Fox, and added, there was no man to whom he should be 'more disposed to give his implicit and entire confidence.' The particulars of this negotiation are admirably related by Lord Malmesbury in his Diary for June 1792.

Six months later, however, the Duke of Portland's friends thought that the time was come when they were imperatively called upon to make a declaration of their intention to oppose the extension of French principles and of French power, either by arms or by any other form of proselytism, and to give the Government support in the measures which the dangers of the times required. Then it was that they found that the Duke's firmness was not equal to his principles; his conduct was unsteady, he could not nerve himself publicly to dissent from Fox, though they differed in opinion as black from white. He refused day after day to make the promised declaration, and prolonged what Elliot calls his own dishonour and our dif ficulties. At length Sir Gilbert resolved to speak out for himself, and on Dec. 28, 1792,

'I expressed very distinctly the entire difference between my opinions and those of Fox and his present party, and the improbability there appears of anything like a general agreement between us while the present circumstances continued. I then stated my opinion that it was my duty to give a fair and honourable support to Government in defending the Constitution and saving the country; that if I had stood alone in this resolution, I should have had courage to do my duty even in that situation, but I was fortunate enough to believe that I agreed with a majority of those with whom I had long acted; that those who differed with me, though weighty and respectable, acted only as individuals, and did not express the sense of any party, but that I, and those who agreed with me, stood precisely on the same footing that we had ever done-perfectly unconnected with Ministry, but connected amongst ourselves, as formerly, on our ancient principles, and under our ancient chief (the Duke of Portland), who I knew agreed with me, or whose sentiments I knew I had expressed on this occasion.' Such was the termination of this painful and memorable struggle. Its results were immediate. Early in February, he writes*

*The date of this letter is remarkable, because it shows what Mr. Windham's intentions were in February 1793. In October of that year he wrote to Mrs. Crewe: My hostility to Jacobinism and all its works, and all its supporters, weak or wicked, is more steady and 'strong than ever. If Pitt is the man by whom this must be opposed, 'Pitt is the man whom I shall stand by. If I do not act with them in office, it is only because I think I can be of more use as I am. Sir 'Gilbert's acceptance of the appointment offered him, has my perfect " concurrence.' Windham says that it was not till December 7 that he

'Elliot (of Wells), who is here, tells me that, through Lord Loughborough, Mr. Pitt had expressed a regard for Windham, Lord Malmesbury, and myself, with a clear intention of offering office, if we are disposed to take it. Windham may be Secretary of State for the Home Department if he chooses, but no specific office has been mentioned for Lord Malmesbury and me. My mind is still extremely disinclined to office. I understand that Windham is in much the same state. not intend to do anything except in conjunction with him.'

I do

Twenty-one Whig members of the House of Commons, and afterwards fifty members, met at Windham's house, and unanimously resolved to support the Government, upon the declaration of war; and soon afterwards Burke, Windham, and Elliot had a conference with Pitt which resembled a cabinet council. No doubt this act was blamed at the time, and has since been criticised and condemned by those who place party obligations above every other rule of conduct. But those who took this step were actuated by no interested or vulgar motives. They made a great sacrifice of their personal feelings. They abandoned none of their deep-rooted and conscientious attachment to the cause of true liberty, for that they believed to be imperilled by the monstrous and sanguinary despotism which had sprung up in Europe. And we believe that they adhered more closely to the constitutional principles of the party to which they belonged than those members of it who embraced for a time the delusions and extravagance of the French Revolution; for, as Lady Minto observes, that Revolution has not even yet given liberty to France, and the maintenance of the British Constitution by repressive measures has not extinguished liberty in England, but on the contrary has enlarged and perpetuated it. This subject has, however, repeatedly been discussed in this Journal, and by none more ably than by the late Sir George C. Lewis, whose views are fully supported by the publication now before us.

One of the great merits of this Correspondence is, that it offers to the reader an exceeding variety of topics, and if we have been tempted to linger too long at the door of Mr. Pitt's cabinet and at the ridottos of London, we shall now pass to totally different scenes. Sir Gilbert Elliot never held one of the cabinet offices which seemed at one moment within his

had his first conference with Pitt, but Sir Gilbert Elliot distinctly states that this conference took place on March 6 in the Speaker's chamber; and, in fact, in December Elliot was at Toulon. This inconsistency is curious; but Mr. Windham must have been mistaken. The Duke of Portland and Windham did not take office till the following year. (See Windham's Diary, pp. 291-6.)

*

grasp. We suspect that his friends discerned in him more diplomatic and administrative ability than parliamentary influence. He constantly complains of his extreme shyness in debate. But his early education had given him a familiarity with the Continent, not common in those days. And the last twenty years of his life were destined to be chiefly spent in the active service of the Crown in foreign countries—in military and political missions, embassies, and at last in the government of India.

In September 1793, Lord Hood had struck a successful blow at Toulon. Fifteen sail-of-the-line of the French navy and that important arsenal were held by the British Admiral for the King of France, in alliance with the Royalists. In the sanguine ignorance of the time, it was supposed in London that the South of France would declare for the monarchy; the Corsicans had risen against France; Naples was to furnish 6,000 men, Spain an equal number, and the King of Sardinia was to advance against the French Republic. These events decided the British Government to send Sir Gilbert Elliot to Toulon, in a ministerial character, and a small detachment of troops was to join him from Gibraltar, under General O'Hara -the same, we believe, who was to have married Miss Berry, and who was as little fit to command an expedition as to make that lady a good husband. The King approved the appointment, and Burke exclaimed with his wonted enthusiasm As

to the Ministry, their nomination of you is a pledge they mean to improve this event, so glorious to the national cha6 racter. The thing is arduous in the extreme, but it is a task worthy of you, and you owe yourself entire to your 'country at this instant.' Nothing is more surprising in the annals of those times, than the extraordinary want of political knowledge and strategical capacity, which characterised the military operations of Mr. Pitt's government. The slender forces of the country were scattered in paltry and abortive expeditions to Flanders, to Noirmoutier, and to Toulon. No real understanding existed with the Continental Powers, and these ridiculous armaments were sent out without the least conception of what they could do. They started without a distinct object, and without a secure base. Pitt never seemed to have realised the nature of war or its first principles, until the immortal victories of Howe, Jervis, and Nelson on the

* In 1806, under Lord Grenville, he held for a few months the office of President of the Board of Control, but without the Cabinet. This, of course, he resigned on going to India, and he never held any other ministerial office in England.

ocean gave it its true character. The letters of Burke, here first published, are deeply interesting, but they display an almost equal ignorance of military art.

Sir Gilbert reached Toulon in November 1793, and was speedily undeceived. He had been sent out without a policy and without the means of giving effect to any policy he might adopt. O'Hara thought as ill as possible of the whole business, though Lord Hood would not then admit the slightest doubt of keeping the place. But every day rendered the position more untenable. The promised Austrian troops never came. The whole body of Spanish forces, full 6,000, were worse than useless. Some 1,200 British soldiers from Gibraltar were detained there by Sir Robert Boyd, who was about ninety years old and had lost any sense he may ever have had. On the 1st December a sortie was made from the place in which O'Hara was taken prisoner, with a loss of 200 British soldiers. No reinforcements came from England. The Neapolitans did not like the danger, and on the 20th December, just a month after Sir Gilbert's arrival, the evacuation of the place was determined upon. He contrived to carry off, besides the troops and sick and wounded, 2,000 or 3,000 of the French Royalists; of those who remained in Toulon plusieurs centaines, choisis en pleine place publique, furent mitraillés sans autre forme de procès Fouché commanding the massacre. 'Had the weather been such as 'it has been ever since,' writes Elliot to his wife, that is 'blowing strong from the east, we must all-fleet, army, and refugees-have inevitably perished.' The capture of Fort Mulgrave, as it was termed, by the republican army was the turning point of the siege; but neither Sir Gilbert, nor any one else, knew at the time that the quick eye of Napoleon Bonaparte had selected the true point of attack, and that his hands had pointed the guns in the republican batteries. The care of these unfortunate French loyalists was no small matter, for no foreign Government except our own was willing to receive them, and we think that some of them continued to figure on our pension list for half a century. Sir Gilbert had at one moment some thousands of them on his hands. On the 10th January Elliot wrote, I go on board the "Lowestoft " to 'Corsica, to settle with Paoli the cession of Corsica to England.'

This sentence opens one of the most interesting episodes in his life, and the whole series of his Corsican letters will be read with great interest, for they contain a narrative of events to which justice has not yet been done by history. We know not

whether Sir Gilbert's instructions from the British Government included any mention of Corsica-he seems indeed to have had no instructions at all. But he had already framed in his own mind a political conception of vast importance, which would, if it had been vigorously supported and acted upon at home, have materially altered the course of events. He already foresaw that the armies of the French Republic, eager alike for spoil and for glory, would overrun the Italian Peninsula. The Governments of Tuscany, Naples, and the Papal States were in a state of abject terror. The means of

defence by Austria and Sardinia were doubtful. Fear and disunion everywhere prevailed. On the 22nd February he wrote to Mr. Dundas:

:

'I have often thought, and I know it is the opinion of much abler men, that some permanent league of the Italian States for their mutual defence would be a great security, not only to that country itself, but to the peace of Europe. The want of it is particularly perceptible at this time. There is not a Government in Italy which is not alarmed both at the idea of the invasion of its territory, and the disturbance of its internal tranquillity; yet there are hardly any of them prepared, or even disposed, to take a step in their defence. This would not be the case if there had previously existed a systematic and established provision for this danger, which would have been prepared at once for action, and would have superseded all the littlenesses in the policy and politics of these little courts.

'Tuscany appears to be a strong instance of Italian weakness. The country is extremely rich and very populous. The Government is satisfied that the entry of the French into Italy would both ruin and destroy the country and overthrow the Government, but they seem determined to seek their safety in no other measure than the most abject prostration before the enemy, knowing perfectly that prostration would not protect them, while the plunder of their towns and churches affords so many provocations to such an enemy. I think it possible, that if some systematic confederacy in Italy were thought a desirable thing, at least for the present occasion, it might be brought about, and if we are settled in Corsica, I should hope still more from the influence of Great Britain in treating the affair. I throw this idea out merely for your consideration, without presuming to recommend it positively, although I confess it has been lately pretty much on my mind.'

To this Lord Grenville replied that the Government ' entirely concurred in the views entertained by him on the affairs of Italy,' and instructed him to promote the great 'object His Majesty has in view of confederating the Italian Powers in a permanent system of general defence.'

We believe that the existence of this wise and deliberate purpose is now for the first time distinctly made known, and it