POSTAL TELEGRAPH CABLE Co. Piff. in Err., V. STATE OF ALABAMA. Statement by Mr. Justice Gray: This was an action brought November 4, 1892, in the circuit court of Montgomery county in the state of Alabama, by the state of Alabama against the Postal Telegraph Cable (See S. C. "Postal Teleg. C. Co. v. U. S." Reporter's Company, a corporation organized under the ed. 482-488.) Suit by state to recover taxes-jurisdiction of circuit court-removal of suit from state court -costs on reversal. laws of the state of New York, to recov- [483 er taxes and penalties claimed by the state of Alabama under its statute of February 28, 1889, chap. 103. By that statute, it is enacted that "all express and telegraph and sleeping car companies, 1. Jurisdiction over a suit brought by a state to doing business between points wholly within recover taxes and penalties imposed by its own this state, and without reference to their interrevenue laws, belongs to its own tribunals, ex-state business, shall pay in advance on the first cept so far as Congress, in order to secure the supremacy of the national Constitution and laws, has provided for a removal into the courts of the 2. A state is not a citizen, and under the judiciary acts of the United States a suit between a state and a citizen or a corporation of another state is not between citizens of different states; and the circuit court of the United States has no jurisdiction of it, unless it arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. United States. 8. No suit can be removed by a defendant from a state court into the circuit court of the United States, as one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, unless the fact that it so arises appears by the plaintiff's statement of his own claim; and a deficiency in his statement, in this respect, cannot be supplied by allegations in the petition for removal or in 4. Where a suit has been wrongfully removed from a state court into the circuit court of the United States by a party defendant, that party must, on reversal, pay the costs in the circuit court, as subsequent pleadings in the case. well as in this court. [No. 702.] Submitted Nov. 19, 1894. 1894. Decided Dec. 17, IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle District of Alabama, to review a judgment for the plaintiff, the state of Alabama, in an action brought by that state against the Postal Telegraph Cable Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York, in the circuit court of that state, and removed by the defendant into the said circuit court of the United States, to recover taxes and penalties claimed by said state. Reversed, and case remanded with directions to remand it to the state court with costs against the Postal Telegraph Cable Company. NOTE.-A8 to removal of causes, under Act of 1875; citizenship, see note to Meyer v. Delaware R. Const. Co. 25: 593. As to removal of causes to United States courts for local prejudice, see notes to Gaines v. Fuentes, 23: 524, and Jefferson v. Driver, 29: 897. As to removal of causes from state to Federal courts where United States Constitution, Act of Congress, or treaty comes in question, see note to Little York Gold Wash. & W. Co. v. Keyes, 24: 656. As to civil rights; removal of causes; when denied, note to United States v. Stanley ("Civil Bee Rights Cases") 27: 835. As to removal of actions against officers; Rev. Stat. 643, see note to Davis v. South Carolina, 27: 574. day of January, in each year, to the auditor of the state of Alabama, a privilege tax of five hundred dollars, together with one dollar for each mile of telegraph line, or of railroad tracks, on or along which the lines of said companies operate or extend; and no express or telegraph company, which has paid the privilege tax hereby required, shall be liable to pay any other privilege or other tax in this state, except licenses required by cities and towns, and except upon their real estate, fixtures and other property, which shall be taxed at the same rate as is now levied and collected upon other property in this state: Provided, that all express or telegraph companies, which have heretofore paid their taxes to the state under existing laws, for the year 1889, are hereby exempt from the provisions of this clause for said year: And provided further, that all telegraph companies, whose lines on which business is done wholly within the state do not exceed 150 miles, shall pay, at the same time and in the same manner and for the same purpose, a privilege tax at the rate of one dollar a mile for each mile of railroad along or upon which they operate or do business, and no more: And provided further, that said company, or some agent thereof, shall, when making payment of the tax lehe inbefore mentioned, report under oath the mileage of railroad operated by them respectively; and, in default of the payment of said tax, or the making of said report, for sixty days after maturity of said tax, a penalty of double the amount of the same shall be imposed on such defaulting companies." Acts of Alabama of 1888-89, p. 89. The complaint consisted of three counts, the first of which was as follows: "The plaintiff, the state of Alabama, claims of the defendant, the Postal Telegraph Company, a foreign corporation, the *sum of [484 fifteen hundred dollars; for that whereas heretofore, to wit, on the first day of January, 1890, and for more than sixty days thereafter, the defendant did engage in the business of a telegraph company between points wholly within the state of Alabama, and did run and operate its lines on or along two hundred and fifty miles of railroad track within the state of Alabama, whereby it became and was the duty of the defendant to pay in advance on the first day of January, 1890, to the auditor of the state of Alabama, a privilege tax of five hundred dollars, together with the further sum of one dollar for each mile of railroad track on or along which the lines of the defendant as such telegraph company did operate or extend, and at the same time to report under oath the | mileage of railroad track operated by it within the state of Alabama; and the plaintiff avers that the defendant made default in the payment of said tax, and in the making of said report, for more than sixty days, whereby it became and was and is liable to pay to the plaintiff a penalty in double the amount of said tax, that is to say, a penalty of fifteen hundred dollars, for which plaintiff here sues." The second and third counts were precisely like the first, except that the second substituted January 1, 1891, for January 1, 1890; and that the third substituted January 1, 1892, and alleged that the defendant operated its lines on or along three hundred and twenty-eight miles of railroad track, and became liable to pay to the plaintiff a penalty of $1656. In December, 1892, the case was removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle District of Alabama, under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1887, chap. 373 (24 Stat. at L. 552) as corrected by the Act of August 13, 1888, chap. 866 (25 Stat. at L. 433) upon the petition of the defendant, alleging that it was a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York in 1886 for the purpose of constructing, owning, using and operating electric telegraph lines within that state, and extending beyond its limits into and across other states and territories, for the purpose of commercial and interstate communication by telegraph lines for general public use; that it had its principal executive, financial and 485] *accounting offices in the city of New York; that it was engaged in the general telegraph business of receiving and sending telegrams over its lines for commercial purposes for the public, between citizens within the state of New York and other states, and across the same to and from other places within other states, and also in sending messages by telegraph communication between the several departments of the government of the United States and their officers and agents at a rate of charges designated and prescribed by the Postmaster General of the United States under the laws of Congress;" that on March 6, 1886, it accepted the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 24, 1866, chap. 230 (now title 65 of the Revised Statutes) and in pursuance thereof the Postmaster General of the United States had annually from time to time designated it as one of the telegraph companies to transmit government messages for the United States: that most of its liues were upon the post roads of the United States; that now and during all these times it was a citizen and resident of the state of New York; and "that the said action is a suit of the civil nature at common law, in which the matter in dispute and the interests involved exceed, exclusive of the interests and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars; and that the controversy therein arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States and laws of the state of Alabama, and is wholly between citizens of different states, to wit, between your said petitioner, who avers that it was at the time of the bringing of this suit and still is a citizen and resident of the said state of New York, and the said plaintiff, the said state of Alabama, who, your petitioner avers, was then and still is a citizen and resident of the state of Alabama." In May, 1893, the defendant filed in the circuit court of the United States an answer, setting up substantially the same facts as in its petition for removal. In January, 1894, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, claiming for each of the years 1890, 1891 and 1892, a privilege tax of $500, and a penalty of $1816; and the defendant filed an answer, similar to its original answer, and admitting the *number of miles 486 of telegraph line owned by it within the state. In February, 1894, the parties submitted the case to the judgment of the court upon an agreed statement of facts, in which the facts set up in the answer were admitted. The court thereupon gave judgment for the plaintiff for the sum of $3846.20; and the defendant sued out this writ of error. Messrs. T. Moultrie Mordecai and P. Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: By section 1 of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1875, chap. 137, as amended by the acts of March 3, 1887, chap. 373, and August 13, 1888, chap. 866, it is enacted that the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the sev eral states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $2000, "and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; or in which controversy the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners; or in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states;" "or a controversy between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states; or a controversy between citizens of a state and foreign states, citizens or subjects." And by section 2, the defendant's right to remove a suit-whether arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or coming within any other class above enumerated from a state court into the circuit court of the United States, is restricted to suits "of which the circuit courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction by the preceding section." 25 Stat. at L. 434. *The grounds upon which the present [487 suit was removed from a court of the state of Alabama into the circuit court of the United States were that the controversy therein arose under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that it was wholly between citizens of different states. But the suit was one brought by the state to recover taxes and penalties imposed by its own revenue laws, the jurisdiction over which belongs to its own tribunals, except so far as Congress, in order to secure the supremacy of the national Constitution and laws, has provided for a removal into the courts of the United States. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. 127 U. S. 265, 290 [32: 239, 243]; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 672 [36: 1123, 1129]. And the complaint by which the suit was begun did not mention the Constitution or any law of the United States, or claim any right under either. pear, the want cannot be supplied by any statement in the petition for removal or in the subsequent pleadings. 2. A complaint in an action for the recovery of land against one who wrongfully withholds the possession, and for damages for the detention which does not show that either party claims any right under the Constitution or laws of the United States, furnishes no ground for removing the case into the United States circuit court. [No. 121.] A state is not a citizen. And, under the judiciary acts of the United States, it is well settled that a suit between a state and a citizen or a corporation of another state is not between citizens of different states; and that the circuit Submitted Dec. 14, 1894. Decided Dec. 17, 1894 court of the United States has no jurisdiction of it, unless it arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449 [28: 482]; Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430 [29: 962]; Ger mania Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 119 U. S. 473 [30: 461]. It is equally well settled that under the provisions, above referred to, of the existing Act of Congress, no suit can be removed by a defendant from a state court into the circuit court of the United States, as one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, unless the fact that it so arises appears by the plaintiff's statement of his own claim; and that a deficiency in his statement, in this respect, cannot be supplied by allegations in the petition for removal, or in subsequent pleadings in the case. Tennessee v. Union & P. Bank, 152 U. S. 454 [38: 511]; Chappell v. Waterworth, ante p. The conclusion is inevitable, that the judgment of the circuit court of the United States must be reversed, and the case remanded to that court, with directions to remand it to the state court; and that, the case having been 488] wrongfully removed into the circuit court of the United States by the Postal Telegraph Cable Company, that company must pay the costs in that court, as well as in this court. Tennessee v. Union & P. Bank, above cited; Panrick v. Hanrick, 153 U. S. 192 [38: 685]. Judgment reversed accordingly. EAST LAKE LAND CO. Plff. in Err.. v. ISAAC C. BROWN. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 488.) Removal of cause-action for the recovery of land. 1. Under the acts of March 3, 1887, chap. 373, and Aug. 13, 1888, chap. 866, a case, not depending on the citizenship of the parties, nor otherwise specially provided for, cannot be removed from the state court into the United States circuit court, as one arising under the laws of the United States, unless that appears by the plaintiff's statement of his own claim; and if it does not so ap NOTE. As to removal of causes; under Act of 1875; | citizenship, see note to Meyer v. Delaware R. Const. Co. 25: 593. As to removal by one of two or more defendants; separable controversies, see note to Sloane v. AnderSon, 29: 899. As to removal of causes to United States courts for local prejudice, see notes to Gaines v. Fuentes, 23: 524 and Jefferson v. Driver, 29: 897. As to removal of causes from state to Federal courts to the Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama. to review a judgment in a suit brought by the East Lake Land Company, plaintiff, against Isaac C. Brown, defendant, in the city court of Birmingham, Alabama, to recover land and afterwards removed to said circuit court of the United States, the judg. ment of which last mentioned court was in favor of defendant. Reversed and remanded. Statement of the case: Suit was brought by plaintiff in city court of Birmingham, Alabama, to recover the land in controversy. The following is the complaint: East Lake Land Company, a Corporation under the Laws of the State of Alabama, plaintiff, V. Isaac C. Brown, defendant. The plaintiff sues to recover the following tract of land, the north half of the southwest quarter of section fourteen (14), township seventeen (17), range two (2) west, in Jefferson county, Alabama, of which it was possessed before the commencement of this suit, and after such possession accrued the defendant entered thereupon and unlawfully withholds and detains the same, together with one thousand dollars for the detention thereof. Hewitt, Walker & Porter, Plaintiff's Attorney. Plea of defendant. The defendant, for answer to the plaintiff's said complaint, says that he is not guilty of the matters therein alleged. Webb & Tillman and Attorneys for Defendant. Petition for removal of cause. In the city court of Birmingham, Alabama. East Lake Land Company, a Body Corporate under the Laws of Alabama, Plaintiff, v. Isaac Brown. Petition for transfer of suit to Federal court. To the Honorable, the city court of Birmingham, Alabama: Your petitioner, Isaac C. Brown, respectwhere United States Constitution, Act of Congress or treaty comes in question, see note to Little York Gold Wash. & W. Co. v. Keyes, 24: 656. As to civil rights; removal of causes; when denied, see note to United States v. Stanley ("Civil Rights Cases") 27: 835. As to removal of actions against officers; Rev. Stat. § 643, see note to Davis v. South Carolina, 27: 574. fully shows that he is the defendant in the foregoing entitled suit, that the same was by the East Lake Land Company, a body corporate under the laws of Alabama, commenced on or about the 20th day of September, 1887, in said city court; that your petitioner was at the time of bringing said suit and still is a citizen of the state of Alabama, and resident thereof. Circuit Court of the United States for the The defendant pleaded the general issue as above set forth, and subsequently in the United States circuit court, after removal of the cause, pleaded three special pleas. The pleadings in the United States circuit court show that the plaintiff claims title under the patent issued by the United States to Thomas Horne on the 9th day of July, 1823; and the defendant under a homestead entry made on April 23, 1887, which entry was merged into a patent during the progress of the suit in the court below. Mr. John T. Morgan for plaintiff in er ror. Mr. D. P. Bestor for defendant in error. THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The judgment is reversed with costs, and the case remanded with a direction to remand it to the city court of Birmingham, county of Jefferson, Alabama, on the authority of Chappell v. Waterworth, ante, p. Reversed and remanded. Your petitioner further shows that there is and was at the time said suit was brought a controversy therein between your petitioner and the said plaintiff, the East Lake Land Company, which is a body corporate under the laws of Alabama, and as such who is citizen of the state of Alabama, and a resident thereof; that said action was brought by the East Lake Land Company for the purpose of recovering from petitioner the possession of the N. of the S. W. of section 14, township 17, range 2 west, in Jefferson county, Ala., of which land petitioner was at the beginning of said suit and is now seized and possessed, and that petitioner's right and title to said land is as a homestead entered by him under the homestead laws of the United States, and for which petitioner holds a certificate of entry under said statutes, and that petitioner's title and right to said lands arise under the laws of the United R. SOPHIA CHASE, Exrx. etc., Piff. in States, and that the matter in dispute in this suit exceeds the sum of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs. Your petitioner further represents that this suit has not been tried, but is now pending for trial in the said city court of Birmingham, Ala., and that your petitioner desires to remove the same into the circuit court of the United States for the southern divis ion of the northern district of Alabama, in pursuance of the acts of Congress in that be- 1. Suits brought against the government under the half provided, to wit, the Act approved March 8, 1887. Your petitioner further says that he offers herewith a bond executed by himself, I. C. Brown and W. E. Brown, of Birmingham, Ala., as surety, in the penal sum of two hun. dred and fifty dollars, conditioned by said Act of Congress required. Err., v. UNITED STATES. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 480-503.) Suits against the government, how reviewedfinding of facts and law-power of Postmaster General. 2. Your petitioner therefore prays that the said bond may be accepted as good and sufficient according to the Act of Congress and that the said suit may be removed into the next circuit court of the United States in and for said south-3. ern division of the northern district of Alabama, pursuant to the aforesaid Act of Congress in such case made and provided, and that no further proceedings may be had therein in his court; and your petitioner will ever pray, etc. Webb & Tillman, this cause to the United States circuit court therein mentioned, it being made to appear Judge of the City Court Dec. 1, 1887. Act of March 3, 1887, in a United States district or circuit court are to be reviewed in this court upon writ of error, if the case be one at law, and upon appeal, if the case is one cognizable in equity or in admiralty. Under the Act of March 3, 1887, a judgment of a United States district or circuit court in an action against the government, will be re-examined bere only when the record contains a finding of facts with the conclusions of law thereon; this court will only inquire whether the judgment below is supported by the facts thus found. The Postmaster General, cannot bind the United States by any lease or purchase of a building to be used for a postoffice, unless the power to do so is derived from a statute, either expressly or by necessary implication; the general authority "to establish postoffices" does not itself imply such power. [No. 83.] Argued Nov. 19, 1894. Decided Dec. 10, 1894. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana, to review States, by the personal representatives of Hiram a judgment dismissing a suit against the United W. Chase, to recover the amount due for rent for the use of a postoffice leased to the government by a lease made by the Postmaster General. Affirmed. See same case below, 44 Fed. Rep. 732. An early ordinance directed the Postmaster General "to superintend and direct the post- | Co. ("The Laura") 114 U. S. 411 (29: 147); office in all its various departments and ser- Parvin v. Wimberg, 15 L. R. A. 775, 130 Ind. vices." 561; Ware v. United States, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 633 (18: 393). 4 Jour. Cong. p. 93. And the Postmaster General is usually regarded as a superintendent. Ware v. United States, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 630 (18: 392); 3 Jour. Cong. 678; 4 Jour. Cong. 93; Act Cong. Sept. 22, 1789; Act Cong. Aug. 4, 1890; Sam'l Osgood Report, 1 Am. Cong. Vol. 2, p. 2112; Act Cong. Feb. 20, 1792; Act May 8, 1794; Enc. Brit. title Postoffice U. S.; 7 Am. Bankers Mag. N. S. p. 358. The Postmaster General before and during the revolution and up to the adoption of the Constitution, was the superintendent of the business of the post. It was a common practice for the Postmaster General to lease buildings for a longer term than one year. This is a matter of common knowledge. For many years he had been accustomed to engage quarters for various terms as he found it best for the postal service. The power to establish post offices includes, not merely the power to designate, but a power to create the thing intended, and to do all other acts to make the thing effectual. 2 Story, Const. § 1133 (old ed). The powers given are understood in a large sense in order to secure the public interests. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 416, 417 (4: 603, 604); Postmaster General v. Early, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 136 (6: 577). To establish, comprehends the renting or building of a house Desty. Fed Const. 93. The phrase "to establish,"must be understood to mean, not merely to designate, but to create, erect, build, prepare, fix permanently, also more comprehensively, the renting or building of a house. Dickey v. Maysville, W. P. & L. Turnp. Road Co. 7 Dana, 125; Ware v. United States, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 617 (18: 389); Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. United States, 104 U. S. 684 (26: 892); Jacksonville, P. & M. R. Co. v. United States, 118 U. S. 627 (30: 273); Garfielde v. United States, 93 U. S. 246 (23: 780); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 732 (24: 879). The court will not presume that high officers will abuse their powers. Searight v. Stokes, 44 U. S. 3 How. 171 (11: 546); Neil v. Ohio, 44 U. S. 3 How. 745 (11: 811). The Postmaster General was adequately "authorized by law," within the meaning of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3732, to make the lease sued on. Dougherty v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 503; New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 473. The long continued and well known usage of the department to make postoffice leases for terms of years, warrants the practice. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U. S. 1 Cranch, 299 (2: 115); Martin v. Hunter, 14 U. S. 1 Wheat. 304 (4: 97); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U. S. 6 Wheat. 264 (5: 257); Cooley v. Philadelphia Port Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 299 (13: 996); Burrow Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53 (28: 349); Pollock v. Bridgeport S. B. Messrs. Joshua E. Dodge, Assistant Atty. Gen., Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., Solicitor Gen., and Holmes Conrad, Assistant Atty. Gen., for the United States: The complainant fails to show any specific authority conferred upon the Postmaster General by Congress for the execution of the lease, and the length of time for which the same was executed exceeds his authority, both express or implied. Individuals, as well as courts, must take notice of the extent of the authority conferred by law upon a person acting in an official capacity; and the rule applies in such case that ignorance of the law furnishes no excuse for any mistake or wrongful act. State v. Hays, 52 Mo. 578; Delafield v. State, 26 Wend. 192; Baltimore v. Reynolds, 20 Md. 10, 83 Am. Dec. 535; Whiteside v. United States, 93 U. S. 257 (23: 885). The legal effect of said contract plainly is to "involve the government for the future payment of money in excess of such appropriation;" the appropriations for the rent of buildings for the use of the government being made annually. Stansbury v. United States, 75 U. S. 3 Wall. 36 (19: 316); Bradley v. United States, 98 U. S. 104 (25: 105); Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 200. There is no jurisdiction in this court by writ of error to review the judgment complained of in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Indiana. In one circuit court of appeals, appeals are dismissed because no bill of exceptions is settled bringing into the record the various objections and exceptions saved in the course of the trial. In others, appeal is held to be proper. United States v. Fletcher, 60 Fed. Rep. 53; United States v. Yukers, 60 Fed. Rep. 641. The existing statutes for the review of judg ments of the Court of Claims reached their present form in the Revised Statutes in 1874, in sections 707, 708, by the latter of which authority was expressly conferred on the Supreme Court to regulate the method of allowing appeals. An appeal is only provided and no writ of error authorized. United States v. Young, 94 U. S. 258, 259 (24: 153). When in 1887, by the Tucker Act, concurrent jurisdiction over this same class of cases was conferred on circuit and district courts, no change took place in the distinctiveness of the class; they remained cases of claims against the United States as before. United States v. Davis, 131 U. S. 36 (33: 93). The right to the review of judgments in claims cases in circuit and district courts is controlled by the statutes regulating views of judgments of the Court of Claims. Strong v. United States, 40 Fed. Rep. 183. Writ of error is not and never was authorized review judgments of the Court of Claims and therefore is not available to bring up for to |