affociated, in confequence of the affociations which take place among their arbitrary figns. Indeed, in the cafe of all our general fpeculations, it is difficult to fee in what other way our thoughts can be affociated; for, I before endeavoured to fhew, that, without the use of figns of one kind or another, it would be impoffible for us to make claffes or genera, objects of our at

tention.

All the figns by which our thoughts are expressed, are addreffed either to the eye or to the ear; and the impreffions made on these organs, at the time when we first receive an idea, contribute to give us a firmer hold of it. Visible objects (as I observed in the Chapter on Conception) are remembered more eafily than those of any of our other fenfes and hence it is, that the bulk of mankind are more aided in their recollection by the impreffions made on the eye, than by thofe made on the ear. Every person must have remarked, in study: ing the elements of geometry, how much his recollection of the theorems was aided, by the diagrams which are connected with them and I have little doubt, that the difficulty which students commonly find to remember the propofitions of the fifth book of Euclid, arises chiefly from this, that the magnitudes to which they relate, are represented by straight lines, which do not make so strong an impreffion on the memory, as the figures which illuftrate the propofitions in the other five books.

This advantage, which the objects of fight naturally have over those of hearing, in the distinctness and the permanence of the impreffions which they make on the memory, continues, and even increases, through life,

in the cafe of the bulk of mankind; because their minds, being but little addicted to general and abstract difquifition, are habitually occupied, either with the immediate perception of fuch objects, or with fpeculations in which the conception of them is more or less involved; which speculations, so far as they relate to individual things and individual events, may be carried on with little or no affiftance from language.

The cafe is different with the philofopher, whofe habits of abftraction and generalisation lay him continually under a neceffity of employing words as an inftrument of thought. Such habits co-operating with that inattention, which he is apt to contract to things external, must have an obvious tendency to weaken the original powers of recollection and conception with respect to visible objects; and, at the fame time, to ftrengthen the power of retaining propofitions and reafonings expreffed in language. The common fyftem of education, too, by exercifing the memory so much in the acquifition of grammar rules, and of paffages from the antient authors, contributes greatly, in the cafe of men of letters, to cultivate a capacity for retain. ing words.

It is furprifing, of what a degree of culture, our power of retaining a fucceffion, even of infignificant founds, is fufceptible. Inftances fometimes occur, of men who are easily able to commit to memory, a long poem, compofed in a language of which they are wholly ignorant; and I have, myfelf, known more than one inftance, of an individual, who after having forgotten completely the claffical studies of his childhood, was yet able to repeat, with fluency, long paffages from Homer

and

and Virgil, without annexing an idea to the words that he uttered.

This fufceptibility of memory with respect to words, is poffeffed by all men in a very remarkable degree in their early years, and is, indeed, neceffary to enable them to acquire the ufe of language; but unless it be carefully cultivated afterwards by constant exercise, it gradually decays as we advance to maturity. The plan of education which is followed in this country, however imperfect in many refpects, falls in happily with this arrangement of nature, and ftores the mind richly, even in infancy, with intellectual treasures, which are to remain with it through life. The rules of grammar; which comprehend systems, more or less perfect, of the principles of the dead languages, take a permanent hold of the memory, when the understanding is yet unable to comprehend their import; and the claffical remains of antiquity, which, at the time we acquire them, do little more than furnish a gratification to the ear, fupply us with inexhaustible fources of the most refined enjoyment; and, as our various powers gradually unfold themfelves, are poured forth, without effort, from the memory, to delight the imagination, and to improve the heart. It cannot be doubted, that a great variety of other articles of useful knowledge, particu larly with refpect to geographical and chronological details, might be communicated with advantage to children, in the form of memorial lines. It is only in childhood, that fuch details can be learned with facility; and if they were once acquired, and rendered perfectly familiar to the mind, our riper years would be fpared much of that painful and uninterefting labour, which

is perpetually distracting our intellectual powers, from those more important exertions, for which, in their mature ftate, they seem to be destined.

This tendency of literary habits in general, and more particularly of philofophical pursuits, to exercise the thoughts about words, can fcarcely fail to have fome effect in weakening the powers of recollection and conception with refpect to fenfible objects; and, in fact, I believe it will be found, that whatever advantage the philofopher may poffefs over men of little education, in ftating general propofitions and general reasonings, he is commonly inferior to them in point of minuteness and accuracy, when he attempts to describe any objec which he has feen, or any event which he has witneffed; fuppofing the curiofity of both, in fuch cafes, to be interested in an equal degree. I acknowledge, indeed, that the undivided attention, which men unaccufftomed to reflexion are able to give to the objects of their perceptions, is, in part, the caufe of the liveliness and correctnefs of their conceptions.

With this diverfity in the intellectual habits of cultivated and of uncultivated minds, there is another variety of memory which feems to have fome connection. In recognizing visible objects, the memory of one man proceeds on the general appearance, that of another attaches itself to fome minute and diftinguifhing marks. A peafant knows the various kinds of trees from their general habits; a botanist, from thofe characteriitcal circumstances on which his claffification proceeds. The last kind of memory is, I think, moft common among literary men, and arifes from their habit of recollecting by means of words. It is evidently much

easier to express by a defcription, a number of botanical marks, than the general habit of a tree; and the fame remark is applicable to other cafes of a fimilar nature. But to whatever cause we afcribe it, there can be no doubt of the fact, that many individuals are to be found, and chiefly among men of letters, who, although they have no memory for the general appearances of objects, are yet able to retain, with correctness, an immenfe number of technical difcriminations.

Each of these kinds of memory, has its peculiar advantages and inconveniencies, which the dread of being tedious induces me to leave to the investigation of my readers.

SECTION III.

Of the Improvement of Memory.Analyfis of the Principles on which the Culture of Memory depends.

THE

HE improvement of which the mind is fufceptible by culture, is more remarkable, perhaps, in the cafe of Memory, than in that of any other of our fa culties. The fact has been often taken notice of in general terms; but I am doubtful if the particular mode in which culture operates on this part of our constitution, has been yet examined by philofophers with the attention which it deferves.

Of one fort of culture, indeed, of which Memory is fufceptible in a very striking degree, no explanation can be given; I mean the improvement which the original faculty acquires by mere exercise; or in other words, the tendency which practice has to increase our natural