tenant Colonel Plumb, who commanded the regiment, did all in his power to punish the savages, but his best efforts fell far short of accomplishing anything decisive. It was finally agreed that this regiment should be relieved by Stagg's brigade, but this body of troops was long on the road and the Eleventh Kansas were not relieved until in August. During June and July, it was estimated that fully seventy-five men, women and children were killed by Indians between Big Laramie and Bridger Pass Stations and more than 1,000 head of stock were run off at the same time. On the line between Julesburg and Denver many persons were killed. The boasted superiority of the white soldiers was not apparent that season, for the savages kept the record more than even. On August 11th, the Sixth West Virginia and the Twenty-first New York were ordered to the mail line, the former to Fort Laramie and the latter between Collins and Sulphur Springs, but the order was changed and later both were sent to Fort Laramie. The Twentyfirst New York was camped some time at Julesburg. On August 14th, the Indians made a raid on Big Laramie Station and ran off a lot of horses and mules. They were pursued by troops, but the stock was not recovered. On the 16th, the stage company re-distributed their stock on the line between Fort Collins and Bridger Pass and for a time it looked as if the Indians would permit it to remain there, but on August 25th, 400 Indians appeared again on the line at Willow Springs but it was soon discovered by the soldiers that they were headed for the Powder River country, having heard that General Connor's forces were in that section. Shortly after, Indians were seen going north from all points and all were in haste. Runners had come down to recall the marauding bands, and for a time the mail line was left in peace.

BLOODY YEAR ON THE PLAINS-[CONTINUED].

TROOPS OPERATING AGAINST SAVAGES-DIVIDED INTO SMALL DETACHMENTS-REDMEN HAVE THINGS THEIR OWN WAY-INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE INDIAN QUESTION-THE POWDER RIVER CAMPAIGN DISCUSSED AND DETERMINED BY GENERALS POPE, DODGE AND CONNOR -GENERAL CONNOR ISSUES HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO COLONEL COLE AND MAKES KNOWN HIS PLAN OF CAMPAIGN-DEPARTURE Of the EXPEDITION-CAPTAIN GEORGE F. PRICE LEFT IN COMMAND AT FORT LARAMIE-POPE ABOLISHES THE DISTRICT OF THE PLAINS— ASSIGNS CONNOR TO THE DISTRICT OF UTAH-GENERAL F. WHEATON ASSIGNED TO THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA WITH HEADQUARTERS AT FORT LARAMIE-INDIAN DEPREDATIONS ON THE TELEGRAPH AND MAIL LINE AFTER GENERAL CONNOR'S DEPARTURE FOR POWDER RIVER.

The operations against Indians by the government had reached large proportions by the 1st of July, 1865. A considerable column of troops was operating south of the Arkansas. Another force on the north side of that river and still another on the Smoky Hill and Republican. Besides those mentioned there were troops in Colorado, and a still larger force in Nebraska. In what is now Wyoming and the two Dakotas there was even a greater number than the combined armies employed in Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado. The various tribes of the mountains and plains had little difficulty in holding their own against the troops in the field. The war had developed great leaders among the savages. These chieftains had secured by their peculiar methods of attacking trains, stage coaches and stations along the mail routes, a large number of arms and a corresponding amount of ammunition. By making war a trade and their chief business in life, they had succeeded to an extent that surprised even themselves. With great forethought they had planned to keep their families in the wilderness, away from danger, so that they could operate against the whites

without being annoyed by the care of the helpless ones. They carried on, what would be termed among white men, a gorilla warfare and it was impossible for the government to successfully operate against them for the reason that they refused to be brought to battle. It is useless to deny that they were a source of much annoyance to the government. They knew the country thoroughly and managed to fight the troops sent against them on battle fields chosen by themselves. The laws of civilized warfare were unknown to them and consequently they took advantage of every cir cumstance that would permit of the capture of emigrant trains containing men, women, children and merchandise. The men were killed and scalped, the women were carried into a captivity that was worse than death, the children were sometimes killed but oftener carried to their villages in the mountains to be brought up as savages. Emigrants too often ventured across the plains badly armed or in such small numbers as to be an easy prey to war parties. To add to the difficulties there was too often bad judgment used by military commanders who had charge of the war against Indians. Plans of campaigns were made and carried out which fell far short of reaching the desired end. The officers in the east who had the management of campaigns against western Indians, as a rule, little understood the more modern Indian. The savage was continuously underated, that is his ability to conduct war. The fact that the hostiles in some respects had made rapid strides in the arts of war seemed to be entirely unknown to those who managed our armies. Five or ten men were expected to guard a stage station that was certain to be attacked by ten or twenty times their number, and the same thing applied to guards furnished to trains and mail coaches. The soldiers, as a matter of course, were continually getting the worst of it. Regiments sent on this service melted away. Not only were our soldiers killed, but the savages were encouraged to keep up the war because they were successful. A few of the officers understood the situation, and recommended the employment of a large force to hunt down the

savages and conquer a peace, but this plan was objected to because war on such a scale meant the expenditure of millions of dollars. Then we had in the eastern country a peace party, that is a class who were opposed to killing Indians. They considered and argued that a great Christian government was in poor business when it sent men to the plains to butcher Indians. We heard a great deal about robbing Indians of their lands and driving them from their homes. They claimed that when white people were killed by the natives it was a misfortune, but that the poor, untutored savage could not be blamed; that the duty of the government was to civilize and Christianize these red men, but under no circumstances was it justifiable to kill them. When pressed closely they always ended up with the argument that white people had no right in the Indian country and if they were killed it was their own fault. These men were the impracticables; they refused to see that as society and civilization existed and had existed since the landing of the May Flower, the Indian must give way to a force that was as irresistable as the power which placed the sun in the heavens. Colonists who settled Cape Cod and all New England wrested the land from the native tribes. The Jamestown Colony did the same thing, and so the conquest went on until all the land east of the Missouri was acquired. There was but a single exception and that was the Schuylkill settlement of Pennsylvania. William Penn bought his land with cheap trinkets, and for this he was called honest and a Christian in his dealings though he paid not a tenth of the price per acre that was afterwards paid by the government to the wild tribes for the lands beyond the Missouri.

Up to midsummer 1865, Generals Pope, Dodge and Connor were of one mind in regard to methods to be employed in bringing the hostiles to terms. Connor had said that the soldiers must hunt them down like wolves before any attempt should be made to form a treaty. This, in his judgment, was the only way to secure lasting peace. He wanted the government to reward good Indians, but to punish bad ones with a heavy hand. General Pope, as I have shown in

a previous chapter, argued somewhat the same way and instructed the generals under him to follow out this method of warfare in the campaigns against the Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahoes and some other tribes. Not only did he approve of the plans submitted to him by General Dodge (these were Connor's) but he urged the campaign pushed forward without delay. On July 28th General Connor issued his instructions to Colonel Cole, who was to have command of the right column of the army invading the Powder River country. The troops which were to compose this column were the Second Missouri Light Artillery, equipped as cavalry, 797 officers and men; Twelfth Missouri Cavalry, 311 officers and men; total 1,108; one section of three-inch rifle guns and a train of 140 six-mule wagons. The mules furnished were unbroken and the drivers were equally as bad as the mules. The route was by way of Columbus, then up the north bank of the Loup, thence to the Niobrara River and up that stream to the head waters of Wounded Knee Creek, from thence down the valley to White Earth River, where they struck the old trail of the American Fur Company, used by General Harney in 1855. This trail was followed to the South Fork of Cheyenne River when a northwest course was taken which led to Belle Fourche River. The expedition followed up this stream to White Wood Creek and from thence directly west to Pine Creek, where it was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker of the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry, who was in charge of the center column of invasion, and his command consisted of 700 cavalry, which had left Fort Laramie on August 2nd, passing through the Black Hills. The left column was commanded by Colonel J. H. Kidd, Sixth Michigan Cavalry, and composed of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, ninety officers and men; Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, ninety officers and men; Sixth Michigan Cavalry, 200 officers and men, and Pawnee Scouts, ninety-five officers and men, total 475. The west column was commanded by Capt. Albert Brown, Second California Cavalry, composed of Second California Cavalry, 116 officers and men and Omaha Scouts, 84 officers and men, total 200. Each