is poffible that a consciousness of originality may give rife to a manner apparently embarraffed, by leading the person who feels it, to trust too much to extem pore exertions *. In general, I believe, it may be laid down as a rule, that those who carry about with them a great degree of acquired information, which they have always at command, or who have rendered their own difcoveries so familiar to them, as always to be in a condition to explain them, without recollection, are very feldom poffeffed of much invention, or even of much quickness of apprehenfion. A man of original genius, who is fond of exercising his reasoning powers anew on every point as it occurs to him, and who cannot submit to rehearse the ideas of others, or to repeat by rote the conclufions which he has deduced from previous reflexion, often appears, to fuperficial obfervers, to fall below the level of ordinary understandings; while another, deftitute both of quickness and invention, is admired for that In the foregoing obfervations it is not meant to be implied. that originality of genius is incompatible with a ready recollection of acquired knowledge; but only that it has a tendency unfavourable to it, and that more time and practice will commonly be neceffary to familiarife the mind of a man of invention to the ideas of others, or even to the conclufions of his own understanding, than are requifite in ordinary cafes. Habits of literary conversation, and, ftill more, habits of extempore difcuffion in a popular affembly, are peculiarly useful in giving us a ready and practical command of our knowledge. There is much good sense in the following aphorifin of Bacon: "Reading makes a full man, writing a correct man, and speaking a ready man." See a commentary on this aphorifm in one of the Numbers of the Adventurer. prompt. promptitude in his decifions, which arifes from the inferiority of his intellectual abilities. It must indeed be acknowledged in favour of the last defcription of men, that in ordinary converfation they form the most agreeable, and perhaps the most inftructive, companions. How inexhauftible foever the invention of an individual may be, the variety of his own peculiar ideas can bear no proportion to the whole mafs of useful and curious information of which the world is already poffeffed. The converfation, accordingly, of inen of genius, is fometimes extremely limited; and is interesting to the few alone, who know the value, and who can distinguish the marks of originality. In confequence too of that partiality which every man feels for his own fpeculations, they are more in danger of being dogmatical and difputatious, than thofe who have no fyftem which they are interested to defend. The fame obfervations may be applied to authors. A book which contains the difcoveries of one indivi dual only, may be admired by a few, who are intimately acquainted with the history of the science to which it relates, but it has little chance for popularity with the multitude. An author who poffeffes induftry fufficient to collect the ideas of others, and judg. ment fufficient to arrange them skilfully, is the most likely person to acquire a high degree of literary fame and although, in the opinion of enlightened judges, invention forms the chief characteristic of genius, yet it commonly happens that the objects of public admiration are men who are much lefs diftinguifhed by this quality, than by extenfive learning and cultivated tafte. Perhaps too, for the multi tude, tude, the latter clafs of authors is the most useful; as their writings contain the more folid difcoveries which others have brought to light, feparated from thofe errors with which truth is often blended in the firft formation of a system. 1. IN CHAPTER SEVENTH. Of Imagination. SECTION I. Analysis of Imagination. N attempting to draw the line between Conception and Imagination, I have already obferved, that the province of the former is to prefent us with an exact transcript of what we have formerly felt and perceived; that of the latter, to make a felection of qualities and of circumstances from a variety of different objects, and by combining and difpofing thefe, to form a new creation of its own. According to the definitions adopted, in general, by modern philofophers, the province of Imagination would appear to be limited to objects of fight. "It "is the fenfe of fight," (fays Mr. Addison,) “which "furnishes the Imagination with its ideas; so that by "the pleafures of Imagination, I here mean fuch as "arife from vifible objects, either when we have them "actually in view, or when we call up their ideas "into our minds, by paintings, ftatues, defcriptions, "or any the like occafions. We cannot, indeed, "have a fingle image in the fancy, that did not "make its first entrance through the fight." Agree ably to the fame view of the fubject, Dr. Reid ob ferves, that "Imagination properly fignifies a lively 66 concep. "conception of objects of fight; the former power being diftinguished from the latter, as a part from "the whole." That this limitation of the province of Imagination to one particular clafs of our perceptions is altogether arbitrary, seems to me to be evident; for, although the greater part of the materials which Imagination combines be supplied by this sense, it is nevertheless indifputable, that our other perceptive faculties also contribute occafionally their fhare. How many pleafing images have been borrowed from the fragrance of the fields and the melody of the groves; not to mention that fifter art, whofe magical influence over the human frame, it has been, in all ages, the highest boast of poetry to celebrate! In the following paffage, even the more grofs fenfations of Tafte form the subject of an ideal repast, on which it is impoffi ble not to dwell with fome complacency; particu larly after a perufal of the preceding lines, in which the Poet describes "the Wonders of the Torrid Zone." Bear me, Pomona! to thy citron groves; |