than the Conclufions of Reafon. Not but that the Evidence of Reafon in fome Cafes is altogether as ftrong and conclusive for the Existence of Things not feen, as Sense is for the Things which are seen. This is manifeft in the Proof of a first Caufe; where, from the vifible Works of the Creation, the Being of an eternal Cause is proved to a Demonstration, from fuch Principles as Senfe and Reason cannot refift. So likewise, from the Teftimony and Credit of others, we arrive to a Certainty of the Existence of some Things which they have seen, but we have not; which Evidence is properly the Evidence of Faith, and may be fo circumftantiated as to admit no Doubt or Scruple. Upon this Evidence Men act in their dearest Concerns in this World; and are as well fatisfied of the Existence of fome Perfons and Places which they never faw, as they are of the Perfons and Places they every Day converse with. And from hence it follows, that it is no Manner of Proof or Prefumption that Things do not exist, because they are not feen; for there are several Ways of being fatisfied of the Existence of Things; and feeing them is but one Way: And Things which admit not of this Proof

may

may admit of another: And therefore it is great Weakness to fufpect the Reality and Existence of Things merely because we do not fee them.

And yet the greateft Piece of Wisdom that the voluptuous Man has to boast of is founded in this Prejudice: He thinks it Wisdom to be on the fureft Side, and not to part with a Certainty for an Uncertainty. The Things of this World he fees and feels; and in renouncing them he is fure he renounces what might afford him certain Pleasure and Enjoyment: But he has not this Notice nor Evidence of future Things: They lie out of the Way of his Senfes; and therefore he looks upon them to have much lefs of Certainty in them than the present Objects of Life; and concludes very folidly, that it is best to make fure of fomething, and not to forego his prefent Poffeffion for the distant Hope of enjoying the uncertain Bleffings of Futurity. Now Senfe is the Measure of his Certainty; or else how comes he to take it for granted that there is more Certainty of the Things which are feen than of the Things which are not feen? His Senfes only prove to him, that he lives at prefent in this World: They cannot poffibly prove

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prove to him, that he fhall not live hereafter in another. So that the Evidence of Senfe reaches but to one Side of the Question, to affure him of his prefent Being; and yet from this Evidence he concludes in Prejudice to the other World; which is very abfurd, fince the Evidence of Senfe cannot, one Way or other, affect the Belief of future Rewards and Glories. Now in all Comparisons Men ought to weigh the Reasons on both Sides : But the comparing and preferring visible Things before invifible, for the Sake of the Evidence of Senfe, is comparing and preferring one to another upon feeing only the Reafon of one Side; for Senfe only extends to vifible Things, and has nothing to do with invifible; And therefore the Judgment that Men are apt haftily to make in this Cafe, when brought to the Teft of Reason, must appear to be groundlefs and precarious.

Since then, in the Queftion between Things vifible and invifible, it is evident that Senfe can judge but of one Side; it follows, that Senfe can be no Rule of judging in this Difpute: For a Rule muft be the common Measure of the Things to be estimated, and applicable to both; but Sente is applicable to fenfible Objects only,

and

and therefore can be no Rule in any Queon between the Things that are, and the 1 hings that are not, the Objects of Senfe.

Allow Senfe to prove, as ftrongly as you would have it, the Existence of this World, and the Things of it: But how can that affect the Belief of another World? The Existence of this World will not prove that there is no other World. That you live now is no Argument that you shall not live hereafter. And therefore the Evidence of Senfe for this World ought to be no Prejudice against the Belief of another.

The Advantage of this Evidence of Sense is great, because it is the first that Men come to the Use and Application of; and by the conftant and familiar Use of it, they learn to depend upon it, and truft to it in all Cafes. It is much later that Men come to the Use of Reafon: And this Evidence of Reason they have lefs Occafion for, and ftill use it less than they have Occasion: So that they are not equally acquainted with the Certainty of this Evidence, as they are with the Demonftrations of Senfe; and therefore are feldom fo perfectly fatisfied with the Deductions of Reafon as with the Reports of Senfe.

This is the true State of the
Queftion

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Question between the Evidence of Senfe and the Evidence of Reason, and the Preference the World gives to the Deductions of one and the other.

Now, if there can be no Evidence for unfeen Things, which may be of equal Weight with the Evidence of Sense; then indeed the Things which are not seen can never be made fo evident as to ftand in Competition with the Things which are feen. But the Means by which we arrive to the Knowledge of Things which we do not fee, are Reafon and Faith; and these may afford an Evidence equal to the Evidence of Senfe.

There are many Things which can be known only from Reason, which yet are as well received as any Report of Sense. We fee many Productions and Works of Nature every Day, the Caufe of which is fecret and remote, and not discoverable by the Senses; and yet no Man doubts but that all these Effects have Causes. You can no more fuppofe, against the Evidence of your Reason, that thefe Things came into Being without any Cause, than you can fuppofe, against the Evidence of your Senfes, that these Things which you fee have no Being. Here then

the