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one hundred and twenty-five acres and three-quarters and thirteen perches, late the estate of Joseph Paxson, an attainted traitor, in order that the same may be assigned to the University of this State, was read, by which return it appears that the said tract of land, with the buildings and other improvements thereon, is of the value of seven pounds per acre; thereupon,

Resolved, That the said estate be assigned to the University of this State, that the same be now delivered to the Trustees, and that the said institution be charged therewith, according to the aforesaid valuation, in the estimation of estates so assigned, agreeably to the act of General Assembly directing the same.

In Council.

PHILADELPHIA, Friday, April 12th, 1782.

PRESENT:

Mr. Cunningham, and
Mr. Penticost.

Mr. Bayard, Mr. Gardner, Mr. Dougherty, Mr. M'Lene and Mr. Wynkoop, a committee of the General Assembly, attended in Council and requested a conference with the Council respecting sundry class-mnen raised in the county of Bedford in the year 1781; and thereupon, a conference was had, and after some time spent therein, it was agreed that the said class-men be joined to the Ranging company raised in the said county, to serve during the term of their enlistment, and the committee was requested to report the same to the House of Assembly.

Dr. The State of Pennsylvania to James M'Lene, Esquire. For attendance in Congress, vizt:

22 days, a £5,

170 do a 9,

119 do a 22 10,

150 do a 60,

£ 110 1,530 2,677 10 9,000

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£109 0 101

26 542 10 Continental, a exchange of 60 for one, is,

specie,

VOL. XIII.-17.

And thereupon,

An order was drawn on the Treasurer in favor of James M'Lene, Esquire, for the sum of one hundred and nine pounds and ten pence half-penny, balance of the foregoing account.

James Moore, Esquire, of the county of Chester, laid before the Board a state of his accounts for payment of bounties to soldiers in the Pennsylvania line, by which it appears that there is due to the State a balance of one hundred and seventy-five pounds twelve shillings and six pence, State money; thereupon,

Resolved, That Mr. Moore be directed to pay the said balance into the hands of the Treasurer of the said State.

The Council resumed the consideration of the petition of Frederick Sneider, praying to be allowed for his services in apprehending a certain Steelman, Black and Shaw; and thereupon,

Ordered, That the following articles, to wit: one pair of worsted stockings, one pair of buckskin gloves, one pair of shoe-buckles, one sett stock buckle, one ditto knee buckle, one pair of golden sleeve buttons, marked S. S., three pair of silver sleeve buttons, and one single ditto, one gold set ring, one breast broach, (silver,) one ivory comb, one brass inkhorn, one clasp-knife, one silver watch, maker's name Richard Doingham, No. 38,981, and one old pocket book, part of the goods seized upon the said persons, be now sold at public auction for the benefit of the petitioner; that the proceeds be paid into the hands of the Treasurer of the State; and that an order be drawn in favor of Frederick Sneider for the amount thereof.

Representation having been made to this Board that Captain Thomas Prizgard, of the Flag of Truce, Commodore Lafarey, is held to appear & to answer a charge against him, made by John Jones, Health Officer, for that he came up to the city of Philadelphia without paying a due regard to the regulations established for preserving the health of the citizens: On consideration,

Ordered, That the Attorney General be directed to enter a noli prosequi in the said case, and that the consideration of the conduct of Captain Prizgard be referred to the Secretary at War, for his determination how far the same may have been contrary to the law of nations.

A resolution of the Honorable House of the General Assembly of the eighth instant, authorizing and empowering this Board to draw upon the Treasury of this State for any sum not exceeding ten thousand pounds of the paper money of this State, emitted by act of Assembly of the seventh of April, 1781, for discharging the debts due for horses and waggons called into service agreeably to requisitions of Congress and the Commander-in-Chief, was received and read.

Ordered, To lie on the table.

The committee appointed to prepare a message to the House of General Assembly, brought in a draft of the same, which is as follows, vizt:

Message from the President and Council to the Representatives of the Freemen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met.

GENTLEMEN: Our desire to preserve the harmony so essential to the public welfare, has kept us silent under the various measures adopted by your House, which we conceive prejudicial to the State and derogatory to the Constitutional rights of this Board. But as we perceive a system to be adopted and steadily pursued, which evidently tends to annihilate the powers and usefulness of the Executive part of government, our duty to our constituents, and a due regard to the sacred obligations we have entered into, oblige us to speak with freedom, and to declare that, as we will never make a voluntary surrender of our privileges, so we will not tamely and silently submit to any invasion of them. In the station assigned us in the government, we do not apprehend ourselves obliged to take notice of any deviations from the Constitution which do not touch our own rights; but of these we conceive ourselves, in the first instance, the special and natural guardians, and when we can no otherwise prevent Legislative encroachments, it is our duty at least to make a solemn appeal to the people, our mutual constituents, the true source and fountain from whence all our authority is derived. When the Constitution of the State placed the Legislative power in a single branch, with certain checks upon rash and and hasty determination, it was never supposed that any House of Assembly would, by special laws made for the purpose, assume the Executive powers, and by blending Legislative and Executive, unite what the Constitution had wisely and decisively separated; much less, that such laws should pass without even a decent regard to those salutary restraints of time and publication, which were intended to provide against intempérate and indigested measures. It has been one of the greatest objections made to this Constitution, that it has left too little power in the Executive branch; and yet we see daily attempts to make that little less. We cannot suppose that it is intended practically to shew the people what mischief and abuse a single Legislature may do, and yet we are at a loss otherwise to account for those proceedings which are particularly the objects of this message. And first, with respect to the Judges of the Supreme Court. The Constitution has vested their appointment in the Council, and declared that "they shall have fixed salaries." Before the appointments were made these salaries were fixed, and then persons were taken from other employments of life into the public service; but as soon as a settled medium of commerce was introduced, you have unfixed those very salaries and reduced them to a value inadequate to the present scale of expence

and the dignity of the station, and so far broken the contract be tween those officers and the public which they justly conceived to be guaranteed by the Constitution. What benefit can the Commonwealth derive from the appointment as directed by the Constitution, or from the independency of their commissions, if, after such appointment, and the rate of their compensation being ascertained, every Assembly may take upon them to alter that rate, and show their favour or resentment by a liberal or inadequate allowance, as the men may be pleasing to them; or otherwise, what is it in effect, but to make them dependant upon the Assembly for their daily subsistence, and subject them to the strongest temptations of yielding to every veering gale of politics or party? Or to what purpose was it to give the appointment to the Council, when the objects of their choice are left in such a state of dependance for their support? We conceive that the powers thus claimed of reducing salaries after the offices have been long accepted and held, is incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and may be exercised in such a manner as in effect to prevent the Council appointing any person to office, by rendering it impossible for the person appointed to accept or to continue in office, however irreproachable in conduct and ability, if he should happen to be displeasing to a majority of the House of Assembly. We conceive the independance of the Judges, both on the Executive and Legislative, as a point of the greatest importance to the good people of the State, and as their commissions are for seven years, unless convicted of misbehaviour, it is clear that their support ought to be equally fixed, and irrevocable during that period.

Secondly: The draughts of public money from the Treasury, without the intervention of the Council, when the appropriation or use of the money is declared, we apprehend to be inconsistent with the Constitution, which declares it to be the right of the Council to draw upon the Treasury for such sums as shall be appropriated by the House." This appropriation we clearly conceive to mean a declaration of the use, and not of the person to draw for it; and that the giving this power to any other persons, by a special law, is a violation of the Constitutional privileges of the Council—an unjust and unnecessary wound to their feelings, and calculated to lessen their influence and utility.

It is altogether unprecedented in this or any of the neighboring States, as far as we know and believe, and must be attended with the greatest inconveniences, if there should be any failure in the collection of the taxes in point of time or quantity.

In a late bill published for consideration, entitled

[Blank in Council book.]

we observe that Commissioners are appointed with like powers, to draw upon the Treasury, and to manage and conduct the defence of

the river Delaware. Though there have been instances wherein the Assembly, since the resolution, have by law nominated Commissioners for special purposes, yet we apprehend there is no precedent for the powers granted by this law; but, on the contrary, when on a former occasion provision was made for the defence of the river and trade, the direction thereof was in all respects intrusted to the Council, who conducted it in such manner as to give effectual relief to the commerce of the city, without any eventual charge to the State. The Constitution expressly declares it to be the right and duty of the Council to expedite the execution of such measures as may be resolved on by the General Assembly. But the language of your laws, gentlemen, is that "other persons shall expedite the execution of your measures," and, in our opinion, plainly encroaches on the rights of the people, who have elected you for the purpose of devising measures, and us for that of executing them; and so far as we attempt to legislate, or you to execute, so far we depart from the principles of the Constitution, usurp the rights of each other, and do injustice to the people. The clause in the law published for consi leration, by which the present Auctioneers are removed from office without any complaint against them, though they have held their offices for a short time, we cannot but consider it as a part of the system to increase your own power and lessen the weight of the Council in the eyes of the world. It is but little more than a year since a former Assembly, in the spirit of the Constitution, placed the appointment of these offices in the Council. Men of approved fidelity in the general cause, and of known capacity, were commissioned. They have just become masters of the business, made their arrangements, and procured suitable accommodations and clerks, when a special act of Assembly is proposed to dismiss them from office and appoint others. What persons will in future be induced to accept of appointments under the Council, even under the sanction of your own laws, which are to be held on so precarious a tenure? or what can be more degrading to a public body than to see persons of their appointment thus displaced, without any cause assigned? We do not contend but that the House might have reserved the original appointment, though we think the spirit of the Constitution discountenances appointments of the Assembly. But to re-assume it by ex post facto law, without any complaint of its being improperly executed, in our opinion, manifests such disrespect to the former Assembly, such an unfreindly disposition towards the Council, and enmity to the present officers, that all candid and considerate men will deem it an undue stretch of Legislative power, and incompatible with the Constitution.

We wish you to consider, gentlemen, before you proceed further in this system, what consequences will be likely to flow from it.An Assembly with different views, may think it proper and just, by other laws, to alter your appointments and displace those whom

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