CHAPTER XIII. THE SECOND MAHRATTA WAR. "DISTRUST OF EACH OTHER, OR THE LUST OF POWER, MIGHT MAKE THEM CONFEDERATE WITH US FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE MOMENT; BUT WHEN THEY FOUND THAT THEY HAD BEEN MADE THE INSTRUMENTS OF SUBVERTING THE DOMINION OF THE RACE TO WHICH THEY BELONGED, AND THAT THEIR POWER WAS CONTROULED BY THE VERY PERSONS BY WHOM IT HAD BEEN SO RECENTLY ESTABLISHED, IT BECAME NATURAL FOR THEM TO SEEK, THROUGH EVERY MEANS, EMANCIPATION FROM SUCH HUMILIATING THRALDOM."-MALCOLM. While the war with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar lasted, Holkar was left undisturbed. Though a main cause or pretext for the armed interference of the English in the affairs of the Mahratta empire in the previous year, it was not deemed expedient to resent his contumacy or his talents, until his rivals were subdued. No sooner, however, had the Governor-General consummated his schemes for their humiliation, than he began to feel uneasy at the scandal which the British name must suffer, if terms were any longer kept with the reigning chief of Malwa. Jeswunt Rao was a junior branch of the house of Holkar, and had by force or stratagem usurped the place of Cashee Rao, who was the lineal heir. That disinterested sense of justice to which the Anglo-Indian administration had hitherto laid claim, required that war should at this particular moment be declared against the usurper, for the purpose of wresting from him the dominions he had unlawfully obtained possession of, and of conferring them upon the dependent allies of the Company. As for the rightful heir, he was formally to be spoken of until Malwa was reduced; after that he could only stand in the way of satisfactory adjustment, and must be provided for in some other way. It was anxiously desired that Scindiah and the Paishwah should be made partakers of the spoil; and, whether sincerely or not, they both professed to aid in the vast preparations which, under Lord Lake, were made in 1804, for the destruction of Holkar.+ This expedient of corruption had already been resorted to, although it does not appear with much success, in the previous struggle. We find General Wellesley urging the resident at Hyderabad, in 1803, History of Central India. † Mill, book 6, chap. 13. to engage the co-operation of Meer Khan, an active minor chieftain, by holding out to him the prospect of sharing in the territorial spoil. And no effort was spared for weaning the subordinate rajahs from the defence of their country, by lures of various glitter. "They kept aloof, however," and could, at furthest, be induced to observe neutrality.* How long their devotion to the cause of their race might have withstood the temptations thus held forth to them, 'twere vain to guess, had the tide of conquest been allowed to pour on uninterruptedly. Despair is the twin brother of desertion; while hope remains-while a chance of eventual justice being done to the motives that dictate selfdevotion is left,-heroism hath where to lay its head; and however inhospitable that shelter be, it can wake up from its hard pillow with strength sufficient to endure or die. But to endure or die for country's sake, strength is needful; and amid the wreck and fall of successive hopes, that strength fails. The Mahrattas had not deserted Scindiah even in his adversity; now Holkar was assailed; he was Scindiah's enemy no doubt, but the assailant was the common foe. Even Scindiah could stifle his old hatred, and secretly assure Jeswunt Rao, that in his camp he should find protection, and, at the prudent time for throwing off the mask he had been compelled by the victors to assume, an ally. Call this duplicity if you will; but weigh the fraud in candid scales. Here was the impoverished and disabled rival of the destined victim, at the moment when all the jealousy and resentment of a life were about to be gratified, not at his cost, but for the certain purpose, among other objects, of his direct aggrandizement, secretly preparing to forego the selfish profit, and the only * Gurwood, vol. I, p. 329, 334. apparent chance of revenge, and hazarding the implacable enmity of that enemy from whose recent onslaught he had hardly enjoyed breathing time. Whatever the true motive of Scindiah's conduct towards Holkar may have been, whether it was a returning insight into the only true and great policy, by which the invader could be effectually kept at bay, or an unreasoned impulse of sympathy for the last unhumbled bulwark of the Mahratta dynasty, it seems impossible to regard it as an ordinary instance of faithlessness or instability of purpose. Holkar successfully baffled Lake, and defeated Monson in a variety of desultory conflicts, during the autumn of 1804; and before the campaign of 1805 could be properly opened, the ambitious spirit who had been the restless cause of so much misery and evil, was replaced at the head of Indian affairs by one of a very different temper. The Directors in England had at an early period become alarmed, at the impetuous and grasping policy of Lord Wellesley. When Mysore was conquered, they could hardly conceal their ill-humour, at finding that their joint-stock sovereignty had been increased, at the cost of several additional millions of joint-stock debt.* Had it been only a few thousand lives that had been wasted, it would have been nothing: "such is the fortune of war." But the sordid soul of Leadenhallstreet sickened at the impiety of unproductive conquest; that was shocking; and under the influence of this feeling, letters of very mingled import were addressed to their vain-glorious Lieutenant, acknowledging his fame and retaining his plunder, but emphatically protesting against his Excellency's investing any more of their resources in such brittle, though brilliant ware. Whereupon the indignant Marquis, stung to the quick by such ingratitude, resigned, and could only be induced to retain his commission, until his successor should be named. Early in 1805, the aged Lord Cornwallis was sent out as Governor-General, charged with instructions, and prepared also as it would seem by his own convictions, to put a peremptory stop to the "comprehensive policy" of Lord Wellesley. He found on his arrival the second campaign recommenced in Malwa, and the dispositions of Scindiah more than doubtful. Lord Lake, who still held the command-in chief, warmly advocated the necessity of vigorous measures; and being a disciple of the Subsidiary Alliance school, * Mill, book 6, chap. 13. pointed out the vast additional powers of controul and mastery, which a few successes in the field would inevitably confer. But the Governor-General declared his fixed determination, to pursue in every respect a totally opposite line of policy. He found the treasury of Calcutta empty, and the pay of the officers in every department in arrear. He saw in the system of intermeddling in the domestic administration of the Mahratta kingdoms, nothing but interminable toil and perplexity; he perceived that the undertaking to garrison the palace of a despotic prince with British troops, was to render him irresponsible, and thereby to render him intolerable to his subjects, while it in no way rendered the defence of the country more secure; he declared that for the sake of the Company and of the people of Hindustan, this system of a double government ought to be abandoned everywhere; and he notified his resolution of restoring to Holkar, all the provinces that had been taken from him since the beginning of the war. Upon his death, which took place in a few months after, Sir G. Barlow, as senior member of the Supreme Council, assumed the temporary reins of government; and fully participating in the cautious views of the deceased nobleman, peace was restored by the end of the year.* The administration of Lord Wellesley had lasted upwards of seven years. In rapidity and extent of acquisition, it stands unrivalled in the annals of British India. Three powerful sovereigns were either crushed or reduced to vassalage; 140,000 miles of territory were added to the empire of England; and her revenues were augmented by £8,561,430 a-year. And yet when the din of glorying had ceased, and the victors in cool blood sat down to count their gains, what profit had they in those things whereof they were not, although they ought to have been, ashamed? By the report of a select committee of the House of Commons upon the affairs of India, in 1810, "the final result" of a searching scrutiny into the financial history of the Company, since the conclusion of the first war with Tippoo Saib, appeared to be this:-That in 1793 their revenue being £6,963,625, and the net charges, including interest upon the funded debt, £5,800,048, their clear profits amounted to £1,163,577 a-year; while in 1808 their gross receipts being £15,525,055, and * Mill, book 6, 13 chap. Marquis Wellesley's Desp. vol. I. note to map. Second Report of Select Committee, 1810. their total expenditure £15,551,097, instead | government is an advantage dearly bought, of a surplus there appeared a deficit of by the sacrifice of independence, of national £26,042.* Such is the sagacity of con- character, and of whatever renders a people quest-such its knack at overreaching itself in its haste to be rich. To understand thoroughly the causes that contributed to produce a result apparently so unaccountable, it were necessary to anticipate that portion of our narrative which must form its sequel, namely, a review of the system of administration, fiscal, political, and judicial, which the English adopted in the provinces they obtained by war. In passing, however, let us hear the confession of one whose testimony is that of a partizan of conquest, and whose weight as an authority upon Indian affairs has never yet been questioned. Sir Thomas Munro was one of the few men, who had opportunities of forming a correct judgment upon the comparative worth of systems of rule, in almost every department of government, civil as well as military, in times of prolonged tranquillity, and amid the troubles of war. His willingness to see conquest extended even further than it had yet been, was not concealed in a letter addressed to Lord Hastings, Governor-General in 1817. He points out therein, the facility wherewith new acquisitions might be made at the expense of Scindiah; but he earnestly deprecates any extension of the subsidiary system, which had been long established in those territories, which the Company had wrenched from the Nabob of Oude, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam. Such a mode of rule he says, "has a natural tendency to render the government of every country in which it exists, weak and oppressive, to extinguish all honourable spirit among the higher classes, and to degrade and impoverish the whole people. The presence of a British force cuts off every chance of remedy of a bad government, by supporting the prince against every enemy. It renders him indolent, by teaching him to trust to strangers for his security; and cruel and avaricious, by showing him he has nothing to fear from the hatred of his subjects. Wherever the subsidiary system is introduced, unless the reigning prince be a man of great abilities, the country will soon bear the marks of it, in decaying villages and decreasing population. This has long been observed in the dominions of the Paishwah and the Nizam, and is beginning to be seen in Mysore. The protection of the British * Second Report of Select Committee, 1810. respectable. The natives may pursue their occupations as traders or husbandmen; but none of them can aspire to any thing beyond this mere animal state of thriving in peace; none of them can look forward to any share in the civil or military government of their country. The effect of this state of things is observable in all the British provinces, whose inhabitants are certainly the most abject race in India.”* At the time when the able document from which the foregoing observations are taken, was presented to the Marquis of Hastings, a new conflict with the Mahratta powers was impending. Ten years of peace had succeeded the former struggle, and the old appetite of appropriation had grown keen once more. On the mountainous frontiers of the Mahratta country, a wild and lawless race called Pindarries had for generations dwelt, who levied a capricious tribute from the peaceable inhabitants of the plains, and whose character, as their name bespoke, was that of professed freebooters. Being numerous and troublesome, the British government justly strove to induce the Paishwah and Scindiah, as well as the minor chiefs, to unite in general measures for their suppression. Whether from indifference or ill will, these powers evaded or neglected doing so; and an excuse for aggression being desirable, this neglect was made use of as a justification for demanding the cession of further provinces, and the augmentation of the subsidiary forces already quartered upon them; or, in case of refusal, for declaring war. To this mode of proceeding, Munro, in his memorial to Lord Hastings, strongly objected. He ridicules the notion of the Mahratta powers hazarding a war for the sake of the Pindarries, and urges multiplied arguments, grounded alike on policy and humanity, against any further extension of the wretched subsidiary system. He recommends instead "the simple and direct mode of conquest from without, as more creditable both to their armies and national character, than that of dismemberment from within, by the aid of subsidiary forces." He concludes by proposing that they should at once "seize the districts" belonging to Memoirs of Munro, vol: 1. p. 462, 465. Testimony without end might be adduced confirmatory of these assertions. Holkar, Scindiah, and Meer Khan, where the Pindarries, as it was alleged, were harboured.* 66 Although we are informed that the expediency of this last suggestion was 'perfectly in accordance with the sentiments of the Governor-general," the arguments of Munro appear to have produced but little impression, regarding the system of piecemeal conquest, through the instrumentality of subsidiary forces. The ill-fated Paishwah was required, in the beginning of 1817, to subscribe a new treaty of alliance, having, as was said, for its object, "the more convenient mode "of providing for the discharge of the engagements already in force," with the Company. The meaning of this, when unwrapped from its official swaddling (or swindling) clothes, was this: Lord Hastings becoming aware that "his Highness the Paishwah," after twelve years' experience of the subsidiary force, that had been hired out to him by the treaty of Bassein, was beginning to entertain serious misgivings of its efficacy for the purpose it was professedly granted for, namely, "his permanent protection, honor, and prosperity;" they therefore resolved that the best means of quieting his doubts, or at least of silencing all complaints on the subject was to double the dose of mercenaries, and accept from his Highness an additional province or two "as compensation for their maintenance."§ The wretched prince in vain expostulated, and attempted to avert this new humiliation. But the heart of aggression is hard; no evasion or alternative would be listened to; "we surrounded him in his capital," says the Governor-general, "and obliged him to submit to terms which preserved ancient appearances, but deprived him of much strength for future machinanations:"* and on the 13th June, 1817, the Paishwah was coerced into signing a treaty, whereby he alienated to the Company, the provinces of Sangur, Huttah, and Darwar, containing no less than 10,000 square miles, and yielding a revenue estimated at £350,000 a year.¶ The Paishwah hankered after the fair provinces of which he had thus been divested ere the ink of the treaty was dry. He fled soon after from his capital, wherein he * Annual Register for 1819. Munro, vol. i. 456. Idem, 457. § Idem, p. 457, 458. might well feel that he was no longer was formed between the four principal But it was now too late. Faction and the quelling influence of foreign garrisons. had done their work. The governments had lost all unity, all nerve; and the people had been suffered to forget the honour and the rights of their race, and tacitly to acquiesce in the usurpations of an alien power. The duration of a foreign yoke has far less to do with its strength, than the temper in which it is borne. Time doth not run against the sovereign claims of nationhood, provided those claims be kept alive, and of force in the minds of the many, by the secret or open observance of the sacred rites of freedom. But when these are suffered to die out, the shrine hath no longer within itself, that whereby alone it can be defended. It falls defenceless because indefensible. The trampler comes, and entering, wonders that a dome so vast should have no guardian deity within; and thinks within himself as he surveys the physical strength that withstood him not,-how indomitably might not have these resisted, had the tutelary spirit still been here! Malwa was invaded in 1817, by a strong force under the command of Sir J. Malcolm. Jeswunt Rao, by whom Lord Lake had been baffled in 1805, was dead; and a minor, surrounded by a profligate regent, and intriguing ministers, now occupied the place of rule. The presence of the invading army hardly sufficed to recall the various internal factions to a sense of their danger and their duty. A revolution in the administration was effected, whereby all those whose treachery or weakness had left their country open to the English, were displaced, and able men summoned to provide for the public safety. But the oppor tunity for effectual resistance had gone by; a sanguinary engagement took place at Soopra on 21st December, in which the British under Sir T. Hislop were victo Note to Map prefixed to Marquis Wellesley's rious; and in January, 1818, a treaty was Despatches. Munro, ut supra. dictated by the conquerors, and signed at Mundissor, whereby the sovereignty of Kandeish, 12,430 square miles in extent, was resigned for ever by the house of Holkar:* "the British government thus relieving them from the anarchy which lately prevailed in their state."+ A memorable instance, however, of the devotion wherewith the people still clung to the last hope of independance, is recorded in a letter from Sir T. Hislop to the commander in chief, dated 28th February, 1818. The Killedar of Talnier had determined to hold his fort to the last extremity for his native sovereign, and if assailed to resist by arms. This resolution was decreed by the English general, to be "rebellion" to the Company, and the King of Great Britain; and a letter was addressed to the brave chieftain, admonishing him of his guilt, and "warning him of the consequences.' The Killedar refused to yield, and a cannonade was forthwith opened on the devoted fortress. After some time, finding that the outworks were giving way, and seeing that his troops, who, by the confession of the victors, fought with admirable skill and bravery, must eventutually be overpowered, the Killedar sent to offer terms. Unconditional submission would alone be granted; and some delay having occurred in opening the gates, the fire was recommenced against them. Upon the storming party entering, they were met by the chief and his attendants in an attitude of submission. "They advanced through another gate, and found the fifth, which led into the body of the place, shut, and those within still insisting upon terms. After some delay the wicket of this gate was opened from within; Colonel Murray and Major Gordon entered with two or three officers and ten or twelve grenadiers. They were immediately attacked by those within, and before adequate aid could be given, struck down. Major Gordon and Captain Macgregor resigned their invaluable lives on this spot, and Colonel Murray was wounded in several places. Thirty or forty grenadiers having now succeeded in getting through the wicket, the garrison took shelter in the houses in the fort, whence they still opposed an obstinate resistance; but the remainder of the storming party having by this time got into the place, the whole garrison, consisting of about three hundred men, were put to the sword: a severe example indeed, but absolutely necessary." This is bad enough, but similar cruelties are, perhaps, inseparable from every species of war; the exasperation of recent loss will inhumanise an excited soldiery at all times; and their leaders will be ever tempted to extenuate, on that most convenient of all grounds-necessity, what many of them would never have commanded. But no such apology can be pleaded for the miserable vengeance that followed the taking of Talnier. We shall not trust ourselves to tell the tale, but allow the hero to be his own historian. "I ordered the Killedar to be hanged on one of the bastions, immediately after the place fell. Whether he was accessary or not to the treachery of his men, his execution was justly due to his rebellion-(rebellion!)-in the first instance, particularly after the warning he had received in the morning."* And this is Christian warfare! And with such deeds reeking in the face of heaven, the spread of civilization by means of conquest is trumpeted forth in the stunned ears of intelligent nations. "The complete overthrow" of all that still subsisted of the Paishwah's government had been discussed at the commencement of the war, as the punishment his faithlessness deserved.+ Destitute of resources, talents, or popularity, the miserable fugitive was soon hunted down, and marched back in triumph to his capital, where, in addition to the cessions which had been wrung from him a few months before, Konkan, Poonah, and other districts were now appropriated by the victors. The extent of these last acquisitions was about double that of the former. Nothing further remained to be taken from him bu his title, which "a positive moral necessity" required to be abolished. Ahmedabad was taken from the Guickwar and permanently retained; but the greatest sufferer in extent of dominions, was the Rajah of Berar. The whole of his possessions became virtually annexed to those of the Company; and from this period, 1818, Berar and Paishwah cease to be reckoned for any political purpose among the powers of India. As in the Carnatic |