"both in the earth and in the granary; what use leaven "is of in making bread, and why wine must stand "fome time in the vat before it ferments." Yet the fame author appears evidently, from his writings, to have had his memory stored with an infinite variety of apothegms, and of historical paffages, which had ftruck his imagination; and to have been familiarly acquainted, not only with the names, but with the ab furd and exploded opinions of the antient philofophers; with the ideas of Plato, the atoms of Epicurus, the plenum and vacuum of Leucippus and Democritus, the water of Thales, the numbers of Pythagoras, the infinite of Parmenides, and the unity of Mufæus. In complaining too of his want of prefence of mind, he indirectly acknowledges a degree of memory which, if it had been judicioufly employed, would have been more than fufficient for the acquifition of all thofe common branches of knowledge in which he appears to have been deficient. "When I have an oration to speak," fays he, "of any confiderable length, I am "reduced to the miferable neceflity of getting it, word "for word, by heart."

ઃઃ

The ftrange and apparently inconfiftent combina tion of knowledge and ignorance which the writings of Montaigne exhibit, led Malebranche (who feems to have formed too low an opinion both of his genius and character) to tax him with affectation; and even to call in question the credibility of fome of his affertions. But no one who is well acquainted with this most amusing author, can reafonably fufpect his veracity; and, in the prefent inftance, I can give him complete credit, not only from my general opinion of his fincerity,

2

fincerity, but from having obferved, in the course of my own experience, more than one example of the fame fort of combination; not indeed carried to fuch a length as Montaigne describes, but bearing a striking refemblance to it.

The obfervations which have already been made, account, in part, for the origin of the common opinion, that genius and memory are feldom united in great degrees in the fame perfon; and at the fame time fhew, that some of the facts on which that opinion is founded, do not justify fuch a conclufion. Befides thefe, however, there are other circumftances, which at first view, seem rather to indicate an inconfiftency between extensive memory and original genius.

The fpecies of memory which excites the greatest degree of admiration in the ordinary intercourfe of fociety, is a memory for detached and infulated facts; and it is certain that thofe men who are poffeffed of it, are very feldom diftinguished by the higher gifts of the mind. Such a fpecies of memory is unfavourable to philofophical arrangement; because it in part fupplies the place of arrangement. One great use of philofophy, as I already fhewed, is to give us an extensive command of particular truths, by furnishing us with general principles, under which a number of fuch truths is comprehended. A perfon in whofe mind cafual afsociations of time and place make a lafting impreffion, has not the fame inducements to philofophize, with others who connect facts together, chiefly by the relations of cause and effect, or of premises and conclufion. I have heard it obferved, that those men who have rifen to the greatest eminence in the profeflion of law, have been

in general fuch as had, at first, an averfion to the study, The reafon probably is, that to a mind fond of general principles, every study must be at first disgusting, which presents to it a chaos of facts apparently unconnected with each other. But this love of arrangement, if united with perfevering industry, will at laft conquer every difficulty; will introduce order into what feemed on a fuperficial view a mafs of confufion, and reduce the dry and uninterefting detail of positive statutes into a system comparatively luminous and beautiful.

The obfervation, I believe, may be made more general, and may be applied to every fcience in which there is a great multiplicity of facts to be remembered. A man deftitute of genius may, with little effort, treasure up in his memory a number of particulars in chemistry or natural history, which he refers to no principle, and from which he deduces no conclufion; and from his facility in acquiring this ftock of information, may flatter himself with the belief that he poffeffes a natural taste for these branches of knowledge. But they who are really destined to extend the boundaries of fcience, when they first enter on new pursuits, feel their attention distracted, and their memory overloaded with facts ariong which they can trace no relation, and are fometimes apt to despair entirely of their future progress. In due time, however, their fuperiority appears, and arifes in part from that very diffatisfaction which they at first experienced, and which does not cease to stimulate their inquiries, till they are enabled to trace, amidst a chaos of apparently unconnected materials, that fimplicity and beauty which always characterise the ope rations of nature.

There

There are, befides, other circumstances which retard the progress of a man of genius, when he enters on a new purfuit, and which fometimes render him apparently inferior to those who are poffeffed of ordinary capacity. A want of curiofity *, and of invention, facilitates greatly the acquifition of knowledge. It renders the mind paffive, in receiving the ideas of others, and faves all the time which might be employed in examining their foundation, or in tracing their confequences. They who are poffeffed of much acutenefs and originality, enter with difficulty into the views of others; not from any defect in their power of apprehenfion, but because they cannot adopt opinions which they have not examined; and because their attention is often feduced by their own fpeculations.

It is not merely in the acquifition of knowledge that a man of genius is likely to find himself furpassed by others he has commonly his information much lefs at command, than those who are poffeffed of an inferior degree of originality; and, what is fomewhat remarkable, he has it least of all at command on those subjects on which he has found his invention most fertile. Sir Ifaac Newton, as we are told by Dr. Pemberton, was often at a lofs, when the converfation turned on his own discoveries t. It is probable that they made but a flight impreffion on his mind, and that a confcioufnefs of his inventive powers prevented him from tak

* I mean a want of curiofity about truth.

"There are many

men," fays Dr. Butler, "who have a strong curiosity to know "what is faid, who have little or no curiofity to know what is "true."

See Note [T].

ing much pains to treasure them up in his memory. Men of little ingenuity feldom forget the ideas they acquire; because they know that when an occafion occurs for applying their knowledge to use, they must trust to memory and not to invention. Explain an arithmetical rule to a perfon of common understanding, who is unacquainted with the principles of the science; he will foon get the rule by heart, and become dexte rous in the application of it. Another, of more inge nuity, will examine the principle of the rule before he applies it to ufe, and will fcarcely take the trouble to commit to memory a procefs, which he knows he can, at any time, with a little reflexion, recover. The confequence will be, that, in the practice of calculation, he will appear more flow and hesitating, than if he fol lowed the received rules of arithmetic without reflexion or reasoning.

Something of the fame kind happens every day in converfation. By far the greater part of the opinions we announce in it, are not the immediate refult of reafoning on the spot, but have been previously formed in the clofet, or perhaps have been adopted implicitly on the authority of others. The promptitude, therefore, with which a man decides in ordinary difcourfe, is not a certain teft of the quicknefs of his apprehenfion *; as it may perhaps arife from thofe uncommon efforts to furnish the memory with acquired knowledge, by which men of flow parts endeavour to compensate for their want of invention; while, on the other hand, it

Memoria facit prompti ingenii famam, ut illa quæ dicimus, non domo attuliffe, fed ibi protinus fumpfiffe videamur. QUINCTIL. Inf. Orat. lib. xi. cap. 2.