were in a most satisfactory condition; the State, the capital, and the country entirely safe" &c &c &c. We found the Governor's family gone, his mansion deserted, the entire machinery of his government removed, and we, who had come well nigh a thousand miles to assist in defending that government were left, without the assistance, support, countenance, or even the presence of its head.

At the railroad depot our eyes rested upon a sea of anxious and affrighted faces. The entire community of Jackson was in motion, and it was the movement of alarm. Every mode of conveyance was in requisition. Entire households were fleeing from the approaching tread of the invader. Confusion, fear, consternation ran riot. Terror reigned supreme.

The President had counted largely on the militia. It was nowhere to be found. The example set by the Governor, its Commander-in-chief, appeared to have been followed with entire unanimity. We certainly saw no members of that arm of the service. The "Exempts" from whom also much was expected were shadows, exempt from the weight and responsibilities of fleshly forms. Exempts in name, they were exempts in fact.

We drove to the hotel. There the intelligence first reached us that telegraphic communication with Vicksburg had been interrupted by the enemy. Shortly after we learned that railroad communication had shared a similar fate.

Genl. Gregg, a brave but inexperienced Brigadier General, in command of the forces in and around Jackson, soon called. He told us that the enemy 25000 strong, had thrown himself between us and Vicksburg. The head of his advancing columns looked towards Jackson. The General assembled such Chiefs of department as were here. The commissary reported a considerable amount of stores, the chief of ordnance, a large amt. of ammunition. The Quartermaster a sad deficiency in transportation. The Medical stores had been sent the day before to Mobile. Much of the public property, machinery &c had already been removed. Genl. Gregg reported his entire available force at less than five thousand men. They were sore, and none too well in hand after a sharp engagement at Clinton the day before. They were being gradually driven back by a largely superior force. They were retiring upon a City without natural defences, and the works which had been constructed around Jackson were not worthy the name of fortifications. Even these were unfinished. There was much straggling. There was some demoralization. There were many sick. Such was our situation. General Johnston left Tallahoma, Tenn. on May 10th to take

command of forty-two thousand men-Pemberton's force. He reached Jackson on the 13th May, to find an army of less than five thousand, rank and file.

He had been promised heavy re-inforcements. Some were on their way-a few had arrived. The movements of the enemy made it doubtful whether the remainder could effect a junction with Gregg's forces.

Night settled upon the City. A heavy rain fell. The darkness which enveloped the physical world, was not more impenetrable than the gloom which oppressed the mind of every member of our little family except that of its majestic head. Johnston alone remained calm. He reminded me of Albert Sydney Johnston as he rode down upon the ensanguined field of Shiloh. His mind was clear as a bell. I never saw a brain act with a quicker or more sustained movement, or one which exhibited a finer sweep or more striking power. No one could have witnessed the interview with his officers without having the idea of Johnston's greatness indelibly impressed upon his mind. In the majority of these officers, he met incompetency or inexperience. In the bulk of his troops he saw defective discipline; in some, positive demoralization. Others were raw. I cannot conceive surroundings more intensely depressing. Yet amidst them all, he preserved the elastic step and glowing brow of the genuine hero. His plans were speedily matured.

At nine o'clock the following telegram was sent to the Secy. of War. "The enemy is in force between here and Vicksburg. Communication is cut off. I am too late." (The italics are mine. Telegrams you know cant be italicised.) "Too late"! Pregnant words! What a wide meaning they contained! How time has added to their significance, and events to their scope! Too late to assume in person the command of the army he had hastened from Tennessee to direct. Too late to form a junction with Genl. Pemberton. Too late to prevent the dismemberment of his army. Too late to secure concentration of his troops. Too late for cooperation. Too late with the promised reinforcements. Too late to thwart the purposes of the enemy. Too late to save Jackson from occupation, to save Port Hudson from siege; to save Vicksburg from investment. Might I not add that the Government realized when too late the danger which threatened this department. That it awoke when too late to the imperilled condition of the army here? "Too late"! Prophetic words! How rapidly they have become a historical formula!

At ten o'clock a courier started for General Pemberton with a letter of which I give the substance: "I have information

that Genl. Sherman, with four divisions is between us at Clinton. It is important to re-establish communication. Without it, you cannot be re-inforced. If practicable" (italics are mine) "come upon the enemy's rear at once. It would be of immense value to beat such a detachment. The troops here could cooperate. All the strength you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all important."

Orders were issued that commissary and other stores should be loaded, and the transportation held in readiness to move, awaiting developments of the enemy. The busines of the most anxious and trying night of my life being concluded, I suggested bed. The General lay down, and in a few moments was asleep. His health, which you know I had been sent down to look after, had been unaffected by the very fatiguing journey, and his strength proved quite sufficient for our first evening in Jackson.

I think it is apparent that at the time Genl. Johnston penned the letter to Pemberton, he believed the purpose of the enemy to be simply to destroy Pemberton's communications, prevent concentration of his troops, cut off reinforcements and supplies. To defeat the full realization of this purpose, and to strike a blow which would end the campaign, the letter urged upon Pemberton the value of time and the importance of concentrating; and ordered that, if practicable, he should attack the enemy in the rear. In such a movement, Gregg's troops could have cooperation. The value of a victory over a detachment of such size could not be over-estimated. It would have been incalculable. At midnight, such a victory seemed within reach. At daylight, intelligence was sent us by Genl. Gregg that the enemy had recommenced his advance. Our forces were deployed for the purpose of retarding his progress while the stores were being removed. About nine o'clock, the work of evacuation began. The enemy came slowly and with great caution. Gregg's command behaved well. The 46th Ga. and the 24th S. C.-two splendid regts. now for the first time under fire, are reported to have conducted themselves with much gallantry. They sustained considerable loss in wounded-very few were killed.

At one o'clock our forces had reached the city. The stores had been saved. The enemy was in sight. Soon his vast columns were seen entering Jackson on the West, as we, with our little army, moved out North on the Canton road. This, was at one o'clock and thirty minutes. Our road lay at right angles to that by which the enemy was approaching. On an eminence about a mile from town, and overlooking it, we halted.

In a few moments a dense volume of smoke, from the direction of the railroad depot, was seen slowly mounting into the air. A messenger announced that the enemy had fired the depot and surrounding buildings, and was engaged in tearing up the railroad track. Silently we returned to the road, and mingling with the infantry, resumed our way towards Canton. At three o'clock the Federal flag floated from the dome of the State House of Mississippi. Rain fell at intervals throughout the afternoon. The enemy did not pursue, and we bivouacked seven miles from Jackson.

Throughout the silent watches of the night, the twinkling stars looked down upon the merciless conflagration kindled by the enemy. Much of Jackson was laid in ashes.

The messenger who had started with the despatch for Pemberton was a young man of fine intelligence and thoroughly acquainted with the country. He promised that it should be delivered before sunrise the next morning, the 14th. In language and intent the letter was mandatory. Celerity of movement, economy of time, concentration of all troops within easy reach was ordered. The practicability of the movement could be decided alone by Pemberton and its decision was entrusted to him. He received the despatch at sunrise. At that very moment the head of McPherson's Corps was within sight of the spires of Jackson. Gregg, who had felt it, estimated it at 25000 strong. A body of the enemy, believed to be a corps, had encamped near Big Black river, and putting himself on the defensive, lay within a few miles of Pemberton's lines. The Federal army had thus divided itself. A distance of twenty miles was by the act of their own commander placed between the column which had fought Gregg and entered Jackson and that which confronted Pemberton on the Big Black river.

The 14th and 15th of May were most critical days in the history of the Mississippi campaign. Their hours were made up of golden moments. They sped away without a movement. Had Pemberton concentrated and attacked, the Confederates, for almost the first time in the history of War, would have outnumbered the enemy. The detachment in his front was a smaller force than his own, and was separated by twenty miles from chance of support.

Throughout the 14th we were in hourly expectation of a messenger from Pemberton, announcing his intention to attack the enemy at dawn on the 15th. Had he struck this blow, he would have crushed a large detachment of Grant's army, and made a vast stride towards ending the campaign. Gregg's little

force was held in readiness to co-operate in whatever movement Pemberton might inaugurate. The entire day and night passed without tidings from him. Meanwhile intelligence concerning the movements of the enemy was being constantly received. At eleven o'clock P.M. a courier started for Genl. Pemberton with the following letter:

"May 14th 9 P.M. In the evacuation of Jackson, the necessity of taking the Canton Road, at right angles with that by which the enemy approached, an obstinate was made impossible. A body of the enemy is reported this morning to have reached Raymond last night, and to have advanced from that direction. Despatches have been sent to Gen. Gist, to assemble the coming reinforcements at a point 40 or 50 miles from Jackson. Gen. Maxey was directed to return to his wagons and ensure the safety of his command by uniting with Genl. Gist. The troops under Gregg will, I hope, be able to prevent the enemy in Jackson from drawing provisions from the North-those under Gist to keep him from the country on the East. Can he supply himself from the Mississippi? Can't you cut him off from it? And above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, can't you beat him? When the reinforcements are all in, no time must be lost in uniting them to the rest of the army. Would it not be better to place the forces to support V.Burg between Genl. Loring and that place, and merely observe the ferries; so that you might unite if opportunity to fight presents itself? If prisoners are to be believed, the forces at Jackson must be half of Grant's army. It would decide the campaign to beat it."

We

Genl. Johnston retired soon after writing this letter. occupied the same room. At nine o'clock the messenger who had started from Jackson with the letter to Gen. P. overtook us on the road, and handed the General a despatch from Gen. P. of which the following is the substance: "Edwards Depot, 5.40 P.M. May 14th. I will move to-morrow morning with 17000 men to Dillon's, 91⁄2 miles from this point, and 71⁄2 below Raymond, on the road from the latter place to port Gibson, with the view of cutting off the enemy's communications, and forcing him to attack me, as I do not think my force sufficient to justify my attacking him in position, or attempting to cut my way to Jackson.

Genl. Johnston immediately returned the following reply: "Our movement to the North renders your plan of junction by Raymond impracticable. You will change your direction and