, by sample, and that the whole was shipped to Barcelona. On being opened, it was found that two of the bales were falsely packed, the outside corresponding in quality with the sample, and the inside consisting of very inferior

cotton.

The plaintiff proved the identity of the bales with those purchased of defendants; also, the false packing and the amount of damage. The defendants offered no evidence, but rested their defense upon two points, viz.: 1st. That as a false and fraudulent packing was charged, they, as the agents of the planter, could not be held liable; and 2d. That as the planter's mark was on the bales, recourse must be had to the principal and not to them.

The Court decided that the defendants, as cotton merchants, selling cotton in one lot, which, perhaps, had been received from many planters-selling it in their own name, without reference to any others as principals-and selling it by sample, thereby warranting the whole to be equal to the sample in quality, were clearly liable-that the charge that the bales were falsely packed, in no manner affected, nor could it have been intended to affect, the character and standing of defendants, who were merely the merchants and not the planters; and that in the transaction the defendants acted and were treated as principals, and not as agents.

From this decision the defendants appealed to the Third District Court of New Orleans, where the judgment of the lower Court was affirmed with costs. The cause was tried in the Appellate Court, and a motion for a new trial made by defendants was argued and overruled.

Emerson for plaintiff, Eggleson for defendants.

SHIPPING MERCHANTS-FREIGHT.

United States District Court. Before Judge Ingersoll. Decision in Admiralty, 1854. Francis Leland vs. William Agnew and others.

The libel in this case is filed by the owner of the ship President Fillmore, to recover the freight on 116 hogsheads of tobacco, brought from New Orleans to this port in August, 1853, under a bill of lading which specified that the tobacco was shipped "deliverable at the Tobacco Inspection Wharf," to be carried to the port of New York, and there delivered to the respondents. The ship arrived at this port during the latter part of August, and, as the yellow fever then prevailed at New Orleans, she was compelled to undergo quarantine. Tobacco, however, was permitted to be brought up to the city without undergoing quaran tine. The ship having been ordered to be discharged, the libelant notified the respondents to get a permit and take their tobacco from the ship. The respondents insisted that the libelant should lighter it up to the Tobacco Inspection Wharf, but the libelant refused to do this, telling them that if they did not send lighters for it, it would be stored at the Atlantic Docks at their expense. Thereupon, the respondents sent lighters for the tobacco, and brought it up to the city. The libelant then brought this suit for the freight, and the respondents

tendered and paid into court the amount of freight, less the expense of lighterage, claiming to deduct that from the full freight.

Held by the Court, That the contract of the libelant was to deliver the tobacco at the Tobacco Inspection Wharf, and that upon the performance of that contract on his part the payment of freight depends, unless there has been a waiver of performance by the owner of the goods, or some act on his part which prevents performance. That the libelant was not prevented from performing his contract by the necessity of discharging his ship at quarantine; the tobacco was not detained, and he was permitted to tranship it into lighters to bring it to the city, and could have done so.

The terms of the contract are express, precise, and unconditional; when no technical mercantile terms are used in it-when there is no uncertainty in regard to it, evidence cannot be introduced to vary its apparent import and to show that, by usage and custom, under certain circumstances, the contract need not be kept and performed according to its terms. Usage cannot be set up to vary the terms of an express contract. That the usage attempted to be proved by the libelant, authorizing him to deliver these goods at quarantine under these circumstances, in spite of the clause in the bill of lading, is not consistent with the contract, but contrary to it, and proof of it cannot be admitted. That the proof offered by the libelant is insufficient to establish such a usage, even if it could be admitted. That the receipt of the tobacco by the respondents, after the notice given them by the libelant, was no waiver by them of their right to demand a delivery at Tobacco Warehouse Wharf.

Decree, therefore, for libelant for $496 50, the amount tendered by the respondents, and the costs of the respondents subsequent to the tender deducted.

GOODS SOLD BY SAMPLE-ACTION TO RECOVER VALUE OF.

In the Supreme Court, General Term, July, 1854. Before Chief Justice Oakley, Judges Duer and Hoffman. P. D. Muller vs. Amos R. Eno and others.

This was a suit to recover the price of lawns sold the defendants. On the 20th of February, 1849, the plaintiff sold defendants 33,600 yards of lawns, packed in 14 bales, at 11 cents per yard, on 8 months' credit. For the defense it was contended that the goods were sold by sample, and that the seller represented the sample as fair specimens of the 14 bales, and that on the faith of such representations the purchase was made.

The bales were not exhibited, nor were accessible for examination, and the samples and representations were of a sound merchantable article. But when examined subsequent to the delivery, were found to be tender, which rendered their value $1,700 less than they would have been had they corresponded with the samples, and the sum was claimed as a deduction from the price. The goods arrived at New York in January. and the greater part of them were sent to the United States Bonded Warehouse. On the 19th February the sale was completed, and the 14 bales were sent to the defendants' store. The defendants opened the bales, as they wanted to sell the goods, and sold a considerable part of them at private sale by pieces, and at the end of four or five weeks the goods, as they alleged, were found to be tender, and the residue were sold at auction, where they brought from 84c. to 8c. per yard, the marketable value of the sound article at that time being from 9c. to 94c.

The jury made an allowance for the damaged state of the goods of $197 87. The verdict was given on the ground that the sale by sample, under the circumstances of the case, amounted to an implied warranty that the goods corresponded with the sample. But whether the implied warranty arose from the samples, or was strengthened by testimony to show that it was an absolute representation, the rule must be the same, which requires a prompt announcement of the ground the purchaser means to assume, and the implication of a warranty attached to a purchase of goods, should endure no longer than a reasonable time necessary for their examination.

Judgment for plaintiff on the verdict, with costs.