affociation, it must not be imagined that the will poffeffes no influence over it. This influence, indeed, is not exercifed directly and immediately, as we are apt to suppose, on a fuperficial view of the fubject but it is, nevertheless, very extenfive in its effects; and the different degrees in which it is poffeffed by different individuals, conftitute fome of the moft ftriking inequalities among men, in point of intellectual capacity.

Of the powers which the mind poffeffes over the train of its thoughts, the most obvious is its power of fingling out any one of them at pleasure; of detaining it; and of making it a particular object of attention. By doing fo, we not only ftop the fucceffion that would otherwise take place; but, in confequence of our bringing to view the lefs obvious relations among our ideas, we frequently divert the current of our thoughts into a new channel. If, for example, when I am indolent and inactive, the name of Sir Ifaac Newton accidentally occur to me, it will perhaps fuggeft, one after another, the names of fome other eminent mathematicians and aftronomers, or of fome of his illuftrious contemporaries and friends and a number of them may pass in review before me, without engaging my curiofity in any confiderable degree. In a different state of mind, the name of Newton will lead my thoughts to the principal incidents of his life, and the more ftriking features of his character: or, if my mind be ardent and vigorous, will lead my attention to the fublime difcoveries he made; and gradually engage me in fome philofophical investigation.

7

vestigation. To every object, there are others which bear obvious and striking relations; and others, alfo, whose relation to it does not readily occur to us, unless we dwell upon it for fome time, and place it before us in different points of view.

But the principal power we poffefs over the train of our ideas, is founded on the influence which our habits of thinking have on the laws of Affociation; an influence which is fo great, that we may often form a pretty fhrewd judgment concerning a man's prevailing turn of thought, from the tranfitions he makes in conversation or in writing. It is well known, too, that by means of habit, a particular affociating principle may be ftrengthened to fuch a degree, as to give us a command of all the different ideas in our mind, which have a certain relation to each other; fo that when any one of the clafs occurs to us, we have almost a certainty that it will suggest the rest. What confidence in his own powers must a speaker poffefs, when he rifes without premeditation, in a popular affembly, to amufe his audience with a lively or an humorous fpeech! Such a confidence, it is evident, can only arife from a long experience of the ftrength of particular affociating principles.

To how great a degree this part of our conftitution may be influenced by habit, appears from facts which are familiar to every one. A man who has an ambition to become a punfter, feldom or never fails in the attainment of his object; that is, he feldom or never fails in acquiring a power which other men have not, of fummoning up, on a particular occafion,

a num

a number of words different from each other in meaning, and resembling each other, more or lefs, in found. I am inclined to think that even genuine wit is a habit acquired in a fimilar way; and that, although fome individuals may, from natural conftitution, be more fitted than others to acquire this habit; it is founded in every cafe on a peculiarly strong affociation among certain claffes of our ideas, which gives the person who poffeffes it, a command over thofe ideas which is denied to ordinary men. But there is no inftance in which the effect of habits of affociation is more remarkable, than in those men who poffefs a facility of rhyming. That a man should be able to exprefs his thoughts perfpicuoufly and elegantly, under the restraints which rhyme impofes, would appear to be incredible, if we did not know it to be fact. Such a power implies a wonderful command both of ideas and of expreflions; and yet daily experience fhews, that it may be gained with very little practice. Pope tells us with refpect to himself, that he could exprefs himself not only more concisely, but more eafily, in rhyme than in profe *.

Nor is it only in thefe trifling accomplishments that we may trace the influence of habits of affociation. In every inftance of invention, either in the

"When habit is once gained, nothing fo eafy as practice. "Cicero writes, that Antipater the Sidonian could pour forth " hexameters extempore; and that, whenever he chose to versify, "words followed him of courfe. We may add to Antipater, "the antient rhapfodifts of the Greeks, and the modern impro"vifatori of the Italians." HARRIS'S Phil. Inq. 109, 110.

fine arts, in the mechanical arts, or in the fciences, there is fome new idea, or fome new combination of ideas, brought to light by the inventor. This, undoubtedly, may often happen in a way which he is unable to explain; that is, his invention may be fuggefted to him by fome lucky thought, the origin of which he is unable to trace. But when a man poffeffes a habitual fertility of invention in any particular art or science, and can rely, with confidence, on his inventive powers, whenever he is called upon to exert them, he must have acquired, by previous habits of ftudy, a command over certain claffes of his ideas, which enables him, at pleafure, to bring them under his review. The illuftration of thefe fubjects may throw light on fome proceffes of the mind, which are not in general well understood: and I fhall, accordingly, in the following Section, offer a few hints with refpect to thofe habits of affociation which are the foundation of wit; of the power of rhyming; of poetical fancy; and of invention in matters of science.

BIA

SEC.

SECTION IV.

Illuftrations of the Doctrine flated in the preceding Section.

A

I. Of Wit.

CCORDING to Locke, Wit confifts" in the "affemblage of ideas; and putting those toge "ther with quickness and variety, wherein can be "found any refemblance or congruity *." I would add to this definition, (rather by way of explanation than amendment,) that Wit implies a power of calling up at pleasure the ideas which it combines: and I am inclined to believe, that the entertainment which it gives to the hearer, is founded, in a confiderable degree, on his furprife, at the command which the man of wit has acquired over a part of the conftitution, which is fo little fubject to the will.

That the effect of wit depends partly, at least, on the circumstance now mentioned, appears evidently from this, that we are more pleased with a bon mot, which occurs in converfation, than with one in print; and that we never fail to receive difguft from wit, when we fufpect it to be premeditated. The pleafure, too, we receive from wit, is heightened, when the original idea is started by one perfon, and the related idea by another. Dr. Campbell has remarked, that "a witty repartee is infinitely more pleafing, than a witty attack; and that an allusion will appear ex

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* Effay on Human Understanding, book ii. chap. 11.

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