thus conferred, the President issued various | first be sought in the language employed. proclamations. On December 8, 1917, he is- If that be plain, it is the duty of the courts sued one (40 Stat. 1728, Comp. St. 1918, § to enforce the law as written, provided it be 3115%, note), forbidding the production of within the constitutional authority of the all malt liquor, except ale and porter, con- legislative body which passed it. Lake Countaining more than 2.75 per cent. of alcohol by ty v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662, 670, 671, 9 Sup. weight. On September 16, 1918, he issued a Ct. 651, 32 L. Ed. 1060; Bate Refrigerating second proclamation (40 Stat. 1848), prohibit- Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 33, 15 Sup. ing after December 1, 1918, the production | Ct. 508, 39 L. Ed. 601; United States v. of malt liquors, including near beer, for Bank, 234 U. S. 245, 258, 34 Sup. Ct. 846, 56 L. beverage purposes, whether or not such malt Ed. 1298; Caminetti v. United States, 242 liquors contained alcohol. On January 30, U. S. 470, 485, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442, 1919, he issued a third proclamation (40 L. R. A. 1917F, 502, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168. Stat. 1930), which modified the others to the Looking to the act we find these are its deextent of permitting the use of grain in the clared purposes: (1) To conserve the man manufacture of nonintoxicating beverages, power of the nation; (2) to increase effiit being recited therein that the prohibition | ciency in the production of arms, munitions of the use of grain in the manufacture of ships, and food and clothing for the army such beverages had been found no longer es- and navy. To these ends it is made illegal to sential in order to assure an adequate and sell distilled spirits for beverage purposes or continuous supply of food. And on March to remove the same from bond for such pur4, 1919, he issued a fourth proclamation (40 poses except for export. And after May 1, Stat. 1937) amending his proclamation of 1919, until the conclusion of the war, and September 16, 1918, so as to prohibit the production only of intoxicating malt liquors for beverage purposes. It thus appears that the President, acting under the act of August 10, 1917, has reduced the prohibition of the use of food materials so that now it is limited to the manufacture of such liquors as are in fact intoxicating. In the light of all this action we come to consider the proper construction of so much of the act of November 21, 1918, as is here involved, which provides: *217 until demobilization is proclaimed by the President, no grains, cereals, fruit, or other food products are permitted to be used in the *218 manufacture or production of *beer, wine or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquors for beverage purposes. The prohibitions extend to the use of food products for making "beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquors for beverage purposes." These provisions are of plain import and are aimed only at intoxicating beverages. It is elementary that all of the words used in a legislative act are to be given force and meaning, Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 115, 25 L. Ed. 782; and of course the qualifying words "other intoxicating" in this act cannot be rejected. It is not to be assumed that Congress had no purpose in inserting them or that it did so without intending that they should be given due force and effect. The government insists that the intention was to include beer and wine whether intoxicating or not. If so the use of this phraseology was quite superfluous, and it would have been enough to have written the act without the qualifying words. "That after June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and nineteen, until the conclusion of the present war, and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the President of the United States, for the purpose of conserving the man power of the nation, and to increase efficiency in the production of arms, munitions, ships, food, and clothing for the army and navy, it shall be unlawful to sell for beverage purposes any distilled spirits, and during said time no distilled spirits held in bond shall be removed therefrom for beverage purposes except for export. After May first, nineteen hundred and nineteen, until the conclusion of the present war and therafter until the termination of [2] This court had occasion to deal with a demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the President of the question very similar in character in the United States, no grains, cereals, fruit, or other case of the United States v. United Verde food product shall be used in the manufacture Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207, 25 Sup. Ct. 222, 49 or production of beer, wine, or other intoxicat- L. Ed. 449, where an act permitted the use of ing malt or vinous liquor for beverage purposes. timber on the public lands for building, agriAfter June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and nine-cultural, mining and other domestic purposes, teen, until the conclusion of the present war and and held that we could not disregard the use thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and of the word "other" notwithstanding the conproclaimed by the President of the United tention that it should be eliminated from the States, no beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt statute in order to ascertain the true meanor vinous liquor shall be sold for beverage pur-ing. poses except for export." [1] Nothing is better settled than that in the construction of a law its meaning must So here, we think it clear that the framers of the statute intentionally used the phrase "other intoxicating" as relating to and defining the immediately preceding des ignation of beer and wine. (40 Sup.Ct.) "As a matter of ordinary construction, where [ Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207, 215, 25 Sup. Ct. several words are followed by a general expres- 222, 49 L. Ed. 449. sion as here, which is as much applicable to the first and other words as to the last, that expression is not limited to the last, but applies to all." Lord Bramwell in Great Western Rail way Co. v. Railway Company, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 787, 808. *219 [4-6] Furthermore, we must remember, in considering an act of Congress, that a construction which might render it unconstitutional is to be avoided. We said in United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 401, 36 Sup. Ct. 658, 659 (60 L. Ed. 1061, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 854): "A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score." *The declared purpose of Congress was to conserve the nation's man power and increase efficiency in producing war essentials; and it accordingly undertook to prohibit the manufacture of intoxicating liquors whose use might interfere with the consummation of that purpose. Other provisions of the act See, also United States v. D. & H. Co., 213 lend support to this view. The sale and U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 527, 53 L. Ed. 836. withdrawal from bond of distilled spirits We held in Hamilton, Collector v. Ken(always intoxicating) were declared unlaw- tucky Distillery & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. ful after June 30, 1919-their manufacture 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106, 64 L. Ed. - decided had already been prohibited. The sale of December 15, 1919, that the war power of beer, wine and other intoxicating malt or Congress, as applied to the situation outlined vinous liquors was prohibited after the same in the opinion in that case, enabled it to prodate and the importation of all such liquors hibit the sale of intoxicating liquor for bevand also of distilled liquors was made im- erage purposes. But the question was neimediately unlawful. The President was em- ther made nor decided as to whether Conpowered at once to establish zones about gress could prohibit even in time of war the coal mines, manufactories, shipbuilding manufacture and sale of non intoxicating plants, etc., and "to prohibit the sale, manu- beverages. facture or distribution of intoxicating liquors in such zones." The fact that the Treasury Department may have declared taxable under many revenue acts all beer containing one-half of 1 per centum of alcohol is not important. Such rulings did not turn upon the intoxicating character of the liquid, but upon classification for taxation controlled by other considerations. A liquid may be designated as beer and subjected to taxation although clearly nonintoxicating. "The question whether a fermented malt liquor is intoxicating or nonintoxicating is immaterial under the internal revenue laws, although An indictment must charge each and every element of an offense, Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 584, 587, 14 Sup. Ct. 934, 38 L. Ed. 830. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that a beverage containing not more than one-half of 1 per cent. of alcohol is intoxicating, and as neither indictment so charges it follows that the courts below in each of the cases correctly construed the act of Congress, and the judgments are Affirmed. (251 U. S. 264) V. CAFFEY, U. S. Atty., et al. it may be a very material question under the JACOB RUPPERT [3] As to the insistence that the Internal (Argued Nov. 20 and 21, 1919. Decided Jan. Revenue Department has determined that a beverage containing one-half of 1 per cent. of alcohol should be regarded as intoxicating within the intendment of the act before us little need be said. Nothing in the act remits the determination of that question to the decision of the revenue officers of the ⚫220 5, 1920.) No. 603. 1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS 134-WAR-TIME By War-Time Prohibition Act Nov. 21, government. While entitled to respect, as 1918, as amended by Volstead Act Oct. 28, such decisions are, they cannot enlarge the 1919, prohibition of the manufacture of intoximeaning of a statute enacted by Congress. cants pursuant to the war-time powers of ConAdministrative rulings cannot add to the gress was validly extended to all beer and other terms of an act of Congress and make con- malt liquor containing as much as one-half duct criminal which such laws leave un-brewer may not show, as basis for relief against of 1 per cent. of alcohol by volume, and a touched. Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606, 38 enforcement of such legislation, that the beer Sup. Ct. 395, 62 L. Ed. 892; United States manufactured by it with alcoholic content not v. George, 228 U. S. 14, 25, 33 Sup. Ct. 412, greater than 2.75 per cent. in weight and 3.4 57 L. Ed. 712; United States v. United Verde' per cent. in volume is not in fact intoxicating. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 2. INTOXICATING LIQUORS 6-UNDER PO- in the production of distilled spirits for LICE POWER OF STATE KINDRED NONINTOX- beverage purposes and authorized the PresiICATING LIQUORS MAY BE PROHIBITED. dent to limit or prohibit their use in the The police power of a state over the liquor production of malt or vinous liquors for bevtraffic is not limited to the power to prohibit erage purposes, so far as he might, from the sale of intoxicating liquors, supported by a time to time, deem it essential to assure an separate implied power to prohibit kindred nonintoxicating liquors, so far as necessary to make adequate supply of food, or deem it helpful in promoting the national security or defense. Under the power so conferred the President, by proclamation of December S, 1917, prohibited the production after January 1, 1918, containing more than 2.75 per centum of of any "malt liquor except ale and porter" alcohol by weight. By proclamation of September 16, 1918, the prohibition was extended to "malt liquors, including near beer, for the prohibition of intoxicants effective, but is a 8A Key-No. Series-VALIDITY OF VOLSTEAD Volstead Act Oct. 28, 1919, tit. 1, § 1, amending War-Time Prohibition Act Nov. 21, 1918, to prohibit the manufacture of beer or other malt liquors containing in excess of onehalf of 1 per cent. of alcohol, though taking effect on its passage, as required by the war emergency, in the opinion of Congress, held not invalid as enforced against a brewer which claimed it had manufactured 2.75 per cent. beer under the general permission of the President in his proclamation of December 8, 1917. 4. CRIMINAL LAW 304 (20)-ALE AND PORTER NOTORIOUSLY ARE "INTOXICATING LIQUORS." *279 beverage purposes, whether or not such malt liquors contain alcohol"; and by proclamation of March 4, 1919, the prohibition was limited "to intoxicating malt liquors." Under section 2 of the act (section 3115% ee) the duty of enforcing the above provisions was assigned to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. This act contained no provision prohibiting the sale of intoxicating or other liquors. On November 21, 1918, the so-called WarTime Prohibition Act (40 Stat. 1045, c. 212) "Ale" and "porter" are intoxicating liquors was approved. It provided that: to the knowledge of all. [Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Intoxicating Liquor.] Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice Day, Mr. Justice Van Devanter, and Mr. Justice Clarke, dissenting. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Suit by Jacob Ruppert, a corporation, against Francis G. Caffey, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Richard J. McElligott, Acting and Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue of the Third District of New York. From a decree of dismissal, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Messrs. Elihu Root and William D. Guthrie, both of New York City, for appellant. Messrs. Assistant Attorney General Frierson and Solicitor General A. L. King, of Atlanta, Ga., for appellees. *278 *Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court. "After May first, nineteen hundred and nineteen, until the conclusion of the present war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the President of the United States, no grains, cereals, fruit, or other food product shall be used in the manufacture or production of beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquor for beverage purposes. After June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and nineteen, until the conclusion of the present war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the President of the United States, no beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquor shall be sold for beverage purposes except for export. Section 1. # On February 6, 1919, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled (Treasury Decision 2788) that a beverage containing as much as one-half of 1 per centum of alcohol by volume would be regarded as intoxicating within the intent of the Act of November 21, 1918, and that after May 1, 1919, persons would not be permitted to qualify as brewers if the alcoholic content of their product equaled or exceeded that percentage. In so ruling the Commissioner adopted and applied to this prohibitory act the same classification of malt liquors which had been applied in administering the laws concerning the taxation of beer and other similar fermented liquors. *280 By the Act of August 10, 1917, c. 53, § 15, 40 Stat. 276, 282 (Comp. St. 1918, § 3115%), a war measure known as the Lev-*For since 1902 (Treasury Decision 514) ferer Act, Congress prohibited the use after mented liquor containing as much as one-half September 9, 1917, of food materials or feeds of 1 per centum of alcohol had been treated For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (40 Sup. Ct.) as taxable under Revised Statutes, §§ 3339 | Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1215). The bill aland 3242 (Comp. St. §§ 6143, 5965), and this classification was expressly adopted in the War Revenue Act of October 3, 1917, c. 63, § 307, 40 Stat. 311 (Comp. St. 1918, § 6144b). The correctness of this construction of the act was promptly and earnestly controverted by the brewers, who insisted that Congress had intended to prohibit the production only of such beer or other malt liquors as were in fact intoxicating. The attempt was then made to remove the doubt by new legislation before May 1, 1919, when the act would by its terms become operative. On February 26 the House Committee on the Judiciary reported favorably an amendment to H. R. 13581 providing: "The words 'beer, wine or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquors' in the war prohibition act shall be construed to mean any liquors which contain in excess of one-half of one per centum of alcohol." The Sixty-Fifth Congress ended on March 4 without acting on this bill, and the SixtySixth Congress did not convene in extra session until May 19. On June 30, the House Committee on the Judiciary reported substantially the same provision as section 1 of title 1 of H. R. 6810; but it was not enacted until October 28, 1919, when as the Volstead Act (Act Oct. 28, 1919, c. 85) it was passed over the President's veto.(a) *281 as *Immediately after the passage of the Volstead Act, this suit was brought in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York by Jacob Ruppert against Caffey, United States Attorney, and McElligott, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, to enjoin the enforcement against the plaintiff of the penalties provided in the War-Time Prohibition Act as amended by the Volstead Act. It was heard below on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and defendants' motion to dismiss, and, having been dismissed, was brought here by direct appeal under section 238 of the Note (a): "The term 'War Prohibition Act' used in this act shall mean the provisions of any act or acts prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors until the conclusion of the present war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the President of the Unit ed States. The words 'beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquors' in the War Prohi bition Act shall be hereafter construed to mean any such beverages which contain one-half of 1 per centum or more of alcohol by volume: Provided, that the foregoing definition shall not extend to dealcoholized wine nor to any beverage or liquid produced by the process by which beer, ale, porter or wine is produced, if it contains less than onehalf of 1 per centum of alcohol by volume, and is made as prescribed in section 37 of title II of this act, and is otherwise denominated than as beer, ale, or porter, and is contained and sold in, or from, such sealed and labeled bottles, casks, or containers as the commissioner may by regulation prescribe." leged that plaintiff, the owner of a brewery and appurtenances, was on October 28, 1919, engaged in the manufacture of a beer containing more than one-half of 1 per centum of alcohol by volume, and less than 2.75 per centum by weight or 3.4 per centum by volume, and had then on hand a large quantity of such beer, and that this beer was not in fact intoxicating. Plaintiff contended (1) that the act of November 21, 1918, had become void or had expired by its own terms before the bill was filed; (2) that its prohibition by its terms was limited to beer which was in fact intoxicating; (3) that the Act of | October 28, 1919, title 1, § 1, which purported to extend the prohibition to the manufacture and sale of beer not in fact intoxicat ing, exceeded the war power of Congress; and that thereby violation of rights guaranteed to plaintiff by the Fifth Amendment was threatened. This case was heard and decided below with Dryfoos et al. v. Edwards and it was argued here on the same day with that case and Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106, 64 L. Ed. decided December 15, *282 1919. For the reasons set forth in *the opin1918, was and remained valid as against the plaintiff and had not expired. For the ion in those cases, the Act of November 21, same reasons section 1 of title 1 of the Act of October 28, 1919, was not invalid, merely because it was new legislation. But it is insisted that this legislation is nevertheless void as against the plaintiff, because Congress could not, even under its full war powers, prohibit the manufacture and sale of nonintoxicants, and, at all events, could not without making compensation, extend the prohibition to nonintoxicating liquor acquired before the passage of the act. These objections require consideration. [1, 2] First. May the plaintiff show as a basis for relief that the beer manufactured by it with alcoholic content not greater than 2.75 per centum in weight and 3.4 per centum in volume is not in fact intoxicating? The gov ernment insists that the fact alleged is immaterial since the passage of the Volstead Act by which the prohibition of the manufacture and sale is extended to all beer and other malt liquor containing as much as one-half of 1 per centum of alcohol by volume. If the war power of Congress to effectively prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors in order to promote the nation's efficiency in men, munitions and supplies is as full and complete as the police power of the states to effectively enforce such prohibition in order to promote the health, safety and morals of the community, it is clear that this provision of the Volstead Act is valid and has rendered immaterial the question whether plaintiff's beer is intoxicat *283 forbidden and such other liquors as contain a given percentage of alcohol. ing. For the legislation and decisions of the highest courts of nearly all of the states establish that it is deemed impossible to effec- A test often used to determine whether a tively enforce either prohibitory laws or other beverage is to be deemed intoxicating within laws merely regulating the manufacture and the meaning of the liquor law is whether it sale of intoxicating liquors, if liability or contains one-half of 1 per cent. of alcohol by inclusion within the law is made to depend volume. A survey of the liquor laws of the upon the issuable fact whether or not a par- states reveals that in sixteen states the test ticular liquor made or sold as a beverage is is either a list of enumerated beverages withintoxicating. In other words, it clearly ap-out regard to whether they contain any alcopears that a liquor law, to be capable of ef-hol or the presence of any alcohol in a beverfective enforcement must, in the opinion of age, regardless of quantity; (c) in eighteen the Legislatures and courts of the several states, be made to apply either to all liquors of the species enumerated, like beer, ale or wine, regardless of the presence or degree of alcoholic content; or if a more general description is used, such as distilled, rectified, spirituous, fermented, malt, or brewed liquors, to all liquors within that general description regardless of alcoholic content; (b) *284 or to such of these liquors as contain *a named percentage of alcohol; and often several such standards are combined, so that certain specific and generic liquors are altogether Note (b): Cases to this effect are Marks v. State, 159 Ala. 71, 48 South. 864, 133 Am. St. Rep. 20; Brown v. State, 17 Ariz. 314, 152 Pac. 578; Bradshaw v. State, 76 Ark. 562, 89 S. W. 1051; Seibert v. State, 121 Ark. 258, 180 S. W. 990; In re Lockman, 18 Idaho, 465, 110 Pac. 253, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 759; Hansberg v. State, 120 Ill. 21, 23, 8 N. E. 857, 60 Am. Rep. 549 (dictum); Kurz v. State, 79 Ind. 488; Sawyer v. Botti, 147 Iowa, 453, 124 N. W. 787, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007; State v. Colvin, 127 Iowa, 632, 103 N. W. 968; State v. Miller, 92 Kan. 994, 142 Pac. 979, L. R. A. 1917F, 238, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 365; State v. Trione, 97 Kan. 365, 155 Pac. 29; Com. v. McGrath, 185 Mass. 1, 69 N. E. 340; Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 100 Miss. 650, 56 South. 316; State v. Centennial Brewing Co., 55 Mont. 500, 179 Pac. 296; Luther v. State, 83 Neb. 455, 120 N. W. 125, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1146; State v. Thornton, 63 N. H. 114; People v. Cox, 106 App. Div. 299, 94 N. Y. Supp. 526; People v. O'Reilly, 129 App. Div. 522, 114 N. Y. Supp. 258; La Follette v. Murray, 81 Ohio St. 474, 91 N. E. 294; State v. Walder, 83 Ohio St. 68, 93 N. E. 531; State v. Bottling Works, 19 N. D. 397, 124 N. W. 387, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 872; State v. Ely, 22 S. D. 487, 118 N. W. 687, 18 Ann. Cas. 92; State v. Oliver, 26 W. Va. 422, 427, 53 Am. Rep. 79 (dictum); Pennell v. State, 141 Wis. 35, 123 N. W. 115; United States v. Cohn, 2 Ind. T. 474, 52 S. W. 38; Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 33 Sup. Ct. 44, 57 L. Ed. 184. Contra: City of Bowling Green v. McMullen, 134 Ky. 742, 122 S. W. 823, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 895; Reisenberg v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 84 S. W. 585; State v. Olson, 95 Minn. 104, 103 N. W. 727; Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751, 37 Am. Rep. 284; State v. Virgo, 14 N. D. 293, 103 N. W. 610; State v. Maroun, 128 La. 829, 55 South. 472; Howard v. Acme Brewing Co., 143 Ga. 1, 83 S. E. 1096, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 91. In Kansas, the Legislature overruled this decision by Laws 1909, c. 164, § 4 (see State v. Trione, supra); in Minnesota, made the prohibition apply to all malt liquors containing as much as 1⁄2 of 1 per cent. of alcohol by volume, Laws 1919, c. 455, p. 537; in North Dakota by Laws 1909, c. 187, p. 277 (see State v. Bottling Works, 19 N. D. 397, 124 N. W. 387, 26 L. R. A. [N. S.] 872), the prohibition applied to all liquors which retained "the alcoholic principle"; in Louisiana, Acts 1914, Nos. 146, 211, operated to cut down the per cent. of alcohol to 1.59 (see State v. George, 136 La. 906, 67 South. 956); in Georgia, Acts 1919, p. 123, changed the rule of Howard v. Acme Brewing Co., supra, see note (d) 4. No. 53, § 1, p. 71, made it unlawful to sell "any al- (133 Am. St. Rep. 20) stated that "or other liquors or beverages Gen. Laws 1919, Act 7, p. 6, in terms prohibits all liquors containing any alcohol. 2. Arizona: Constitution, art. 23, § 1, prohibits "ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquor, or liquors of whatever kind." Brown v. State, 17 Ariz. 314, 152 Pac. 578, held that "beer" was prohibited, whether or not it was intoxicating. 3. Arkansas: Acts 1917, Act 13, p. 41, as amended by Acts 1919, Act 87, p. 75, prohibits "any alcoholic, vinous, malt, spirituous, or fermented liquors." Seibert v. State, 121 Ark. 258, 180 S. W. 990, held that the enumerated liquors are prohibited, whether they are intoxicating or not if they contained any alcohol. An earlier act contained the words "or other intoxicating liquors," following "or fermented liquors." It was held in Bradshaw v. State, 76 Ark. 562, 89 S. W. 1051, that this clause did not modify the enumerated liquors, and that they were prohibited, whether intoxicating or not. 4. Colorado: Sess. Laws 1915, c. 98, § 30 (prohibition), as amended by Sess. Laws 1919, c. 141, prohibits "intoxicating liquors • no matter how small the percentage of alcohol they may contain." 42. Hawaii: Rev. Laws 1915, § 2101 (license law). "Intoxicating liquors' shall be held to include spirituous liquors, and any beverage in which may be found any percentage of distilled spirits, spirits, alcohol and alcoholic spirits as defined by the laws of the United States, and any sake, beer, lager beer, ale, porter and malt or fermented or distilled liquors." 5. Idaho: Sess. Laws 1909, p. 18 (local option). "Spirituous, vinous, malt and fermented liquors, and other drinks that may be used as a beverage and produce intoxication." In re Lockman, 18 Idaho, 465, 110 Pac. 253, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 759, held that the enumerated liquors are within the act whether or not they are intoxicating. Constitutional amendment of November 7, 1916 (prohibition). Sess. Laws 1917, p. 528. The enforcement laws are cumulative, including Sess. Laws 1915, c. 28; Sess. Laws 1915, c. 11 (see section 23); Sess. Laws 1911, c. 15; and Sess. Laws 1909, p. 18. Thus the definition and interpretation above are retained. 6. Iowa: Code Supp. 1915, § 2382, prohibits "any intoxicating liquor, which term shall be construed to mean alcohol, ale, wine, beer, spirituous, vinous and malt liquor, and all intoxicating liquor whatever." State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 76 Iowa, 243, 41 N. |