from it an objectionable feature, to confine the right of complaint to the same persons that would have a right to appeal, in case the matters complained of were brought to a judicial decision, i. e., to confine this right to individuals who are personally interested in the question at issue, and are thus a bona fide party, but who have not reached the point in the process where an appeal could be taken. The objectionable feature alluded to is the arraigning of a majority of an inferior judicatory before a higher tribunal, by their brethren of the minority. Judges in a Court of Jesus Christ, complaining of other judges, who ought to be presumed to have acted conscientiously, though they may have erred in judgment. Who ever heard of such a proceeding in a civil court? This point is of too much importance to be disposed of in this incidental and summary manner under the head of obscurity. So, also, the question concerning the right of the lower judicatory to sit in the higher courts, in cases of appeal. We may, perhaps, discuss these questions more at length hereafter. With regard to complaints, our decided opinion is, that a minority of a judicatory should never be allowed to complain to a higher court against the majority. Let their decisions be scrutinized, but, without placing the judicatory itself at the bar of the higher court, putting it on trial, and making it liable to censure. If any satisfactory method can be devised, except by complaint, to give brethren their rights in all cases when personally aggrieved, but who could not appeal, we should be in favour of abolishing the right of complaint altogether. There would still remain three methods of carrying up a cause from a lower to a higher judicatory, viz., by reference, by appeal, and by general review and control. By the latter method, a dissatisfied minority could obtain a hearing before the higher judicatory, by entering their protest, and by calling the attention of the higher court to such protest, as recorded on the minutes, and individuals might generally obtain relief in the same way; but if complaints are allowed to individuals personally interested, but who, from the nature of the case, could not appeal, let this right be restricted to them; and with regard to these, they should not, we think, be ever permitted to appeal and complain, in the same case.

3. A difficulty often arises in our higher judicatories concerning the latitude which may be allowed to an appellant in conducting his defence; whether, in his statement of facts and circumstances relating to his own case, he shall be strictly confined to those particulars which were before the lower court, or whether he may introduce informally new matter tending to exculpate him from the charges which he is endeavouring to meet. After a careful perusal of the chapter on New Testimony, we are at a loss to perceive any ground for a difference of opinion. The language is clear and explicit. We see nothing which requires amendment, unless it be that, in order to render it more full in the particular now referred to, and to cut off all ground for discussion, a clause might be added to the

following effect, viz., that neither party shall be allowed to introduce new testimony in an informal manner when conducting an appeal before a higher judicatory. It is a laudable feeling to sympathize with the accused, and to desire to give him every advantage which is practicable to show his innocence, or palliate his offence. But as ample provision is made for this in the chapter on New Testimony, its provisions ought to be uniformly adhered to in our superior judicatories. This rule is seldom, if ever, departed from by our judicatories with regard to the prosecutor; and except for the sympathy of brethren for the accused, no debate would probably arise on the subject.

II. The evils in our judicial proceedings arising from their prolixity are more numerous. Says the overture of the Philadelphia Presbytery, "So tedious is the whole course of procedure in the higher courts of the Church, there is a constant disposition on the part of our judicatories to evade the hearing of complaints and appeals, and mere technical objections, it is to be feared, are sometimes insisted upon, to a degree which amounts, practically, to a denial of justice to the parties concerned." These are grave allegations; and all ground of objection in this particular ought to be removed as speedily as possible. We shall offer for consideration several suggestions.

But before proceeding, we will notice some changes which have been proposed by others to remedy the evils of prolixity. One of these is the appointment of commissions, with full powers to sit, adjudicate, and issue appeals, after the adjournment of the bodies appointing them. This plan has been long practised in the Church of Scotland; and it has been partially acted upon in this country. Our objections to commissions are, that the most serious and vital interests of the Church are committed to the judgment of a few individuals, whose decision will not be likely to be as satisfactory to the parties concerned as though it were rendered by the whole judicatory. Their judgment would also carry less force and authority with the churches than one which should emanate from the united wisdom of the entire body. And further, the decisions of these commissioners might vary in successive years and in different parts of the Church.

Another proposal is to appoint a committee with limited powers, i. e., subject in all cases to the sanction of the judicatory before their action is final. This measure is resorted to now, so far as it relates to taking testimony at distant points where the judicatory cannot meet without great inconvenience; and it is doubtful whether anything beyond this would be expedient, or meet the approbation of the Church.

A third measure which has been proposed is to stop all appeals and complaints in the court next higher than the one in which the case originated. Our objections to this are, that it alters the Presbyterian idea of the Church, viz., that it is essentially one body,

by making a part of the body the court of ultimate resort; and it abridges the rights of our members, by denying them the privilege of being heard, if so disposed, by the representatives of the whole Church.

A fourth mode of remedying in part this evil is to make our Synods representative bodies, composed of commissioners, elected by the Presbyteries, as is now done to the General Assembly. For judicial purposes some advantages might result from this change. But in our judgment the loss in other respects would be greater than the gain in this particular. Synodical boundaries are not usually large, the meetings are easily attended, and there are many local interests which could not be promoted so efficiently in the way suggested as by the attendance of all the ministers and lay representatives from all the churches. And besides, Synodical meetings ought to be, to a considerable extent, devotional in their character; and by having a general convocation of all the ministers, and as many elders in a given district, an impulse might be imparted to the cause of vital piety of the greatest importance to the growth and prosperity of the churches under their care. This is happily the fruit of Synodical meetings almost every year in some sections of our country.

A fifth plan (that proposed by Dr. Breckinridge to the last Assembly) is to have the General Assembly composed of not over one hundred commissioners, fifty ministers, and fifty ruling elders, to be elected by the Synods. This change would not alter the spirit of our Form of Government, which defines Synods to be only larger Presbyteries. We doubt the expediency of limiting the number of commissioners to one hundred, for the reason especially that, if our Church shall continue to enlarge as it has done hitherto, the number of Synods will soon exceed fifty; after which, on this plan, each of the Synods would not be entitled to a full representation. But the plan of electing commissioners to the General Assembly by Synods strikes us favourably. The Assembly, already quite large, will become, in a few years, too numerous to do business with despatch, or to be conveniently accommodated in the places where they may wish to meet. It will also be onerous, if not impracticable, for all our Presbyteries to send commissioners, located as they will be in every section of our extensive territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

But not to dwell longer on these several plans, we will offer some suggestions of our own, which may relieve our higher judicatories, in part, of the prolixity in their proceedings, felt to be so burden

some.

1. Much time would be saved in issuing appeals, if our judicial forms were so amended as to require the lower judicatories to send up to the higher courts a succinct statement of the grounds of their decision, and to require the parties concerned to agree upon such an abstract of the proceedings in the Session or Presbytery as would

prevent the necessity of reading the entire minutes of the case in the higher judicatories. Such a statement and abstract would often be an advantage to the parties as well as to the court, by leaving out all irrelevant matter, and such as had been previously adjusted, and presenting with greater clearness and precision the exact points at issue and no others.

2. When the decision in the lower judicatory manifestly turned on a particular exposition of ecclesiastical law, to which alone the appellant or complainant took exception, much time might be saved in the higher judicatory by requiring the appeal or complaint to be confined to the simple question of law, the decision of which would be as really a trial of the merits of the case, as though all the facts were brought in detail before the higher court. In the Presbyterian Church suit, the lower court tried the facts, and the court in bank the law of the case; and every one conversant with such matters knows that the decision of the court in bank was really and truly a reversal of the judgment rendered in the lower court.

3. Much time might be saved in our higher judicatories by requiring the judicial committee, in the first place, to confer with the parties at variance, with a view to effect a reconciliation. This is eminently proper in cases before ecclesiastical judicatories, and it would often result, we might reasonably hope, in an amicable settlement. And further, if their attempt at reconciliation fails, let power be given to the same committee, not only to examine the papers and report whether they are regular, &c., but to report the precise points on which the higher court is called to adjudicate.

4. Considerable time is frequently occupied in discussing questions of order, which might be saved by requiring all questions of this kind to be decided by the moderator, subject to an appeal to the house, without debate, unless the moderator shall ask for information; when a brief statement should be permitted by one on each side of the question. In ordinary cases it ought to be presumed that the members of our judicatories are sufficiently conversant with our judicial forms to judge concerning points of order without discussion, and especially that this is the case with the moderator, whose election to this office is made on the ground in part of his acquaintance with the Constitution of the Church.

5. The time consumed in calling the roll might be saved by dispensing with this rule altogether, and instead thereof let the moderator announce, at the proper place, that, if any members of the judicatory desire to express their views, they may then avail themselves of this privilege. In a large judicatory one half of the time usually taken would, we doubt not, be saved by this course. The mere roll-calling requires considerable time; and many speak when their names are called, who would otherwise remain silent.

These suggestions are made for the consideration of the committee of revision, and of our ministers and ruling elders generally. We do it also for the purpose of eliciting further discussion. If

he is a friend to his country who adds any materials, however small, towards perfecting its Constitution, and securing the proper administration of its government and laws, so he is a friend to the Presbyterian Church, who contributes his mite towards bringing to perfection its admirable system of Ecclesiastical Government and Discipline.

WESTMINSTER.

THREE LETTERS ON CONSERVATISM.

LETTER II.

EMANCIPATION AND THE CHURCH.

TO THE REV. C. VAN RENSSELAER-Having examined the question-What is a proper statement of the Scripture doctrine of slavery ?—I will now ask your attention to another point on which we differ, viz. :

II. The proper work of the Church-the object and end which she is to keep in view in her labours for and with the slave race in our country. And let me ask you to especially note the fact, that it is the work of the Church, and not the work of the Christian citizen, in his character as a citizen, about which I raise a question.

On this point

You write "We regard the Christian instruction and elevation of the slaves as a means to an end, and that end is the recovery of the blessings of personal liberty, when Providence opens the way for it. The higher end is the salvation of their souls." (Pres. Mag. p. 422.)

I have written "In the case of a race of men in slavery, the work which God has appointed his Church-as we learn it, both from the example and the precepts of inspired men-is to labour to secure in them a Christian life on earth and meetness for his heavenly kingdom." (Chn. Doc. Sla. p. 131.)

What you have set forth as "the higher end" of Christian instruction, is just what I hold to be the one end at which the Church is to aim. As to this end, then, we agree.

We differ in that you teach that the Church, in addition to this, should aim at securing for the slave-in your own language-" the blessing of personal liberty, when Providence opens the way for it." Before entering upon the examination of the point of real difference between us, I must strip your proposition of the adventitious support it derives from the terms in which you have expressed it. And I shall do this the more carefully, and, if possible, distinctly, because you have expressed it in the same terms in which I have often seen it expressed before; and, if I mistake not, it is mainly