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that he sends to the frontiers of Ruflia.

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1.C. 1700. been so much wanted, and which they had been & 1112. obliged to purchase at fo dear a rate; the grand

seignior resolved to send a spy into Crimean Tarperor is

tary and to the confines of Russia, in order to by a spy assure himself of the facts. He chose for this

delicate commission Kibleli, his master of the
horse, who was to visit, without any public gha-
racter, and without a retinue, all the czar's
new fortresses, examine the levies of troops, the
stores, in short, to render an exact account of
every thing that was obvious, and endeavour to
penetrate by address and money the intentions
of the court of Russia. This Kibleli was nephew
by his mother's side to the grand vizier; but the
prince, who had not consulted the minister on the
choice which he had made of the master of the
horse, knew nothing of it. The envoy, or rather
spy, of the Porte, agreed secretly with his uncle,
before he fet out, that they would concert toge-
ther on his return what account' he should give

He saw in fact that vessels were
building at a great expence in two ports of
Ruflia, Voroneschi and Afoph ; that several
places had been fortified on the other Ade of the
Boristhenes; that the cataracts of this river were
rectified, and that by great labour the navigation
of it was made quite free; that the Russians
threatened Turkey aloud; and that the last peace
had given great hopes and spirits to the enemies
of the Porte. Kibleli, on his return to Conftan-
tinople, communicated what he had learned to


the emperor:

the grand vizier and the mufti, who were both L.C. 1700.

Heg.1111, united in inclination, opinion, and interest. & inz. Thefe timid old men thought that if they kept the emperor in the dark, all would go right. They dictated to Kibleli an account to give the grand seignior, quite different from that which they had just heard. He was to tell the prince, that the fortifications of the places on the Boristhenes, which had been begun during the war, had been stopt as soon as the news of the truce had been received ; that the Russians were building vessels for commerce only, and that the czar was preparing an embassy to the Porte to confirm the peace between the two nations. Mustapha, whom the battle of Zenta and so many other unfortunate events had given a difike to war, easily believed what he wished. He wrote thundering letters to the khan of the Tartars, with the tone which a powerful prince makes use of to a vassal removeable at will, reproaching him with having deceived him. The prince of the Tartars replied with firmness, that the envoy of Mustapha was the fole deceiver; he persisted in every thing that he had already said, adding, that the evil 'grew worse and worse, and that perhaps it would be too late to remedy ic when it should be desired. This letter was carried to the emperor by an officer of the seraglio, who was no friend to the grand vizier.

The khan had taken precautions to prevent this new advice from falling into hands interested in fuppressing it. Kibleli, being





This spy



L.C. 1700. sent for again, would' 'fain maintain what he had & 1112.' first advanced ; but being closely pressed by the

questions of the monarch; he varied on fome circumstances; and as he was threatened to have the truth wrested from his mouth by the torture, which was prepared before him, he fell on his knees toʻthe sultan, and confessed that the grand vizier, his uncle, had forced him to disguise the truth to his highness. After having agreed to all that the khan of the Tartars had said, he was

conducted to the Seven Towers, where a few days is punishme after he was strangled. The mufti, whom Kib

leli had not accused, protected the grand vizier deposes the grand vi. his friend: his life was not taken; he got off

with the loss of the seals and part of his fortune; for the chief of the law obtained, that he should be left wherewithal to live quietly in a private ftate; but grief, or natural infirmities, put an end to his days two months after his depo

fition. J.C.1701.

The mufti, who, fince Mustapha had been Hez.1113. disgusted with war, had acquired a great ascen

dency over his master, pointed out to him for

grand vizier Daltaban, who, being baihaw of g!and vi- Bosnia, had had the glory of stopping prince

Eugene, and who had been since sent to Bagdad to keep the Arabians in order, because he had formerly protected the caravans in their way to Mecca. This was the only baihaw who had acquired any reputation in the last war; and his first exploits in Ala had gotten him such a degree


Daltaban is made


He blames of Carlowitz, and

of favor, that the efforts of several -énemies had J.C.1701.

vleg, 1113. only increased his credit. On his arrival at u Adrianople, where he received the feals of the the peace empire, he demanded of Rami reis effendi and Mauro Cordato an account of the peace which wahrebe they had concluded as plenipotenţiaries, and the mufti. 'sacrifices that they had made to gain it. When he learned that the Porte had given up all Transylvania, and every thing that it poffeffed sin Hungary; that it had lost Kaininieck, that bulwark so necessary and secure on the side of Poland; and that a great part of the country of which he had been bashaw was reduced under the power of the Giaurs, he could not disguise his indignation, and repeated several times to the two plenipotentiaries, that they had betrayed the empire. Though the mufti, who had just raised him to the dignity of grand, vizier, had confirmed this peace by a fetfa; Daltabanz boldly declared to the grand feignior and to the mufti himself, that the Ottoman empire could not be established on a solid basis 'till this shameful treaty were broken.. The Musulman law, opposed if; the Alcoran absolutely forbids the breaking of an engagement, even with the Giaurs, unless they have broken it first. Now both the Poles and Austrians had faithfully executed all the articles, and there was no pretext for freeing the empire from the disgrace of this peace. The only way the grand vizier could think of was to pretend that the ministers, fent to Carlowitz, had ex





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L.C.1701. ceeded their powers, to have them punished in

consequence, and to declare, after their chastisement, that a treaty made without fufficient powers was void. The first of these ambassadors, in quality of effendi, could not be put to death. The privileges of the clergy had always been greatly respected in this despotic country. When they want to put an effendi to death, means must ibe found to get him out of the uleina, where he is sure to find protection. The grand vizier, in order to conform to the law, and satisfy his wish, proposed to the sultan to give Rami a bashawcy; this promotion drew the reis effendi out of the uleina, and, by giving him an almost absolute authority over a province, deprived him of his own safety. The mufti, whose creature Rami was, perceived the snare; being himself interested in countenancing the peace, he obtained that Rami, instead of being a bashaw of one-tail in some perty Afiatic province, which would re: move him from the Porte and expose hiin 'to lose his life at the pleasure of the grand vizier, should be a bafhaw of the bench or of three-tails, a member of the divan, without any particular bashawcy that should require his residence from

Daltaban clearly perceived, that another interest than his had opened the entrance of the prince's council to the man whom he had meant to raise only to destroy.' He complained highly of the proceedings of the mufti, and for the second time a grand vizier was seen speak to the



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