THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF PREMIERS:

MINUTES OF MEETINGS

[The minutes here printed are only those of the meetings of the International Council of Premiers at which representatives of the United States were present prior to the termination of the Peace Conference at Paris on January 21, 1920. The files of the Department of State do not contain minutes of the meetings of this Council at which the United States was not represented.]

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/2

ICP-2

Secretary's Notes of a Conference Held at 10, Downing Street, London, S. W. 1. on Friday, December 12, 1919, at 11:30 a. m.

(1) MR. LLOYD-GEORGE proposed that the discussion should begin with the question of the Adriatic. A Joint Note had been prepared by the representatives of the United States of America, France and Great Britain, in Paris, with a view to its presentation to Signor Scialoja, and he understood that M. Clemenceau was prepared to hand the

The Adriatic

Note.1

M. CLEMENCEAU handed Signor Scialoja the Note. He said he had already informed his colleague Signor Scialoja semi-officially of the

1 For text, see Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question, p. 3.

existence of this Note, and had told him that it had been signed in complete agreement by the representatives of the United States of America, France and Great Britain. The object of the Note was to try and find a final settlement. The delay on this question had kept the Conference at bay for months. The same delay had brought Italy into a situation that was veritably revolution. There could be no peace in Europe till this question was settled. The United States Government, through President Wilson, had given an indication of the concessions to which it could agree and as to what it could not accept. On that basis Great Britain and France had always sought to find a text which would be acceptable to all parties. The difficulties had been increased owing to the occupation of Fiume by D'Annunzio and owing to the fact that a part of the Italian Army and Fleet had refused to obey the orders of the Italian Government. The British and French Governments had considered the question point by point, from the point of view both of the position of Italy and of President Wilson's concessions, and had done their best to bring the views of all into accord. They knew that the Italian Government opposed resistance on certain points. They knew also that the Italian Government would accept the Note in the friendly spirit in which it was offered, but asked to be allowed to make a reply and to present observations and criticisms. In handing this Note to Signor Scialoja he asked him, as well as the Italian Government, to bear in mind that it constituted a supreme and, as they hoped, a final effort to secure a peaceful settlement. He implored the Italian Government to make an attempt to reach an agreement. No great concession on their part was required. If the Allies could succeed in settling this question it would remove one of the great obstacles to the pacification of the world.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he would receive the Note with the same friendly sentiments as had been expressed by M. Clemenceau on behalf of the Allies. He had learned from M. Clemenceau that this Note was to be presented, and he had afterwards learned certain further details from M. Polk and Lord Curzon, who had indicated to him the broad lines of the new proposal. He doubted if Italy could accept it without certain alterations. What he attached great importance to was that the Note explained the reasons on each point. Up to now he thought that the reasons had not been sufficiently discussed in the consideration of this question, which had been treated too vaguely. The subject must be examined in close detail, with full regard to the realities of the situation. He thought if the reasons were examined on each point a solution could be found. He recog

2 See Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question, p. 9.

nised that the Adriatic question was closely connected with the general European situation. Italy had suffered very much from the failure to settle the question of Fiume, and he recognised that Italy's internal difficulties were closely connected with these external difficulties. He asked what would be the best procedure as regards the Italian reply? To whom should it be addressed, in order to pave the way for an agreement? Should this question be separated and considered by itself?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he took a very strong view in regard to Signor Scialoja's last question. He did not believe that this matter could ever be settled by Notes. It was no use for the Powers to sling documents at each other's heads. This question would never be settled until people who had authority to sign a document could meet together. Personally he was so anxious for a settlement of the question of Fiume, that he would go anywhere and at all risks, and there were risks at a time when strikes were threatening. A point which strongly impressed him had been that the question would go from bad to worse if it was not settled soon. Already it constituted a danger to the internal peace of Italy, and it could not do this without affecting all the other countries. Moreover, it created doubts as to the unity of the Allies. He hoped, therefore, that there would be an end of Note-writing, and that persons with authority to settle would meet and come to an arrangement. He knew Signor Scialoja's difficulties, and naturally he could not settle the question in the absence of the Italian President of the Council. He would propose, therefore, that the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain and Italy, together with a representative of the United States, with full powers, if this could possibly be arranged (though he fully realised the difficulty of this) should meet together. Even in the very regrettable absence of a representative of the United States with full powers, he thought it should not be impossible to reach an agreement which he felt sure would carry great weight with the American Government. He therefore asked Signor Scialoja if the Italian President of the Council, with his Foreign Minister, could not meet his colleagues somewhere and settle the question? When he had been in Paris the question had been bad enough, but since then D'Annunzio's coup and the trouble with the Italian Army and Navy had made it infinitely worse. It would be a great advantage, therefore, if Signor Nitti could meet his colleagues, together with the Foreign Ministers, and settle the question.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he would put this proposal before Signor Nitti. For the moment he feared it would be impossible for Signor Nitti to leave Rome, as the Chamber was engaged in difficult and, indeed, tumultuous debates. Signor Nitti could not leave the Cham

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