The Politics and Law of Term LimitsEdward H. Crane, Roger Pilon Cato Institute, 1994 - 163 էջ Eighty percent of the American people say congressional terms should be limited. Fifteen states have already done so, and efforts are spreading to more states and hundreds of cities. Would term limits be a good idea? Would they be constitutional? The Politics and Law of Term Limits presents both sides of the issue and lets the reader decide. Contributors include syndicated columnist George F. Will, League of Women Voters president Becky Cain, Thomas E. Mann of the Brookings Institution, constitutional scholar Ronald D. Rotunda, and former White House counsel Lloyd Cutler, among others. The Founding Fathers did not include term limits in the Constitution because they thought citizen legislators, not professional politicians, would be the rule, and an overwhelming number of voters from every demographic group in the nation believe that should be the case today. Problems such as the burgeoning federal deficit indicate that careerism and legislative "experience" may not be all they are cracked up to be. Proponents of term limits argue that abolishing careerism would open the political process to a new type of candidate - the aspiring citizen legislator - who wishes to take a brief time out from his or her work to make a contribution to society. But opponents of term limits counter that such a change would induce an unhealthy dependence on congressional aides and professional lobbyists. Who is correct? You decide. |
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| 5 | |
| 17 | |
| 29 | |
Term Limits Not the Answer to What Ails Politics | 47 |
Restoring The University in Rotation An Essay in Defense of Term Limitation | 59 |
Congressional Term Limits A Bad Idea Whose Time Should Never Come | 85 |
The Constitutionality of StateImposed Term Limits for Federal Office | 101 |
State TermLimits Laws and the Constitution | 111 |
Congressional Term Limits and the Constitution | 127 |
A Commentary on the Constitutionality of Term Limits | 143 |
INDEX | 159 |
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Common terms and phrases
additional qualifications amateurs American argue argument ballot ballot-access Becky Cain campaign finance reform candidates career Cato Institute challengers citizen legislature competition congressional term limits constitutionality Convention debate delegates Deliberative Democracy democracy democratic disqualified district electoral enacted ex rel exclusive experience F.Supp Federalist Fourteenth Amendment Framers Hamilton House of Representatives impose term limits incumbents issue Joseph Story League of Women limit the terms lobbyists Madison Malbin Mann members of Congress ment officeholders opponents of term party percent Petracca political politicians poll Powell President professional prohibition proposed qualifications clauses qualifications for office quasi-term limits regulation representation representative democracy republican requirements Roger Pilon rotation in office Rotunda rule served sional spending Supreme Court term-limits laws term-limits legislation term-limits movement Thomas Mann Thorsted tion tive turnover U.S. Constitution U.S. representatives U.S. Senate U.S. Term Limits unconstitutional Victor Kamber violate vote Washington Women Voters
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Էջ 63 - No state shall be represented in congress by less than two nor by more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United States, for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any kind.
Էջ 76 - While acting as their Representative, I shall be governed by their will on all subjects upon which I have the means of knowing what their will is ; and upon all others I shall do what my own judgment teaches me will best advance their interests.
Էջ 62 - That the legislative and executive powers of the State should be separate and distinct from the judiciary; and that the members of the two first may be restrained from oppression, by feeling and participating the burdens of the people, they should, at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return into that body from which they were originally taken, and the vacancies be supplied by frequent, certain, and regular elections, in which all, or any part of the former members, to be again eligible,...
Էջ 96 - Had the intent of the Framers emerged from these materials with less clarity, we would nevertheless have been compelled to resolve any ambiguity in favor of a narrow construction of the scope of Congress' power to exclude members-elect. A fundamental principle of our representative democracy is, in Hamilton's words, "that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.
Էջ 37 - It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust.
Էջ 62 - That a long continuance in the executive departments of power or trust is dangerous to liberty; a rotation therefore, in those departments is one of the best securities of permanent freedom.
Էջ 77 - Mr. DAVIE seconded the motion. Dr. FRANKLIN. It seems to have been imagined by some, that the returning to the mass of the people was degrading the magistrate. This, he thought, was contrary to republican principles. In free governments, the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors and sovereigns. For the former, therefore, to return among the latter, was not to degrade, but to promote, them.
Էջ 62 - See life dissolving vegetate again: All forms that perish other forms supply; (By turns we catch the vital breath, and die) Like bubbles on the sea of Matter borne, They rise, they break, and to that sea return.
Էջ 64 - The second feature I dislike, and greatly dislike, is the abandonment in every instance of the necessity of rotation in office, and most particularly in the case of the President. Experience concurs with reason in concluding that the first magistrate will always be re-elected if the constitution permits it. He is then an officer for life.