on the highway 11 It is not, however, limited to any particular class of cases.12 It is proper to allow a recovery where the driver of a motor car sees a pedestrian in time to avoid injury by stopping and fails to reduce his speed or bring his car to a stop.13 And it has been held that when a bathhouse keeper is notified of a bather's disappearance so soon thereafter as to justify a reasonable inference that an immediate search in the water would result in rescue before death, and has no one present to attempt the rescue, and fails to make immediate search in the water for the missing bather, it is error, in an action to recover damages on account of the death, to direct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.14 It has been said, however, that the doctrine is applicable only in exceptional cases, and the prevalent habit of incorporating it in almost every charge to the jury in negligence cases, in connection with, and often as a part of, instructions upon the subject of contributory negligence, is misleading and dangerous.15

116. Basis of Doctrine; Comparative Knowledge of Danger.-The basis of recovery in this case as in others is the defendant's superior knowledge of the peril.16 It has been said that the ground upon which a plaintiff may recover, notwithstanding his own negligence, is that the defendant, after becoming aware of the danger to which the plaintiff was exposed, failed to use a proper degree of care to avoid injuring him.17 In many of the cases the defendant's conduct is characterized as having been "wilful," "wanton," or "reckless," 18

son v. Salt Lake Rapid-Transit Co., 16 Utah 281, 52 Pac. 92, 67 A. S. R. 621, 40 L.R.A. 172. See RAILROADS. 11. Markowitz v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 186 Mo. 350, 85 S. W. 351, 69 L.R.A. 389; Yergy v. Helena Light, etc., Co., 39 Mont. 213, 102 Pac. 310, 18 Ann. Cas. 1201; Rider v. Syracuse Rapid Transit R. Co., 171 N. Y. 139, 63 N. E. 836, 58 L.R.A. 125; Norman v. Charlotte Electric R. Co., 167 N. C. 533, 83 S. E. 835, Ann. Cas. 1916E 508 and note.

12. Carrico v. West Virginia Cent., etc., R. Co., 39 W. Va. 86, 19 S. E. 571, 24 L.R.A. 50.

13. Butler v. Cabe, 116 Ark. 26, 171 S. W. 1190, L.R.A.1915C 702; Starck v. Pacific Electric R. Co., 172 Cal. 277, 156 Pac. 51, L.R.A.1916E 58 and note; Navailles v. Dielmann, 124 La. 421, 50 So. 449, 134 A. S. R. 508; Norman v. Charlotte Electric R. Co., 167 N. C. 533, 83 S. E. 835, Ann. Cas. 1916E 508; Mosso v. E. H. Stanton

Co., 75 Wash. 220, 134 Pac. 941, L.R.A. 1916A 943; Deputy v. Kimmell, 73 W. Va. 595, 80 S. E. 919, Ann. Cas. 1916E 656, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 989; British Columbia Electric R. Co. v. Loech [1916] A. C. 719, Ann. Cas. 1916D 497 and note.

14. Brotherton v. Manhattan Beach Imp. Co., 48 Neb. 563, 67 N. W. 479, 58 A. S. R. 709, 33 L.R.A. 598.

15. Drown v. Northern Ohio Traction Co., 76 Ohio St. 234, 81 N. E. 326, 118 A. S. R. 844. And see Smith v. Rezburg, 24 Idaho 176, 132 Pac. 1153, Ann. Cas. 1915B 276.

16. Note: Ann. Cas. 1912B 891.. See supra, par. 10.

17. Evans v. Adams Exp. Co., 122 Ind. 362, 23 N. E. 1039, 7 L.R.A. 678.

18. Frazer v. South, etc., Alabama R. Co., 81 Ala. 185, 1 So. 85, 60 Am. Rep. 145; Fox v. Oakland Consol. St. Ry., 118 Cal. 55, 50 Pac. 25, 62 A. S. R. 216; Anderson v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 103 Minn. 224, 114 N. W. 1123,

but very plainly there need have been no express intention to inflict an injury.19 The defendant's knowledge, however, must have been actual knowledge; he is not to be held liable upon proof that he ought to have discovered the plaintiff's perilous situation,20 for such proof does not establish superior knowledge of the peril.1 It is what the defendant did or failed to do after acquiring knowledge of the plaintiff's peril that constitutes the breach of duty. For example, although one in charge of a team of horses drives them near a railroad track with knowledge that a train is approaching and that they will be frightened by it, it is held that he may recover of the railroad company for an injury resulting from their fright if those in charge of the train discovered the peril in time to have avoided the injury, and failed to make any effort to do so.3 Very often the proposition has been stated that there can be no recovery where it appears that the negligence of the plaintiff continued until the very moment of the injury, which is understood to mean that both parties neglected to use their senses to discover the dangerous situation.*

14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 886; Kellny v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 101 Mo. 67, 13 S. W. 806, 8 L.R.A. 783; Holwerson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 157 Mo. 216, 57 S. W. 770, 50 L.R.A. 850; Neary v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 37 Mont. 461, 97 Pac. 944, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 446 and note. See infra, par. 118.

19. Harrington v. Los Angeles R. Co., 140 Cal. 514, 74 Pac. 15, 98 A. S. R. 85, 63 L.R.A. 238.

20. Harrington v. Los Angeles R. Co., 140 Cal. 514, 74 Pac. 15, 98 A. S. R. 85, 63 L.R.A. 238; Atlanta, etc., Air-Line R. Co. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369, 20 S. E. 550, 44 A. S. R. 145, 26 L.R.A. 553; Bourrett v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 152 Ia. 579, 132 N. W. 973, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 957 and note; Smith v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 114 N. C. 728, 19 S. E. 863, 923, 25 L.R.A. 287; Todd v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 135 Tenn. 92, 185 S. W. 62, L.R.A.1916E 555.

1. See supra, par. 10.

2. Chunn v. City, etc., Ry., 207 U. S. 302, 28 S. Ct. 63, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 219; Louisville, etc., R. Co., v. Young, 153 Ala. 232, 45 So. 238, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 301; Butler v. Cabe, 116 Ark. 26, 171 S. W. 1190, L.R.A.1915C 702; Western, etc., R. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 Ga. 708, 39 S. E. 306, 54 L.R.A. 802. Keefe v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 92 Ia.

182, 60 N. W. 503, 54 A. S. R. 542; Hoffard v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 138 Ia. 543, 110 N. W. 446, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 797; Wilson v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 150 Ia. 33, 129 N. W. 340, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 687; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Harrod, 155 Ky. 155, 159 S. W. 685, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 918; Baltimore Consol. R. Co., v. Armstrong, 92 Md. 554, 48 Atl. 1047, 54 L.R.A. 424; Clark v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 109 N. C. 430, 14 S. E. 43, 14 L.R.A. 749; Chattanooga Light, etc., Co. v. Hodges, 109 Tenn. 331, 70 S. W. 616, 97 A. S. R. 844, 60 L.R.A. 459; Thompson v. Salt Lake Rapid-Transit Co., 16 Utah 281, 52 Pac. 92, 67 A. S. R. 621, 40 L.R.A. 172; Mosso v. E. H. Stanton Co., 75 Wash. 220, 134 Pac. 941, L.R.A. 1916A 943; Carrico v. West Virginia Cent., etc., R. Co., 39 W. Va. 86, 19 S. E. 571, 24 L.R.A. 50.

3. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Harrod, 155 Ky. 155, 159 S. W. 685, 47 L.R.A (N.S.) 918.

4. Dyerson v. Union Pac. R. Co., 74 Kan. 528, 87 Pac. 680, 11 Ann. Cas. 207, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 132 and note; Butler v. Rockland, etc., St. Ry., 99 Me. 149, 58 Atl. 775, 105 A. S. R. 267; Fonda v. St. Paul City R. Co., 71 Minn. 438, 74 N. W. 166, 70 A. S. R. 341; Drown v. Northern Ohio Tras

If both plaintiff and defendant failed to look a recovery is barred upon the plainest of principles, but there are cases holding to the contrary. So, in some jurisdictions it is held that if the engineer or motorman, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have learned that danger was imminent, but did not do so, the liability of the company will be determined in all respects as though he had in fact become aware of it, the constructive knowledge being deemed apparently the equivalent of actual knowledge." And some cases seem practically to have held a railroad company responsible to the heirs of a suicide. Such decisions, however, virtually abolish the doctrine of contributory negligence."

117. Knowledge of Plaintiff's Inability to Save Himself.-Not only must the defendant have had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's dangerous situation,10 but he must have been aware also of the plaintiff's unconsciousness of or inability to avert the peril. The plaintiff's right of recovery exists when the defendant, after having discovered his peril, having also reasonable ground to believe him unconscious of danger, or unable to avoid it, might himself, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, have prevented the mischief which followed.12 It is when the engineer or motorman sees that a person "is apparently placing himself in a position of danger without being aware of the approaching" train or car that "it is plainly his duty to take cognizance of that fact and avoid injury to him if practicable.13 If, on the other hand, the trainmen see a person on or near the track and there is nothing to indicate that he is unconscious of danger from

tion Co., 76 Ohio St. 234, 81 N. E. 326, 114 N. C. 728, 19 S. E. 863, 923, 25 118 A. S. R. 844.

Note: Ann. Cas. 1912B 890.

5. Wabash R. Co. v. Tippecanoe Loan, etc., Co., 178 Ind. 113, 98 N. E. 64, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1167; .Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. McLeod, 78 Miss. 334, 29 So. 76, 84 A. S. R. 630, 52 L.R.A. 954; Southern Railway Co. v. Bailey, 110 Va. 833, 67 S. E. 365, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 379.

Note: Ann. Cas. 1912B 892, 893.
See supra, par. 99.

6. Note: Ann. Cas. 1912B 892.
7. Starck v. Pacific Electric R. Co.,
172 Cal. 277, 156 Pac. 51, L.R.A. 1916E
58.

Notes: 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 136; Ann. Cas. 1912B 893.

L.R.A. 287; Drown v. Northern Ohio
Traction Co., 76 Ohio St. 234, 81 N. E.
326, 118 A. S. R. 844.

Note: Ann. Cas. 1912B 889.
10. See supra, par. 116.

11. Note: Ann. Cas. 1912B 891.
12. Evans v. Adams Exp. Co., 122
Ind. 362, 23 N. E. 1039, 7 L.R.A. 678.

To like effect see Sullivan v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 39 La. Ann. 800, 2 So. 586, 4 A. S. R. 239; Holwerson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 157 Mo. 216, 57 S. W. 770, 50 L.R.A. 850, overruled on another point by Sluder v. St. Louis Transit Co., 189 Mo. 107, 88 S. W. 648, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 186; Brotherton v. Manhattan Beach Imp. Co., 48 Neb. 563, 67 N. W. 479, 58 A. S. R. 709, 33 L.R.A. 598; Hays v. Gainesville St. R. Co., 70 Tex. 602, 8 S. W. 491, 8 A. S. R. 624.

8. Vizacchero v. Rhode Island Co., 26 R. I. 392, 59 Atl. 105, 69 L.R.A. 188. 9. Smith v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co.,

13. Note: Ann. Cas. 1912B 891.

the train, no duty devolves upon them to stop.14 And so where the motorman of an electric car sees a person on the track at a place where the car is plainly visible, he has the right to assume that such person will use his senses and get off the track in time to avoid injury. The doctrine of "last clear chance," under such circumstances, does not require the motorman to exercise care and diligence to ascertain whether such person, when first seen on the track, is so intoxicated that he will fail to use his senses and to avoid obvious danger.15 It follows from what has been stated that if the trainmen, being careful and experienced individuals, in the exercise of their best discretion do not regard a person on the track as being in danger, until, on getting nearer to him, he appears to be unconscious of his peril, and they then do all in their power to prevent an injury to him the company is not liable.16 Any evidence of "discovered peril" will usually make the case for the jury.17

118. Wilful, Wanton, or Intentional Injury by Defendant.—It frequently is stated in the books that contributory negligence constitutes no defense where it appears that the defendant acted “wilfully," "wantonly," or "recklessly." 18 According to an approved statement of the proposition, "if the wrong on the part of the defend

14. Green v. Los Angeles Terminal R. Co., 143 Cal. 31, 76 Pac. 719, 101 A. S. R. 68; Smith v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 114 N. C. 728, 19 S. E. 863, 923, 25 L.R.A. 287.

15. Little Rock R., etc., Co. v. Billings, 173 Fed. 903, 98 C. C. A. 467, 19 Ann. Cas. 1173, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1031.

16. Hoffard v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 138 Ia. 543, 110 N. W. 446, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 797; Wilson v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 150 Ia. 33, 129 N. W. 340, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 687; Southern R. Co. v. Bailey, 110 Va. 843, 67 S. E. 365, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 379. Compare Meeks v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 56 Cal. 513, 38 Am. Rep. 67.

17. Starck v. Pacific Electric R. Co., 172 Cal. 277, 156 Pac. 51, L.R.A. 1916E 58 and note; Norman v. Charlotte Electric R. Co., 167 N. C. 533, 83 S. E. 835, Ann. Cas. 1916E 508.

But see Anderson v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 95 Neb. 358, 145 N. W. 842, L.R.A. 1916F 95.

18. Frazer v. South, etc., Alabama R. Co., 81 Ala. 185, 1 So. 85, 60 Am. Rep. 145; Pratt Coal, etc., Co. v. Brawley, 83 Ala. 371, 3 So. 555, 3 A. S. R.

751; Highland Ave., etc., R. Co. v. Robbins, 124 Ala. 113, 27 So. 422, 82 A. S. R. 153; Tennessee Coal, etc., R. Co. v. Bridges, 144 Ala. 229, 39 So. 902, 113 A. S. R. 35; Birmingham E., etc., Co. v. Jung, 161 Ala. 461, 49 So. 434, 18 Ann. Cas. 557; Harrington v. Los Angeles R. Co., 140 Cal. 514, 74 Pac. 15, 98 A. S. R. 85, 63 L.R.A. 238; Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. 507, 50 Am. Dec. 261; Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. McClure, 26 Ind. 370, 89 Am. Dec. 467; Pennsylvania Co. v. Sinclair, 62 Ind. 301, 30 Am. Rep. 185; Brannen v. Kokomo Gravel Road Co., 115 Ind. 115, 17 N. E. 202, 7 A. S. R. 411; Parker v. Pennsylvania Co., 134 Ind. 673, 34 N. E. 504, 23 L.R.A. 552; Carroll v. Minnesota Val. R. Co., 13 Minn. 30, 97 Am. Dec. 221; Fonda v. St. Paul City R. Co., 71 Minn. 438, 74 N. W. 166, 70 A. S. R. 341; Anderson v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 103 Minn. 224, 114 N. W. 1123, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 886 and note; Markowitz v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 186 Mo. 350, 85 S. W. 351, 69 L.R.A. 389; New Jersey Exp. Co. v. Nichols, 33 N. J. L. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 722; Chapman v. New Haven R. Co., 19 N. Y. 341, 75 Am. Dec. 344;

22 19

ant is so wanton and gross as to imply a willingness to inflict the injury, the plaintiff may recover notwithstanding his own ordinary neglect; and this is always to be attributed to the defendant, if he might have avoided injuring the plaintiff, notwithstanding his own negligence. Pursuant to this rule it is held that if a railroad engineer throws steam and hot water upon a trespasser, with intent to drive him from his engine, and the trespasser is guilty of contributory negligence in attempting to jump from the engine to a car attached thereto, and thereby adds to his injury, he is still entitled to recover all damages resulting from the wilful assault by the engineer.20 But it has been held that wilfulness is not shown by mere failure to provide for the protection of a possible trespasser in an archway covering railway tracks leading into a manufacturing establishment into which a car is propelled at a negligent speed so as to render the railway company liable for his death notwithstanding his contributory negligence. To establish wilfulness it is said that the following named elements must be disclosed: (1) Knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary care and diligence to avert injury to another; (2) ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care and diligence in the use of the means at hand; (3) the omission to use such care and diligence to avert the threatened danger, when to the ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove disastrous to another. From this it appears plainly enough that the basis of recovery in this class of cases is the same as that of the doctrine of discovered peril.3

Comparative Negligence

119. Generally. The common law, in determining responsibility for an injury, is said to take no account of the degree in which each of the parties may be shown to have been responsible for the injury. If the plaintiff can be said to have been at fault in any degree he will be held to be barred of recovery. It makes no difference that the defendant was responsible in a greater degree. In the courts

Hawks v. Slusher, 55 Ore. 1, 104 Pac.
883, Ann. Cas. 1912A 491 and note;
Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Zantzinger,
92 Tex. 365, 48 S. W. 563, 71 A. S. R.
859, 44 L.R.A. 553.

Note: 12 L.R.A. 281.
See supra, par. 116.

4

Clure, 26 Ind. 370, 89 Am. Dec. 467.

20. Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Zantzinger, 92 Tex. 365, 48 S. W. 563, 71 A. S. R. 859, 44 L.R.A. 553.

1. Parker v. Pennsylvania Co., 134 Ind. 673, 34 N. E. 504, 23 L.R.A. 552. 2. Note: 69 L.R.A. 516. 3. See supra, par. 114–117.

But a duty rests upon one who is threatened with wilful injury to pro4. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hamler, tect himself by any reasonable means. 215 Ill. 525, 74 N. E. 705, 106 A. S. Planz v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 157 Mass. R. 187, 3 Ann. Cas. 42, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 377, 32 N. E. 356, 17 L.R.A. 835. 674; Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, etc., R. 19. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Mc- Co., 3 Ohio St. 172, 62 Am. Dec. 246; R. C. L. Vol. XX.-10.

145