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that have been carried on either in Greece or Asia Minor, indeed the only ones that throw any considerable light upon the pre-historic antiquities of those countries—it is impossible to assume that there was any marked line of demarcation between the bronze and stone periods, implements of both classes being found promiscuously mixed together, though in varying proportions, indicating undoubtedly different states of civilisation, but not in accordance with any chronological sequence.
One other point must be mentioned, in respect to which the discoveries of Dr. Schliemann appeared likely to throw a very unexpected light upon the history of early civilisation, but on which unfortunately his evidence has broken down. Throughout the body of his work, both in the detailed reports of the progress of his excavations and in the general introduction in which he sums up the results, he speaks of all the metallic objects found as of copper ; and he tells us distinctly that while those discovered in the Hellenic stratum were alloyed with tin —that is to say were of bronze, like all other Hellenic remains of the kind—those found in the lower strata were uniformly of pure copper, without any alloy whatever. Such a fact would have been as interesting as it was unique. It has always been one of the most difficult questions in the history of mankind to account for the very early and general use of bronze, a mixed metal, one of the ingredients of which is tin, a metal found only in a few localities, far distant from the earliest centres of civilisation. And it would seem but natural to suppose that an
age of copper' must have preceded the Age of Bronze, before people had found the art of hardening the one metal by the admixture of the other. To have lighted upon such a period would indeed have been a most interesting discovery, and Dr. Schliemann's precise testimony upon the subject was based on the authority of Professor Landerer, Professor of Chemistry at Athens. Unfortunately, the result of a more careful analysis made for him at Lyons by. M. Damour, which is appended to the very last page of his book, shows that both specimens submitted to him, from the objects discovered with the treasure' itself, contained tin in considerable quantities, and in one instance in almost precisely the same proportions as one from an axe of the pure Hellenic period. There can therefore be but little doubt that all, or almost all, the implements and utensils discovered in the course of his excavations, and described by him as of copper, were really of bronze, as has been found to be the case with similar objects in all other instances.
We feel that we are so far from having exhausted the many interesting topics which Dr. Schliemann's discoveries suggest for
our consideration, that we have only found time to touch upon a few of them. He has opened a field of research in great measure new, and combining at once so much interest with difficulties and anomalies of so startling a character, that we have little doubt it will afford a battle-field for archæologists and philologers for many years to come.
We do not think that his own theories will find general acceptance; but we cannot be too grateful for the zeal and energy which he has displayed in his researches, as well as for the conscientious and highly satisfactory manner in which he has given their results to the public.
ART. IX. — Address of the Right Hon. William Ewart
Gladstone, First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of
January 24, 1874.
representative institutions and popular government that we feel no surprise, and we shall express no vain regret, at the catastrophe which has overtaken the late Ministry and terminated their existence as a Government. Least of all would it befit the leaders and members of the popular party in this country to complain of any fair and unequivocal expression of the national will, however adverse it may be to themselves. The late general election took place under circumstances of which we have not the slightest reason to complain. The time and manner of the dissolution, kept secret from almost every other member of the community, was deliberately selected by the Prime Minister. The terms on which he challenged the judgment of the country were entirely his own, and expressed in his own language. The power and skill of Parliament had long been engaged in bringing our whole electoral machinery to perfection. For the first time, all the recent legislative provisions designed to secure the utmost freedom, purity, and independence of election were in full operation. Never in this kingdom did so large a number of electors record their votes. Never was there less bribery, intimidation, or electoral manæuvring. The ballot enabled every man to indulge at his pleasure the secret passion or the passing caprice of the hour. And if the sovereignty of the people of England now resides in the ballot box, to be exercised at those times and seasons when a direct appeal is made to it by the prerogative of the Crown, we do not believe that the voice of the people
ever gave, or ever can give, a more distinct and authoritative response. It would be idle and unbecoming in us to protest against such a verdict, emanating from the powers we have ourselves contributed to call into being. For we may here remark that the extension of the suffrage and the adoption of the ballot unquestionably strengthen the authority of a great legal manifestation of the national will. With a more restricted constituency, voting openly, the results of an election were obnoxious to the suspicion that they might be due to the votes of a privileged class, or to the influence of personal and local pressure. But in the vast constituencies of the present day such petty causes disappear. The causes which operate must be broad and general, though they may be fallacious. Thus the effect, especially when it pervades the whole kingdom, is irresistible. A defeated Ministry is crushed by a much heavier weight. The victorious party is borne into power by a stronger wave.
There can be no greater delusion than to suppose that in a well-ordered State, swayed by popular influences, the current of opinion and policy will always flow in the same stream. Nothing, we are persuaded, could be more mischievous and fatal to the system of government by parties. It is not by a uniform current, setting in one direction, that men's minds are governed, but rather by a tidal wave that sways them to, and fro, till the excess in one sense is counteracted by an opposing force. Peace and war, profusion and economy, liberty and authority are alternating ideas which take possession of men and rule their conduct in relation to the circumstances in which they are placed ; and it is a mistake to suppose that because a given popular movement is very strong at one moment it will go on to gain strength. It will, on the contrary, lose strength in proportion to the satisfaction afforded it, and will ultimately turn in the opposite direction. The excessive confidence of many members of the Liberal party in the permanence of the impulse which brought them into Parliament and into power, has been one of the principal causes of their recent defeat: the tide turned and left them on the shore.
Another principle cordially acknowledged by none more than by ourselves —being, indeed, one of the fundamental doctrines of the Whig school—is that an administration ought not to last, or seek to last, for one hour after it has lost the confidence of the country. In the last century it was possible for George III. to prolong the existence of Lord North's Cabinet long after it had lost its hold on the nation. In France the same thing was done by King Louis Philippe, who VOL. CXXXIX. NO. CCLXXXIV.
upheld the Guizot Ministry, until his throne and the Cabinet crumbled into ruins together. Even in our times the experiment has been tried both by Sir Robert Peel and the late Lord Derby of administrations struggling against hostile majorities, and not adequately supported by public opinion out of doors. Henceforth such attempts are impossible. Mr. Gladstone recognised and acted on this principle with the utmost promptitude and sincerity, when he resigned last year after his first important defeat on the Irish University Bill. He even urged his resignation on the Crown with unusual pertinacity; but circumstances and the tactics of his opponents were too strong for him, and, unfortunately for himself and for his party, he resumed a disputed authority and a divided power. It is, we doubt not, on the whole a perfectly sound and beneficial principle, that no government should continue to exist with impaired resources. A struggle for existence, to be carried on by alternate concessions to disaffected supporters or candid antagonists, is unworthy of a high-minded statesman, and degrades the functions of government itself.
Mr. Gladstone, full of that heroic resolution which is so characteristic of the great acts of his policy, might have exclaimed on January 24, in the words of Montrose
"He either fears his fate too much,
Or his desert is small,
To win or lose it all.' He played for the largest possible stake, and he played it on a single throw. One week he was a powerful Minister, still commanding a majority of upwards of sixty in the House of Commons-able, beyond all doubt, to have carried a series of important and brilliant financial measures in the present session of Parliament, disposing of the surplus of the coming year, and not ill prepared to await the chances of the future: the next, his party was dispersed, his administration broken up, his majority converted into the feeblest representation of Liberal principles which has occupied the opposition benches for thirty years. The causes of this extraordinary tactical movement have never been explained to us. They will afford an inexhaustible theme of speculation to the memoir-writers and constitutional historians of the future. The time is not come to investigate or to estimate all the motives which may have actuated the Head of the late Government; but those which have been disclosed are clearly inadequate to account for his decision. We can conceive that Mr. Gladstone had become indignant at the decline of his influence, as evinced by several recept elections, and therefore resolved to know his fate, for better or for worse, before he met Parliament in a new session. But we cannot suppose that men of long Parliamentary experience should imagine that, in presence of these untoward symptoms, the position of the Government would be improved in the House of Commons by a dissolution. Nothing can be more fatal than to dissolve Parliament on an ebb tide. All the precedents are against it, and, in 1841, when Lord Melbourne's Government vainly resorted to it, the measure was strenuously debated in the Cabinet, and several of the most eminent members of the Whig party were on principle opposed to it. In 1834, Sir Robert Peel had no choice, for before he reached England it had been assumed that a dissolution was inevitable, and, indeed, without it he could not have insured the re-election of his own colleagues. But Sir Robert Peel says in his Memoirs (vol. ii. p. 44), "I was no advocate 'for frequent or abrupt dissolutions. I had more than once ' had occasion to express in Council my distrust in them, as * remedies for the weakness of a government, constantly bear
ing in mind the remark of Lord Clarendon at the commence'ment of his “ History of the Rebellion," upon the evil effects
of an ill-considered exercise of this branch of the prerogative. • “ No man,” says he, “can show me a source from whence (6 these waters of bitterness we now taste, have more proba6 “ bly flowed than from those unseasonable, unskilful, and
precipitate dissolutions of Parliament.” And again: “ The «" passion and distemper gotten and received into Parliament «« cannot be removed and reformed by the more passionate ““ breaking and dissolving of it.”'
Some such considerations as these might, with due time for deliberation, have presented themselves to the minds of the eminent men who were led to adopt so unusual a course; and certainly a far shorter time for reflection would have sufficed to demonstrate the probable, if not the inevitable, results of it. The step taken by the late Government was extremely analogous to the false tactical operation of the Emperor Napoleon and Marshal Macmahon, when they resolved, in presence of a powerful invasion, to make a flank movement to the north-east of France, instead of concentrating their forces and awaiting an attack, war having been declared with a very imperfect knowledge of the relative strength of the belligerents. The result in both instances was the loss, not only of a battle, but
It would be superfluous at this time and in this place to invoke the past services of the late Government in extenuation
of an army,