to affift the reason, the invention, and the memory. In his writings, too, he fomewhere fpeaks of an alphabet of human thoughts, which he had been employed in forming, and which, probably, (as Fontenelle has remarked,) had fome relation to his univerfal language *.

The new nomenclature which has been introduced into chymistry, feems to me to furnish a striking illuftration of the effect of appropriated and well-defined expreffions, in aiding the intellectual powers; and the period is probably not far diftant, when fimilar innovations will be attempted in fome of the other sciences.

66

"M Leibnitz avoit conçu le projet d'une langue philofophique et univerfelle. Wilkins Evêque de Chefter, et Dalgarno y "avoient travaillé ; mais dès le tems qu'il etoit en Angleterre, il "avoit dit à Meffieurs Boyle et d' Oldenbourg qu'il ne croyoit pas que ces grands hommes euffent encore frappé au but. Ils pouvoient bien faire que des nations qui ne s'entendoient pas "euffent aifément commerce, mais ils n'avoient pas attrappé les "véritables caractères réels, qui étoient l'inftrument le plus fin "dont l'esprit humain se pût fervir, et qui devoient extrêmement "faciliter et le raifonnement, et la memoire, et l'invention des "chofes. Ils devoient reffembler, autant qu'il étoit poffible, aux "caractères d'algebre, qui en effet font très fimples, et très expreffifs, qui n'ont jamais ni fuperfluité, ni équivoque, et dont "toutes les varietés font raisonnées. Il a parlé en quelque endroit, "d'un alphabet des penfées humaines, qu'il meditoit. Selon "toutes les apparences, cet alphabet avoit rapport à fa langue "univerfelle." Eloge de M. LEIBNITZ par M. de FONTENELLE,

SECT.

SECTION V.

Of the Purposes to which the Powers of Abstraction and Generalifation are fubfervient.

IT

has been already fhewn, that, without the ufe of figns, all our knowledge muft neceffarily have been limited to individuals, and that we fhould have béen perfectly incapable both of claffification and general reasoning. Some authors have maintained, that without the power of generalisation, (which I have endeavoured to fhew, means nothing more than the capacity of employing general terms,) it would have been impoffible for us to have carried on any fpecies of reafoning whatever. But I cannot help thinking that this opinion is erroneous; or, at least, that it is very imperfectly stated. The truth is, it appears to me to be juft in one fenfe of the word reafoning, but falfe in another; and I even fufpect it is falfe in that fenfe of the word in which it is moft commonly employed. Before, therefore, it is laid down as a general propofition, the meaning we are to annex to this very vague and ambiguous term, fhould be ascertained with precision.

It has been remarked by feveral writers, that the expectation which we feel of the continuance of the laws of nature, is not founded upon reasoning; and different theories have of late been propofed to account for its origin. Mr. Hume refolves it into the afsociation of ideas. Dr. Reid, on the other hand,

maintains,

maintains, that it is an original principle of our conftitution, which does not admit of any explanation and which, therefore, is to be ranked among those general and ultimate facts, beyond which, philofophy is unable to proceed. Without this principle of expectation, it would be impoffible for us to accommodate our conduct to the established courfe of nature; and, accordingly, we find that it is a principle coëval with our very existence; and, in fome measure, common to man with the lower animals.

In inquiries of this nature, fo far removed from the common courfe of literary purfuits, it always gives me pleafure to remark a coincidence of opinion among different philofophers; particularly among men of original genius, and who have been educated in different philofophical fyftems. The following paffage, in which M. de Condorcet gives an account of fome of the matephyfical opinions of the late Mr. Turgot, approaches very nearly to Dr. Reid's doctrines.

"La mémoire de nos fenfations, et la faculté que nous avons "de réfléchir fur ces fenfations paffées et de les combiner, font "le feul principe de nos connoiffances. La fuppofition qu'il "exifte des loix conftantes auxquelles tous les phénomenes obfervés. "font affujettis de maniere à reparoitre dans tous les temps, dans "toutes les circonftances, tels qu'ils font déterminés par ces loix, "eft le feul fondement de la certitude de ces connoiffances.

"Nous avons la confcience d'avoir obfervé cette conftance, et un " fentiment involontaire nous force de croire qu'elle continuera de "fubfifter. La probabilité qui en refulte, quelque grande qu'elle “soit, n'est pas une certitude. Aucune relation nécessaire ne lie 66 pour nous le paffé à l'avenir, ni la conftance de ce que j'ai vu à "celle de ce que j'aurois continué d'observer si j'etois refté dans des "circonftances femblables; mais l'impreffion qui me porte à re"garder comme existant, comme réel ce qui m'a présenté ce carac"tere de conftance eft irrésistible."-Vie de TURGOT, partieii.p. 56. "Quand un François et un Anglois penfent de même, (fays "Voltaire,) il faut bien qu'ils aient raifon."

It is an obvious confequence of this doctrine, that, although philofophers be accuftomed to ftate what are commonly called the laws of nature, in the form of general propofitions, it is by no means necessary for the practical purposes of life, that we should express them in this manner; or even that we fhould express them in words at all. The philofopher, for example, may state it as a law of nature, that "fire fcorches ;" or that "heavy bodies, when unfupported, fall downwards :" but, long before the use of artificial figns, and even before the dawn of reafon, a child learns to act upon both of these fuppofitions. In doing fo, it is influenced merely by the instinctive principle which has now been mentioned, directed in its operation (as is the cafe with many other inftincts) by the experience of the individual. If man, therefore, had been deftined for no other purposes, than to acquire fuch an acquaintance with the course of nature, as is neceffary for the prefervation of his animal exiftence; he might have fulfilled all the ends of his being without the use of language.

As we are enabled, by our inftinctive anticipation of phyfical events, to accommodate our conduct to what we forefee is to happen, fo we are enabled, in many cafes, to increase our power, by employing phyfical caufes as inftruments for the accomplishment of our purposes; nay, we can employ a feries of fuch caufes, fo as to accomplish very remote effects. We can employ the agency of air, to increase the heat of a furnace; the furnace, to render iron malleable; and the iron to all the various purposes of the mecha

nical arts. Now, it appears to me, that all this may be conceived and done without the aid of language: and yet, affuredly, to difcover a feries of means fubfervient to a particular end; or, in other words, an effort of mechanical invention; implies, according to the common doctrines of philofophers, the exercise of our reasoning powers. In this fenfe, therefore, of the word reafoning, I am inclined to think, that it is not effentially connected with the faculty of generalisation, or with the ufe of figns.

It is fome confirmation of this conclufion, that favages, whofe minds are almost wholly occupied with particulars, and who have neither inclination nor capacity for general fpeculations, are yet occafionally obferved to employ a long train of means for accomplishing a particular purpose. Even fomething of this kind, but in a very inferior degree, may, I think, be remarked in the other animals; and that they do not carry it farther, is probably not the effect of their want of generalisation, but of the imperfection of fome of thofe faculties which are common to them with our fpecies; particularly of their powers of attention and recollection. The inftances which are commonly produced, to prove that they are not deftitute of the power of reafoning, are all examples of that fpecies of contrivance which has been mentioned; and are perfectly diftin&t from thofe intellectual proceffes to which the ufe of figns is effentially fubfervient *. Whether

* One of the beft attefted inftances which I have met with, of fagacity in the lower animals, is mentioned by M. Bailly, in his Lettre fur les Animaux, addressed to M. Le Roy.

"Un de mes amis, homme d'efprit et digne de confiance, m'a

raconté