from those of the two celebrated fects already mentioned. In denying the existence of univerfals, we know that the Conceptualifts agreed with the Nominalists. In what, then, can we fuppofe that they differed from them, but about the neceflity of language as an inftrument of thought, in carrying on our ge neral speculations?

With this fect of Conceptualifts, Dr. Reid is dif pofed to rank Mr. Locke; and I agree with him fo far as to think, that, if Locke had any decided opinion on the point in difpute, it did not differ materially from what I have endeavoured to express in the two general propofitions which I have just now stated. The apparent inconsistencies which occur in that part of his Effay in which the question is difcuffed, have led fubfequent authors to represent his fentiments in different lights; but as thefe inconfiftencies plainly fhew, that he was neither fatisfied with the system of the Realists, nor with that of the Nominalists; they appear to me to demonstrate that he leaned to the intermediate hypothefis already mentioned, notwithftanding the inaccurate and paradoxical manner in which he has expreffed it *.

May I take the liberty of adding, that Dr. Reid's own opinion feems to me alfo to coincide nearly with that of the Conceptualists; or, at least, to coincide with the two propofitions which I have already supposed to contain a fummary of their doctrine? The abfurdity of the antient opinion concerning univerfals, as main tained both by Plato and Ariftotle, he has exposed

* See Note [K],

by

by the clearest and most decisive arguments; not to mention, that, by his own very original and important fpeculations concerning the ideal theory, he has completely deftroyed that natural prejudice from which the whole fyftem of univerfal ideas gradually took rife. If, even in the cafe of individuals, we have no reafon to believe the exiftence of any object of thought in the mind, diftin&t from the mind itfelf, we are at once relieved from all the difficulties in which philofophers have involved themselves, by attempting to explain, in confiftency with that antient hypothefis, the process of the mind in its general fpeculations.

On the other hand, it is no lefs clear, from Dr. Reid's criticisms on Berkeley and Hume, that his opinion does not coincide with that of the Nominalists; and that the power which the mind poffeffes of reafoning concerning claffes of objects, appears to him to imply fome faculty, of which no notice is taken in the fyftems of thefe philofophers.

The long experience I have had of the candour of this excellent author, encourages me to add, that, in ftating his opinion on the fubject of univerfals, he has not expressed himself in a manner fo completely fatisfactory to my mind, as on moft other occafions. That language is not an effential inftrument of thought in our general reafonings, he has no where pofitively afferted. At the fame time, as he has not affirmed the contrary, and as he has declared himself diffatisfied with the doctrines of Berkeley and Hume, his readers are naturally led to conclude, that this is his real opi. nion on the fubject. His filence on this point is the more to be regretted, as it is the only point about

which there can be any reasonable controversy among thofe who allow his refutation of the ideal hypothefis to be fatisfactory. In confequence of that refutation, the whole difpute between the Realifts and the Conceptualists falls at once to the ground; but the dif pute between the Conceptualifts and the Nominalists (which involves the great question concerning the use of figns in general fpeculation) remains on the fame footing as before.

In order to justify his own expreffions concerning univerfals; and in oppofition to the language of Berkeley and Hume, Dr. Reid is at pains to illuftrate a diftinction between conception and imagination, which, he thinks, has not been fufficiently attended to by philofophers. "An univerfal," fays he, " is not "an object of any external fenfe, and therefore can"not be imagined; but it may be diftinctly conceived. "When Mr. Pope fays, "The proper study of "mankind is man;" I conceive his meaning dif tinctly; although I neither imagine a black or a "white, a crooked or a straight man. I can conceive a thing that is impoffible; but I cannot diftinctly imagine a thing that is impoffible. I can conceive a propofition or a demonstration, but I cannot ima gine either. I can conceive understanding and will, "virtue and vice, and other attributes of the mind; "but I cannot imagine them. In like manner, I can " distinctly conceive univerfals; but I cannot imagine "them."

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It appears from this paffage, that, by conceiving univerfals, Dr. Reid means nothing more, than under

standing the meaning of propofitions involving general terms. But the obfervations he has made (admitting them in their full extent) do not in the least affect the question about the neceffity of figns, to enable us to speculate about fuch propofitions. The vague use which metaphyfical writers have made of the word conception, (of which I had occafion to take notice in a former chapter,) has contributed in part to embarrass this fubject. That we cannot conceive univerfals in a way at all analogous to that in which we conceive an absent object of fenfe, is granted on both fides. Why then fhould we employ the fame word conception, to exprefs two operations of the mind which are effentially different? When we speak of conceiving or understanding a general propofition, we mean nothing more than that we have a conviction, (founded on our previous ufe of the words in which it is expreffed,) that we have it in our power, at pleasure, to fubftitute, instead of the general terms, fome one of the individuals comprehended under them. When we hear a propofition announced, of which the terms are not familiar to us; we naturally defire to have it exemplified, or illustrated, by means of fome particular instance; and when we are once fatisfied by fuch an application, that we have the interpretation of the propofition at all times in our power, we make no fcruple to fay, that we conceive or understand its meaning; although we should not extend our views beyond the words in which it is announced, or even although no particular exemplification of it fhould occur to us at the moment. It is in this fenfe only, that the terms of any general propofition can poffibly be underftood:

and

and therefore Dr. Reid's argument does not, in the leaft, invalidate the doctrine of the Nominalists, that, without the use of language, (under which term I comprehend every fpecies of figns,) we fhould never have been able to extend our fpeculations beyond individuals.

That, in many cafes, we may fafely employ in our reasonings, general terms, the meaning of which we are not even able to interpret in this way, and confequently, which are to us wholly infignificant, I had occafion already to demonftrate, in a former part of this fection.

SECTION IV.

Continuation of the fame Subject.-Inferences with respect to the Ufe of Language as an Inftrument of Thought, and the Errors in Reasoning to which it occafionally gives rise.

IN the last Section, I mentioned Dr. Campbell, as an ingenious defender of the fyftem of the Nominalists; and I alluded to a particular application which he has made of their doctrine. The reafonings which I had then in view, are to be found in the seventh chapter of the second book of his Philofophy of Rhetorick; in which chapter he proposes to explain how it happens, "that nonsense so often escapes being "detected, both by the writer and the reader." The title is fomewhat ludicrous in a grave philofophical work; but the difquifition to which it is prefixed, contains many acute and profound remarks