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(Okla.)

Oregon.

Pennsylvania.

66

In all cases where an order fixing rates to be charged by any public service corporation, person or firm, has been appealed from and a supersedeas issued, the Corporation Commission in making all orders requiring a refund of overcharges during the time the rates or charges were suspended, shall require such public service corporation, person or firm, to pay, in addition to such refund, all expenses incurred by the Corporation Commission in checking such refund, determining to whom the same belongs, and in delivering the same to the party lawfully entitled thereto." Laws 1913, c. 10, § 3.

"After the commencement of such suit the circuit court may for cause shown, * * * upon notice to the Commission and hearing, suspend or stay the operation of the order of the Commission complained of until the final disposition of such suit, upon the giving of such bond or other security, and upon such conditions as the court may require; * * *

If a rate order the court shall require a bond to answer for all damages caused by the delay, and the refunding of sums collected in excess of rates prescribed in the order.

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No appeal to the Supreme Court shall stay the operation of any order of the Commission unless the circuit or Supreme Court shall so direct, and unless the public utility so appealing shall give a bond with like conditions and terms as that given on granting injunctions suspending an order of the Commission fixing rates." Laws 1911, c. 279, § 55.

"No application for a rehearing shall in anywise operate as a supersedeas, or in any manner stay or postpone the enforcement of the original or existing order, except as the commission may by its order direct." Laws 1913, No. 854,1 Art. VI, § 15.

"No appeal from any order of the commission (except as hereinafter provided) shall in any case operate as a supersedeas of the order appealed from, unless the aforesaid proper court of common pleas shall, by an interlocutory order, make said appeal a supersedeas; which interlocutory order shall be made only after such notice to the commission and other parties of record as the court may direct, and after a hearing upon said application for an interlocutory order of supersedeas. Upon the granting of a supersedeas upon the application of a public service company in any case (except as hereinafter provided), the court may, in its discretion, require the filing of a bond to the Commonwealth, for the use of all parties aggrieved, in such sum and conditioned as the court may by its order direct, or may grant the supersedeas upon such other terms and conditions as the court in its discretion may prescribe: Provided, however, That in all cases of appeal by a public service company from an order of the commission establishing, changing, or altering, or in any manner affecting, the prices, rates, joint rates, tolls, or charges for any service, such appeal shall operate as a supersedeas upon the filing of a bond to the Commonwealth, in the said court, by said public service company, for the use of all parties so damaged by the failure of such company to comply with the order appealed from, during the period of such supersedeas. Said bond to be in such sum as shall be fixed by the court, and with sureties to be approved by the court, shall be conditioned for the repayment to all such aggrieved parties of any excess over the rate or charge fixed by the commission, which shall be received by such public service company after the 'Effective January 1, 1914.

making of such order by the commission, if the said order shall be
finally affirmed, and may also contain such further conditions as
the court may order and direct." Same, § 19.

"No injunction shall issue modifying, suspending, staying, or
annulling any order of the commission, or of a commissioner, except
upon notice to the commission and after cause shown upon a
hearing. The court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County is hereby
clothed with exclusive jurisdiction throughout the Commonwealth
of all proceedings for such injunctions, subject to an appeal to
the Supreme Court as aforesaid. Whenever the commission shall
make any rule, regulation, finding, determination, or order under the
provisions of this act the same shall be and remain conclusive upon all
parties affected thereby, unless set aside, annulled, or modified in an
appeal or proceeding taken as provided in this act." Same, § 31.

"Every such appeal shall act as a stay of the order appealed from: Provided, that the court, or if the court is not in session, any justice of such court, may at any time order that such appeal shall not so operate if, in the opinion of such court, or justice, the appeal is brought for purposes of delay, or if justice, equity or public safety shall so require; or such court or justice may order that such appeal shall so operate only upon compliance by the parties, or any of them, with such terms or conditions as such court or justice may determine: Provided, further, that if the order of the commission appealed from is sustained by the court, such order shall, if previously stayed under the provisions of this section, take effect and become operative for all purposes under this act within five days from the date of the decree sustaining such order, unless the commission within such five days, shall upon the application of any party. to such appeal, fix a different time when such order shall take effect and become operative, and such order so fixing the time shall not be subject to review by any court of this state." Laws 1912, c. 795, § 35.

Upon the perfecting of an appeal and the approval by the secretary of a suspending bond conditioned upon the payment of costs and refund of excess collections

"all proceedings for the enforcement of such final order or determination shall be stayed pending such appeal." Laws 1913, c. 312, § 5.

"No court of this state, except by way of appeals as herein provided, shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct or annul any action of the board, or to suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or interfere with the board in the performance of its official duties." Same, § 9.

In connection with appeals from orders of the circuit court requiring compliance with commission's orders it is provided that

"no appeal to said supreme court shall operate to stay or supersede the order of the court, or the execution of any writ or process thereon; ***." Laws 1911, c. 207, § 19.

"*** provided, that no rate, rule, or order or regulation shall be suspended, pending a hearing in the Courts, unless legal proceedings are instituted within ten days after such rate, rule, order or regulation has been fixed and adopted by the Commission, and entered of record.

(Pa.)

Rhode

Island.

South
Dakota.

Tennessee.

(Tenn.)

Vermont.

Virginia.

Washington.

West
Virginia.

"And then only upon injunction issued by some court of competent jurisdiction and upon adequate and sufficient grounds, fully shown in bill, and subject to penal damages to the State in the sum of $1000 a day, provided said injunction is procured in bad faith, otherwise the usual damages payable to State all or any of said damages so collected may be applied by the Court to damages of parties involved in its discretion; and that no injunction shall issue by any Court to suspend any order of the Commission, except upon notice to the Commissioners.' Acts 1913, c. 32, § 13.

*** Such appeal shall not vacate any judgment, order or decree of said board, but the supreme court or, when not in session, a judge thereof, may suspend execution of the same as justice and equity require, unless otherwise specifically provided by law." Pub. Stats. 1906, § 4600.

Provisions similar to Oklahoma (§§ 20, 21) are found in Const., §§ 156 (d), 156 (e).

If, after a full hearing on a proposed increase in rates which has been suspended by the commission, the commission shall

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refuse to permit such increase, either in whole or in part, no supersedeas shall be granted in any action or proceeding brought to review the order of the commission pending the final determination of such action by the superior court, or if appealed to the supreme court by such supreme court." Laws 1911, c. 117, § 82.

"The pendency of any writ of review shall not of itself stay or suspend the operation of the order of the commission, but the superior court in its discretion may restrain or suspend, in whole or in part, the operation of the commission's order pending the final hearing and determination of the suit.

"No order so restraining or suspending an order of the commission relating to rates, fares, charges, tolls or rentals, or rules or regulations, practices, classifications or contracts affecting the same, shall be made by the superior court otherwise than upon three days' notice and after hearing, and if a supersedeas is granted the order granting the same shall contain a specific finding, based upon evidence submitted to the court making the order, and identified by reference thereto, that great or irreparable damage would otherwise result to the petitioner, and specify ng the nature of the damage: Provided, however, That when any rate has been in force for any length of time exceeding one year, and such rate is advanced by the public service company, and the order of the commission reinstates such prior rate, in who e or in part, no supersedeas shall be allowed in any case from such order pending the final determination of t'e cause in the superior court, or if appealed to the supreme court by such supreme court."

In case an order is superseded by the court it shall require a bond conditioned. that the company answer for all damages occasioned by the delay, and all compensation collected in excess of the rates prescribed in the order. The court may, in addition or in lieu of such bond require other or further security. Same, § 87. No order superseding the order of the commission denying a rehearing shall be granted by the court pending its review. Same, § 89.

For provisions relating to suspending orders, see Acts 1913, c. 9, § 16. (Quoted on p. 520.)

"No injunction shall issue suspending or staying any order of the commission, except upon application to the circuit court or presiding judge thereof, notice to the commission, and hearing." Stats. 1911, § 1797m-66, 1797-16 (a).

12. BURDEN OF PROOF

-ORDERS PRIMA FACIE VALID.

"That all rates, tolls, charges, time and condition of pay-
ment thereof, schedules, and joint rates fixed by the commission shall
be in force and shall be prima facie reasonable until finally found
otherwise in an action brought for that purpose."
District Appro-
priation Act, March 4, 1913, § 8, par. 63.

"That in all trials, actions, and proceedings arising under
the provisions of this section or growing out of the exercise of the
authority and powers granted herein to the commission, the burden of
proof shall be upon the party adverse to such commission or seeking
to set aside any determination, requirement, direction, or order of said
commission to show by clear and satisfactory evidence that the deter-
mination, requirement, direction, or order of the commission com-
plained of is inadequate, unreasonable, or unlawful, as the case
may be." Same, par. 69.

"All rates, *** charges, classifications and joint rates and orders establishing rules, regulations, practices or services fixed by the commission, shall be in force, and shall be deemed prima facie reasonable and valid in any court wherein is properly drawn in question the reasonableness or validity thereof, and the burden shall be upon the party attacking said rates or orders to show that same are invalid or unfair and unreasonable." Code 1907, § 5683, as am'd Acts 1907, Special Sess., No. 21, § 3.

Wisconsin.

District of
Columbia.

Alabama.

§ 65 of the Arizona law (Laws 1912, c. 90) is identical with § 65 of the Cali- Arizona. fornia law, quoted below.

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"In all trials, actions and proceedings arising under the provisions of this Act or growing out of the exercise of the authority and powers granted herein to the Commission, the burden of proof shall be upon the party adverse to such Commission or seeking to vacate or set aside any determination, requirement, direction or order of the Commission to show by clear and satisfactory evidence that the determination, requirement, direction or order of the Commission complained of is unreasonable or unlawful as the case may be." Laws 1912, c. 90, § 67 (g).

"In all collateral actions or proceedings, the orders and decisions of the commission which have become final shall be conclusive." Stats. 1911, 1st ex. sess., c. 14, § 65.

***The findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact shall be final and shall not be subject to review; such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the commission on reasonableness and discrimination. *** Same, § 67.

California.

§ 50 of the Colorado law is identical with § 65 of the California law, quoted Colorado above. Laws 1913, c. 127, § 50.

“*** The findings and conclusions of the Commission on disputed questions of fact shall be final and shall not be subject to review. *** Same, $52.

Florida.

Idaho.

Illinois.

Indiana.

Kansas.

*** All rules and regulations made and prescribed by the commissioners shall be prima facie evidence. Every rule, regulation, schedule, order or requirement heretofore or hereafter made by the commissioners shall be deemed and held to be within their jurisdiction and their powers, and to be reasonable and just and such as ought to have been made in the premises and to have been properly made and arrived at in due form of procedure and such as can and ought to be executed, unless the contrary plainly appears on the face thereof or can be made to appear by clear and satisfactory evidence, and shall not be set aside or held invalid unless the contrary so appears. All presumptions shall be in favor of every action of the commissioners and all doubts as to their jurisdiction and powers shall be resolved in their favor, it being intended that the laws relative to the Railroad Commissioners shall be deemed remedial laws to be construed liberally to further the legislative intent to regulate and control in the public interest the persons and corporations under their jurisdiction. If in any proceeding to enforce any rules, regulations, schedules or order any part thereof shall be found invalid the court shall proceed to enforce such portion thereof as may be valid if the same can be done." Laws 1913, c. 6525, § 20.

"All orders and decisions of the Commission which have become final and conclusive shall not be attacked collaterally." Laws 1913, c. 61, § 61.

“*** The findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact shall be regarded as prima facie just, reasonable and correct; Such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the Commission on reasonableness and discrimination. ***." Same, § 63 (a).

Similar provision is made in connection with appeals from district court to supreme court. Same, § 63 (c).

***The findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact shall be held prima facie to be true and as found by the commission; and a rule, regulation, order or decision of the commission shall not be set aside unless it clearly appears that the finding of the commission was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented to or before the commission for and against such rule, regulation, order or decision, or that the same was without the jurisdiction of the commission. *** Rules, regulations, orders or decisions of the commission shall be held to be prima facie reasonable, and the burden of proof upon all issues raised by the appeal shall be upon the person or corporation appealing from such rules, regulations, orders or decisions. **** Laws 1913, p. 459,1 § 68.

"In all trials, actions and proceedings arising under the provisions of this act or growing out of the exercise of the authority and powers granted herein to the commission, the burden of proof shall be upon the party adverse to such commission or seeking to set aside any determination, requirement, direction or order of said commission, to show that the determination, requirement, direction or order of the commission complained of is unreasonable or unlawful as the case may be." Acts 1913, c. 76, § 84.

All orders of the commission shall be prima facie reasonable unless or until changed or modified by the commission or in pursuance of court proceedings. Laws 1911, c. 238, § 18. See, also, Gen. Stats. 1909, § 7176.

'Effective January 1, 1914.

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