A participation by fishermen of the United States in the freedom of these waters must, notwithstanding their wonderfully reproductive capacity, tell materially on the local catch, and, while, affording to the United States fishermen a profitable employment, must seriously interfere with local success. The extra amount of bait also which is required for the supply of the United States demand for the bank fishery must have the effect of diminishing the supply of cod for the inshores, as it is well known that the presence of that fish is caused by the attraction offered by a large quantity of bait fishes, and as this quantity diminishes, the cod will resort in fewer number to the coast. The effect of this diminution may not in all probability be apparent for some years to come, and whilst United States fishermen will have the liberty of enjoying the fisheries for several years in their present teeming and remunerative state, the effects of overfishing may, after their right to participate in them has lapsed, become seriously prejudical to the interests of the local fishermen.

II. The privilege of procuring bait and supplies, refitting, drying, transshipping, &c.

Apart from the immense value to United States fishermen of participation in the Newfoundland inshore fisheries, must be estimated the important privilege of procuring bait for the prosecution of the bank and deep-sea fisheries, which are capable of unlimited expansion. With Newfoundland as a basis of operations, the right of procuring bait, refitting their vessels, drying and curing fish, procuring ice in abundance for the preservation of bait, liberty of transshipping their cargoes &c., an almost continuous prosecution of the bank fishery is secured to them. By means of these advantages, United States fishermen have acquired, by the Treaty of Washington, all the requisite facilities for increasing their fishing operations to such an extent as to enable them to supply the demand for fish food in the United States markets, and largely to furnish the other fish markets of the world, and thereby exercise a competition, which must inevitably prejudice Newfoundland exporters. It must be remembered in contrast with the foregoing, that United States fishing craft before the conclusion of the treaty of Washington, could only avail themselves of the coast of Newfoundland for obtaining a supply of wood and water for shelter and for necessary repairs in case of accident, and for no other purpose whatever; they therefore prosecuted the bank fishery under great disadvantages notwithstanding which, owing to the failure of the U. S. local fisheries, and the consequent necessity of providing a new fishing grounds, the bank fisheries have developed into a lucrative source of employment to the fishermen of the U. S. That this position is appreciated by those actively engaged in the bank fisheries is attested by the statements of competent witnesses, whose evidence will be laid before the Commission.

It is impossible to offer more convincing testimony as to the value to United States fishermen of securing the right to use the coast of Newfoundland as a basis of operations for the bank fisheries than is contained in the declaration of one who has been for six years so occupied, sailing from the ports of Salem and Gloucester, in Massachusetts, and who declares that it is of the greatest importance to

United States fishermen to procure from Newfoundland the bait necessary for those fisheries, and that such benefits can hardly be overestimated; that there will be, during the season of 1876, upwards of 200 United States vessels in Fortune Bay for bait, and that there will be upwards of 300 vessels from the United States engaged in the Grand Bank fishery; that owing to the great advantage of being able to run into Newfoundland for bait of different kinds, they are enabled to make four trips during the season; that the capelin, which may be considered as a bait, peculiar to Newfoundland, is the best which can be used for this fishery, and that a vessel would probably be enabled to make two trips during the capelin season, which extends over a period of about six weeks. The same experienced deponent is of opinion that the bank fisheries are capable of immense expansion and development, and that the privilege of getting bait on the coast of Newfoundland is indispensable for the accomplishment of this object. As an instance of the demand for bait supplies derived from the Newfoundland inshore fisheries, it may be useful to state that the average amount of this article consumed by the French fishermen, who only prosecute the bank fisheries during a period of about six months, of the year, is from $120,000 to $160,000 annually. The herring, capelin, and squid amply meet these requirements and are supplied by the people of Fortune and Placentia Bays, the produce of the Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon being insufficient to meet the demand.

It is evident from the above considerations that not only are the United States fishermen almost entirely dependent on the bait supply from Newfoundland, now open to them for the successful prosecution of the bank fisheries, but also that they are enabled, through the privileges conceded to them, by the treaty of Washington, to largely increase the number of their trips, and thus considerably augment the profits of the enterprise. This substantial advantage is secured at the risk, as before mentioned, of hereafter depleting the bait supplies of the Newfoundland inshores, and it is but just that a substantial equivalent should be paid by those who profit thereby.

We are therefore warranted in submitting to the commissioners that not only should the present actual advantages derived on this head by United States fishermen be taken into consideration, but also the probable effect of the concessions made in their favor. The inevitable consequence of these concessions will be to attract a larger amount of United States capital and enterprise following the profits already made in this direction, and the effect will be to inflict an injury on the local fishermen, both by the increased demand on their sources of supply and by competition with them in their trade with foreign markets.

III. The advantage of a free market for fish and fish-oil in Newfoundland.

It might at first sight appear from the return of fish exports from the United States to Newfoundland, that this privilege was of little or no value; indeed, the duties, when collected on this article, were of insignificant amount. There is, however, an important benefit conferred by it on United States fishermen engaged in the Bank fisheries. In fishing on the banks in deep sea, heretofore large quantities of small fish were thrown overboard as comparatively useless when large

fish suitable for the United States market could be obtained in abundance; this practice was highly prejudicial to the fishing grounds. Under the Washington Treaty, two objects are obtained: first a market for the small fish at remunerative prices in Newfoundland; and secondly, the preservation of the fishing grounds.

It is evident that, although at the present time United States fishermen have been in enjoyment of the privileges conferred by the Treaty of Washington only for a short period, and may not have availed themselves to the full extent of this privilege, the actual profits derived thereby, and which, in certain instances, will be substantiated before the commissioners by the evidence of competent witnesses, will be more fully appreciated during the remaining years of the existence of the right, and this item must form a part of the claim of Newfoundland against the United States."

AWARD OF THE FISHERY COMMISSION UNDER THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, MAY 8TH, 1871.

The undersigned Commissioners appointed under Articles XXII and XXIII of the Treaty of Washington of the 8th of May, 1871, to determine, having regard to the privileges accorded by the United States to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, as stated in Articles XIX and XXI of said treaty, the amount of any compensation which in their opinion ought to be paid by the Government of the United States to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, in return for the privileges accorded to the citizens of the United States under Article XVIII of the said treaty;

Having carefully and impartially examined the matters referred to them according to justice and equity, in conformity with the solemn declaration made and subscribed by them on the fifteenth day of June, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-seven:

Award the sum of five millions five hundred thousand dollars, in gold, to be paid by the Government of the United States to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty in accordance with the provisions of the said treaty.

Signed at Halifax, this twenty-third day of November, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-seven.

MAURICE DELFOSSE.
A. T. GALT.

The United States Commissioner is of opinion that the advantages accruing to Great Britain under the Treaty of Washington are greater than the advantages conferred on the United States by said treaty, and he cannot therefore concur in the conclusions announced by his colleagues.

And the American Commissioner deems it his duty to state further that it is questionable whether it is competent for the board to make an award under the treaty, except with the unanimous consent of its members.

a Ib.

p. 103-106.

E. H. KELLOGG, Commissioner.

b Ib. p. 76.

RECIPROCAL TRADE WITH BRITISH COLONIES.

Extract from Haliburton's "Historical and Analytical Account of Nova Scotia," pub. 1829.

CHAPTER VIII.

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF COLONIAL TRADE-TABLES EXHIBITING COMPARATIVE STATEMENTS OF THE TRADE OF NOVA-SCOTIA AT DIFFERENT

PERIODS-REVENUE, &C.

When America was first discovered, the motives which induced individuals to migrate to the Colonies, were, in some instances, the mines and precious metals, and in others relief from religious persecution; but the parent state had no definite object in view. Public opinion was much divided, as to the expediency of engaging in these transatlantic settlements. Hume informs us, that "speculative reasoners during that early age, raised many objections to the planting of these remote Colonies, and foretold that after draining the mother countries of inhabitants, they would soon shake off her yoke, and erect an independent government in America." The British Colonies, therefore, owe their origin more to fortuitous circumstances and civil commotions, than to the wisdom or policy of the government of that day, and the opinion which is generally entertained, that they were founded for the extension of commerce, and for markets for British Goods, is erroneous. So late as 1622, the exports of England were £2,320,436, and the imports £2,619,315. We may also form some opinion of the state of her manufactures, by the condition of her agriculture, inasmuch as it furnishes the materials for the labour of art. The sudden transitions so often mentioned by historians, from the lowest to the highest price of grain at that time, and the prodigious inequalities in its value in different years, are sufficient proof that the produce entirely depended on the seasons, and that skill had done nothing to fence against the injuries of the heavens. The nation was dependent on Foreigners for bread, and if ever the supplies from the Baltic, or from France, were interrupted, the bad consequences were felt by the whole kingdom. Manufactures were few, and those but indifferent. Naval stores and ships were both supplied by their neighbours. Germany furnished all articles of metal, even to nails. Wine, paper, linens, and an infinite variety of other articles, came from France. Markets, therefore, were not wanting to those who were themselves importers. From this it is obvious, that accidental circumstances and not political foresight, gave birth to the Anglo American Provinces; and an attentive perusal of the history of that time, will convince us that the restrictions of Colonial Trade owe their origin to the same causes, and not to national avarice or illiberality. The first European settlements were scattered and weak, and it became necessary to shun the observations of strangers, who might be invited to attack, by the certainty of success, or to plunder, by the knowledge of the value of the booty. Boundaries were unsettled and titles insecure, and possession informal or incomplete; and as the interests of the Colonies of the several nations, and their respective claims, were adverse, the inclinations of the contending parties became hostile, and little or no mutual inter

course was allowed. This spirit of jealous exclusion, though natural at first, grew confirmed by habit, and in time gave rise to that refined and complicated system of monopoly, with which the trade of every American colony has been fettered and restrained-Spain gave the first example, and in the exclusion of foreigners, took to herself not only the trade of her colonies, but even the manufacture of the articles of primary necessity for their supply. She would not permit them to make any efforts in industry, that might interfere with her own productions and these restrictions extended to the culture of the grape and the olive, which were inhibited by severe penalties. Great Britain soon perceiving that great advantages were to be derived from the commerce of America, followed, with many liberal modifications, the policy of Spain, and monopoly became the principle of her Colonial intercourse. This was three-fold-monopoly of supply, monopoly of provincial produce, and monopoly of manufacture. By the first, the Colonists could not resort to foreign markets.-By the second they were obliged to carry their staple commodities to the mother country; and by the third, to carry them in a raw state to be manufactured, and then sent back to them for their own consumption.

In practice many indulgencies have, from time to time, been extended to her transatlantic possessions; but in theory, this principle has been carried to the most unlimited and extravagant extent. The Earl of Chatham asserted in Parliament "that the British Colonists in America had no right to manufacture even a nail for a horse-shoe." To render the account of the trade, at present enjoyed by this Province, intelligible to those not engaged in mercantile pursuits, it will be necessary, and I hope acceptable to the generality of readers, to give, as briefly as is consistent with perspecuity, an historical sketch of the origin and principal changes of the commercial system of the Colonies, previous to the new navigation laws. First-as regarded the trade between them and Europe; secondly, between the Colonies themselves; and thirdly between them and the United States.

First. As it regarded the trade between them and Europe, the foundation upon which this intricate system was built, was the famous statute, called, by way of eminence, the navigation act, the rudiments of which were framed in 1650. The resistance offered by Barbadoes to Oliver Cromwell, and its attachment to Charles the 2nd, occasioned the prohibition of all foreign ships from trading with the English plantations, and of the importation of Goods into England or its dependencies, in any other than English bottoms, or in ships of that European nation of which the merchandize imported was the genuine produce and manufacture. At the restoration, notwithstanding the origin of the act, those provisions were continued by the 12th C. 2nd, Chap. 18, with this very material addition, that the master and three fourths of the crew should be English subjects, and that certain articles, therein enumerated, the production of any English Colony, in Asia, Africa, or America, should not be exported to any place, except to some other English plantation, or to England, Ireland, Wales or Berwick. Three years afterwards these restrictions were extended and strengthened by the 15th C. 2d, Chap. 7, which, after stating that plantations were formed of citizens of the Mother Country, declares the motive of the act to be "the maintaining a greater correspondence and kindness between the subjects at home,