In H0 Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Sawy. 552, specially relied on by the defendants, the point decided was that the board of supervisors of San Francisco had no authority over the sanitary condition of the county jail. Hence an ordinance requiring a prisoner’s hair to be clipped, whether as an additional penalty or a sanitary regulation, was an excess of authority. In Budd v. State, 3 Humph. 483, the indictment was held to be insufficient; the court adding that, if the offense had been properly charged, an act making it a felony for an officer or servant of a particular bank to embezzle its funds, and which did not apply to the officers and servants of all banking corporations, would be unconstitutional. The case of State v. Dufly, 7 Nev. 342, involved an act excluding negroes from public schools, which was, to that extent, held to be in conflict with the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States. In the remaining cases cited the acts considered were held not to be unconstitutional.

Very instructive remarks are found in many of the opinions, but we fail to find among them a case similar to or decisive of the question before us; and we do not know of any case which decides that, in a penal statute, there may not be special regulations for particular trades. Nor is it necessary, in our view of the case, that we should. The defendant’s contention rests solely upon the ground that the penalty upon pharmacists is distinct and exclusive, and that they are thereby exempted from the provisions of section 8. If they are not thus exempted, there is no discrimination against the defendant, and the question of the constitutionality of section 5 does not arise until a case is brought under it.

The underlying and controlling question, then, is whether the penalty in section 5 is distinct and conclusive, or whether it is cumulative. If it is cumulative, it.may be void as to those upon whom it bears unequally, without affecting section 8, which is general and equal. The two sections are not so interwoven that they cannot be separated. If section 5 be cumulative, we do not need to say what itsefl‘ect upon the law would ,be if it were otherwise. It is an elementary proposition that courts only determine, by construction, the scope and intent of a law when the law itself is ambiguous or doubtful. If a law is plain, and within the legislative power, it declares itself, and nothing is left for interpretation. It is as binding upon the court as upon every citizen. To allow a court, in such a case, to say that the law must mean something different from the common import of its language, because the court may think that its penalties are unwise or harsh, would make the judicial superior to the legislative branch of the government, and practically invest it with the ; law-making power. The remedy for a harsh law is not in interpretation, .' but in amendment or repeal. It is also an elementary rule that, in the ‘ interpretation of statutes, a court must look to the language of the law. If this be plain, it must be followed, and in doing this the court does not assume that the legislature meant to enact incongruous and repugnant provisions. ,

The language of section 8 is so general and direct that we can neither disregard it, nor say that it is so ambiguous as to need interpretation. It is: “If any person shall sell,” etc., “in violation of any of the provisions of this act.” This is broad enough to include, and by its terms does include, pharmacists and everybody else who shall violate the act in any way. It contains no exception. If we were to say that it does not include pharmacists, we should import an exception into the section contrary to its terms. We should turn aside from its broad terms to follow a conjecture or assumption that the legislature must have intended an exception, from the fact that another punishment is provided for pharmacists who violate the act. The legislature expresses its meaning by the words of the law; and when it says, “If any person shall sell in violation of any of the provisions of this act,” we cannot suppose it intended to exclude pharmacists. It is not claimed that this language, in itself, transcends any recognized limit of legislative power, so as to call for the interpolation of words which it must be presumed were meant to be included, but which were omitted.

The defendant contends, however, that we must assume that pharmacists are excepted from the section because they are excepted from section 7, which provides a penalty for sales to minors. But this is not so. Section 7 does not except pharmacists, but only sales made “as provided in section 4.” A pharmacist who should sell to a minor otherwise than “as provided in section 4” would be liable to the penalty of section 7. The exception applies to the manner of the sale, and not to the person who may make it. Under section 4, pharmacists may sell to minors, for medicinal purposes, upon a physician’s prescription, and a written request from a parent or guardian. Hence the section forbidding all sales to minors must necessarily except a sale in the manner permitted. There is no discrimination or class legislation in this, nor any exemption from the penalty to any person who violates the provision.

Considering section 8 as including every person who violates the law, it follows that an additional provision prescribing a special penalty for transgressing certain limits of authority must be regarded as imposing a cumulative penalty. If it be urged that such a cumulative penalty is unreasonable and severe, we can only say that this is a matter which rests in the discretion of the legislature. It may have been thought that the authority given to pharmacists gave them also such peculiar opportunities to evade and violate the law as to require additional safeguards. Our conclusion is that section 8 is not in conflict with the constitution of this state or of the United States.

We may here remark that the Massachusetts statute of 1855, cap. 215, contained a special penalty for druggists, and the Maine statute (Rev. St. 1871, cap. 27) a special penalty for agents violating the law, as well as a general section like our own. In the numerous cases in which the constitutionality of those acts was brought in question, and in which they were declared to be valid, we find no suggestion that the special provision invalidated the statute. The silence of the cases on that point is significant that neither bench nor bar considered the laws objectionable on that account. See Com. v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 100, and Com. v. Hitchings, Id. 486.

Section 15 prescribes forms of complaint which may be used in pros— ecutions under the act. The defendant claims that the forms as there given do not sufficiently declare “the nature and cause of the accusation.” Whatever force there might be in the objection to complaints a1leging only what is set forth in section 15, the objection has no application to these complaints. These do not simply follow the permitted form. The sales are here charged as sales of liquor “to be used as a beverage.” This describes the one offense prohibited by the act in the first section. No authority is anywhere given in the act to sell liquors for such a purpose, and hence there is no exception to the prohibition. Nor could there be; for, if the act contained any such exception, it would therefore be in conflict with the fifth amendment to the constitution. The authority which is given to sell for other purposes, in section 3, gives no authority to sell for use as a beverage. Authority to sell for other purposes, therefore, need not be negatived in the complaints. Negative averments are not required unless an exception is made to the enacting clause. State v. Rush, 13 R. I. 198; State v. O’Donnell, 10 R. I. 472.

Inasmuch as the complaints specifically, accurately, and fully describe the offense prohibited by the enacting clause of the act, and are not in the form set forth in section 15, we are not called upon to decide, and need not discuss, the constitutionality of the section with reference to a complaint framed according to its terms. As to these cases, therefore, we decide that chapter 596 of the Public Laws is not in conflict with the constitution of this state, nor Of the United States. The cases must be remanded to the district court for sentence.

ATTACHMENT—EXEMPTION—NEoEssARIEs—PUR. ST. R. I. OH. 209, § 4, CL. 12. Pub. St. R. I. c. 209, § 4, cl. 12, exempts from attachment wages not exceed- ing $10. except when the cause of action is for necessaries. Upon action in 'debt upon judgment recovered against defendant in action in assumpsll for necessaries, held, that the cause of action is as much for necesSaries in the action in debt upon the judgment as in the action in assumpst't.

Crafts (ft Tlllinghast, for plaintiff.

PER CURIAM. Pub. St. R. I. c. 209, § 4, cl. 12, exempts from attachment “the salary or wages due or payable to any debtor, not exceeding the sum of ten dollars, except when the cause of action is for necessaries furnish ed the defendant.” The plaintiff formerly recovered a judgment against the defendant in an action of assumps'lt for necessaries furnished to him. This action is debt upon that judgment, and the writ was served in part by garnishment of $13.86, wages due the defendant. The court below charged the garnishee to the full amount disclosed. The defendant excepted, and now contends that the court erred in so charging, because the cause of action was the judgment, and not neces

saries furnished. We think there was no error. Strictly speaking, the cause of action in the first suit was the promise of the defendant, express or implied, to pay the amount due for necessaries, and in the second suit the judgment against the defendant for the amount due for necessaries. We cannot see Why the cause of action is not as much for necessaries furnished in the second suit as in the first. The meaning of the statute is that any person who has furnished another with necessaries shall have the right to attach the latter’s wages to their full amount. We cannot see any reason why we should not give effect to this meaning when the action is on a judgment as well as when it is on the original promise.

The evidence to show that the judgment was for necessaries is admissible, under Pub. Laws R. I. c. 433, § 2. Exceptions overruled.

COTTRELL o. BABCOCK PRINTING-PRESS MANUF’G Co.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. June 18, 1886.)

1. PARTNERSHIP—DISSOLUTION—RIGHTS 0F PARTNERS—Goon-WILL.

A partner who, upon dissolution oi the partnership, purchases the goodwill, secures merely the right to conduct _the old business at the old stand, and, in the absence in the contract of dissolution of stipulations to the contrary, the retiring partner may lawfully establish a similar business, even in the neighborhood, and by advertisement, circular, card, and personal solicitation invite the public generally, including the customers of the old firm, to come there and purchase of him.

2. SAME—SOLICITATION OF TRADE BY RETIRING PARTNER.

But trade must be so solicited as not to lead any one to believe that the ma-\ chinery offered for sale is manufactured by the partner who purchased the goodwill, or that he is the successor to the old firm, or that the owner of the good-will is not carrying on the business formerly conducted by the old firm.

8. SAME—FINDINGS OF FACT—CONCLUSIVE ON APPEAL. ‘

The question whether or not the cards and circulars used by the retiring partner in soliciting trade are so printed as to violate this rule is a question of fact, and the fin ings of the trial court upon that point are binding on the appellate court.

Appeal from superior court, New London county.

Injunction to restrain the Babcock Printing-press Manufacturing Company, appellee, from making and selling, or advertising or offering for sale, a certain kind of printing-press, and from using a certain trade name or trade-mark, and for an account. Injunction denied. Plaintiffs appealed.

BEARDSLEY, J ., before whom the case was heard, found the following facts:

Calvert B. Cottrell and Nathan Bahcock, both residents of Stonington, in this state, formed a copartnership in 1855 under the name of Cottrell do Babcock, and carried on the business of manufacturing and selling machinery at the town of Stonington. In 1867 they commenced to manufacture and sell printing-presses and printing machinery, and so continued up to July, 1880. The firm manufactured lithographic stop-cylinder, two-revolution, and drumcylinder printing-presses. The presses so manufactured and sold embodied many novel mechanical features and devices which were of great utility and value, by reason of which the presses became widely known among publishers e O 792 ATLANTIC REPORTER. [Conn.

and printers. The firm expended large sums Of money in perfecting the mechanical arrangements and devices embodied in their printing-presses, and also in advertising the presses. The printing-presses, while manufactured by the firm, had cast upon their frames the words “Cottrell & Babcock, ” and were stamped, marked, advertised, and sold in large quantities, and were known in the market, and to printers, publishers, and purchasers, as the “Cottrell & Babcock” printing-presses.

In July, 1880, the copartnership was dissolved by mutual consent. On the twenty-seventh day of that month the following agreement was entered into between Cottrell and Babcock:

“Whereas, the copartnership heretofore existing under the name of Cottrell & Babcock has been by mutual consent dissolved; and whereas, the said Nathan Babcock has preferred his petition to Hon. JOHN D. PARK, judge of the superior court, for the appointment of a receiver of the partnership assets; and whereas, in order to settle and determine all differences existing between said partners relative to their settlement Of their partnership accounts and respective interests in said firm,—they mutually agree as follows:

“First. That the said Nathan Babcock agrees to sell, assign, transfer, and convey to said Calvert B. Cottrell all his right, title, and interest in and to the partnership assets of every name and nature, including all patent-rights, good-will, and trade-marks, whether in his own name or in the copartnership name, for the sum Of $29,000 in cash, and the transfer to him of eighty-four shares of the capital stock of the w Williamsburg & Flatbush Railroad Company, now held by William B. aite as security for the sum of about $1,600, upon the release by said Waite of said stock upon the payment of said sum as security for which it is now held, and the agreement of the said Calvert B. Cottrell to assume and pay all the debts and liabilities of said firm of every description.

“Second. The said Calvert B. Cottrell agrees to pay the said $29,000 as follows: $3,000 within ten days; $13,000, with interest, within sixty days; and the balance of $13,000, with interest, within ninety days. And within ten days from date the said Calvert B. Cottrell agrees to transfer to the said Bahcock, as aforesaid, the said eighty-four shares of stock Of said railroad company, and further agrees that he will assume and pay all the indebtedness and liabilities of said firm, Of every description, as they fall due, and save the said Babcock harmless therefrom, and from all costs, loss, or damage on account Of the same.

“Third. That said Calvert B. Cottrell further agrees that he will, on or before the first day of January, 1882, remove the savings bank mortgage, which was given to secure a debt of said copartnership by said Nathan Babcock upon his residence, and that as soonas practicable, and within the time limited by the trust deed, he will procure the said property to be released from the incumbrance of the conveyance in trust to Thomas Greenman, to secure said partnership creditors.

“Fourth. The said Nathan Babcock agrees that, upon the full payment of said $29,000 as stipulated, and the transfer of said eighty-four shares of stock as aforesaid, the said Babcock will execute and deliver to said Calvert B. Cottrell any and all instruments of transfer necessary and proper to convey to said Cottrell all Of said Babcock’s interest in and to the assets and property before mentioned, but without recourse to him, including all rights pertaining to the same, of whatsoever description.

“Fifth. It is expressly understood that no Obligation shall be contracted, and no business carried on, in the name of Cottrell 80 Babcock, except as hereinafter provided. .

“Sixth. The said Calvert B. Cottrell agrees that, upon the conveyance by said Babcock to him as hereinbefore stated, the railroad stock and the Paw