*Two years after, an enterprise of the Lacedæmonians against Megalopolis, a city of Arcadia, gave Demosthenes another opportunity to signalise his zeal, and display his eloquence. That city, which had been lately established by the Arcadians, who had settled a numerous colony there from different cities, and which might serve as a fortress and bulwark against Sparta, gave the Lacedæmonians great uneasiness, and alarmed them extremely. They resolved therefore to attack and make themselves masters of it. The Megalopolitans, who without doubt had renounced their alliance with Thebes, had recourse to Athens, and implored its protection. The other people concerned sent also their deputies thither, and the affair was debated before the people.

+ Demosthenes founded his discourse from the beginning of it upon this principle: That it was of the last importance to prevent either Sparta or Thebes from growing too powerful, and from being in a condition to give law to the rest of Greece. Now it is evident, that if we abandon Megalopolis to the Lacedæmonians, they will soon make themselves masters of Messene also, two strong neighbouring cities which are a check upon Sparta, and keep it within due bounds. The alliance we shall make with the Arcadians, in declaring for Megalopolis, is therefore the certain means to preserve so necessary a balance between Sparta and Thebes; because whatever happens, neither the one nor the other will be able to hurt us whilst the Arcadians are our allies, whose forces in conjunction with ours, will always be superior to those of either of them.

A weighty objection to this advice of Demosthenes, was the alliance actually subsisting between Athens and Sparta: for, in fine, said the orators who opposed Demosthenes, what idea will the world have of Athens, if we change in such a manner with the times? or is it consistent with justice to pay no regard to the faith of treaties? "We ought," I replied Demosthenes, whose very words I shall repeat in this place, we ought "indeed always to have justice in view, and to make it the rule of our "conduct; but, at the same time, our conformity to it should consist with "the public good and the interest of the state. It has been a perpet"ual maxim with us to assist the oppressed." He cites the Lacedæmonians themselves, the Thebans, and Euboeans as examples. "We have never varied from this principle. The reproach of changing therefore "ought not to fall upon us, but upon those whose injustice and usurpation "oblige us to declare against them."

66

I admire the language of politicians. To hear them talk, it is always reason and the strictest justice that determine them; but to see them act, makes it evident that interest and ambition are the sole rule and guide of their conduct. Their discourse is an effect of that regard for justice which nature has implanted in the mind of man, and which they cannot entirely shake off. There are few who venture to declare against that internal principle in their expressions, or to contradict it openly. But there are also few who observe it with fidelity and constancy in their actions. Greece never was known to have more treaties of alliance than at the time we are now speaking of, nor were they ever less regarded. This contempt of the religion of oaths in states, is a proof of their decline, and often denotes and occasions their approaching ruin.

per to explain in what manner the Athenians fitted out and subsisted their fleets. * A. M. 3651. Ant. J. C. 353. Diod. I. xv. p. 401.

+ Demost. Orat. pro. Megalop.

Η Δεν σκοπειν μεν αις και πρατειν τα δίκαια συμπαραβήξειν δε, όπως αμα και συν Φέροντα εςι ταύτα.

*The Athenians, moved by the eloquent discourse of Demosthenes, sent 3000 foot and 300 horse to the aid of the Megalopolitans, under the command of +Pammenes. Megalopolis was reinstated in its former condition, and its inhabitants, who had retired into their own countries, were obliged to return.

The peace which had put an end to the war of the allies, did not procure for all of them the tranquility they had reason to expect from it. The people of Rhodes and Cos, who had been declared free by that treaty, only changed their master. Mausolus, king of Caria, who had assisted them in throwing off the Athenian yoke, imposed his own upon them. Having publicly declared himself for the rich and powerful, he enslaved the people, and made them suffer exceedingly. He died the second year after the treaty of peace, having reigned 24 years. Artemisa his wife sueceeded him; and as she was supported with all the influence of the king of Persia, she retained her power in the isles lately subjected.

In speaking here of Artemisa, it is proper to observe that she must not be confounded with another Artemisa who lived above 100 years before, in the time of Xerxes, and who distinguished her resolution and prudence so much in the naval battle of Salamin. Several celebrated writers have fallen into this error through inadvertency.

This princess immortalized herself by the honours she rendered to the memory of Mausolus her husband. She caused a magnificent monument to be erected for him in Halicarnassus, which was called the Mausoleum, and for its beauty was esteemed one of the wonders of the world, and gave the name of mausolæum to all future great and magnificent structures of the same kind.

She endeavoured also to eternise the name of Mausolus by other monuments, which she believed more durable than those of brass or marble, but are often no better proof against the injuries of time; I mean works of wit. She caused excellent panegyrics to be made in honour of her husband, and proposed a prize of great value for the person whose performance should be the best. Amongst many others the celebrated Isocrates and Theopompus his disciple, were competitors for it.

Theopompus carried it from them all, and had the weakness and vanity to boast in public of having gained the prize against his master; preferring, as is too common, the fame of fine parts to the glory of a good heart He had represented Mausolus in his history as a prince most sordidly avaricious, to whom all means of amassing treasure were good and eligible. He painted him without doubt in very different colours in his panegyrie, or else he would never have pleased the princess.

¶ That illustrious widow prepared a different tomb for Mausolus than what I have been speaking of. Having gathered his ashes, and had the bones beaten in a mortar, she mingled some of the powder every day in her drink, till she had drank it all off; desiring by that means to make her own body the sepulchre of her husband. She survived him only two years, and her grief did not end but with her life.

Instead of tears, in which most writers plunge Artemisa during her wid

*Diod. l. xv. p. 402.

+ This is not the Pammenes of Thebes, of whom mention has been made he-fore.

t A. M. 3650. Ant. J. C. 354. Diod. I. xvi. p. 435.

Plin. l. xxxvi. c. v.

Aul. Gel. I. x. c. 18. Plut. in
Cic. Tuse. Quæst. 1. iii. n. 75.

Isocrat. p. 838.

Val. Max. I. iv. c. &.

owhood, there are some who say she made very considerable conquests. *It appears by one of Demosthenes' orations, that she was not considered at Athens as a forlorn relict, who neglected the affairs of her kingdom. But we have something more decisive upon this head. Vitruvius tells us that after the death of Mausolus, the Rhodians, offended that a woman should reign in Caria, undertook to dethrone her. They left Rhodes for that purpose with their fleet, and entered the great port of Halicarnassus. The queen being informed of their design, gave the inhabitants orders to keep within the walls, and when the enemy should arrive, to express by shouts and clapping of hands a readiness to surrender the city to them. The Rhodians quitted their ships, and went in all haste to the public place, leaving their fleet without any to guard it. In the mean time, Artemisa came out with her galleys from the little port through a small canal, which she caused to be cut on purpose, entered the great port, seized the enemy's fleet without resistance, and having put her soldiers and mariners on board of it, she set sail. The Rhodians having no means of escaping, were all put to the sword. The queen all the while advanced towards Rhodes. When the inhabitants saw their vessels approach, adorned with wreaths of laurel, they raised great shouts, and received their victorious and triumphant fleet with extraordinary marks of joy. It was so in effect, but in another sense than they imagined. Artemisa having met with no resistance, took possession of the city, and put the principal inhabitants to death. She caused a trophy of her victory to be erected in it, and set up two statues of brass, one of which represented the city of Rhodes, and the other Artemisa, branding it with a hot iron. Vitruvius adds, that the Rhodians dared never demolish that trophy, their religion forbidding it; but they surrounded it with a building, which prevented it entirely from being seen.

All this, as Monsieur Bayle observes in his Dictionary, does not express a forlorn and inconsolable widow, that passed her whole time in grief and lamentation: 'which makes it reasonable to suspect, that whatever is reported of excessive in the mourning of Artemisa, has no other foundation but its being advanced at a venture by some writer, and afterwards copied by all the rest.

I should be better pleased, for the honour of Artemisa, if it had been said as there is nothing incredible in it, that by a fortitude and greatness of mind, of which her sex has many examples, she had known how to unite the severe affliction of the widow with the active courage of the queen, and made the affairs of her government serve her instead of consolation. Negotia pro solatiis accipiens.

The Rhodians being treated by Artemisa in the manner we have related, and unable to support any longer so severe and shameful a servitude, they had recourse to the Athenians, and implored their protection. Though they had rendered themselves entirely unworthy of it by their revolt, Demosthenes took upon himself to speak to the people in their behalf. He began by setting forth their crime in its full light; he enlarged upon their injustice and perfidy; he seemed to enter into the people's just sentiments of resentment and indignation, and it might have been thought was going to declare himself in the strongest terms against the Rhodians: but all this was only the art of the orator, to insinuate himself into his auditors' opin

* Demost. de Libert. Rhod. p. 145. Vitruv. de Architect. I. ii. c. 8. Tacit.

A. M. 5653. Ant. J. C. 351. Dem, de Libert, Rhod.

ion, and to excite in them quite contrary sentiments of goodness and compassion for a people, who acknowledged their fault, who confessed their unworthiness, and who nevertheless were come to implore the republic's protection. He sets before them the great maxims which in all ages had constituted the glory of Athens, the forgiving of injuries, the pardoning of rebels, and the taking upon them the defence of the unfortunate. To the motives of glory he annexes those of interest, in showing the importance of declaring for a city that favoured the democratic form of government, and of not abandoning an island so powerful as that of Rhodes: which is the substance of Demosthenes' discourse entitled, "For the lib"6 erty of the Rhodians."

*The death of Artemisa, which happened the same year, it is very likely re-established the Rhodians in their liberty. She was succeeded by her brother Idræus, who espoused his own sister Ada, as Mausolus had done Artemisa. It was the custom in Caria for the kings to marry their sisters in this manner, and for the widows to succeed their husbands in the throne in preference to the brothers, and even the children of the defunct.

SECTION IV.

EXPEDITION OF OCHUS AGAINST PHŒNICIA, CYPRUS, AND EGYPT. OCHUS + meditated in earnest the reduction of Egypt to his obedience, which had long pretended to maintain itself in independence. Whilst he was making great preparations for this important expedition, he received advice of the revolt of Phoenicia. That people oppressed by the Persian governours, resolved to throw off so heavy a yoke, and made a league with Nectanebis king of Egypt, against whom Persia was marching its armies. As there was no other passage for that invasion but through Phoenicia, this revolt was very seasonable for Nectanebis, who therefore sent Mentor the Rhodian to support the rebels with 4000 Grecian troops. He intended by that means to make Phoenicia his barrier, and to stop the Persians there. The Phoenicians took the field with that reinforcement, beat the governours of Syria and Cilicia that had been sent against them, and drove the Persians entirely out of Phoenicia.

The Cyprians who were not better treated than the Phoenicians, seeing the good success which had attended this revolt, followed their example and joined in their league with Egypt. Ochus sent orders to Idræus king of Caria to make war against them, who soon after fitted out a fleet, and sent 8000 Greeks along with it, under the command of Phocion the Athenian, and Evagoras who was believed to have been the son of Nicocles. It is probable that he had been expelled by his uncle Protagoras, and that he had embraced with pleasure this opportunity of re-ascending the throne. His knowledge of the country, and the party he had there, made the king of Persia choose him very wisely to command in this expedition. They made a descent in the island, where their army increased to double its number by the reinforcements which came from Syria and Cilicia. The hopes of enriching themselves by the spoils of this island, which was very rich, drew thither abundance of troops, and they formed the siege of Salamin by sea and land. The island of Cyprus had at that time nine cities, considerable enough to have each of thein a petty king. But all those

* Strab. I. xiv. p. 656.

Diod. I. xvi. p. 439.

VOL. II.

65

† A M. 8853. Ant J. C. 351.
Diod. I. xvi. p. 440, 411.

kings were however subjects of Persia. They had upon this occasion, united together to throw off that yoke, and to render themselves independent.

Ochus, having observed that the Egyptian war was always unsuccessful from the ill conduct of the generals sent thither, resolved to take the care of it upon himself. But before he set out, he signified his desire to the states of Greece, that they would put an end to their divisions, and cease to make war upon one another.

It is a just matter of surprise, that the court of Persia should insist so earnestly and so often that the people of Greece should live in tranquility with each other, and observe inviolably the articles of the treaty of Antalcides, the principal end of which was the establishment of a lasting union amongst them. It had formerly employed a quite different policy.

From the miscarriage of the enterprise against Greece under Xerxes, judging gold and silver a more proper means for subjecting it than that of the sword, the Persians did not attack it with open force, but by the method of secret intrigues. They conveyed considerable sums into it privately, to corrupt the persons of credit and authority in the great cities, and were perpetually watching occasions to arm them against each other, and to deprive them of the leisure and means to invade themselves. They were particularly careful to declare sometimes for one, sometimes for another, in order to support a kind of balance amongst them, which put it out of the power of any of those republics to aggrandize itself too much, and by that means to become formidable to Persia.

That nation employed a quite different conduct at this time, in prohibiting all wars to the people of Greece, and commanding them to observe an universal peace, upon pain of incurring their displeasure and arms to such as should disobey. Persia, without doubt, did not take that resolution at a venture, and had its reasons to behave in such a manner with regard to Greece.

Its design might be to soften their spirit by degrees, in disarming their hands; to blunt the edge of that valour which spurred them on perpetually by noble emulation; to extinguish in them their passion for glory and victory; to render languid by long inertion and forced ease, the activity natural to them; and in fine to bring them into the number of those people whom a quiet and effeminate life enervates, and who lose in sloth and peace that martial ardour which combats and even dangers are apt to inspire.

The king of Persia who then reigned, had a personal interest as well as his predecessor, in imposing these terms upon the Greeks. Egypt had long thrown off the yoke, and given the empire just cause of inquietude, Ochus had resolved to go in person to reduce the rebels. He had the expedition extremely at heart, and neglected nothing that could promote its success. The famous retreat of the ten thousand, without enumerating many other actions of a like nature, had left a great idea in Persia of the Grecian valour. That prince relied more upon a small body of Greeks in his pay, than upon the whole army of the Persians, as numerous as it was; and he well knew that the intestine divisions of Greece would render the cities incapable of supplying the number of soldiers he had occasion for.

In fine, as a good politician, he could not enter upon action in Egypt till he had pacified all behind him, Ionia especially, and its neighbouring provinces. Now, the most certain means to hold them in obedience, was to deprive them of all hope of aid from the Greeks, to whom they had al