(2.) Immortality,, as applied to the fpirits of men, imports that their fouls are not only capable of continuing, but living in this feparate ftate, fo as to be fenfible of happiness and mifery. For the foul of man being of an higher nature, and not only endowed with a faculty of fenfe, but likewife other faculties which have no neceffary dependence upon, or connexion with matter, having a fenfe of God, and of divine and fpiritual things, and being capable of happinefs in the enjoyment of God, or of mifery in a feparation from him; it is but reasonable to imagine, that the fouls of men fhould be admitted to the exercise of thefe faculties, and the enjoyment of that life which they are capable of in a feparate ftate. And this is that which conftitutes that vaft and wide difference between the fouls of men and beafts: And this degree of immortality is as much above the other, as reason and religion are above fenfe.

2. Another faculty in us, which argues an immaterial, and, confequently, an immortal principle in man, is memory; and this likewife is common in fome degree to feveral of the brute creatures, and it feems to be nothing elfe but a kind of continued fenfation of things. And of this we can give no account from mere matter. For if that which we call the foul, were nothing elfer but, as Epicurus imagined, a little wild fire, a company of fmall round particles of matter in perpetual motion, it being a fluid thing, it would be liable to a continual diffipation of its parts, and the new parts that come, would be altogether ftrangers to the impreffions made upon the old: So that, fuppofing the foul liable but to thofe changes which the groffer parts of our bodies, our flesh and blood, continually are liable to, by the evaporation and spending of the old, and an acceffion of new matter; (and if we fuppofe the foul to be fluid matter, that is, confifting of particles, which are by no kind of connexion linked to one another, it will in all probability be more eafily diffipable than the groffer parts of the body;) and if fo, how is it imaginable that these new and foreign particles fhould retain any fenfe of the impreffions made upon those which are gone many years ago? 3. Another

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3. Another faculty which I shall inftance in, is the will of man, which is endowed with liberty and freedom, and gives a man dominion over his own actions. Matter moves by neceffary and certain laws, and cannot move if it be at rest, unless it be moved by another; and cannot reft, that is, cannot but move, if it be impelled by another. Whence then are voluntary motions ? Whence is the go, the arbitrary principle which we find in ourselves, the freedom of action to do or not to do this or that, which we are intimately conscious to ourfelves of? Of all the operations of our minds, it is the hardest to give an account of liberty from mere matter. This Epicurus was fenfible of, and infinitely puzzled with it, as we may fee by the question which Lucretius puts, Unde eft hæc, inquam, fatis avulfa voluntas ? "How comes the foul of man to have this peculiar pri

vilege of freedom and liberty, above all other forts “of matter that are in the world? Whence is it, that "when all things else move by a fatal neceffity, the foul "of man fhould be exempted from that flavery?" He does indeed attempt to give an account of it from a ́motion of declination which is proper and peculiar to the particles of the foul: But that is a more unintelligible riddle than liberty itself. The

4. And last operation I shall inftance in, is that of reafon and understanding. Not to mention the activity and nimbleness of our thoughts, in the abstracted notions of our minds, the multitude of diftinct ideas and notions which dwell together in our fouls, none of which are accountable from matter: I fhall only inftance in two particulars.

I. Thofe acts of reafon and judgment, whereby we over-rule the reports of our fenfes, and correct the errors and deceptions of them.

2. The contemplation of fpiritual and divine things.

1ft, Thofe acts of reafon and judgment, whereby we over-rule the reports and determinations of fenfe. Our fenfe tells us, that things at a diftance are less, than our reafon tells us they are really in themselves; as that the body of the fun is but about a foot diameter: but our reafon informs us otherwife. Now what is the principle that controuls our fenfes, and corrects the deception of

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them? If the foul of man be mere matter, it can only judge of things according to the impreffions which are made upon our fenfes: But we do judge otherwife, and fee reafon to do so many times. Therefore it must be fome higher principle which judges of things, not by the material impreffions which they make upon our fenfes, but by other measures. And therefore, to avoid this inconvenience, Epicurus was glad to fly to the abfurdity, to affirm that all things really are what they appear to us, and that in truth the fun is no bigger than it feems to be.

2dly, The contemplation of things fpiritual and divine, is an argument that the foul is of a higher original than any thing that is material. To contemplate the nature of God, and the divine excellencies and perfections; the meditation of a future ftate, and of the happiness of another world; thofe breathings which good men feel in their fouls after God, and the enjoyment: of him, argue the fpiritual nature of the foul. Hoc ha-bet argumentum divinitatis fuæ, faith Seneca, quòd cam divina delectant, nec ut alienis intereft, fed ut fuis. "The foul of man hath this argument of its divine origi-"nal, that it is fo ftrangely delighted, fo infinitely pleaf-"ed and fatisfied with the contemplation of divine things, " and is taken up with thefe thoughts, as if they were: "its proper bufinefs and concernment." Thofe ftrong inclinations and defires after immortality, and the pleafure which good men find in the fore-thoughts of the hap pinefs which they hope to enter into, when their foulsthall quit thefe manfions; the reflefs afpirings of our fouls towards God, and those blessed mansions where he dwells, and where the fpirits of good men converfe with him and one another; thefe fignify our fouls to be of as nobler extraction than the earth, that they are defcend-ed from above, and that heaven is their country, their thoughts are fo much upon it, and they are fo defirous to return to it.

I fhall conclude this argument from the noble and excellent operations of our fouls, of which we are confcious to ourselves, with a paffage of Tully to this parpofe. Animarum nulla in terris origo inveniri po teft: Nihil enim eft in animis mixtum atque concretum; »

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ut quod ex terra natum atque fictum effe videatur. "The "fouls of men, have not their original from the earth, "it is in vain to feek for it there: For there is nothing "in the mind of man of a material mixture and compofition, which we can imagine to be born or formed out of the earth. For, fays he, among material and earthly things there is nothing," quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis, habeat, quod & præterita teneat, & futura provideat, & complecti poffit præfentia. "There is no earthly thing which hath the power of memory, "of understanding, of thought, which retains things "paft, forefees and provides for things future, compre"hends and confiders things prefent." Singularis eft igitur quædam natura atque vis animi, fejuncta ab his ufitatis notifque naturis; "fo that the nature and power "of the foul are of a peculiar and fingular kind, different "from all thofe natur.s which we are acquainted with in "this world." He concludes, Itaque quicquid eft quod fentit, quod fapit, quod vult, quod viget, cælefte & divinum eft, ob eamque rem æternum fit neceffe eft. "Therefore, whatever that is which is endowed with a power "of perception, with wifdom, with liberty, with fo much vigour and activity as the foul of man, is of heavenly and divine original, and for that reafon is neceffarily immortal, and to continue for ever."

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Thus I have reprefented to you, as briefly and plainly as I could, those which I account the chief and strongest arguments of this great principle of religion, the foul's immortality. Some of them are plain and obvious to every capacity; the reft, though they be above common capacities, yet were not to be neglected, because they may be useful to fome, tho' not to all; and as thofe who are more wife and knowing fhould have patience, whilft the most common and plaineft things are spoken for the inftruction of ordinary capacities, fo thofe of lower capacities fhould be content that many things fhould be spoken which may be useful to others, though they be above their reach.

To fum up then what has been faid from reason, for the proof of the foul's immortality. It is a natural dictate and notion of our minds, univerfally entertained in all ages and places of the world, excepting fome very

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few perfons and fects; it doth not contradict any other principle that nature hath planted in us, but doth very well agree with those other notions which are most natural; it is most suitable to the natural hopes and fears of men; it evidently tends to the happinefs and perfection of man, and to the good order and government of the world; laftly, it gives the faireft account of the phæ nomena of human nature, of thofe feveral actions and operations which we are confcious to ourfelves of.

Now, fuppofing the foul were immortal, what greater rational evidence than this can we expect for it? How can we, without a revelation, have more affurance of the things of this nature, than thefe arguments give us, not taken fingly, but as they concur together to make up an entire argument, and to give us fufficient evidence of this?

I do not fay that thefe arguments do fo neceffarily conclude it, that there is an abfolute impoffibility the thing should be otherwife; but fo as to render it fufficiently certain to a prudent and confiderate man, and one that is willing to accept of reasonable evidence. For the generality of the Papists do pertinaciously maintain this unreasonable principle, that there can be no certainty of any thing without infallibility: Yet fome of the wifer of them have thought better of it, and are pleased to state the business of certainty otherwife; particularly Melchior Canus, one of the most learned of their writers, determines those things to be fufficiently certain, which no man can, without imprudence and obftinacy, difbelieve. Certa apud homines ea funt, quæ negari fine pervicacia & ftultitia non poffunt. "Men efteem thofe things certain "which no man that is not unreasonably obftinate and imprudent, can deny." And I think the arguments I have brought for the foul's immortality, are fuch, as no man that is unprejudiced, and hath a prudent regard to his own intereft, can refift.

Thus I have done with the first thing I propounded to do for the proof of the foul's immortality, which was to fhew what evidence of reafon there is for it. I fhall fpeak briefly to the

Second thing I propounded, which was to fhew how little can be faid against it, because this will indirectly