If the guiding cylinder of this patent had been a pioneer invention, it is possible the patentee might have been entitled to a construction of this claim broad enough to include the defendant's device, notwithstanding the absence of the semi-circular connecting piece; but as we have already said, the novelty of the invention is at least open to doubt, and we think the patentee should be held to a rigid construction of these claims. The opening in the guiding cylinder, which is supposed to be the equivalent of the connecting piece d, instead of increasing so as to form a semi-circular opening as in the patent, decreases, so as to prevent, if anything, ready access to the stuffing box, and, under the circumstances, does not constitute a mechanical equivalent for it. Indeed, the guiding cylinder of the defendant's engine bears a strong resemblance to those shown in the prior patents hereinafter cited than to that of the Wright patent, and hence if the prior patents anticipate the Wright cylinder, the defendant's does not infringe it.

nig piece merging at one end in the guiding | in, perhaps, an equally effective manner. cylinder and at the other end in the cylinder Vance v. Campbell, 66 U. S. 1 Black, 427 [17: head, thus uniting the two, is not only made 167]; Union Water Meter Co. v. Desper, 101 an element of both these claims, but is said to U. S.332 [25: 1024]; Gage v. Herring, 107 U. S. constitute, in connection with the guiding 640, 648 [27: 601, 604]; Rees v. Gould, 82 U. S. cylinder and cylinder head, a special feature 15 Wall. 187 [21: 39]; Brown v. Davis, 116 U. of the invention. This so called connecting S. 287, 249 [29: 659, 663]. piece is distinguished from the guiding cylinder in that it is only semi-circular, and thus ad51]mitting of access to the stuffing box *with perfect freedom throughout a complete half circle. This access is bad, not through a mere hole or opening, such as are ee, but through such an opening as can be obtained by cutting away the upper half of the frame at this point. The device used by the defendant contains a similar cylinder for guiding the cross head, and a trough connecting it with the base; but this cylinder, instead of having its entire interior surface bored out, so that it may guide the cross head in the same way that the piston is guided in the steam cylinder, (as in the Wright patent) merely contains an upper and a lower guide, formed of two slides or fitting strips, the surfaces of which are bored out, but no other portion of the cylinder. We do not regard this, however, as a material departure from the Wright patent, as it constitutes a mere difference in detail of construction, not affecting in any way the operation of the cross head of the cylinder, or changing materially the efficiency of such cylinder. Nor do we think it material that in defendant's structure there is no cylinder head forming part of, cast with, and constituting a portion of the engine frame, since the frame of the defendant's device terminates in a flange adopted to be bolted to a cylinder head, and thus in fact constituting a part of it.

But the absence of the semi-circular connecting piece d is a circumstance worthy of more serious consideration. In the defendant's engine there is no such semi-circular connecting piece as is described in the Wright patent, but the guiding cylinder extends backward to a connection with the head of the steam cylinder, the side of such guiding cylinder, through which the cross head operates, containing an opening oval in shape and narrower at each end than in the center. The equivalent for the connecting piece, if found at all, must be in this continuation of the guiding cylinder backward to the steam cylinder. But this portion of the cylinder is neither scooped out in a semi-circular form, nor does it admit of ready access to the cross head shown at this point in the Wright patent. Instead of access to the cross head being easier at this point then any other, it is in reality more difficult, as the oval opening is narrower there than in 52] the center. *Now, while this semi-circular connecting piece may be an immaterial feature of the Wright invention, and the purpose for which it is employed accomplished, though less perfectly, by the extension of the guiding cylinder in the manner indicated in defendant's devise, yet the patentee, having described it in the specification and declared it to be an essential feature of his invention, and having made it an element of these two claims, is not now at liberty to say that it is immaterial, or that a device which dispenses with it is an infringement, though it accomplish the same purpose

(2.) The second claim of the patent is for "the combination, in a horizontal engine frame of the guiding cylinder b, base H, and troughlike connection D." The guiding cylinder which is used in lieu of the ordinary parallel slides, was, however, by no means a novelty in the construction of engine frames. It is found in different stages of perfection in several prior patents, viz: in a patent issued to[53 Samuel Wright as early as 1837, for locomotive engines, and was there used, as the patentee states, "to subserve the twofold purpose of a (steam) pump and guide." In the patent to Gelston Sanford of February 15, 1859, in which the invention related to elongating the cylinder, "by which means it becomes a part of the frame, used for the support of the crank shaft, and so constructed that when bored out forms a guide and rest for the cross head;" in the patent to William Wright of August 8, 1865; in which the movement of the piston is transmitted to the main crank by means of a connecting rod, jointed to the cross head, to which the piston is attached, and which is guided in ways or guides, fast to the frame; and in which a semi-circular connecting piece is also shown; in that to John B. Root of August 14, 1886, in which the piston also works in two cylindrical guides attached to the cylinder heads; in that to Maxwell & Cope of February 13, 1872; in that to Edward H. Cutler of November 26. 1872; and in that to George H. Babcock of December 10, 1872.

It is true that none of these patents exhibit distinctly the trough-like connection D of the Wright patent, but that also is found in the patent to Chilion M. Farrar of March 19, 1872, in which it is fully shown in the drawings, though not described in the specification, and is used in connection with the ordinary flat guides or parallel slides.

Wright's only invention, then, was in the combination of the cylindrical guide with the

trough shown in the Farrar patent. Did this accomplish a new and valuable result it is quite possible that a patent therefor might have been sustained, but we do not find this to be the case. The cylindrical guide performs the same functions as in the prior patents; the trough in which the connecting rod works in the Farrar patent, is practically the same as in the Wright patent, and the combination is a mere aggregation of their respective functions. If the combination of the trough and cylindrical guide of the Wright patent gives greater lightness and strength to the frame than the combination of the trough and the flat guides of the Farrar patent, it is a mere difference in 54] degree, a carrying forward of an old idea, a result, perhaps, somewhat more perfect than had theretofore been attained, but not rising to the dignity of invention. We have repeat edly held patents of this description to be invalid. Stimpson v. Woodman, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 117 [19: 866]; Smith v. Nichols, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 112 [22: 566]: Guidet v. Brooklyn, 105 U. S. 550 [26: 1106]; Hall v. Macneale, 107 U. S. 90 [27: 367].

The decree of the court below, dismissing the bill is, therefore affirmed.

WILLIAM WRIGHT, Appt.,

V.

JOHNSTON BEGGS.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 54.)
[No. 2.]

Argued Oct. 9, 1894. Decided Oct. 22, 1894.

PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Southern District of
New York.

Mr. Andrew M. Todd for appellant.
Mr. B. F. Lee for appellee.

Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 54-58.)

County bonds, when void.

court of the territory of Arizona, affirming a judgment of the District Court of the First Judicial District of that territory, in favor of the defendant Pima county, in an action brought by Charles Edward Lewis, plaintiff, upon certain coupons attached to bonds issued by said county, and payable to the Arizona Narrow Gauge Railroad Company. Affirmed.

PPEAL from a judgment of the supreme

Statement by Mr. Justice Brown:

This was an action originally begun in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Arizona upon 2250 coupons*attached to 150[55 bonds, issued by the defendant county July 1, 1883, and payable to the Arizona Narrow Gauge Railroad Company or bearer. The railroad in question was organized under a general act of the territorial legislature for the incorporation of railroads, passed in 1879, which gave them power to make all contracts, acquire real and personal property, to sue and be sued, to borrow money necessary for the construction of the road, to issue bonds and notes therefor and to receive donations or voluntary grants of real and personal property to that end. The bonds in question were issued by the board of supervisors of the defendant county under an act of the legislature of Arizona of February 21, 1883, entitled "An Act to Promote the Construction of a Certain Railroad," and were part of a series of 200 bonds issued in pursuance of said act, and exchanged for a like number of bonds of the railroad company of like amounts, bearing like interest, and running like times as the bonds in

suit.

Defendant demurred to the complaint both generally and specially, and upon argument the demurrer was sustained and judgment entered in favor of defendant.

Plaintiff appealed to the supreme court of the territory, by which the judgment of the district court was affirmed. He thereupon sued out this writ of error.

Messrs. W. H. Barnes, and W. H. Rossington, for appellant:

A law enacted since the issuance of the bonds cannot affect them, and the re-enactment of the general statutes on the subject in 1887 does not apply to these bonds.

Greene County v. Daniel, 102 U. S. 187 (26: 99); Shinbone v. Randolph County, 56 Ala. 183; Limestone County Court v. Rather, 48 Ala. 433. Limitation is a defense to be set up by answer, and cannot be raised by demurrer.

Tarbox v. Adams County Suprs. 34 Wis.

The bonds issued by Pima county under the Ari-560; Sand v. St. John, 36 Barb. 628; Baldwin

zona act of Feb. 21, 1883, in aid of the construc

tion of the Arizona Narrow Gauge Railroad, were issued contrary to the restrictions imposed upon the legislatures of territories by Congress, and create no obligation against the county. [No. 550.] Submitted Oct. 17, 1894. Decided Oct. 29, 1894.

NOTE. As to negotiability of railroad bonds, see note to White v. Vermont & M. R. Co. 16: 221.

As to mandamus to compel city, town, or county to levy tax to pay bonds or interest on honds, see note

to Davenport v. United States, 19: 704.

As to municipal bonds; reference to statute in, see note to Ogden v. Daviess County, 26: 263.

v. Martin, 14 Abb. Pr. N. S. 9; Esselstyn v. Weeks, 12 N. Y. 635.

Even if the court might refuse by mandamus to compel the county to issue the bonds, yet, if the county has voluntarily done so, the law gives the authority to do it, and the county cannot now be heard to dispute the power to do what has been done.

Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 53, 80 Am.

Dec. 718; Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. Co. 15
Conn. 476; Napa Valley R. Co. v. Napa County
Suprs. 30 Cal. 437; Stockton & V. R. Co. v.
Stockton, 41 Cal. 169.

By the General Railroad Act the railroad

company had full and complete capacity to! issue its bonds and to receive bonds of the county of Pima. No legislation was needed to enable it to do it. Counties are not included in the words "towns, cities or other municipal corporations."

Mitchell v. Franklin County Treasurer, 25 Obio St. 143; Wahoo v. Reeder, 27 Neb. 770; Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309; Askew v. Hale County, 54 Ala. 639, 25 Am. Rep, 730; Barton County v. Walser, 47 Mo. 189; Maury County v. Lewis County, 1 Swan, 236; Granger v. Pulaski County, 26 Ark. 37; Laramie County Comrs. v. Albany County Comrs. 92 U. S. 307 (23: 552); Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kan. 23; Sherman County v. Simonds, 109 U. S. 735 (27: 1093); 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 343, title Counties. It was urged below that this act was in violation of the Organic Act aforesaid and beyond the power of the legislature, because it confers a special privilege upon the said railroad com

433), requiring, in actions between citizens of different states, suits to be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant, it is admissible to bring a suit for partition in a district in which only a part of such defendants reside.

2. Where the laws of a particular state give a remedy in equity, as, for instance, a bill by a party in or out of possession, to quiet title to lands, such remedy will be enforced in the Federal courts, if it does not infringe upon the constitutional rights of the parties to a trial by jury. Where a case is appealed under section 5 of the Act of March 3, 1891, upon a question of jurisdiction, no other question can be properly considered in this court.

[No. 517.]

1894.

The question is too clear for extended argument. By the "internal affairs" of a municipal corporation, in the administration of which the legislature could alone authorize it to incur a debt, was undoubtedly intended such business as municipalities of like character are usually required to engage in to fulfill their proper functions, and to effectuate the objects of their charters. In the case of counties these are ordinarily to provide a court-house for the administration of justice; a jail for the confinement of prisoners; a poor-house for the suste-3. nance of paupers (where by local law they are made chargeable upon the county); offices for the various officials of the county; and, under certain circumstances, highways and bridges for the accommodation of the public. It could Submitted April 30, 1894. never have been contemplated, however, that this power would be used to incur obligations in favor of a railroad operated by a private corporation for private gain, though also subserving a public purpose. The record before us does not show whether this railroad was designed to extend beyond the limits of the county; but if the county had power to issue its bonds in aid of railroads at all, there is nothing to indicate that such power was restricted to such roads as were wholly within the county, and if this act were a valid exercise of the authority of the legislature, the credit of the county might be indefinitely pledged for the construction of railways extending far beyond the county limits, and, indeed, for carrying out any such schemes of public improvement as the legislature could be persuaded to authorize. Clearly such debts would not be incurred in the administration of the internal affairs of the county.

Decided Oct. 29,

PPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida, dismissing a suit in equity for the partition of real estate brought by George P. Greeley and Mary P. Greeley, his wife, plaintiffs, for the former of whom Mary P. Greeley was afterwards substituted as executrix, against Richard H. Lowe et al. Reversed and case remanded for further proceed ings.

Statement by Mr. Justice Brown:

This was a bill in equity for the partition of real estate originally filed by George P. Greeley and wife, who were alleged to be citizens of New Hampshire, against 130 defendants, most of whom were citizens of Florida. Of the remaining defendants some were citizens of Georgia, others of Illinois, South Carolina, Alabama, Texas, North Carolina, New York, New Jersey, Mississippi, and one Eliza B. Anderson, of the city of Washington and District of Columbia.

The argument of counsel on both sides was 58]largely directed *to the question whether the territorial act of 1883, under which these bonds were issued, conferred an "especial privilege" upon the railroad company, within the mean- The bill averred the plaintiff, George P. ing of Revised Statutes, section 1889, inhibit- Greeley, to be seized as tenant in common, in ing "private charters and especial privileges," fee simple, and in actual possession of 10,016 and also to the further question whether bonds acres of land in the Northern District of Florissued under a mandatory or compulsory stat-ida, of the value of $10,000, exclusive of inute are valid. But in the view we have taken of the case it is unnecessary to express an opinion upon these points.

We are compelled to hold that the bonds in question create no obligation against the county which a court of law can enforce.

The judgment of the court below is, therefore, affirmed.

MARY P. GREELEY, Executrix of GEORGE
P. GREELEY, Deceased, Appt.,

v.

RICHARD H. LOWE ET AL.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 58-76.)

terest and costs, etc.; that one John T. Lowe and Susan, his wife, were originally seized of the said premises by grant from the Spanish government in 1816, as a mill right, Lowe be ing then married, and his wife Susan being seized by ganancial right of an undivided half of said premises under the laws of Spain, which declared that real estate acquired by either the husband or wife during coverture by purchase, gift, or gain becomes and remains community property, and that they were seized thereof as tenants in common; that Lowe died in 1824, and the grant was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1842 (United States v. Low, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 162 [10:

District in which suit may be brought—juris-923]), that the ganancial right and title of said

diction of Federal courts-appeal.

1. Under the Act of August 13, 1888 (25 Stat. at L.

NOTE.-As to jurisdiction of United States circuit cour: depending on parties and residence, see note to Emory v. Greenough, 1: 640.

As to colorable conveyances to enable suit to be brought; motive of transfer; when no objection; coupons; residence of assignor, see note to M'Donald v. Smalley, 7: 287.

Susan Lowe has never been alienated, relinquished, or annulled, and has been duly protected and guaranteed by the treaty of 1819

As to amount necessary to give jurisdiction in circuit court cases prior to Act of 1875; amount necessary since Act of 1875; amouut in dispute, see note to Schunk v. Moline, M. & S. Co. 87: 255.