feldom precise and steady in the employment of words, it is only to their prevailing practice that we can appeal as an authority. What the particular relations are, by which those ideas are connected that are fubfervient to poetical imagination, I fhall not inquire at prefent. I think they are chiefly those of resemblance and analogy. But whatever they may be, the power of fummoning up at pleasure the ideas fo related, as it is the ground-work of poetical genius, is of fufficient importance in the human conftitution to deserve an appropriated name; and, for this purpose, the word fancy would appear to be the most convenient that our language affords. 66 Dr. REID has fomewhere obferved, that "the part "of our conftitution on which the affociation of ideas depends, was called, by the older English writers, "the fantafy or fancy;" an ufe of the word, we may remark, which coincides, in many inftances, with that which I propofe to make of it. It differs from it only in this, that these writers applied it to the affociation of ideas in general, whereas I reftrict-its application to that habit of affociation, which is fubfervient to poetical imagination. According to the explanation which has now been given of the word Fancy, the office of this power is to collect materials for the Imagination; and therefore the latter power presupposes the former, while the former does not neceffarily fuppofe the latter. A man whose habits of affociation prefent to him, for illuftrating or embellifhing a fubject, a number of refembling or of analogous ideas, we call a man of fancy; but for an effort of imagination, various other other powers are neceffary, particularly the powers of taste and of judgment; without which, we can hope to produce nothing that will be a fource of pleafure to others. It is the power of fancy which fupplies the poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analogies which are the foundation of his allufions; but it is the power of imagination that creates the complex fcenes he defcribes, and the fictitious characters he delineates. To fancy, we apply the epithets of rich or luxuriant; to imagination, thofe of beautiful or fublime. SECTION II. Of the Principles of Affociation among our Ideas. HE facts which I flated in the former Section, to illustrate the tendency of a perception, or of an idea, to fuggeft ideas related to it, are fo obvious as to be matter of common remark. But the relations which connect all our thoughts together, and the laws which regulate their fucceflion, were but little attended to before the publication of Mr. Hume's writings. It is well known to thofe who are in the leaft converfant with the prefent state of metaphyfical fcience, that this eminent writer has attempted to reduce all the principles of affociation among our ideas to three: Refemblance, Contiguity in time and place, and Caufe and Effect. The attempt was great, and worthy of his genius; but it has been fhewn by several writers fince his time*, that his enumeration is not only incomplete, but that it is even indiftinct, fo far as it goes. It is not neceffary for my present purpose, that I should enter into a critical examination of this part of Mr. Hume's fyftem; or that I fhould attempt to fpecify thofe principles of affociation which he has omitted. Indeed, it does not feem to me, that the problem admits of a fatisfactory folution; for there is no poflible relation among the objects of our know. ledge, which may not ferve to connect them together in the mind; and, therefore, although one enumeration may be more comprehenfive than another, a perfectly complete enumeration is fcarcely to be expected. Nor is it merely in confequence of the relations among things, that our notions of them are affociated: *See, in particular, Lord Kaimes's Elements of Criticism, and Dr. Gerard's Effay on Genius. See alfo Dr. Campbell's Philofophy of Rhetoric, vol. i. p. 197. It is obferved by Dr. Beattie, that fomething like an attempt to enumerate the laws of affociation is to be found in Ariftotle; who, in fpeaking of Recollection, infinuates, with his usual bre. vity, that "the relations, by which we are led from one thought to another, in tracing out, or hunting after," (as he calls it,) "any particular thought which does not immediately occur, are chiefly three; Refemblance, Contrariety, and Contiguity." See Differtations, Moral and Critical, p. 9. Alfo p. 145. The paffage to which Dr. Beattie refers, is as follows: Όταν ἓν αναμιμνησκώμεθα, κινεμεθα των προτέρων τινα κινήσεων, ἕως αν κινηθώμεν, μεθ' ήν εκείνη είωθε. Διο και το εφεξής θηρευομεν νοήσαντες απο τε νυν, η αλλά τινος, και αφ' όμοια, η εναντία, η το συνεγγυς. Ala στο γίνεται η ανάμνησις. ARISTOT. de Memor. et Reminifc. vol. i. p. 681. Edit. DU VAL. they they are frequently coupled together by means of relations among the words which denote them; fuch as a fimilarity of found, or other circumstances still more trifling. The alliteration which is fo common in poetry, and in proverbial fayings, feems to arise, partly at least, from affociations of ideas founded on the accidental circumstance, of the two words which exprefs them beginning with the fame letter. "But thousands die, without or this or that, Die; and endow a College, or a Cat.” POPE'S Ep. to Lord BATHURST. "Ward tried, on Puppies, and the Poor, his drop." Id. Imitat. of HORACE. "Puffs, powders, patches; Bibles, billets-doux." RAPE of the Lock. This indeed pleases only on flight occafions, when it may be fuppofed that the mind is in fome degree playful, and under the influence of thofe principles of affociation which commonly take place when we are careless and difengaged. Every perfon must be offended with the fecond line of the following couplet, which forms part of a very fublime description of the Divine power: "Breathes in our foul, informs our mortal part, "As full, as perfect, in a Hair as Heart." ESSAY ON MAN, Ep. i. To these observations, it may be added, that things which have no known relation to each other are often affociated, in confequence of their producing fimilar effects on the mind. Some of the finest poetical allufions U 2 lufions are founded on this principle; and accordingly, if the reader is not poffeffed of fenfibility congenial to that of the poet, he will be apt to overlook their meaning, or to cenfure them as abfurd. To fuch a critic it would not be easy to vindicate the beauty of the following ftanza, in an Ode addreffed to a Lady by the Author of the Seasons : Oh thou, whofe tender, ferious eye The penfive fhadows of the grove. I have already faid, that the view of the subject which I propofe to take, does not require a complete enumeration of our principles of affociation. There is, however, an important diflinction among them, to which I fhall have occafion frequently to refer; and which, as far as I know, has not hitherto attracted the notice of philofophers. The relations upon which fome of them are founded, are perfectly obvious to the mind; thofe which are the foundation of others, are discovered only in confequence of particular efforts of attention. Of the former kind, are the relations of Refemblance and Analogy, of Contrariety, of Vicinity in time and place, and thofe which arife from accidental coincidences in the found of different words. Thefe, in general, connect our thoughts together, when they are fuffered to take their natural courfe, and when we are confcious of little or no active exertion. Of the latter kind, are the relations of Cause and Effect, of Means and End, of Premifes and Conclufion; and those others, which regulate the train of thought in the mind of the philofopher, |